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ABSTRACT
The acceptance by the British Royal Navy in 1832 of an accounting system
based upon double entry bookkeeping to be used for its central administration
accounting was the first occasion on which this mode of bookkeeping was
officially adopted by a British Government department. It was a momentous
event in accounting history for the system was the precursor to the
institutionalisation of DEB by all government departments which was to play a
critical role in the evolution of modern public sector accounting and audit
through the enhancement of the financial accountability of the executive to
Parliament. The object of this study is to scrutinise ‘the recruitment of DEB’ by
the Navy through an examination of the system’s evolution and its eventual
acceptance by the restructured Admiralty following the abolition of the Navy and
Victualling Boards. The remarkable efforts of one individual, Sir John Deas
Thomson, in the development of the system have been given prominence in this
study for until now he has remained an unknown in accounting history. It was
only through his leadership, accounting skills, devotion to duty, drive and
dogged determination that ‘the recruitment of DEB’ in 1832 came to fruition in
an arena of challenge built upon politics, ignorance, conservatism, arrogance
and obfuscation. In achieving this object, the study will contribute to accounting
history research by extending and expanding the literature on the initial
adoption and use of DEB by the British Government, and in so doing will
provide further evidence of the importance of key individuals such as Deas
Thomson in the institutionalisation of accounting practices.

.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

2

Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The object of this study
The acceptance by the British Royal Navy1 in 1832 of an accounting system
based upon double entry bookkeeping (hereafter DEB)2 to be used for its
central administration accounting was the first occasion on which this mode of
bookkeeping was officially adopted by a British Government department. It was
a momentous event in accounting history for the system was the precursor to
the institutionalisation of DEB by all government departments which was to play
a critical role in the evolution of modern public sector accounting and audit
through the enhancement of the financial accountability of the executive to
Parliament. The object of this study is to scrutinise ‘the recruitment of DEB’ by
the Navy through an examination of the system’s evolution and its eventual
acceptance by the restructured Admiralty following the abolition of the Navy and
Victualling Boards. The remarkable efforts of one individual, Sir John Deas
Thomson (1763-1838) (hereafter Deas Thomson), in the development of the
system have been given prominence in this study for until now he has remained
an unknown in accounting history. It was only through his leadership,
accounting skills, devotion to duty, drive and dogged determination that ‘the
recruitment of DEB’ in 1832 came to fruition in an arena of challenge built upon

11

Hereafter the British Royal Navy and its predecessor, the English Navy Royal, will be referred
to under the blanket ‘Navy’.
2
DEB was known by a number of names, including the ’Italian method or system’, from which
the title of this study arises. Other names include: the ‘Venetian system’, and the ‘mercantile
system’, although the latter is usually associated with accrual accounting. Also see Edwards et
al., 2002, p. 638.

3

politics, ignorance, conservatism, arrogance and obfuscation. In achieving this
object, the study will contribute to accounting history research by extending and
expanding the literature on the initial adoption and use of DEB by the British
Government, and in so doing will provide further evidence of the importance of
key individuals such as Deas Thomson in the institutionalisation of accounting
practices.

The study draws upon information derived predominantly from a number of
sources including British Parliamentary Papers (hereafter BPP) which came to
be the primary source of information. Made available online through the
resources of the State Library of New South Wales, it was ably supported by
another online source, British History Online. Other British sources included The
National Archives (hereafter TNA) at Kew, Richmond, Surrey, the National
Maritime Museum (hereafter NMM) at Greenwich, and the Royal Navy Museum
at Portsmouth. TNA provided information in the detail sought by accountants
but the quantity and quality of the material required considerable research time
over a number of visits. Finally, reference must be made to the Deas Thomson
papers held by his family in England 3, and the Mitchell Library within the State
Library of New South Wales in Sydney4.

3

The Grigg Family papers. John Deas Thomson’s son Edward, who had been appointed the
Colonial Secretary for the colony of New South Wales in 1837, married the daughter of the
Governor of the colony, Richard Bourke. Their eldest daughter married into the Grigg Family
4
The Thomson Family papers.

4

1.2 Calls for the reform of British Government accounting
The belated adoption of DEB in the 19th century by the British Government
emanated from the considerable pressure for economic reform in Britain in the
latter part of the 18th century. This in turn can be traced to the explicit criticism
of the Nation’s system of financial management which had arisen with the
funding of the American War of Independence by way of debt and
unprecedented levels of taxation, including income and property taxes, required
to pay the interest on the loans. This criticism, exacerbated by debates on
unsatisfactory government accounts, the balances held by public accountants
and uncontrolled expenditure of the military services, created a perception that
the country’s financial system was unsound. Together with the alienation of
Lord North’s ministry through its abysmal handling of the war and the resultant
loss of prestige, such criticism generated support for administrative reform. This
was exemplified in the debates on the Civil List5 in 1777, the passage of a
proposal to establish a committee to investigate the soaring amounts charged to
the Army’s extraordinaries, and the close division on a bill to reduce the
emoluments of offices linked to the influence of the Crown (Reitan, 2007, p. 30).
In late 1779, an Economical Reform movement emerged calling for both
economic reform and the purging of the system of court patronage on the
grounds that Parliament had become increasingly subservient to the Crown as
illustrated by its continuing support of Lord North’s ministry and the war in
America. This subservience was deplored by supporters of Economical Reform

5

It is the list of sums appropriated annually by Parliament to pay the expenses of the sovereign
and his or her household.

5

and as a consequence they sought the means to diminish the system of royal
and ministerial influence and so remove what they perceived was a threat to the
independence and sovereignty of Parliament. In his paper Foord (1947, pp.
506-507) concluded that
(t)he destruction of the influence of the crown occurred, not in the
1780s nor in 1832, but in the period lying between. It was effected,
not by any enactment or group of enactments, but by a long train of
legislation, administrative reform, and changed attitudes in public life.
The forces motivating these alterations were the constant pressure of
opposition parties striving to reduce ministerial power, the need for
economy and the retrenchment after the American revolution and
during and after the wars of the French revolution, and the social and
economic changes in British life.6
The “social and economic changes” Foord refers to would eventually ensue with
the “triumph of the entrepreneurial ideal” by the late 19th century after the great
majority of society had been persuaded to accept the ideal of the capitalist
middle class based on capital and competition (Perkin, 1969, p. 272) and the
horizontal solidarities of class in place of the old vertical connections of
dependency and patronage (Perkin, 1969, p. x). Rather than the government’s
corrupting

influence

and

its

associated

amateurism

and

inefficiency,

extravagance, waste, secrecy and lack of accountability, the increasingly
influential capitalist class demanded “selection and promotion by merit,
professional efficiency, retrenchment and economy, publicity and full financial
accountability” (Perkin, 1969, p. 320). ‘Accountability’ refers to the ability of
citizens to obtain information concerning the actions of government, “the critical
guarantee of liberty” (Emphasis in original) (Funnell, 2007, p. 278), especially
the government’s right to spend funds approved by Parliament. Parliamentary

6

Reitan disagrees with Foord by referring to the “decline” in the influence of the Crown, not its
“destruction” (Reitan, 2007, p. 226).

6

control of executive finances however requires an efficient global system of
public accounts which was missing in the British government of the late 18th
early 19th centuries due to the absence of uniformity7 in accounting systems and
methodology across departments and the existing accounting systems being
based upon the charge and discharge (hereafter CAD) mode of bookkeeping
that lacked “accuracy, simplicity and perspicuity” (BPP 1829(290), p. 4) and
reflected the old society priority of personal accountability8.

As a consequence of pronounced shortcomings in British central government
accounting practice, men such as the ‘Utilitarians” called for change. A key
figure in the “Utilitarian” movement was Jeremy Bentham who had considerable
influence on financial and fiscal policy in the 19th century. He understood that
“bookkeeping must serve the dual purpose of control or security and decision
making, and it could do this only by providing a complete and analytical account
of the enterprise’s use of resources, as well as its financial transactions” (Hume,
1970, p. 22). Originally, he was convinced of the value of adequate
bookkeeping but not DEB as he questioned whether the accounts would be any
clearer “by translating them into a language composed entirely of fictions, and
understood by nobody but the higher class of merchants and their clerks”
(quoted in Goldberg, 1957, p. 219). However, Bentham later came to the
conclusion that there was a place for double entry in government accounting for

7

Two of the members of a Treasury’s Commission for Public Accounts had advised in their
1829 report that apparently there had been “in times remote from the present” uniformity in
departmental accounting but due to frequent change “the Departments (had) more and more
varied from each other in their several modes of bringing their transactions to account” (BPP
1829(290), p. 88).
8
The objective of personal accountability of office-holders in a hierarchical system was to
demonstrate that payments had validly taken place within delegated powers (Edwards et al.,
2002, p .650).

7

“Government has everything to gain, nothing to lose” (Goldberg, 1957, p. 241).
He successfully promoted his ideas within the Utilitarians to such men as
Joseph Hume, Charles Poulett Thomson, Francis Baring, John Bowring, and
Henry Parnell, all of whom had input in varying degrees in the eventual
changeover to DEB in the British Government.

On 1 July 1819 Parnell tabled in the House of Commons (hereafter the
Commons) 46 resolutions concerning the retrenchment of public expenditure
that he had drawn from the recommendations and resolutions of various
contemporary commissions and committees of the Commons. All of these
reports, he said later,
censure the interference of the Treasury for the sake of patronage;
the perplexed plans of keeping the public accounts; the useless and
confused forms of office; and the progressive increase of salaries,
incidents, allowances, super annuities, and compensation in all the
public offices (Hansard, First Series Vol. 40, July 1819, Cols. 15511568).
Three of Parnell’s resolutions referred to recommendations for the use by
government of “mercantile accounts” that were based upon DEB (BPP
1819(542), p. 2). This is not surprising given that the successful use of DEB in
large commercial enterprises had provided positive evidence of the relevance of
the use of the technique in government. Resolutions 7 and 12 recommended
the replacement of the existing CAD-based accounting systems by DEB-based

8

systems.9 In resolution number 36, using the words of the Committee on Public
Expenditure in their Fifth Report, Part II (BPP 1810(371-1), p. 23) in regard to
the existing accounting systems in government, he referred to “a total want of
‘that simplicity and uniformity in the Office Accounts of the Public Expenses,
which is so essential to regularity and dispatch, and which ought to characterize
a great system of Public Accounts’” (BPP 1819(542), p. 5) (see Appendix 1.1).
From the wording of his resolutions it is obvious that Parnell held a high opinion
of the “mercantile” system based upon its simplicity, its emphasis upon
uniformity, and its ability to assist in the expeditious creation and promulgation
of accurate accounts. Debate upon his resolutions was adjourned until 12 July
1819 during which time Parnell called upon the government to make “great
innovations ... in the established forms of all the public offices concerned in the
receipt or expenditure of the public money”. He urged the Commons “to make
such changes in the old systems, as the new state of the financial difficulties
absolutely require, as well as the modern improvements in conducting matters
connected with money transactions” (Hansard, First Series Vol. 40, July 1819,
Cols. 1551-1568). Following a debate on the first resolution it was resolved that
further consideration of Parnell’s resolutions be adjourned for three months but,
unfortunately, they received no further consideration by the Commons. There
was also a 47th resolution which reads:

9

Resolution 7 reads: “That it appears, from various Reports of Committees of this House, and
of Commissioners who have been appointed by Parliament to inquire into the Public Income,
that the established system of keeping the Accounts of the Public Money in the Departments
employed in collecting it, is intricate and perplexed; and that if the systematic simplicity and
uniformity of keeping Accounts, which is practised in Trade, were substituted in place, the
Accounts of the Public Money might be kept and rendered as speedily and as correct as
Mercantile accounts”.
Resolution 12 reads: “That if the simple Mercantile system of Accounts was established in all
the Public Departments; and if the rules of Office, and the regulations of the Revenue Laws
were simplified; such a Reform would tend materially to diminish the charges of Collection”.

9

(t)hat it appears to this House, from the Statements contained in the
foregoing Resolutions, that a very important Reduction may be made
in the Public Expenditure, without any detriment to the Public
Service; and that this House will, early in the next Session of
Parliament, take the same into its most serious consideration (BPP
1819(542), p. 6).
It was treated by the Commons with the same lack of urgency.

Parnell’s resolutions, which were tabled on 1 July 1819, were reinforced by the
proposal of the Select Committee on Finance in their Fifth Report of 2 July 1819
that the public accounts should be kept using the same mode of examining and
passing accounts as used “by the mercantile and commercial men of this
country” (BPP 1819(539) (121), p. 122) (Appendix 1.1). The Select Committee
based their proposal on their perception that the accounting procedures in
government and commerce were similar, and the conviction that the ‘men of
commerce’ would not have selected a mode of accounting that was deficient in
any way (BPP 1819(539) (121), p. 122).

Within the Commons there was obviously much dissatisfaction with the public
accounts that arose from deficiencies such as the meagreness of the
information furnished to Parliament which can be adduced from the statement in
the official Return to an Order of the House of Commons in 1816 (Sessional
Paper, No. 412) that “owing to the confused state in which the Public Accounts
were kept previous to 1800, no accurate view of the Income and Expenditure
previous to that date could be made out” (BPP 1868-69(366) (366-1)). The
dissatisfaction was further manifested by an observation of one member who
advised the Commons that even “gentlemen who were most conversant with
the subject, declared themselves incapable of understanding (the accounts)”

10

(Hansard, Second Series Vol.4, February 1821, Cols. 307-308). Another
member enquired “whether the national business was to be impeded because
the Chancellor of the Exchequer had got a complicated system of accounts?”
The member went on to remonstrate with the Chancellor that he knew “persons
who were fully competent to understand any system of accounts” yet those
persons considered “the accounts of the Chancellor of the Exchequer (to be)
beyond their comprehension” (Hansard, Second Series Vol. 4, February 1821,
Cols. 307-308). The same member saw no reason why the accounts of the
nation should not be kept in as simple a manner as the accounts of a private
merchant (Hansard, Second Series Vol. 4, February 1821, Cols. 307-308).

A failure to require uniformity across the departments and to select a mode of
bookkeeping that would assist in the preparation of timely and accurate financial
management reports and so assist in the effective planning and financial control
of departmental business was exacerbated by the defective legislation
according to which the public accounts were prepared. The Public Accounts
Act, 1802 (42 Geo. III) c. 70, which described the nature of the accounts
required, failed to prescribe any specific form to be followed (BPP 1822(618), p.
3)10 and as a consequence, the total income shown in the financial accounts of
the Nation was the total amount collected and paid into the Exchequer while the
total expenditure shown was the total paid by the various pay offices instead of
the amount issued from the Exchequer. The repercussion of this flaw was that it

10

Reference should be made to the comments of John Sinclair in his book, the History of the
rd
Public Accounts of the British Empire, 3 edition, 1804, vol. 2, p.58 particularly those in regard
to the lack of “an annual balance sheet of the public receipt and expenditure” (BPP 186869(366) (366-1), App. 13).
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was not possible to determine a meaningful year-end balance. Although it was
early days in his illustrious and lengthy Parliamentary career, Joseph Hume
also voiced his criticism of the public accounts in a speech in February 1822 to
the Commons in which he reminded the members that
every hon. Member, on whichever side of the House he sat, must
lament to see the complex state of the public accounts ... in a country
placed in such a “commanding situation” and under the guidance of
such “able ministers” the people could not, amidst the intricacy and
involution of the public accounts, distinguish the real situation of the
finances with accuracy” (Hansard, Second Series Vol. 6, February
1822, Col. 53).
In 1822, Parnell, as a member of the Select Committee on Public Accounts,
took the opportunity to continue his crusade for the reform of government
accounting and submitted to the Committee draft Forms of Account which the
Committee did not adopt but thought should be included in the Appendix to their
report (BPP 1822(618), p. 11 and pp. 104-106). He took further advantage of
his membership of the Committee to voice on the final page of his submission
his strong opinion that the quest for “perfect” public accounts was not
achievable while the Exchequer existed in its prevailing form.
N.B. – NO statement of the Public Accounts can be a perfect one, so
long as the Exchequer exists under the present laws and regulations.
The whole system of it is inapplicable to the modern variety and
extent of the Public Finances (Emphasis in original) (BPP 1829(618),
p. 106).
Although the conspicuous shortcomings in government accounting led to
concerted calls for the public accounts to be simplified and brought in-line with
those of merchants, there remained a strongly entrenched aversion to reform.
This is exemplified by the obfuscation of the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
Nicholas Vansittart, who, in reply to the call for simplification of the accounts,
advised that

12

the House ought also to be aware of the great evils that might ensue
from an alteration in all the old forms. Such a measure would render
them perplexed and unintelligible and the whole for a century past
must be new-modelled, to enable them to draw a comparison
between the past year and that in which they were. He preferred
going on in the way which use and experience had rendered clear
and applicable to the general service (Hansard, Second Series Vol.
4, February 1821, Cols. 307-308).
Nevertheless, in April 1822 Vansittart moved in the Commons for the
appointment of a committee for simplifying the public accounts and calling for
the accounts annually laid before the Commons to “be made up on a mercantile
plan, presenting, at one view as in a balance sheet, the income and expenditure
of each year” (Hansard, Second Series Vol. 6, April 1822, Col. 1463). Parnell
however advised the Commons that “(i)t was not merely a simplification of the
annual accounts that was called for; but a simplification of the whole system of
keeping accounts in all the public departments” (Hansard, Second Series Vol. 6,
April 1822, Col. 1463). Vansittart, however, would not consent to the
enlargement of his motion and in July 1822 the Select Committee on Public
Accounts11 that he had called for submitted a number of recommendations for
the simplification and better arrangement of the public accounts only, including
one that the expenditure figures should be based upon the issues from the
Exchequer (BPP 1822(618), pp. 3-4). The outcome of these recommendations
was that changes were undertaken commencing with the national accounts for
1823 for which a ‘balance sheet’ was prepared, and the deficiency as to the lack
of an annual balance sheet highlighted by Sinclair12 eliminated. It was ironic that
criticism of the method of accounting for expenditure through the measurement

11

Also known as the Committee for Simplifying the Public Accounts (Hansard, Second Series
Vol. 6, April 1822, Col. 1463).
12
See Footnote Number 8.
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of the amount paid by the various pay offices was eventually to be recognised
as the correct method of accounting, being the method required under s.24 of
the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act, 1866 (29 & 30 Vict.) c. 39.
An appropriation account of supply grants shall exhibit on the charge
side thereof the sum or sums appropriated by Parliament for the
service of the financial year to which the account relates, and on the
discharge side thereof the sums which may have actually come in
course of payment within the same period … .
The conviction that financial accountability in government in the late 18th and
early 19th centuries was unsatisfactory was amplified by the deficiencies in the
financial administration of and accounting in the departments, a situation which
was strongly criticised. In his book, On Financial Reform (1831, pp. 105-106),
Parnell described
(t)he complicated and multifarious methods of keeping accounts in all
the public offices; the numerous and dilatory methods of auditing
them; and the almost incredible fact, that there is not made up in any
office such a document as an account of the actual annual
expenditure of the public money.
With regard to the accounts of the Navy, in 1845 the then Accountant General
of the Navy, John Thomas Briggs (hereafter Briggs), advised the Select
Committee on Colonial Accounts that, prior to the introduction of DEB in 1832,
the accounts of the Navy were frequently in arrears. “(T)he great naval account
was never made up. There never was any annual account made up for the navy
at large” (BPP 1845(520), p. 31). Similar scathing criticism was made by William
George Anderson (hereafter Anderson) who had been deeply involved in the
adoption of DEB by both the Navy and the Office of the Paymaster-General. ,
When questioned by the same committee as to the state of the Navy’s accounts
prior to the adoption of DEB, he informed the committee that “It was impossible
to render accurately a general account of the navy’s receipts and expenditure

14

prior to the introduction of that system: there were no books in existence from
which the information could be collected13” (BPP 1845(520), p. 101). In
evidence given to another select committee Anderson described the system as
being “the most complicated of Government accounts” (BPP 1849(499) (499II)). Unsurprisingly its use had resulted in the Navy experiencing many
accounting difficulties including the impossibility of rendering “accurately a
general account of the Navy receipts and expenditure; there were no books in
existence from which the information could be collected” (BPP 1845(520),
Question 1313 to Anderson p. 101).

The consequence of defective accounting in the Navy was highlighted by the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Lewis, in his Memorandum on Financial
Control to the Select Committee on Public Monies in 1857 in which he
described the “systematic misappropriation of the separate grants made for
naval service” which were found to have taken place over a number of years
prior to 1831. Three of the causes of these ‘misappropriations’, which resulted
in money voted for specific purposes being applied to other purposes not
sanctioned by Parliament, included loose estimates which did not truly
represent the Navy’s financial needs, tardy examinations of the accounts which
delayed the preparation of audited returns of expenditure, and the absence of
the appropriate returns to Parliament showing whether the intentions of
Parliament had been complied with. However, Lewis also identified a fourth
cause, “an incomplete system of accounts, which did not and could not exhibit
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There was in use, however, an “Abstract’ which was “a large sheet of chequered paper, in the
squares of which the whole amount of expenditure of six millions is to be digested; and which
Abstract is intended to supply the place of a regular Ledger” (BPP 1831(50), p. 12).

15

the naval expenditure under the heads of the separate grants of Parliament”
(BPP 1857 Session 2(279), App.1, p. 31).
It was evident that at the root of these defects lay an imperfect
system of accounts. Without correct accounts of past expenditure it
was impossible to prepare correct estimates of future expenditure. In
the absence of correct accounts of current expenditure it was
impossible to regulate properly the application of the annual grants.
Without a complete system of accounts the arrears of unaudited
expenditure could not be kept in view, and balanced accounts of the
naval expenditure compared with the separate grants could not be
prepared for the information of Parliament (BPP 1857 Session
2(279), App.1, p.31) (Appendix 7.1).
A significant reason for the poor state of departmental accounting was the
previously mentioned emphasis placed upon personal accountability which
together with inertia arising from a conservative aversion to change in all forms
had led to the retention of CAD. As a consequence accounting could play only a
minor role in a department’s financial management, CAD being unable to
provide accurately the required financial accounts and financial management
information in a timely manner.

1.3 Action taken to reform British Government accounting
The continuing criticisms of the accounting across the British Government was
strengthened in 1828 by the recommendation to Treasury by a powerful and
influential Committee of Finance, comprising six highly qualified and influential
members14 which had been established as a consequence of continued
parliamentary pressure, that “the Public Accounts should be kept according to
the mode which had been established by immemorial usage between
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The members of the Committee were: Henry Parnell, Robert Peel, William Huskisson, George
Tierney, Alexander Baring, and John Herries (TNA: T 64/395).
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mercantile and commercial men” (TNA: T 64/395), specifically DEB-based
accounting. The consequence of this recommendation was the appointment by
the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury of a Commission of Public Accounts15
consisting of three individuals, two of whom were career public servants,
Thomas Constantine Brooksbank and Samuel Beltz16 (who together are
referred to in this study as B&B) and one private sector accountant, Peter
Harriss Abbott, a well-known private sector accountant who brought with him
experience in the design and implementation of accounting systems based
upon DEB. Many years later Abbott was described in The Accountant (17
November 1888) as the “the practical founder of the profession of public
accountants in this country” (quoted in Parker, 2000, p. 88)17. Parnell (1831, p.
166) informed his readers that Abbott as a “professional mercantile accountant,
... holds the highest rank; and he has acquired a full knowledge of official
accounts by diligently making use of powers vested in him for ascertaining the
nature, description, and purpose of the several books used in each office”.
Edwards et al. (2002, p. 646) concluded that while B&B were associated with
the landed classes and, therefore, “perceived themselves as responsible for
defending the traditional role of government accounting against the radical
changes advocated by the champion of business methods and the
entrepreneurial ideal”, Abbott was associated with the expanding middle
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The Treasury Commission was also known as the ‘Commission of Accounts’ and the
‘Commissioners for Examining and Stating the Public Accounts’ (TNA: ADM 106/1473). The
Commission should not be confused with the Royal Commission of Public Accounts which
produced only one report on the Exchequer (BPP 1831(313)) in which it strongly recommended
the employment of DEB in all public departments (Appendix 7.1).
16
. Brooksbank was a member of the staff of the Revenue Department of Treasury while Beltz
was member of the staff of the Civil Service Pay Office (Edwards et al., 2002, p. 645)
17
See Edwards et al. (2002, pp. 643-644) for further details of Abbott’s career.
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classes. As a consequence Edwards et al. (2002, p. 646) believed “that the
Commissioners would have viewed the nature and purpose of government
accounting from contrasting ideological standpoints”.

The Treasury Commission of Public Accounts was required to enquire into the
existing accounting systems in the principal departments, to suggest changes
which would enable, firstly, the establishment of a uniform system of accounts
across government departments of state and, secondly, the provision of “more
satisfactory and ready information as to the nature and amount of the
expenditure under each head of service18” (Emphasis added) (BPP 1829(290)
App.1, p. 125). Most importantly, the Commissioners were directed to give
consideration “to how far it may be practicable and advantageous to employ the
mercantile system of Double Entry in keeping the Public Accounts in preference
to the official system now in use” (Emphasis added) (1829(290), App. 1, p. 125).
The Commission of Public Accounts however unilaterally expanded their
commission and, rather than presenting the results of their enquiries, submitted
in early 1829 designs for two DEB-based accounting systems which differed as
to whether the system should reflect the “old society” priorities of stewardship,
patronage and personal accountability or “new society” pressure for a business
framework judged capable of achieving “cheap and efficient government””
(Edwards et al., 2002, Abstract). This fundamental ideological difference which
caused the “old society” system recommended to Treasury by B&B to be
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A ‘head of service’ is an expense item within a department’s annual estimates and
subsequent year-end accounts.
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basically cash-based19 retained the principles and practices of CAD that was
associated

with

personal

accountability.

The

‘new

society’

system

recommended by Abbott was accruals-based and analogous to the systems
used in commerce “without variation” (BPP 1831(50), App.1, p. 17). B&B’s
system is examined in Chapter 6.

Outside the Navy Office and the Treasury’s Commission of Public Accounts
there apparently was no awareness that a DEB-based accounting system had
been under development in the Navy Office since the beginning of 1826. Parnell
made no reference to it in either his later papers (TNA: T 64/395) or his book
(1831) and it is not possible to ascertain whether the members of the
Committee of Finance was aware of its existence as the Committee’s papers
curiously were never tabled in Parliament (Bonner-Smith, 1945, p. 154) The
genesis of the Navy Office system was a detailed examination in late 1825 of
the system in the Department of Accounts of the Navy Office by Deas Thomson
who was the Chairman of the Committee of Accounts of the Navy Board (TNA:
ADM 106/2714). As a consequence of his examination Deas Thomson on 1
January 1826 (TNA ADM 106/2719) initially implemented amendments to the
existing CAD accounting system but that approach was quickly superseded by
the development of a new system based on DEB.

In 1832 this system was chosen for use in the Admiralty’s central administration
following the abolition of the Navy and Victualling Offices instead of the DEB-
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In the area of accounting for stores used in manufacturing B&B considered that further
direction from Treasury was required before they could finalise their recommendations (BPP
1829(290), p. 94).
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based system recommended by the two civil servant members of the Treasury
Commission of Public Accounts and approved by Treasury in 1829 but which
had been suspended by Treasury in December 1830.on Parnell’s application to
Lord Althorp (TNA: T 64/395). The adoption of the new system by the Admiralty
was the first occasion on which a DEB-based accounting system was officially
implemented in a British Government department.

It was the conspicuous efforts of Deas Thomson which brought this adoption to
fruition at a time in the history of accounting when the forces for change in
British Government accounting had to contend with vociferous opposition from
within government, in particular the Navy. It was a time in British history in
which there was a widespread objection to all government interference and an
aversion to an “assumption of centralisation by some central organ in the State
of the power to meddle and fuss and to impose common standards on the
whole country” (Kitson Clark, 1965, p. 97). The gentle prodding by Treasury for
departments in particular the Navy to accept DEB and the fact that the
Admiralty was accepting of such prodding would have created antipathy in the
Navy Office to its concurrence to commonality in accounting systems across
government. The aversion to the concept of centralisation was a formidable
obstacle to change particularly if success had been achieved on past occasions
in frustrating change, deflecting it or even causing plans to be cancelled. This is
exemplified by the ability of the Navy Board to delay the change to Deas
Thomson’s DEB-based system for many years together with the considerable
difficulties Deas Thomson had to contend with in bringing his project to fruition,
which he described by him in the following terms.
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The novelty of the (system of double entry) in a public office (this
being the first department in which it has been introduced), the want
of instruments acquainted with its principles and the partiality that
existed for the old forms rendered its introduction almost an
insuperable difficulty (TNA: T 92/153B).
Deas Thomson’s difficulties, particularly as he was answerable to Byam Martin
the Comptroller of the Navy Board, can be traced to the determination of
department heads to maintain their departments in a manner analogous to that
in personal fiefdoms and to resist change which could threaten their position
and to reduce the substantial and enduring social, political and economic
advantages that were available to them. This culminated in incrementalist
government intervention with a preference for modifications to existing
administrative structures. This approach meant that an incremental change
would be closely aligned to the past as demonstrated by the accounting system
recommended by B&B continuing to be centred upon personal accountability.

1.4 Existing research into the adoption of DEB within the
British Government
This study which concerns the largest British Government department, the
Navy, draws upon, and complements, the limited research by accounting
historians interested in the adoption of DEB within the British Government,
specifically that of Edwards, Coombs and Greener. In an important contribution
to the study of the history of public sector accounting Edwards, Coombs and
Greener. in their paper British central government and “the mercantile system of
double entry” bookkeeping: a study of ideological conflict (2002) sought to
explain resistance to the introduction of DEB by the British Government, and the
ultimate form that it took when implemented in 1832, as the result of ideological
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conflict between the privileged landed aristocracy and the rising merchant
middle class (Edwards et al., 2002, Abstract, pp. 637, 638, 642; Perkin 1969, p.
44). The dysfunctional proceedings of the Commission of Public Accounts
which was appointed in 1828 to investigate the possibility of introducing DEB
throughout government departments is identified by Edwards et al., (2002) as a
particularly prominent example of how members of the established order sought
to prevent any changes to the administration and accountability of government
which might threaten their social and political supremacy. In their paper,
Edwards et al., (2002, p. 638) caution that they were unable to confirm the
introduction of DEB, “for evidence of the extent of its adoption, whether in
substance or form, awaits the location and study of relevant archival records”.
Edwards and Greener. (2003, p. 63) in a postscript to their paper Introducing
‘mercantile’ bookkeeping into British central government, 1828-1844 examine
the progress made across the departments of the British central government in
the implementation of cash-based DEB up until 1844. The authors advise that
they had “left unexamined the relevant accounting records that have survived
from the period 1818-44” and accordingly their paper is a record of what
government officials had claimed and what writers believed to have been the
accounting practices of particular departments (Edwards and Greener., 2003, p.
63) The authors, however, expressed their concern that there were “grounds
for doubting the complete accuracy of some of the assertions made” (Edwards
and Greener., 2003, p. 63) and consider that further research is necessary in
order to clarify the apparent inconsistencies that their research had brought to
light. As a consequence there is a dearth of published evidence regarding the
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adoption of DEB in the British Government, a fact

which confirms the

importance of this study.

Further confirmation of this study’s importance is seen in the comments by
Haas (1994, p. 197) made in response to Webb’s observations in the
publication The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth
Century (1989, p. 218), that “further study remains to be done in our
understanding of the Navy’s accounting procedures”. Haas (1994, p. 197)
warned “(i)t is unlikely, ... that the endeavor, if it is ever undertaken, will lead
anywhere other than down a blind alley”. This study, however, has accessed
previously undiscovered archival material in TNA and the NMM, which, with
Deas Thomson’s personal papers, has provided the means to achieve that
which Haas pessimistically believed unachievable, a detailed history of the
introduction of DEB in the Navy’s central administration.

With the exception of the two papers referred to above, no other published
material has been found that has examined in depth the adoption of DEB within
the British Government. Funnell (2007, p. 269) was surprised by this neglect.

For the accounting historian intent upon tracing the main stages in
the evolution of modern public sector accounting and audit in Britain,
but more especially the motives of those promoting reform, the
period of British history spanning the century between 1780 and
1880 is especially significant. It is the period during which matured
the constitutional protections, which endure in their essentials to the
present day, for making effective the financial accountability of the
executive to the parliament (Funnell, 2007, p. 269).
In an earlier paper Funnell had argued (1990, p. 320), that such

neglect

indicated the preference of scholars of accounting “to stand upon an intellectual
terrain that has been well mapped. Meanwhile, research directed at the origins
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of accounting practices in the public sector has remained stunted in the face of
a near obsession with the private sector”.

Funnell’s pessimistic assessment was reinforced by Parker (2000, pp. 87-88)
in his preview of a book edited by Edwards, Coombs and Greener, “Double
Entry Bookkeeping in British Central Government, 1822-1856” (1997) in which
he noted the authors’
attempt to persuade accounting historians to take more interest in the
accounts of central government, a subject most of them have been
happy to leave alone. ... Edwards and colleagues seek to tempt
historians into post-tally central government accounting by the lure of
double entry bookkeeping in an unfamiliar environment.
However, as Parker (p. 88) pointed out,
(d)ouble entry is a subtle and flexible technique which many nonaccountants seem to have great difficulty in understanding with the
result that one cannot turn to the historians of central government
finance for much elucidation on double entry in government
accounting. Moreover, there is no equivalent for government
accounting of the stream of texts on double entry which provided raw
material for many ‘traditional’ accounting historians. Richard fitz
Nigel’s20 text on governmental Charge and Discharge Dialogus de
Scaccario (The Course of the Exchequer)21 (c. 1179) has been ably
edited by medieval historians but had no successors. What are
available are the many reports reprinted in the BPP and it is to these
that Edwards and his colleagues have gone.
Despite the urging and prompting of various accounting historians there
continues to be a lack of substantive interest within the discipline of accounting in
the history of accounting and accountability in government. A brief survey of the
titles of papers included in the accounting history publication lists for the five
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Or fitz Neal.
Also known as the Dialogue of the Exchequer which is a dialogue which took place on the
banks of the Thames between a senior staff member of the Exchequer and a junior which
described the management of the king’s revenue and expenditure, in particular the personal
accountability of the officials within the Exchequer.
21
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years from 2008 to 2012 published in the journal Accounting History (Foreman,
2009, p. 329; 2010, p. 421; 2011, p. 353; 2012, p. 265; 2013, p. 281) shows that
there were only seven papers on central government accounting, and four on
state and local government accounting. None of these papers concerned public
sector accounting and accountability in Britain. Of the seven papers concerning
central government accounting there is only one paper that is relevant and that is
the 2008 paper by Gomes et. al. the focus of which concerns the earliest use of
DEB within the Portuguese central government, namely the adoption of DEB at
the Portuguese Royal Treasury in 1761. This was a crucial first step in the
institutional of DEB both within that organisation and throughout the public
administration of Portugal (Gomes et. al, 2008, p. 1145). Although the use of
DEB for mercantile purposes provided evidence to the key decision makers in
both Portugal and Britain that DEB was also relevant to public administration,
there are two major difference between the systems adoption in Britain and
Portugal. Firstly, in Portugal DEB was initially adopted by the Royal Treasury
while in Britain it was initially adopted by one of the great departments, the Navy,
not Treasury. Secondly, the individual who was key to the successful adoption of
the system in Portugal, the “key individual”, was the Chief Minister, the Marquis
of Pombal, who was a powerful political figure, while in Britain that individual was
a Commissioner of the Navy Office, Deas Thomson, who had very limited
influence. These two facts are important in that the British adoption by the Navy
would not have possessed the perceived legitimacy it would have possessed if it
had been initially adopted at the Treasury. This is probably a further reason for
the difficulties that Deas Thomson had to confront in his endeavours to complete
the adoption expeditiously and successfully.
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This study seeks to describe the development and eventual adoption by the Navy
in 1832 of DEB, one of Funnell’s “constitutional protections” (p. 269). In so doing,
it is intended that the study will expand upon the existing literature on the initial
adoption of DEB in central government in general, and in Britain, in particular.
Recognising the importance of key individuals in accounting history, the study will
examine the input of the key participants in this critical episode.

1.5 This study as a historical narrative
The discovery of the critical and remarkable role played by Deas Thomson in the
adoption by the Navy of DEB-based accounting which had eluded previous
studies and historians was the fundamental source from which this study
developed for it led to the “discoverable truth” that was to be found within the
existing archival documents (Funnell, 1996, p. 46). Prior to this discovery, no “set
of preconceived ideas of either specific questions to be pursued or expected
findings” was available that could provide initial guidance, only “rough
hypotheses” (Funnell, 1996, p. 46) derived from the previously referred to work of
accounting historians and others. To trace Deas Thomson’s work in the
conversion to DEB in the Navy based upon these ‘rough hypotheses’ required
reliance on historical narrative which provides,
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the means to order the individual events which are proposed to
constitute the “facts” of history, thereby making them
“comprehensible by identifying the whole to which they contribute.
The ordering process operates by linking diverse happenings along a
temporal dimension and by identifying the effect one event has on
another, and it serves to cohere human actions and the events that
affect human life into a temporary gestalt22” Thus, at the heart of a
history narrative is the coherence of generically related historical
events (Funnell, 1998, p. 145).
A ‘historical narrative’ is very much more than a chronology of historical events.
Although it can be defined as a written composition using source material that
has been critically selected and organised, the narrative used by the historian
should

also

encompass

the

arguments

to

establish

cause-and-effect

relationships between past events (Munslow, 2002, p. 18). This will include
imaginative elements which have been inspired through the interpretation of
source-based data employing the individual historian’s ideology and social
theory preferences as filters and will require the historian to reach a conclusion
as to the order of those events. It will be necessary for the historian to recognise
that history is a narrative representation of the ‘past’, the actual events which
are now gone and, having no direct contact with the past, a historical
explanation will depend on the interpretation of the evidence that must be
selected from the source material. However, while the selection and
interpretation procedures may appear uncomplicated the available evidence
may be misleading, “or then again our inferences may be faulty, or we may
misconceive the appropriate social theory we think is suggested by the
evidence, or we cannot establish all the necessary truth-conditions that will
make even our singular statements fully reliable (Munslow, 2000, p. 88). In

22

“Gestalt” is a German word that translates roughly as “a whole”.
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addition, Munslow points out that “the nature of history depends on the
historian’s epistemological23 choice(s)” (Quoted in Gaffikin, 2010, p. 29).
Together with a need for historians to possess an understanding of
epistemology, they will also require “an understanding of the ontology 24 of the
history narrative and also the historian’s own ontological commitments” (Quoted
in Gaffikin, 2010, p. 29). The result is that “there is a wide range of views on
what constitutes appropriate historiography (which is) the writing and hence
creation of history” (Gaffikin, 2010, p. 28).

Accounting history and accounting historiography, which is concerned with the
chronology and evolution of the theory and practice of accounting, was enriched
over many years, particularly in the 1990’s, through vigorous debate in the
accounting history literature in regard to the creation of an accounting past.
Perhaps the most challenging episode arose with Miller et al. (1991, p. 395))
describing a change in accounting history which entailed “both a pluralisation of
the methodologies and a change in the position of history within the discipline of
accounting. The extent of this change is held to entitle us to speak of the “new
accounting history” which, as Napier observed, is “characterised by an intensive
use of social history to define research questions and provide a structure for
understanding and interpreting the research results” (2009, p. 31). As a
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“Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that addresses the nature, history, theory and
foundations of knowledge, its conditions, limits and possibilities” (Munslow. 2000, p.88). That is,
what can be considered to be historical knowledge.
24
“Ontology is that branch of metaphysics that addresses the general state of being, the nature
of existence, and how the human mind apprehends, comprehends, judges, categorises, makes
assumptions about and constructs reality. For the historian ontological questions arise when we
address how to create historical facts within the large ontology of our own existence, that is, the
condition(s) of being under (when) we create or construct the past as (the discipline of) history ”
(Munslow, 2000, p. 185).
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consequence of the advent of the “new accounting history”, a dichotomy was
created between ‘new history’ and ‘traditional history’, the major differences being
in the fields of “subjectivity, realism and conceptions of time” (Funnell, 1996, p.
43).

Following the schism, difficulties were experienced in differentiating “between
what has been spoken of as traditional (accounting) history and new (accounting)
history because the term ‘new history’ has been used in several contexts”
(Gaffikin, 2010, p. 33). The term ‘new history’ has generically embraced the
various modes of historical enquiry other than the traditional but, as argued by
Gaffikin (2010, p. 37), “(i)t is simply wrong to lump together Marxist, critical,
interpretative, poststructuralist and other modes of history enquiry under one
classification of “new history””. However, this is the manner in which Miller et al.
(1991, p. 396) described it in their paper. According to them, “(t)he new
accounting history that has emerged ... does not represent a unitary research
programme with definite theoretical boundaries. It can be seen instead as a loose
assemblage of quite often disparate research questions and issues”. As a
consequence of the perceived arrogance and provocative statements of the ‘new
historians’ and the “wildly differing perceptions about content and methods, as
well as divergent ontological and epistemology beliefs” (Funnell, 1996, p. 45),
fears were expressed by the traditionalists that their work would be denigrated
and devalued which led to considerable debate between the two camps. Funnell
(1998, p. 142) describes the situation eloquently.

29

Energetic proponents of the new accounting history have produced
considerable consternation amongst the more traditional of their
colleagues because of the way they have questioned many of the
cherished beliefs, achievements, practices and the value of
previously sanctioned accounts of accounting history. Some
traditional accounting historians have therefore felt they are being
goaded and ridiculed by what they see as an intolerant aberration of
“real” accounting history.
Provocatively, Miller et al. (1993, p. 639) suggested that “within the traditional
evolutionary model, the now is always present, if only in utero, in the then”. Yet, it
is difficult to believe that a historian is capable of fully eliminating his/her biases.
History is by its very nature subjective and requires exposure of the readers of
historical narratives to primary source material which will enable them to evaluate
the historian’s interpretation of those materials and the level of personal bias. It is
further suggested “that historians should also expose their individual biases
whenever possible to allow the reader (of historical narratives) to judge whether it
is the past or the historian speaking at key junctures” (Fleischman et al., 1997, p.
99).

The two ‘histories’ differ in that the ‘new history’ involves the study of accounting
within the contexts in which it operates and, as a consequence, it has contributed
to an understanding of accounting as a social practice. Miller (1994, p. 20) noted
that “if we are to understand fully how particular ways of accounting have
emerged, and why such significance is accorded them, we have to move beyond
the boundaries of the organisation and examine the social and institutional
practice of accounting”. Accountants also have to understand that the move
outside the traditional boundaries has implicated accounting “in the construction
and facilitation of the contexts in which it operates. It cannot be extracted from
the environment like an individual organism from its habitat” (Hopwood et al.,
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1994, p. 228). “Accounting”, Hopwood said in an earlier paper entitled The
Archaeology of Accounting Systems (1987, p. 207), “is not a static phenomenon.
Over time, it repeatedly has changed”. He went on to point out that accounting
had led to “new patterns of organisational autonomy and interdependency (being)
highlighted, if not (being) more actively created by accounting means. Different
managerial functions have come to be emphasised by the changing accounting
representation of them” (Hopwood, 1987, p. 207).

As a consequence of accounting being “embedded in the functioning of the
organisation, co-existing and interdependent with such other aspects of the
organisation as its strategy, structure, approaches to the segmentation of work
and other organisational technologies and practices” (Hopwood, 1987, p. 212), it
can be thought of as simply reflecting the context in which it operates. However,
as pointed out by Burchell et al. (1985, p.385), accounting can “give rise to
developments which shape the context in which it operates. The environment of
accounting can become, in part, at least, contingent upon the accounting of it”. It
is obvious that an accounting history in regard to one or more of the ‘individual
organisms’ cannot be prepared in the absence of the consideration of the
contexts in which it operates.

As a way around the differences in the various factions, it has been suggested
that it may be helpful to researchers and those seeking to understand accounting
history if two sub-categories of ‘historical accounting research’ were created, the
‘history of accounting’ and ‘socio-historical accounting research’ (Napier, 2009, p.
32). The latter category is of particular interest in that the researcher “is primarily
concerned

with

how

accounting

impacts

on

specific

individuals

and
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organisations, and more broadly on society” (Napier, 2009, p. 32). However,
Napier later sounds a warning in regard to socio-historical accounting research
“that practitioners do not probe deeply enough into the actual accounting that
they claim is affecting organisations and society” (Napier, 2009, p. 40).

Throughout these debates it was apparent that there was an implied acceptance
that there was a degree of commonality across the various approaches to
historical knowledge, most especially that the writing of accounting history should
utilise the narrative form and its epistemological attributes (Funnell, 1996, p. 58).
Funnell (1996, p. 59) amplifies his thoughts in stating “the writing of accounting
history needs to be a collaborative effort. It requires researchers whose primary
focus is on the “what” and “how” of history which verifies dates and the specifics
of historical chronology, the province of the traditional accounting historians, and
those whose overwhelming concerns are to interrogate the historical record and
ask “why” or “how” did we get into this state”. This is supported by Carnegie and
Napier who proposed a rider “that accounting history is enhanced by locating our
narratives within an understanding of the specific context in which the object of
our research emerges and operates” (Quoted in Funnell, 1998, p. 142). The
basis of the methodology used in this study is derived from such thinking.

1.6 The plan of this study
This study of the adoption of the Royal Navy’s central accounting system based
upon DEB in the third decade of the 19th century is firstly contextualised in both
time and place in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 by describing the domain in which the
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need for the adoption of DEB arose and in which it would operate. The
dynamics of the reform are then discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.

Chapter 2 examines public sector administration and its constitutional
foundations, with an emphasis upon the financial control of government revenue
and expenditure. It is considered that a basic knowledge of the Navy and its
remarkable history is indispensable to the study and this is provided in chapter
3 together with consideration of the affection the Nation held for its Navy.

In Chapter 4 the administration of the Navy is examined for without an efficient
and effective administrative system it would have been impossible to have built
and maintained the Navy over the centuries. Its administration, which was
carried on mainly through the Navy and Victualling Boards, came to be the
largest civilian enterprise in the world, and notwithstanding the arrogance, the
innate inefficiencies, graft, and corruption, it proved to be, as Vesey Hamilton
(1896, pp. 1-2) said, “sound and sufficient in itself” and provided the “proper
constitution, maintenance, and disposition of the fleet in its material and
personal elements” over many centuries.

Chapter 5 examines the financing of the Navy with particular emphasis being
placed on the determination of its annual estimates. It will enable an
appreciation to be gained of the complexity involved in the preparation of the
annual estimates and the vital need for a central accounting system that could
assist in, not only the estimating process but, the Navy’s overall financial control
which was one of the main avowed advantages that were foreseen with the
implementation of DEB in the Navy. The chapter also examines Navy debt and
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the fact that it became a cause for corruption at the highest levels of
government particularly in the 18th century.

Chapters 6 and 7 examine the two DEB-based accounting systems that
competed for the honour of being the first accounting system of this type to be
installed in a British Government department. Chapter 6 examines the DEBbased system that had been recommended by B&B and approved by the Lords
Commissioners of the Treasury. Chapter 7 examines the development of the inhouse system by a team in the Navy Office under the direction of Deas
Thomson that was to be eventually adopted by the Navy in 1832.

The final chapter, Chapter 8, provides a conclusion to and summary of the
study.
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CHAPTER 2
BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY FINANCIAL CONTROL
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Chapter 2
British Parliamentary Financial Control
2.1 Introduction
The statement “‘Parliamentary Control of the Purse’, which has been held to be
a basic principle of the British Constitution” (Reid, 1966, p. 9), refers to the
control exercised by Parliament over the raising of money for the purposes of
government expenditure and the scrutiny of that expenditure. It is a fundamental
constitutional principle that the elected representatives of the people assent to
all taxation and to all public expenditure; this is basic to British democracy.

In this Chapter, a discussion of the British Constitution and the safeguards it
provides will precede examinations of the financial control of government
revenue and government expenditure. The examination of government revenue
will scrutinise the imposition of both direct and indirect taxes and the borrowing
of funds on both the short- and long-term markets. The examination of
government expenditure will describe the system of appropriation and
estimation, government accounting, and the uniting of the Exchequer and Audit
under the control of Parliament. The chapter will conclude with a review of
reforms made in other areas of parliamentary financial control.

A constitution can be defined as the body of rules, formal or informal, which
regulates the system of government within a state. Constitutions can be
classified in various ways: written or unwritten, flexible or inflexible, monarchical
or republican, parliamentary or presidential, and federal or unitary. The
constitution of Great Britain is unwritten in that it is not in a documentary or
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codified form for it is a summation of government practice over centuries. It is
flexible in that it can be amended simply by passing an Act of Parliament and it
is certainly monarchical, parliamentary and unitary, although with devolution in
regard to Scotland it could be argued that it should be re-classified as being
federal or, perhaps, quasi-federal. It could also be argued that the description of
the constitution as being an unwritten document is overstated in that it includes
many Acts of Parliament and many judicial decisions which are in printed form.
There are also many constitutional rules which are constitutional conventions,
rules which are generally observed but have no legal force. However, being the
product of historical practice and not being part of a fixed, formal written
instrument, such as the Constitution of the United Sates, the rules must be and
are adaptable as the circumstances by which they were originally moulded
change.

To be in a written form is certainly not a guarantee that a constitution will have a
long life. During the 20th century the constitutions of many of the countries
emerging from colonial rule, particularly those in Africa, were declared and
written with considerable fanfare but the legal frameworks espoused were so
remote from reality that many collapsed at the first challenge as, for example,
did the constitution of the Republic of Nigeria when Biafra attempted to secede.
Great Britain has been fortunate over the centuries in having an unwritten and,
therefore, inherently flexible constitution which has enabled the British to
accommodate significant change, yet within the constraints imposed by the
requirement for continuity. Keir (1969, p. 1) observed that Britain’s
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institutions, though unprotected by the fundamental or organic laws
which safe guard the ‘rigid’ constitutions of most other states, have
preserved the same general appearance throughout their history,
and have been regulated by principles which can be regarded as
constant. ... Yet continuity has not meant changelessness.
Perhaps the most important of the ‘constant principles’ referred to by Keir
above was “the true excellence of the English government, that all the parts of
it form a mutual check upon each other”, where
(i)n the legislature, the people are a check upon the nobility, and the
nobility a check upon the people; by the mutual privilege of rejecting
what the other has resolved: while the king is a check upon both,
which preserves executive power from encroachments. And this
executive power is again checked and kept in bounds by the two
houses (Blackstone, Vol.1, 1876, p. 123).
Keir also speaks of ancient institutions being “ceaselessly adapted” to changes
in the requirements of society but “the very flexibility of the constitution has
ensured that the process of modifying and adding to it has involved no sudden
and capricious breach with the past” (1969, p. 2). There have also been
reinterpretations of the principles inherent in the body of the constitution as
circumstances have changed but “(n)either in its formal and legal, nor in its
informal and practical aspect has English government at any stage in its history
violently and permanently repudiated its own tradition” (Keir, 1969, p. 2). A
review of British history over the seventy-five years prior to the death of Anne in
1714 exemplifies the flexibility of the constitution which had enabled it to be
modified, enlarged and/or reduced. It reveals remarkable political instability in
that there had been a civil war, the king had been executed, the monarchical
government had been abolished and then restored, the hereditary right to the
Crown had been repudiated, a Dutch prince and his English wife had been
placed on the throne, and on his death he had been replaced by his deceased
wife’s sister, Anne. On her death, she was succeeded by a king who had been
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born in Hanover and who, like his successors prior to Queen Victoria, was both
the king of England and Elector of Hanover but he could not speak English and
continually yearned for his home country. It is remarkable that this period of
such political instability revealed the durability and flexibility of the country’s
political institutions and in doing so enabled an ill-defined dualism between a
monarch, who was theoretically supreme in matters of administration and
policy, and a Parliament sovereign in matters of legislation and finance (Keir,
1969, p. 289). This ‘dualism’ is the cornerstone of British ‘responsible
government’ which is a system of government embodying the principle of
parliamentary accountability, the requisites of which are competent financial
control of both government revenue and expenditure for they are the keys to all
government action since the King ceased to ‘live of his own’.

2.2 Government revenue
It was the incessant warfare against France by Norman and Angevin

25

England

during the Middle Ages that was the primary cause of the king being unable to
‘live of his own’ ordinary resources. As a consequence, it was necessary for the
king to impose taxation upon his subjects who, understandably, were not
predisposed to continue paying taxes beyond times of war and external threat
for by doing so the king, if so inclined, would be able to maintain a standing
army which would enable him to impose despotic rule. The outcome was that
the king’s subjects sought to limit the king’s powers to levy taxes by, firstly,
receiving advice from the king as to the purpose of a tax, and, secondly, giving
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their consent to a tax before it was imposed. Unsurprisingly the requirement to
ensure consent to taxation led to a struggle, which was to play a crucial role in
the development of Parliament.

This principle of parliamentary consent to taxation acquired constitutional
recognition when it was incorporated into the Grand Charter, the Magna Carta
of 1215, which had been designed to remedy the abuse of unwritten custom by
the king and his predecessors, and their exploitation of the vagueness of the
feudal relationship (Lloyd, 2002, p. 607). Chapter 12 of the Magna Carta stated
that: “No scutage nor aid shall be imposed on our kingdom, unless by common
counsel of our kingdom”. Although it eventually became “a statement of law,
confirmed and interpreted in Parliament and enforced in the law courts” (Lloyd,
2002, p. 607), the Magna Carta did not extinguish the conflict which continued
to smoulder up until 1689 when one of the Subjects Rights outlined in the Bill of
Rights declared that only Parliament could authorise taxation or other levy. In
contrast, the ministers of the Crown after the Glorious Revolution in 1688 had a
virtual monopoly of the parliamentary initiative in proposing increases in public
expenditure or taxation. Parliament was “traditionally in favour of royal
economy” and “abstained from taking the initiative in offering money to the
Crown” (Erskine May quoted in Reid, 1966, p. 36). Bagehot observed “(o)n
common subjects any member can propose anything, but not on money – the
Minister only can propose to tax the people” (Bagehot, 1963, p. 154). “And to
this must be added: can propose the expenditure of public money. This, it is
claimed, is a major constitutional principle” (Reid, 1966, p. 35). It is a principle
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that was expressed in a Standing Order of 1713 which established the Crown’s
right of financial initiative26. It permanently prohibited private member financial
initiatives arising via petitions and prevented irresponsible pressure for public
expenditure. The Standing Order “extended a practice that evolved as a
defence against the extravagance of the monarch to become also a defence
against the extravagance of the House” (Reid, 1966, p. 37). Roseveare
considers the measure as having been of profound importance as it eventually
“rooted the Treasury in the leadership of the House” (Roseveare, 1969, p. 80).

Up until the 16th century the English public sector financial system was based
upon the ordinary revenue of the Crown, of which there were three sources:
firstly, the lands belonging to the Crown in its own right; secondly, the feudal
dues of the Crown such as wardships and reliefs, the profits of marriage,
occasional exactions for special events, and the rights of the Crown to
purveyance and pre-exemption which enabled goods and services to be
requisitioned at arbitrary prices; and thirdly, the judicial system such as the
imposition of fines, and the granting of pardons (Keir, 1969, pp. 10-12). By the
late medieval era the ordinary revenue of the Crown which had been sufficient
for the normal needs of government began to decline, and a series of
experiments in poll taxes, whereby a tax applied to an individual in accordance
with a census, was instituted by John of Gaunt in the late 14th century to pay for
war with France during the Hundred Years War. It proved to be most unpopular
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“The Crown demands, the Commons grant and the Lords assent to the grant” (Erskine May
quoted in Reid, 1966, p. 36).
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and as a consequence violence against collectors broke out leading to the
Peasants’ Revolt in 1381 led by Wat Tyler and John Ball.

With the failure of the poll tax and continuing war the economic situation of
England necessitated recourse to parliamentary grants, levies, and forced
loans. Recourse to parliamentary grants was problematic for both Parliament
and the king for there was opposition to such grants which resulted in the
fulfilment of the king’s requests being delayed, but war was not so constrained.
To raise funds for the purposes of ‘national defence’ the Tudors from time to
time fell back on the use of forced loans which if not repaid amounted to
extortion, or, to use more sophisticated and benign language, ‘benevolences’.
Other demands were met by the sale of licences and ship money which was
originally raised on seaports but was later extended to inland towns. Such
varied means of financing the government were decidedly consistent with the
fundamental characteristic of Tudor rule, the recourse to the authority of the
Crown in Parliament.

The various defects with the then existing methods of taxation led to the
consideration of alternatives, both direct and indirect. The poll tax was
resurrected during the 17th century, initially in 1641 by Charles I to finance his
army in the crushing of the uprisings in Scotland and Ireland. Charles II also
had to use a poll tax to finance the disbanding of the New Model army (12
Charles II, c. 9). William and Mary utilised this form of taxation in 1689, 1691,
1692, and finally in 1698, the last poll tax until the 20th century. The tax was
abandoned, not because of its unpopularity but due to the inefficiency in its
collection which left shortfalls to be collected through other means. A much
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more controversial tax, introduced by Charles II in 1692, was the hearth tax
which imposed a substantial two shillings tax on every hearth in a family
dwelling. The need for inspectors to enter premises to count the hearths
resulted in the tax being hugely unpopular and, as a consequence, it was
repealed in 1689 being replaced in 1695 by a window tax.

By the end of the 17th century the main direct tax was land tax which had been
introduced as an extraordinary impost in place of the poll tax. However, within a
few years it became an annual tax. Assessment was based on a crude
estimate of land value derived from an equally crude registration system on
which an annual value of six per cent (the maximum legal rate of interest) was
calculated which was rated at twenty per cent. This resulted in a so-called
quota of four shillings in the pound.

Historically, the principal indirect taxes were excise and customs duties. Excise
duties, being a tax upon articles manufactured at the place of manufacture was
a tax on internal consumption and initially, in 1643, fell primarily on consumer
goods such as beverages and foodstuffs but by early in the 18th century few
articles of domestic consumption were left untaxed. Customs duty, based upon
tonnage (a volumetric basis) and poundage (upon value), was levied “on goods
passing into or out of a given locality. They might be local, for the benefit of a
municipality, or they might be royal, for the benefit of government” (Binney,
1958, p. 20). Whether duty was levied on goods imported for domestic
consumption and/or for export and entrepôt trades depended on whether the
government’s policies were directed at the collection of revenue or the
protection of home industries. There existed a Book of Rates “which specified
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the supposed value of a large number of enumerated articles, and upon that
supposed value the duties were calculated. Only upon articles not enumerated
therein was there any attempt to calculate the duties based upon true value”
(Binney, 1958, p. 21). However, akin to the difficulties applicable to the
collection of land tax, there was a lack of an effective system to assess value
and this was a major reason for the system being notoriously complex.

The other substantial pillar on which the British fiscal system rested was
government borrowing. This was to be the means by which augmented levels
of military expenditure were to be financed from the time of William and Mary
until the policy was reversed by Pitt ‘the Younger’ in 1799. Prior to the
introduction of long term borrowing in the late 17th century, revenue deficits and
heavy capital commitments had traditionally been met through sales of Crown
lands and rents, but these revenue resources were limited. However, the
introduction of the excise placed government revenue on a sounder basis and
strengthened the government’s position as a borrower which enabled it to
introduce a system of short-term borrowing made in anticipation of the receipt
of direct taxes and paid off when they were received. Even though the ‘Stop of
the Exchequer’ in 1672 damaged Charles II’s financial standing, it was only a
partial repudiation of part of the Crown’s debts rather than an outright
declaration of bankruptcy. The short term “loans in anticipation of customs,
excise and direct taxes continued to function smoothly” (Dickson, 1967, pp. 4546). The first consideration at Parliamentary level of long-term borrowing was in
January 1692 when a committee was appointed to receive proposals for raising
£1 million “upon a Fund of perpetual Interest” (Quoted in Dickson, 1967, p.50),
the use of the word ‘perpetual’ indicating ‘long-term’. By the middle of the 17th
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century, long-term financing had been accepted for private finance with the
development of the joint-stock company, and this was complemented by the
laying down of the foundations of actuarial science.

Government long-term borrowing commenced tentatively in 1693 with a tontine
loan of £1m27, incorporating a standby that if it was only partially successful the
balance was to be raised by the sale of ordinary life annuities carrying 14%
interest. The tontine was viewed with suspicion due to its perceived
complication and raised only £108,100 (in 1692) as against £891,900 in
annuities (£773,394 in 1692, and £118,506 in 1693) (BPP 1868-69 (366) (3661), pp. 8-9). Although lottery loans were used as well, public loans were to
provide the decisive variable element in British public revenue. The first steps
taken to create a system of long-term government borrowing were marked by
“haste, carelessness, and episodic failure – even if in comparison with the
management of short-term finance they were shiningly successful” (Dickson,
1967, p. 57). The government, however, had learned some valuable lessons,
“the connections between long- and short-dated finance (and) consultation with
the City of London” (Dickson, 1967, p. 58) where marine insurance companies
and partnership banking, which were to be of such great importance to Britain’s
burgeoning trade, were developing rapidly. The government also gained an
understanding of the relative popularity of the different kinds of loans and the
need for the maintenance of foreign confidence in sterling (Dickson, 1967, p.
58).
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Perhaps most importantly the government came to understand that in
connection with a public loan it was necessary to reinforce the creditworthiness
of the nation and to do this it was essential for a public debt to be a funded debt
in that the indebtedness of the government had to match the claims of the
private creditors. A change that was to have far-reaching ramifications was the
establishment of the Bank of England in 1694. Although its rise was bitterly
deplored by its enemies, the Bank gradually assumed responsibility for the
administration of government borrowing from the Exchequer. Eventually, the
Bank was to become the centrepiece of the government’s system of public
borrowing and so enabled England to spend on war an amount well in excess
of its tax revenue (Dickson, 1967, p. 9).

Having described the manner in which the first component in British
government financial control was administered, the second component, the
expenditure of the revenue collected, will now be examined.

2.3 Government expenditure
The establishment of the ‘circle of control’ of expenditure by Parliament which
would enable the Commons to rightly claim that it could meet its responsibilities
as the steward of public monies required a system of detailed appropriation, an
availability of accurate, useful and timely accounts, control over an efficient
Exchequer and Audit, and finally, presupposing that the other three
requirements had been established, an effective Accounts Committee (Chubb,
1952, p. 6).
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2.3.1 Appropriation
The requirement for a system of appropriation was discussed by Lord
Monteagle in a memorandum he prepared in 1857 for the Select Committee
enquiring into the Receipt, Issue, and Audit of Public Monies in the Exchequer,
the Pay Office, and the Audit Department.
(T)he framers of our constitution soon perceived that the prohibition
of raising taxes without Parliamentary authority would be unavailing if
the proceeds, even legal taxes, could be expended at the arbitrium of
the sovereign. Hence an additional protection was found to be
indispensable. The right of appropriation was the immediate and
logical consequence of the right of levying supplies (BPP 1857
Session 2 (279), App. 3, p. 69).
Appropriation was meant to ensure that specified amounts of public money
could be expended only for the purposes authorised by Parliament. In theory, it
is an instrument of control over how much can be spent, on which objects, and
the source(s) of the funds to be expended. In his memorandum, Monteagle also
referred to a description of appropriation by a ‘Mr. Hargrave (Juridical
Arguments)’, as being,
the practice of Parliament to appropriate the supplies granted during
a Session, by a statute describing the application of them to certain
specified uses, according to the exigency of the year (BPP 1857
Session 2 (279), App. 3, p. 69).
Although the appropriation of funds on a regular basis dates from 1688, the
practice of appropriation commenced much earlier in English history. Chubb
(1952, pp. 6-7) noted that the first “unequivocal instance occurred as early as
1353 when a subsidy on wool was granted to be applied solely to the purposes
of war”. This was supported by a statement by Hargrave which Monteagle cited
in his memorandum.
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The early exercises of these Parliamentary powers is traceable to
very remote times; numerous and significant precedents are found in
our history, sufficient to establish and explain the principle. In the
ninth of Richard II, 1-10th, 1-15th, and a moiety of each were granted
by Parliament for specific purposes, the safe custody of the sea, and
the aid of John of Gaunt (BPP 1857 Session 2 (279), App. 3, p. 69).
Monteagle also cited a comment made by Hargrave that, from a constitutional
point of view, this was more than ‘appropriation’ as it took away from the officers
of the Exchequer their constitutional right of receiving and issuing public monies
and, therefore, evinced a peculiar want of confidence in the executive power at
the time (BPP 1857 Session 2 (279), App. 3, p. 70).

Although Parliament under the Tudors and the Stuarts did not exercise control
over ordinary expenditure of the Crown, the appropriation of revenues granted
for specific uses continued to occur intermittently. For example, in April 1666
with a Bill of Supply in progress, George Downing made a submission to the
government and the king that the financial difficulties of the time could not be
effectively remedied unless the money voted was used as intended. Downing’s
recommendation that a clause of appropriation be introduced that provided that
the money granted by this particular Bill of Supply should be kept in the
Exchequer distinct from all other monies, and issued for setting out a fleet
during the summer and paying seamen for this expedition, and for no other use
or purpose (BPP 1857 Session 2 (279), App. 3, p. 70). The intermittent use of
appropriation at this time was not continued during the reign of James II (16851688) for under this king the theory of the Constitution was still that of a Tudor
monarch. The executive came to be entirely under his control and Parliament in
1685 made no attempt to calculate the revenue needs of the government.
William Shaw said that at that time
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(w)ithout the king’s confiding in them at all, without his submitting an
estimate to them, without the slightest justification for any or for all of
his demands, the Commons met his wishes, voted supply in illconsidered and precipitate haste, exacted no guarantee as to the
application of the money, inserted no appropriation clause, nor even
raised the question of accountability (Calendar of Treasury Books,
Volume 8: 1685-1689).
From the time of the Revolution, however, the concept of appropriation, that had
been conceived only as a restriction on those who were responsible for the
management of the public revenue, was increasingly adopted to become a
major part of the future system of financial control of government. However, a
matter of some delicacy in regard to appropriations which the Commons
subsequent to the Revolution had to contend with was that it had not
established a right to examine and control the Civil List expenditure. The Civil
List of William III preserved a vestige of the ancient principle that ‘the King
should live of his own’, that is, the king through his ministers had absolute
control over this grant, but he had no power of supplementing or increasing it.
Hence, if the royal expenditure was excessive, or if the charges of the civil
government increased with the increase of wealth and population, the Civil List
fell into arrears. At these times in the 18th and in the early part of the 19th
century Parliament was frequently asked for special grants to clear the debt
which had accumulated. In the reigns of George III (1760–1820) and George IV
(1820–1830), while various charges of the civil government were taken off the
Civil List and made either a permanent charge on the Consolidated Fund or
provided by annual vote. The separation between the Royal expenditure and
expenditure on civil government, however, was not completed until the reign of
William IV (1830–1837) when the Civil List lost its original meaning as the
provision of Parliament for the civil government. From then on it was restricted
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to the personal expenditure of the sovereign, while the cost of the civil
government was made either a charge on the Consolidated Fund or formed the
subject of annual vote (BPP 1902(387), App. 13, p. 228).
A particular advantage of the introduction of appropriation was that it was
possible for the government to borrow funds secured against the appropriated
funds. This necessitated the Acts of supply being appropriately worded by
taking into consideration the terms of these tied loans and for the requisite
administration systems being put in place. With the payments of interest and the
repayments of principal having to be made on time and for the agreed amounts
to move from the sovereign to the state, together with an implied guarantee of
the Commons that it would make good any shortfall in those payments, the
British government credit ratings improved and so reduced the country’s
sovereign risk. With a strong financial reputation it became easier to borrow
both domestically and internationally and, importantly, at lower interest rates.

A pre-requisite in the administration of appropriations is that the departments
must prepare and submit estimates of their requirements to the Commons’
Committee of Supply, which could reduce or reject them. In laying the
foundation for the modern parliamentary practice of annual estimates and
accounts, Parliament during the reign of William III had progressed as gradually
and uncertainly as it had in the settlement of his revenue. Prior to 1688, as far
as the Parliament was concerned it’s only conception of estimating as a
financial control device was in connection with special transactions as and when
they arose, for instance when it voted an aid for the re-building of the fleet. As
far as the King and his executive in particular his Privy Council were concerned,
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the device of estimating was only employed when a new establishment was to
be drawn up and authorised. Beyond this casual and intermittent recourse to
the practice of preparing a special estimate, there was no conception by either
the king or Parliament of systematically employing departmental estimates for
the purpose of forecasting each coming year’s probable expenditure and using
such forecasts for the purpose of controlling the actual expenditure. Parliament
left it to the king to make ends meet on his income, although the king had no
counsel to guide him beyond the tales from each of his departmental offices of
ever increasing debts (‘Introduction, Part 3’, Calendar of Treasury Books,
Volume 9: 1689-1692, (1931)).

The failure to administer the national finances without the guidance of yearly
estimates being rigidly enforced meant that systematic economy and scrutiny
was absent and that matters drifted year after year until departmental debts
became intolerable and the overall financial situation of the Nation precarious.
Then it would be necessary for a desperate eleventh hour review of expenditure
to be undertaken by the King in Council and a scheme of ‘retrenchment’ of
expenditure ordered. This occurred on two occasions during the reign of
Charles II, in 1668 and 1676 (‘Introduction, Part 3’, Calendar of Treasury Books,
Volume 9: 1689-1692(1931)).

That control of public expenditure had passed to Parliament by 1689 was
confirmed when William had “accounts” of the Army, Navy and Ordnance
prepared for the war expenditure from 28 December 1688 to 29 September
1689 in support of his request for funds for the ‘Charge of the War’ against
France and the Jacobite forces in Ireland in the ensuing year. He did not want
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any delay in Parliament’s deliberations on the matter for, as he emphasised, it
was necessary for England’s allies to be advised of England’s intentions as
soon as possible in order “to concert the Measures for the next Campaign”
against France, and to commence gathering together the requisite matėriel for
the campaigns. In his speech to Parliament on 19 October 1689, William
advised the members:
That you may be satisfied how the Money has been laid out, which
you have already given, I have directed the Accounts to be laid
before you, when you think fit to call for them (JHC: vol. 10: 16681693 (1802), pp. 273-274).
On 24 October the Commons called for the accounts for the period to
September 1689 and requested from the King a “state of the war for one
ensuing year” to which the King readily assented. As a consequence, estimates
covering the “Land Forces for the English and Dutch Forces in England, the
English Forces in Holland and the Forces in Ireland”, the Navy and the
Ordnance were presented to the Commons. However, the ‘accounts’ for the
period ended September 1689 were not accounts of actual expenditure but
estimates. The Exchequer system of accounting and auditing was such that it
was impossible to present accounts quickly. Instead, the accounts of actual
expenditure were not tabled in the Commons until 1707, 18 years after the
event.

Following its review of the estimates for the ensuing year, the Commons in
November 1689 voted supply of £2.0 million for the vanquishing of Ireland and
the prosecution of the war against France both by sea and land. However, an
examination of the debate reveals that the Commons had derived only vague
ideas of the armed forces proposed and that it had made no serious attempt to
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test the estimates. The Commons was obviously confused and had little
understanding of the constitutional use of estimates. This was exacerbated by it
being devoid of advice from the king’s officials. Even so, from 1689 to 1697 the
conflict with France necessitated annual sessions of Parliament and annual
grants of supply. Once again constitutional development had been hastened by
the pressure of war.
The great financial change made at the Revolution related to the
charge of the Navy and Army. The Revolution introduced annual
Sessions of Parliament, the French war led to annual Votes in Supply
for Navy, Army, and Ordnance services, and these Votes were
formally sanctioned by Lord Somers’ Appropriation clauses (BPP
1902(387), App. 13).
When it is remembered that the ordinary Civil Establishments were supposed to
be provided for out of the king’s ordinary revenues, it will be seen that the three
estimates submitted to the Commons for the Army, Navy and Ordnance covered
practically the remaining national expenditure.

The reality of the control by Parliament over public expenditure, which extended
only to the expenditure of the Army, Navy and Ordnance, was proved by the
reduction of the army enforced after the Peace of Ryswick28 by the Commons
against the wishes of the king29. The words ‘control by Parliament’, however, is
a misnomer for there was only one vote for the whole of the Navy until 1798.
Between that time and 1819 the form was changed and the estimates became
more and more detailed (Chubb, 1952, pp. 8-9). Up until 1711, during Anne’s

28

The Peace of Ryswick of July 1697 brought the Nine Years War with France to an end.
William’s loss in this instance, however, was offset by the French under the treaty recognising
his claim to the throne of England.
29
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reign, there was no specific appropriation of definite amounts to either the Army
or the Navy.

The absence of specific appropriations can be seen in the appropriation clause
in the Act, 1702 (1 Anne) c. 15 which described the issue and application of the
whole of the supplies granted in the session in non-specific terms, such as
‘being partially for defraying the charge of the Navy’s ordinary’, ‘the victualling
thereof’, ‘the sea ordnance’, and ‘garrisoning by the army in the Low Countries’.
On the first occasion on which the parliamentary grants were specified, the
details of the particular sums which were to be applied to the different Army and
Ordnance services were recited in the appropriation act for the session. Even
though a separate amount was appropriated by Parliament for the Navy in
1711, and subsequent years, the practice of granting, in the Appropriation Acts,
one total sum for all Navy Effective Services, including Ordnance Sea Service,
was continued up to 1798. Accounts presented to the Commons, and printed
in the Commons Journal, alone showed specific sums required respectively for
wages of seamen, ordinary of the Navy, and building of ships, and other
extraordinary charges, as well as for the Transport Service in time of war (BPP
1868-69(366) (366-1) App. 13).

In the Army, Navy and Ordnance there grew up the practice of large sums
being paid by the sole authority of the minister out of money appropriated for
other services without the previous sanction of Parliament. The Commons were
left with no option but to sanction these ‘extraordinaries’ that came before them
in a subsequent session. The size of the extraordinaries was enormous, as
seen in the figures below (Figure 2.1) that were provided by the Finance
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Committee of 1782 in their report dated 5 July 1782 for the 6 years from 1776
to 1782 (BPP 1868-69(366) (366-1), App. 13).

FIGURE 2.1

Expenses of the Army, Navy, and Ordnance, 1776-1782

Paid Without
Service

Total Authorised

Total Expenditure
Authority

Army

£31,472,520

£15,602,742 (50%)

£47,075,262

Navy

£31,831,173

£17,132,350 (54%)

£48,963,523

Ordnance

£3,371,663

£3,133,497 (93%)

£6,505,160

TOTALS

£66,675,356

£35,868,589 (54%)

£102,543,945

Reference was made to the Army extraordinaries figures during these years in
the Return to an Order of the House of Commons of 24 July 1866 by which it
was provided with the Accounts of Net Public Income and Expenditure of Great
Britain and Ireland, 1688 -1800 (BPP 1868-69 (366) (366-1)).
The (Finance) Committee drew attention to the enormous amount of
Army Extraordinaries, incurred without the sanction of Parliament, as
an abuse of the most alarming nature, calling for immediate attention;
and as consisting of sums paid by the sole authority of the Minister
out of money appropriated for other services, leaving no option to the
House when the account came before them (BPP 1868-69 (366)
(366-1), App. 13).
During the same period the unfunded debt of the Navy increased from
£3,624,420 to £11,318,451, an increase of 312%. “Out of the total Navy debt
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on 31 December 1781 the greater portion, amounting to £7,918,000, consisted
of Navy and Victualling bills unpaid and carrying interest of 4%” (BPP 1868-69
(366) (366-1), App. 13, p. 676). Lord Welby (hereafter Welby) considered that
while this increased expenditure was justified, having been incurred in the first
six years of the war with the American Colonies, “(t)he control exercised
through the Votes in supply was ... imperfect, and left a great latitude to the
executive government, of which the government did not fail to avail itself” (BPP
1902(387) App. 13).
But this control, however imperfect it may have been, ceased with
the act of voting supply. No means were taken by which the
Commons could ascertain whether the money was actually
expended on the service for which it was voted. No accounts were
presented on system to the House of Commons until the introduction
in the 1802 of the “Finance Accounts”. Until 1802, therefore,
Parliament had no information of any kind as to the expenditure of
money which it had voted, unless a return for a special object was
asked and granted (BPP 1902(387), App. 13).
No commissions of public accounts were appointed from the time of Anne
(1702-1714) until the twentieth year of George III’s reign in 1780, nor was there
during this long period any systematic presentation of accounts of the public
income and expenditure to Parliament. Although no balanced annual account of
the Public Income and Expenditure was prepared and presented to Parliament
prior to 1823, having been recommended by the Select Committee of Public
Accounts in 182230, much detailed information upon the subject was provided in
the annual Finance Accounts, the publication of which commenced in 1802. It
should be added, for the sake of accuracy, that even in the time of William III a
few votes were taken annually for services of a civil character. These gradually

30

BPP 1822(618)
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increased in number, but they were comparatively insignificant until the latter
part of the reign of George III.

After the American and French wars, further public accounts commissions were
initiated, and although they brought to light irregularities and pointed out
defects in financial organisation, they had no continuity and none of the
elements of an audit of expenditure. Although the introduction of regular
appropriations saw the commencement of the practice of voting supply
annually for the Army, Navy and Ordnance, their ‘estimates’ contained little
detail. It will be appreciated that estimating expenditure for a year, however, is
not as straightforward as it would seem for there can be considerable diversity
of principle in estimating and carrying to account the various items of
expenditure. For example, how should expenditure applicable to the provision
of a service or supply of a stores item that will extend beyond the end of the
financial year be estimated and accounted for, and how should expenditure
applicable to the provision of a service or supply of a stores item provided in
one year but which will not be paid until the following year(s) be estimated and
accounted for?

Variations in practice across the different departments weakened the control of
Parliament over the public expenditure; for example, funds available to

a

department but which were not required for its immediate use could be
employed for uses not contemplated by Parliament or even used in another
department. “By such means the army grants have provided the large advances
required for recruiting and other services chargeable to the East India
Company” (BPP 1844(364), p. 45). On the basis of such examples the
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Committee of Inquiry into the System of Account and Audit in the Ordnance
Department, in their Fourth Report31 dated 7 March 1844, recommended that
the estimates of the military and naval departments “should in future provide
only for those expenses which are to be paid in the year”. It was considered that
this was
the most correct mode of forming an estimate, and the only one
indeed susceptible of general application. It is in accordance with the
principle adopted by the Committee of the House of Commons
appointed in 182232 to consider the best mode of simplifying the
accounts annually laid before Parliament (BPP 1844(364), p. 45).
Apart from the diversity of principle, there was also diversity of practice between
the Army, Navy and Ordnance. As an example that was quoted in a report
recommending uniformity across the three departments, the charges for pay
and allowances were stated and brought to account as follows.
Army: when paid, charged to the year for which they were due;
Ordnance: estimated for, and charged to the year for which they
were due; and
Navy: for non-civilians, charged to the year of payment; for civilians,
charged to the year for which the sums were due, without restriction
as to the date of actual payment (BPP 1844(364), p. 44).
The lack of uniformity across departments which permitted a variety of
estimating principles and practices to be used was a major defect in the system
of public accounts. The failure to enforce uniformity across the various
departments was exacerbated by a lack of uniformity in the various
departmental accounting systems. A ‘major defect’ was the attitude displayed
by Parliament in February 1822 when in a Committee of Supply a member

31

A copy of this report can be found in the Statement of Changes introduced into System of
Book-keeping in Public Departments Report which was prepared as a Return to an Order of the
House of Commons dated 13 March 1844 (BPP 1844(364), p. 45).
32
BPP 1822(618)
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reminded the members that it was necessary for the estimate to be laid upon
the table before the Committee proceeded to vote of supply for the Navy. In
reply, the Chancellor of the Exchequer advised members that the necessary
documents would be ready in the course of a few days and would then be
placed in the hands of the Members. He was supported by the member (George
Warrender) in charge of the Navy estimate who expressed his opinion “that the
vote in question was a mere matter of course” (Hansard, Second Series Vol. 6,
February 1822, Cols. 455-456). This brought Joseph Hume to his feet advising
that he could not “agree to proceed with it until the estimates were before the
House”. The display of such an off-hand and arrogant attitude may have been
the reason for the debates on the Navy estimates not being resolved until 18
March that year. It was a hard fight for Hume and his supporters but they were
to win the more important fight when the Commons that month agreed to
appoint a select committee “to consider the best mode of simplifying the
accounts annually laid before the Houses” (BPP 1822(618)).

2.3.2 The provision of accurate, useful, and timely financial
accounts to Parliament
Having put in place a system of detailed appropriation, including estimation, it
came to be understood that appropriations by themselves are of small value in
controlling the actions of government for “(w)hen the House of Commons
appropriates, it only indicates its wishes about how the money ought to be
spent” (Chubb, 1952, p. 12). Accordingly, it was necessary for accounting
systems to be developed that would enable the accuracy of both the issues and
applications of the funds appropriated to be verified.
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These checks existed in the form of the Exchequer, of departmental
and Exchequer accounts of doubtful value and of an administrative
audit carried out by the Auditors of the Imprest. Until the nineteenth
century Parliament had no control over them and wished none. They
were directed by the only interested party, the Crown. It was not until
Parliament began to feel and assume responsibility for government,
that it felt any need to control these checks (Chubb, 1952, p. 12).
Government accounts have two broad purposes. The first is an accountability
purpose which is concerned with controlling the actions of individuals or groups
of individuals who are entrusted with the handling and disposal of money not
belonging to them. Secondly, government accounts have a policy purpose
which assists individuals who have been allotted responsibilities in carrying out
their duties with “maximum efficiency” having regard to the final purposes their
duties are intended to serve (BPP 1950 (Cmd. 7969), pp. 10-11).

Government accounting enables accountability by providing information
regarding receipts and payments relative to the original estimates to parties
such as Treasury, the auditors and the responsible officers in the departments
in order to ensure the authenticity of each item and its accordance with the
sanctioning authority of Parliament. It also enables information to be prepared
and made available to concerned parties within government about the national
finances in order to assist those parties in the development and measurement
of public sector efficiency, in the development of future government policies and
the assessment of past and existing government policies. It enables information
to be prepared and made available to interested parties outside government,
with the information required to enable those parties to measure and interpret
current financial and non-financial data, trends and prospects. The financial and
non-financial information provided to the population will allow them to measure
and reach conclusions as to the government’s efficiency and financial efficacy,
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and whether they retain the confidence of the electorate. However, the
purposes of government accounting are constrained by the exigencies of
transparency, timeliness, cost effectiveness, and simplicity.

Perhaps the best example of accounts with a pure accountability purpose is the
annual appropriation accounts of the departments of state. These form an
essential part of the system laid down in the Exchequer and Audit Departments
Act of 1866 which was framed with little or nothing more than an accountability
purpose in mind. The constitutional principle, as examined earlier, behind these
accounts was that the legislature provided year by year stated sums of money
which were entrusted to the executive, that is the various departments, to be
spent within the limits approved by Parliament on the approved, stated
purposes. Parliament therefore required an assurance, when the year had
ended, that the monies had in fact been spent as authorised (BPP 1950
(Cmd.7969), p. 11). This was the predominant purpose of the financial
accounts.

Prior to the 20th century, going behind the figures and attempting to ascertain
the monetary value of the expenditure was not generally sought. In 1873, an
Admiralty Committee of inquiry into the audit of accounts said that the
“Dockyard Manufacturing and Expense Accounts (were) statistical rather than
financial” and concluded that it need not discuss their value (BPP 1873(70), p.
11). The annual appropriation accounts` which related all items of expenditure
to the specific purpose which Parliament had voted money, was purely a cash
account, with its categories determined more by political considerations than by
a businesslike analysis of the functions of different classes of expenditure. Still it
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was the account to which the most care was attached. The accounting
information used for policy purposes is very different from the information within
the appropriation accounting system and accordingly must be sought from
some other system. For the purpose of shaping and executing policy, estimates
may be sufficient in circumstances where exactness is not possible or where
the manager is time constrained.

2.3.2.1 The accounting framework
Bookkeeping
Bookkeeping

emerged

through

the

interweaving

of

various

essential

antecedents (or elements) over time. These antecedents were, firstly, a material
(something which needs to be reworked) which included private property,
capital, commerce and credit and, secondly, a language (a medium for
expressing the material) including writing, money and arithmetic. When
energised by favourable economic and social circumstances, these antecedents
produced a methodology, a plan for systematically rendering the material into
the language (Littleton, 1933, p. 13). “This methodology is bookkeeping”
(Littleton, 1933, p. 13).

There are various definitions of bookkeeping. Coombs et al. (1994, p. 164)
referred to bookkeeping as a method or system of record keeping, while
Littleton (1928, p. 134) described it as a simple classifying mechanism whereby
like things are brought together, a basic sorting into ‘pigeon-holes’ or accounts.
However, he went on to point out that this segregation of like things in classes
is alone not sufficient for accounting, which requires class balances that, in
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turn, require that both likes and opposites must be brought into the classes.
Littleton (1928, p. 135) went on to state that this
up-and-down characteristic of a ‘class’, makes a bilateral form in the
basic record practically inevitable, one side to group together like
elements, the other to group together related, but opposite elements,
the item of primary importance being always the balance. In working
thus for balances, subtraction comes to be indicated by contraposition; that is, items placed in juxtaposition are thought of as
having an ‘oppositeness’ which leads to subtraction. Thus a matter of
mere ‘form’, of arbitrary arrangement, comes to have an implied or
understood meaning.
Littleton appears to have been discussing the situation as it applied to DEB but
the items need not only be placed in juxtaposition to indicate oppositeness and
the consequent subtraction. It would be possible to use a negative sign adjacent
to the figure, or enclose the amount in brackets, or use red-ink. Such indicators
of oppositeness would be adequate if single-entry bookkeeping was in use.

There are two substantial differences between bookkeeping of today and that
of the medieval past when there was little attention given to either the balancing
of the books or closing them on a regular basis. The closing of the books was
tied to random events such as the completion of a venture, the sale of a
business, and the filling of a ledger. The failure to complete periodic reckonings
led, of course, to later difficulties in balancing but in many cases no attempt
was made to correct any observed imbalance.

Whereas ‘bookkeeping’ can be considered to be a narrow technical mechanism
used for the collection and recording of transactions, ‘accounting’, on the other
hand, refers to the installation and implementation of systems of bookkeeping
and the analysis and interpretation of financial data collected through the
utilisation of those systems. Accounting is
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a process of attributing financial values and rationales to a wide
range of social practices, thereby according them a specific visibility,
calculability and operational utility .... Accounting is located as a
central component within a broad range of practices of economic
calculation, rather than being viewed as an independent set of
techniques (Miller, 1990, pp. 316-317).
However, the instrumental role of accounting is “serving the interests of
property”. This role “is fundamental to the indifference of the double entry
accounting calculus to the distribution of property and its associated
entitlements which double entry accounting catalogues and makes visible”
(Funnell, 2001, p. 192). Although accounting is neither neutral nor objective, it
is vital for the protection of property rights. Accordingly the most important role
of bookkeeping since its inception has been the safeguarding of property
entitlements for without this safeguard trade would not have been possible.
Another important role played by bookkeeping was that which arose from the
need for bookkeeping systems that were capable of holding agents
accountable as a consequence of the creation of agency relationships (Oldroyd
et al., 2009, p. 112). To fulfil these roles of protecting property rights and
holding agents accountable at a distance, it has been necessary for
bookkeeping to continually adapt to a variety of modes of organisational control
(Oldroyd et al., 2009, p. 112). This is in accord with Hopwood’s opinion that
“(a)ccounting “is not a static phenomenon. Over time, it repeatedly has
changed” (1987, p. 207).

There are two categories of bookkeeping, single entry and double entry. As
stated by Coombs et al. (1994, p. 164),
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(s)ingle entry is not a particular system of bookkeeping, but is the
term used to cover any written accounting record other than double
entry. It is in the nature of a homespun system which is nevertheless
capable of meeting the needs of (usually) a small-scale
organisational entity such as a sole trader, club or society.
A subset of single entry bookkeeping is CAD which had its origins in the
English Exchequer as early as the commencement of the eleventh century,
being documented in 1177-1179 by Richard fitz Nigel in the Dialogus de
Scaccario (Dialogue of the Exchequer). The CAD system, which is a simple but
intensely personal system being based upon personal accountability, has been
described as a system of agency accounting, the use of which enables an
agent to account for his financial responsibilities to a higher authority. The
agent, having been ‘charged’ by the higher authority with sums of money or
goods for which he is held responsible, is required to account for the balance of
the charge that remains in his hands at a future time. The agent is personally
liable for any difference between the total for which he was charged and the
balance remaining at the time of accounting, the difference being reduced by
any approved outgoing. This was the ‘discharge’.

CAD is also known as ‘stewardship accounting’ and ‘manorial accounting’.
When using this mode, feudal manors, governments, and the church recorded
income, expense, and the settlement of obligations, sometimes in narrative form
with figure references, sometimes in separate lines for each category, and
sometimes in separate lines with figures in columns. Merchants everywhere
used single entry throughout most of the 13th century and well beyond for
controlling individual ventures. This form of bookkeeping had the advantage of
providing, at low-cost, a rational basis for decision-making. It had the
disadvantages, however, of not providing profit measurement automatically and
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not distinguishing between capital and revenue. Importantly, fraud was easy to
perpetrate as it was possible to leave blank spaces, modify past entries, and
insert extra sheets, which would have necessitated a greater emphasis on the
auditing of financial records. A further complaint was that the system used too
many separate books and notebooks for registering transactions (JuradoSánchez, 2002, p. 167).

From about the 13th century some form of bookkeeping had been in use in
Europe for financial record-keeping by enterprises of substance, partnerships,
and individuals such as merchants. Bookkeeping was used to keep track of
credit dealings, inventories, partners’ capital and, of course, cash. Though there
was a desire to calculate profits, automatic profit finding was never built into
surviving medieval account books nor were historical accounting results used in
the allocation of resources or choosing from alternatives.
The opportunistic nature of trading made past operations an
uncertain guide to the future, and most merchants did not rely on
venture accounts for decision making data – experience was
considered less important than fresh news (Chatfield, 1977, p. 59).
In the late 13th century, as the international merchants of the port and inland
cities of Italy faced increasingly complex transactions in more and more
locations, they found they needed a system that would improve control. Their
needs were answered with the publication in 1494 by Fra Luca Pacioli of
Summa de Arithmetica, Geometrica, Proportioni et Proportionalita, which
included a chapter extolling the virtues of DEB, De Computis et Scripturis.
Significantly the publication coincided with the introduction of the printing press
and it is possible that this was another reason for the rapid spread of the system
across Italian firms. By the early 15th century it had reached a sophisticated
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level of development in the larger commercial entities. Whether or not this was
‘true’ double entry accounting as defined today is debatable but the important
point is that it satisfied to a large extent the pressing needs of wide-ranging
business. Even so, it is important to note that DEB was far too ponderous to
play the revolutionary role often attributed to it in managing the business. It had
no advantage then, as now, over single-entry in assessing the merits of a
business proposition (Hunt and Murray, 1999, pp. 62-63).

Despite the perceived simplicity of DEB whereby it recognised that the receipt
of cash involved two entries, a discharge in the account of the debtor and a
charge in the record of the cashier, permitting the establishment of cross
references, it demanded greater care and accuracy by the clerks. However, the
system provided arithmetic checks from periodic balancing and it permitted the
division of labour among several clerks of varying qualifications. DEB provided
balance sheet data, separated capital from revenue accounting, and was to
introduce advanced concepts such as accruals and depreciation. Although it is
considered that it gave the owners of the enterprise a much improved system of
control, it was criticised by Edward Thomas Jones in his English System of
Bookkeeping by Single or Double Entry of 1796 in which he perhaps foresaw
the future when he stated that single entry bookkeeping had an advantage over
double entry as the latter’s complexity allowed greater secrecy and more scope
for fraud (Yamey et al, 1963, p. 17).

“The double entry system involved control from a distance and was essentially
impersonal. Control under CAD was achieved not at a distance, but face-toface, eyeball to eyeball” (Jones, 2008, p. 467). DEB was not widely used until
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the late Middle Ages, its adoption being very slow and as a consequence it was
not widely used in the Western world until the 19th century. For example, it was
not introduced to British central government accounting until 1826 and not
formally adopted by a British government department until 1832. Accordingly, it
was surprising to discover the following entry dated December 1664 in the
Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies.
897. Accounts of the revenue of Jamaica and disbursements,
extracted from the books of accounts of Governor Sir Thomas
Modyford, which books were duly kept by way of debtor and creditor,
after the Italian manner, arranged under the heads of the King’s
particular account (Volume 5:1661-1668 (1880), pp. 258-265).
Although the use by English merchants of the Italian method in the 17th century
is not a revelation, the discovery that the government of the English colony in
Jamaica may have used the ‘Italian method’ in the 17th century is intriguing in
that, on face value, it provides some support for the unsubstantiated contention
made by Binney that “(s)ince 1688, indeed, there had been made up in the
Treasury, books of account on the double entry system” (1958, p. 244). Later
Binney said that “besides the books of Treasury, it seems that the domestic
accounts of the revenue departments were kept on the double entry system”
and referred readers to “the Instructions for Stamp Distributors (1759), (TNA)
T1/392” (Binney, 1958, p. 244). An examination of these instructions reveals
that there was no instruction requiring the use of DEB by the distributors.
Instead there was an instruction that they were to “keep just and regular
Accounts by way of Debtor and Creditor, according to the Office printed Form”
(Instruction number 5). One of the forms attached to the instructions, The
METHOD to be observed by each Distributer in making up his Annual Accounts
on the several Stamp-Duties, was in a ‘T’ form and divided into two parts, debit
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and credit, each being subdivided into monetary columns by type of duty.
Receipts of stamps were debited and issues and expenses (called ‘incidents’)
credited to the form. With the distributor being responsible for the balance of the
stamps he held and reported using this form, it is an example of CAD with
subsidiary books maintained outside the system and certainly not an example of
DEB as espoused by Binney. He (1958, p. 289) also refers to double entry in
his Appendix V, Note on the Public Accounts.
The Treasury Account Books, which cover the period from the day of
William’ III’s landing in this country in November 1688, represent the
accounts of the Exchequer recast in double entry form. They may be
studied, conveniently condensed and analysed, in House of
Commons Sessional Paper, No. 366, Pts. I and II, of 1868/9 (volume
xxv of the Accounts and Papers of that Session).
There is however a major difference in that in the latter statement he used the
word “form” not “system” and, as a consequence, it is considered that the latter
statement also can be ignored as a support for Binney’s contention regarding
the use of DEB in Treasury

Returning to the intriguing possibility of DEB having been used by government
in Jamaica as early as 1664, the fact that the Instructions for Stamp Distributors
also used the same words (“by way of debtor and creditor”) in the same context
leads to the conclusion that the system used in Jamaica also would have been
CAD with debtor and creditor subsidiary books maintained outside the system
and not DEB. The reference to only the debtors and creditors being “after the
Italian manner” does not indicate that the bookkeeping system itself was
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DEB33. Research has not found any evidence that DEB was used in British
government departments prior to the 19th century. This is supported by, for
example, Oates and Sadler (2006, p. 14) who in their paper in regard to the
Stamp Act crisis in the American colonies in the 1760/70s refer to the accounts
under the Act being in the form of CAD which “was the prevailing form for
government accounting, not only in Britain, but also in continental Europe”.

From a mechanical point of view, DEB requires accounting data to be posted to
pre-defined accounts in a ledger according to specific rules of debits and
credits. Each transaction posted to the ledger is recorded twice, once as a debit
and once as a credit so that the total of the debit postings should equal the total
of the credit postings. Although recognising the sophistication of DEB, Littleton
emphasised
this is not theory; this is not the essence of double entry; it is simply
methodology. The double posting and opposition of debit and credit
are merely incidental to a test of mechanical accuracy. They produce
an equilibrium of amounts, it is true, but the true virtue of
bookkeeping is not in this weak insurance against errors. The real
essence of bookkeeping lies deeper than this.
Beneath the surface of the methodology ... is the unquestionable
recognition of the fact that every transaction has a dual aspect, just
as a coin has “heads and tails”. This is much more fundamental than
the mere recording of facts “in double” to get as a test an equality of
totals (Littleton, 1928, p. 132).
Although the following quotation is from a paper dealing with record keeping in
a municipal corporation, it applies to DEB generally.

33

Figure 7.3 shows the financial statements for the quarter 31 March 1826 which had been
prepared by Deas Thomson using CAD, not DEB as it may appear from the ‘Balance Sheet”
(Figure 7.3(b)) by it showing both debit and credit columns.
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The records are ... more comprehensive and orderly; the duality of
entries provides a convenient check on the accuracy and
completeness of the ledger (Coombs et al., 1994, p. 171).
In the same paragraph, the authors note that:
Jones (1992) sees the first two factors as of supreme importance,
arguing that double entry is a ‘better stewardship model than
charge/discharge when organisations carried out a substantial
number of transactions involving debtors and creditors’ (p. 68) which
ensures the recognition of liabilities and safeguards against the
manipulation of cash flows (p. 137) (Coombs et al., 1994, p. 171).
While many accountants would consider the aspects of dual entry and equality
of the trial balance to be the essence of DEB, these aspects are very
superficial. The true essence of DEB is to be found in commerce in the
integration of real accounts (an asset, liability or equity account to which the
balance at period end in a nominal or temporary account is transferred) and
nominal or temporary accounts which interrelate the capital in use with the
income arising from management’s supervision of that use (Littleton, 1958, p.
246).

There are many variants of DEB available, from the fundamental system in
which the only criterion is the equality of debit and credit ledger account
balances, there being no requirement to calculate profit, to the system using
capital accounts integrated with real and nominal ledger accounts with the
nominal accounts being used to determine net income before being closed off
to capital periodically. Between these two extremes there are two other
interpretations, both of which are based upon the fundamental system, the first
being a system which adds a capital account, and the second which adds
nominal accounts in addition to the capital account but does not calculate the
net income periodically. Winjum says that it was this latter system which was
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“described by the early authors and implemented by merchants in the 18th
century” (1971, pp. 334-335). Variants will also be possible depending on
whether cash accounting, a hybrid of cash accounting, or full accrual accounting
is to be used. The cash accounting hybrid can be referred to as the “receivablepayable” basis in which the accounts are kept on a cash basis but are adjusted
to bring to account amounts applicable to an accounting period but not received
or paid during that period.

The ready acceptance of DEB by individuals and members of various
parliamentary commissions and committees in the 19 th century34 seems to have
been based in part upon the presumption that if it was used in commerce it
must, ipso facto, be appropriate for application in government accounting.
However, any validity in this presumption depends heavily upon the level of
attention that is given to the differences in the constitutional and statutory
backgrounds of government and commercial accounting. The less the amount
of attention given to these differences, the more readily the presumption
escapes question. The demise of CAD for government accounting in the 19th
century, however, can also be traced to DEB being a more systematic,
comprehensive and effective system which is self-balancing which would have
been a great advantage for those departments with large volumes of
transactions to be processed, such as the Navy. A further reason behind the
support of DEB was the growth of the accounting profession, the members of
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For example, the members of the Select Committee that was appointed in 1831 “to inquire
into what improvements may be introduced in the mode of keeping the Public accounts, and of
providing an efficient control over the expenditure of the public money” (Hansard, Third Series
Vol. 2, February 1831, Cols. 625-626).
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which, having been trained in DEB, would have been unabashed in selling the
system to prospective users. By contrast with CAD, it could be said that DEB
was the intellectual property of the professional accountant.

There were to remain staunch followers of CAD who considered that DEB had
no place in entities outside commerce, such as central and local government,
university colleges, parishes, trusts, and landed estates. Such advocates
received indirect support through the normal aversion to change. This was
commented upon by the Commission on Accounts in their Fifth Report when the
Commissioners noted the following.
We are well aware of the Difficulties that must for ever attend the
introducing Novelty of Form into ancient Offices, framed by the
Wisdom of Ages; they are considered as incapable of Improvement:
the Officers educated in, and accustomed to the Forms in Use, are
insensible of their Defects, or, if they feel them, have no Leisure,
often no ability, seldom any Inclination, to correct them; alarmed at
the Idea of Innovation, they resist the Proposal of a Regulation,
because it is a Change, though from a perplexed and intricate, to a
more simple and intelligible System (Fifth Report of the
Commissioners of Accounts,1781, p. 19)
Such aversion to change in the Navy Office was to hamper considerably the
implementation of DEB within the Navy and set back the project by a number of
years which, because the Navy’s system came to be used as the basis of the
new accounting systems implemented elsewhere in government, had a
deleterious effect upon the pursuit of uniformity across the central government.
It was fortunate that there existed at the time committed and competent
protagonists such as Deas Thomson and Henry Parnell who possessed the
requisite qualities of leadership and who gave the changeover to DEB the form
and force necessary to overcome interested opposition and to convince
sufficient numbers of the benefits of relinquishing the then existing CAD system
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of bookkeeping (Funnell, 2004, p. 41). Without their dedication the changeover
to DEB would have been an even more protracted, complicated and
disagreeable business than it was.

Measurement bases
A measurement basis of accounting is the body of accounting principles that
determine when the effects of transactions or events should be recognised for
accounting reporting purposes. It relates to the timing of the measurements
made regardless of the nature of the measurement. The two most prevalent
reference measurement bases of accounting are the cash basis and the accrual
basis. In the minds of many, DEB and accrual accounting are synonymous but
this is not correct as it is possible to use DEB for either cash or accrual
accounting.

The distinctive feature of accounts kept on a cash basis (also called “receipts
and payments” basis) is that they record money received and money paid, and
only such transactions, within a given period, whether or not the receipts and
payments are in respect of goods supplied or services rendered consumed or to
capital transactions. Because cash accounting is uncomplicated and less costly
to operate than accrual accounting, which can introduce subjectivity and make
the all important link with public sector monitoring and management of liquid
(cash) resources less clear , it was seen as a means of enhancing constitutional
security in government accounting. “(I)t assists punctuality, and it prevents also
the hiding away of any improper payment; misdirection or misappropriation of
money is much more easy under a complex system, under which the accounts
are continually in arrear, than under a system by which the accounts are
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balanced day after day” (BPP 1867(3848), p. 208 quoted in Funnell, 2003, p.
119). The accrual basis requires the accounts to be adjusted to bring to account
revenue and expense transactions when they occur rather than when the
applicable cash flow(s) arises. Funnell (2003, p. 119) points out that
(a)ccrual accounting was attributed by parliament with the ability to
obscure parliament’s superintendence of government expenditure. It
was apparent to parliament that accrual accounting introduced what
was an unnecessary complication and increased the opportunities for
malversation in public finance.
Because the Treasury view was that accrual accounting involved
allocating costs between years on the basis of resource use rather than
cash funding, accrual accounting was considered to be “incompatible with
Parliamentary sovereignty and therefore unacceptable” (Perrin, 1998, p.8).
Accordingly, because Parliament voted cash funding on a year-by-year
basis, “the main control accounts, reports and accountability must be on
an annual cash basis” (Perrin, 1998, p. 8).

Between these two extremes are numerous variations, the two most prominent
being “modified accrual accounting”, and “modified cash accounting”. The
former differs from accrual accounting in that physical assets are expensed at
the time of purchase while the latter differs from cash accounting in that, in a
government institution, it recognises receipts and disbursements committed in
the budget year and allows a specified period after year-end for payments of
these to be recorded and reported (International Monetary Fund, 2007, p. 129).
While “full accrual” is the method that has been used to date predominantly in
commerce, today it is being slowly introduced into government.
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But one of the main virtues of (DEB) is that it facilitates the
preparation of accruals-based financial statements and, where this is
not a priority, the case for the introduction of a more sophisticated
method of record keeping is less strong (Coombs et al.,1994, p. 170).

Estimating bases
Recording expenditure by either CAD or DEB requires selection of a base which
can be used in the estimation of expenditure, government or otherwise. The first
basis, known as the “subjective basis” (BPP 1950 (Cmd. 7969), classifies the
expenditure according to its subject or nature under primary account heads,
such as salaries or the purchase of stores. While there is a strong argument in
favour of the subjective basis in that there is accounting simplicity, there is an
equally strong argument against it in that it is impracticable in situations where
there are numerous locations of an activity as in a large department such as the
Navy. Hence the need for the second basis, known as the “objective (or
purposes) basis”, which classifies the expenditure according to its object or
purpose, such as navy dockyards or fleet manoeuvres. Funnell (1997, p. 21)
notes that, a substantial shortcoming of the mechanism of appropriation and
required reporting after 1846, from the point of view of assuring an efficient and
effective military force and aiding parliamentary surveillance of expenditure, was
the emphasis on appropriating to “subjects” of expenditure which “was entirely
consistent with concern primarily for financial accountability, although not with
efficient, economical and effective administration”.35 The concern with financial
accountability was a requirement of the then existent constitutionally-based
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The following statement was made in evidence before a sub-committee of the Select
Committee on Public Accounts by Charles Harris, the Assistant Financial Secretary to the War
Office in regard to estimating bases. “You cannot control administration by controlling expenses
on subjects. If you want to control administration by appropriation you must appropriate to
objects” (Select Committee on National Expenditure, Session 1918.Seventh Report, p. 63).

76

system of accounting which “was the honed product of more than three hundred
years of constitutional practice since it was introduced in 1689 as part of the
constitutional settlement after the Glorious Revolution” (Funnell, 2006, p. 741).

2.3.3 Uniting the Exchequer and Audit under the control of
Parliament
In this section, the third of the preliminary requirements for an effective ‘circle of
control’ will be examined. From the time of the Norman Conquest in 1066 up to
the reign of Henry VII from 1485 to 1509, the principal financial officers of
England were those of the Court of Exchequer. According to the Dialogus de
Scaccario (Dialogue of the Exchequer), which was possibly the first western
book on accounting (Jones, 2008, p. 443), the original form of the Exchequer
consisted of two parts, the Upper and the Lower Exchequer, or the Court of
Account and the Court of Receipt. As the latter name implies this was where
money was disbursed, to be recorded in writing and on tallies, and later
accounted for by the recipient of the disbursement in the Court of Account. The
Exchequer had occupied a central position until the Restoration when the Lord
High Treasurer and the Commissioners became separated from it to form the
Treasury to which passed the superintendence of financial affairs. The functions
of the Exchequer became confined to the receipt of public money and to its
lawful use, to record and to audit (Chubb, 1952, p. 12). The Exchequer merely
controlled the issue of money and, it would seem, inefficiently and as such it
was useless as an impartial check on public spending (Chubb, 1952, p. 13).

Eventually change was made and the Exchequer’s main function was to
ensure, on behalf of Parliament, that all issues, now from the Bank of England,
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were legal (Chubb, 1952, p. 13). Parliament’s belief that “it could control
expenditure by putting checks on the issue of money from the Exchequer
instead of ascertaining how the money had been spent” (BPP 1902(387) Q.
2508) continues to surprise, particularly as men such as William Pitt and Robert
Peel, who had been Chancellors of the Exchequer in the past, appear to have
been oblivious to this defect which was to remain unremedied for many years.
The attention of Parliament was again drawn to the subject in 1834 when the
old Exchequer was abolished and custody of public money was entrusted to a
newly created officer independent of the executive government, the Comptroller
of the Exchequer, whose duty it was to not allow an issue from the Exchequer
except in accordance with the Act of Parliament.

The absence of controls on the expenditure of money was a remarkable
omission in parliamentary control which remained unremedied until 1866.
However, in 1831 an important but isolated measure had been adopted in the
Navy which laid a foundation for reform in 1866. In 1831, James Graham
(hereafter Graham) was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty and in his speech
in moving the Navy estimates of 1831 informed the Commons that
works of great extent in the department of the naval service had been
begun, completed, and paid for, without the knowledge or sanction of
Parliament, or without the subject having once been brought under
the notice of the House of Commons. These works were paid for out
of the surplus from other votes, which were greater than was needed
for the purpose to which it was intended they should be applied
(Hansard, Third Series Vol. 2, February 1831, Cols. 947-993).
Graham was referring to work such as the buildings that had been constructed
by the Victualling Board at Weovil and Cremill Point. The transfer of funds
allotted for purposes or services under a vote to purposes or services under
other votes of the same department is referred to as ‘virement’. However, the
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power of virement was not allowed outside the armed services mainly because
most of the civil votes were for quite dissimilar purposes, for example the
Caledonian Canal and the Jewel Office of the Tower of London. A review of
Hansard indicates that the use of the term in the Commons did not become
prevalent until the latter part of the 19th century when it was used to refer to
underhanded or unscrupulous behaviour. As an example: “Under the French
Empire the system of virements grew up by which enormous sums were voted
in one way and applied in another, involving immense abuse” (Hansard, Third
Series Vol. 297, April 1885, Cols. 825-847).

In relation to the Navy, Graham said that he and Joseph Hume had often
together ‘fought the estimates’ but they had omitted to insist upon the
implementation of a system which provided Parliament with an annual ‘balancesheet’ showing the actual expenditure under each head for the Navy and
Victualling Boards (Hansard, Third Series Vol. 2, February 1831, Cols. 947993). Although the work for Victualling were blatant departures from both the
letter and the spirit of parliamentary appropriation, the Committee for Public
Accounts in their Second Report described such activity as an Admiralty “habit”
(BPP 1862(414), p. iv). In 1832 Parliament passed the Admiralty Act,361832 (2
& 3 Will.4) c. 40 which, as well as abolishing the Navy and Victualling Boards,
required the Admiralty to prepare annually an account “of the Naval Receipt
and Expenditure of the year ending on the Thirty-first Day of March preceding,
distinguishing the Expenditure under the several Heads of Naval Service, as

36

Also referred to as the “Navy Civil Departments Act” and the “Civil Departments Act”.
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expressed in the Appropriation Act or Acts for that year” 1832 (2 & 3 Will. 4) c.
40, cl. XXX).

On completion of an audit and certification of the accounts, the Commissioners
for Auditing the Public Accounts were required under this Act to provide the
Commons with a copy of the accounts “noting under each Head whether the
Expenditure has exceeded or fallen short of the Sums voted by Parliament for
the Naval Service of the year” ((2 & 3 Will. 4) c. 40, cl. XXX). This practice of
presenting appropriation accounts, which commenced in the Admiralty, was
extended to the War Office and Ordnance Office in 1846 and to the Office of
Woods and Works in 1851. In 1861 legislation was enacted that required
revenue departments to present appropriation accounts and the obligation was
extended throughout government with the enactment of the Exchequer and
Audit Departments Act, 1866 (29 and 30 Vict) c. 39.

The 1866 Act, however, was deficient in that it made no reference to the
treatment of any under-or over-expenditure of the total Parliamentary grants in
a financial year. An unexpended balance (or “balance unappropriated”) of
£424,225 occurred in the Navy in the financial year ended 31 March 1833
which was the year in which the Admiralty Act was enacted and, by an
arrangement between the Admiralty and Treasury, it was decided that the
balance should be carried to Ways and Means for the following year. This
practice was followed in subsequent years until the year ended 31 March 1840
when there was a net excess expenditure of £34,726 but through the utilisation
of an unexpended balance of £5,031 brought forward from the year ended 31
March 1839, this was reduced to £29,694. When the accounts for 1839 were
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prepared, this balance was available to Ways and Means but as the Admiralty
accounts did not include the expenditure for the bases at Trincomalee in
Ceylon or the Cape of Good Hope, an application was made to Treasury for the
sanction to retain the balance in the Exchequer to the credit of the Navy in
order to defray that ‘late’ expenditure. However, as the balance was insufficient
to defray the ‘late’ expenditure it was necessary to apply to Parliament to vote
the amount of the insufficiency (Hansard, Third Series Vol. 56, March 1841,
Col. 1159). This was to be the practice in future years when over-expenditure
occurred.

Prior to enactment of the Admiralty Act, unexpended balances at the end of a
financial year remained in the Exchequer to the credit of the Navy and were
expended by the Admiralty either to offset any excess expenditure or for any
purpose deemed beneficial to the public service. It was these credits that had
enabled the Admiralty to erect the buildings at Weovil and Cremill Point without
the knowledge or sanction of Parliament, actions that were strongly condemned
in Parliament in 1832 by Graham, prior to the enactment of the Admiralty Act
that year. The Admiralty, however, continued to retain the power of virement,
without the sanction of Treasury, provided the aggregate grant was not
exceeded; this view was taken by the Admiralty until 1846. The Committee for
the Public Accounts in their Second Report (BPP 1862 (414) p .iv) stated “(i)n
1845 an alteration was made in the Appropriation Act, and the power of the
Admiralty and Treasury was put on the present footing”. Scrutiny of the
Appropriation Acts for both 1844 and 1845 reveals that the same wording was
used, namely, “Supplies to be applied only for the Purposes aforesaid”. In 1846
however, a new section was introduced into the Appropriation Act which
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allowed the Navy, Army and Ordnance, with the approval of Treasury, to
expend their grants in proportions that were different from those in the grant,
but as long as the total expenditure did not exceed that the total amount
granted (1846 (9 & 10 Vict.) c. 116, cl. XXIV) (also see Treasury Minute of 8
September 1846 in BPP 1856(160), p. 11).

The first supply appropriation by this Act was an amount of £44,420 “(f)or
Excess of Naval Expenditure over Grants of 1844” (Clause XI). In 1862 the
Appropriation Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict.) c. 71, cl. 26 removed the power that
Treasury had been conferred with between 1846 and 1861 of appropriating
surpluses on some grants to cover deficiencies on others within the same
department. “Treasury may in certain Cases of Exigency, authorize Expenditure
unprovided for; provided that the aggregate Grants for the Navy Services and
the Army Services respectively be not exceeded”. Treasury considered that the
intention of this enactment was “to carry into effect the recommendation
contained in the Second Report of the Committee of Public Accounts of last
Session – that “a Vote would then be proposed to meet any deficiencies, and
the surpluses would then be surrendered to the Exchequer” (Treasury Minute
27 January 1863 in BPP 1937-38(154), p. 14). Finally, in 1863, by way of a
Treasury Minute of 27 January, the practice of virement was restricted within
definite and clearly laid-out limits (BPP 1937-38(154), p. 14). In the same year
the system of “formalised appropriation audits” (Funnell, 1997, p. 15) in force in
the Navy was introduced to the Army Departments. Although these
departments had the same power of transfer within their respective grants as
the Admiralty, no transfer could be made between each other.
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Funnell (1997, p. 15) sees the appropriation audits on behalf of Parliament as
being “a watershed in state audit” as “(t)hey represented a dramatic change to
the system of audit which had been instituted at the close of the 18th century”.
At the same time, Graham introduced a revised and enlarged classification of
estimates. Henceforth, the Admiralty had to not only provide accurate estimates
of expenditure; it also had to account accurately for the actual expenditure. The
precedent thus created was applied in later years to other departments,
providing the model on which the appropriation accounts of public expenditure
were rendered. This was the first instance of providing the Commons with a
return of actual expenditure. However, as Welby noted, it was an isolated
instance, applying to only one branch of expenditure, and there was no
provision in the Act which forced the Commons to pass judgement on the
account, “it practically passed year by year without the notice (from Parliament)
which it is really deserved”, (BPP 1902(387), App. 13, p. 229).That was until in
1866 when the changes were made universal by the Exchequer and Audit
Departments Act, 1866 (29 & 30 Vict.) c. 39. Welby observed that
(t)he passing of the Exchequer and Audit Act marks the final stage in
the working out our system of financial control over public
expenditure. The House of Commons learned at last that it could not
ensure correct appropriation by cumbrous checks imposed before
the expenditure took place, and that it could only enforce its control
by early audit of the expenditure after it had taken place, and by
examining itself the results of that audit (BPP 1902(387) App. 13, p.
230).
The Act required departments to present appropriation accounts and an
explanatory statement of any excess of expenditure over the grant or grants.
The Comptroller and Auditor General was required to examine these accounts
on behalf of the Commons in order to ascertain first, whether the payments are
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properly supported and, second, whether the money expended has been
applied to the purpose for which the money was intended to provide.

The development of the Commons’ appropriation procedures on one hand,
and the implementation of efficient exchequer and audit checks and their
transfer from executive to parliamentary control on the other were the
necessary prerequisites for effective supervision of executive spending by
Parliament. All that was required to complete the ‘circle of control’ was the
emergence of a committee of the

Common to examine the results of the

audits. “On 31 March 1862, Gladstone moved for a select committee ‘who shall
be nominated at the commencement of every session’ and on 3 April he moved
that the resolution of 31 March should be a Standing Order of the Commons.
The Committee was now a permanent piece of the Commons’ financial
machinery” (Chubb, 1952, p. 32).

2.4 Financial control of expenditure
During the reign of Charles II (1660-1685), Parliament on one occasion
appointed Commissioners of Accounts to ascertain how money granted for the
continued prosecution of the second Anglo-Dutch war (1665-87) had been
expended. It was on that occasion, even before the Revolution, that Parliament
grasped the meaning of real control in as much as it was not satisfied with
directing beforehand that its grant should be appropriated for a specific object.
Instead, Parliament sought to ascertain through its Commissioners that the
money had been actually expended on that object (BPP 1902(387) App. 13). In
his speech to both Houses of Parliament on 21 September 1666, at the
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commencement of the seventh session of the second Parliament, Charles II
made reference to the existing war with the Dutch and the need for fresh supply
in order to prosecute the war. The Commons, in reply, unanimously resolved
that ”the humble and hearty thanks of the House be returned to his Majesty, for
his great Care in the management of the present War and that this House will
supply his Majesty proportionably to his present Occasions” (JHC: vol. 8: 16601667 (1802), pp. 625-626). Although Charles was to receive eventually a royal
Aid of £1.8 million37 for carrying on the war, the effect of the Commons’ largesse
was somewhat diffused when on the same day it had voted him thanks it had
also resolved that “Tuesday next be appointed for the officers of his Majesty’s
Navy, Ordnance, and Stores to bring in their Accompts” (JHC: vol. 8: 1660-1667
(1802) pp. 625-626)). William Shaw, who edited the Calendar of Treasury
Books, however considered that
(i)t was perfectly natural that before considering further supply the
Commons should call for an account of the expenditure of the
moneys raised. … in order to see how much of the credits raised
thereby still remained unexpended. The next step would be to
estimate the probable cost of the war for the coming months, and
then the Commons would have an idea of the amount of further
supply which would be necessary. … It was not an unfriendly act
directed in a moment of suspicion against the King’s administration, it
was simply the most methodical way the Commons had of preparing
for itself those estimates which in later and happier times would have
been prepared for it by the various departments (‘Introduction’;
Calendar of Treasury Books, Volume 2: 1667-1668 (1905)).
Charles raised no objections and accordingly the required accounts were
delivered by his executive to the Commons on the appointed day, following

37

”A great sum”, Pepys observed, “were it not for the debts which swallowed almost all of it”
(Pepys’ Diary, 13 October, 1666).
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which the Commons appointed a committee to inspect them. Pepys’ comments
in respect to the quality of the Navy’s accounting at the time are telling.
Saturday 22 September 1666
… I to the office again, and then to Sir G. Carteret38, and there found
Mr Wayth, but Lord! how fretfully Sir G. Carteret do discourse with Mr
Wayth about his accounts, like a man that understands them not one
word. I hold my tongue and let him go on like a passionate foole.
Sunday 23 September 1666I by water to White Hall and there at Sir
G. Carteret’s lodgings Sir W. Coventry39 met, and we did debate the
whole business of our accounts to the Parliament; where it appears
to us that the charge of the war from September 1st, 1664, to this
Michaelmas40, will have been but £3,200,000, and we have paid in
that time somewhat about £2,200,000; so that we owe about
£900,000: but our method of accounting, though it cannot, I believe,
be far wide from the mark, yet will not abide a strict examination if the
Parliament should be troublesome. Here happened a pretty question
of Sir W. Coventry, whether this account of ours will not put my Lord
Treasurer to such difficulty to tell what is become of all the money the
Parliament have ‘give’ in this time for the war, which hath amounted
to about £4,000,000, which nobody there could answer; but I
perceive they did doubt what his answer could be ... and I to the
office till midnight drawing the letter we are to send with our accounts
to my Lord Treasurer.
Monday 24 September 1666
... and up and down to look for Sir W. Coventry; and at last found him
and Sir G. Carteret with the Lord Treasurer at White Hall, consulting
how to make up my Lord Treasurer’s general account, as well as that
of the Navy particularly. Here brought the letter, but found that Sir G.
Carteret had altered his account since he did give me the abstract of
it: so all my letter must be writ over again, to put in his last abstract.
Tuesday 25 September 1666
... with all my people to get the letter writ over, and other things done,
which I did, and by coach to Lord Bruncker’s (sic), and got his hand
to it; and then to Parliament Commons and got it signed by the rest,
and then delivered it at the Commons-door to Sir Philip Warwicke; Sir
G. Carteret being gone into the Commons with his book of accounts
under his arme, to present to the Commons ... and then to the office,
where Mr Hater all day putting in order and entering in a book all the
measures that this account of the Navy hath been made up by.

38

Then 'Treasurer of the Navy’.
A ‘Commissioner of the Treasury'.
40
29 September 1666
39
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Wednesday 26 September 1666
... I to Sir W. Batten, and there hear our business was tendered to
the Commons to-day, and a Committee of the whole Commons
chosen to examine our accounts, and a great many Hotspurs
enquiring into it, and likely to give us much trouble and blame, and
perhaps (which I am afeard of) will find faults enow to demand better
officers. This I truly fear (Diary of Samuel Pepys).
On Wednesday, 26 September 1666 Carteret produced “a Book of Accompt of
the Public Monies, by way of Charge and Discharge: Part of which he read to
the House; and delivered the Book in at the Clerk’s Table” (JHC: vol. 8: 16601667 (1802), pp. 627-628).

Although Pepys made no reference to it in his diary, Tanner referred to a letter
from the Navy Board to the Lord Treasurer (MS. 2859, p. 13) dated 24
September 1666, intended for the information of Parliament, just then about to
meet, which supplied the following details (Figure 2.2).
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FIGURE 2.2

Navy expenses between 1 Sept. 1664 and 29 Sept. 1666

Bills due but not made out
Wages – to officers and seamen

£1,003,605

1,114,326

Victuals

743,238

Ordinary and extra of yards and ropery

209,792

Sick and wounded

72,000

Admiral’s Regiment

45,479

Widows and orphans

12,076

TOTAL

£3,200,516

As Tanner points out, “(o)f this total, only £2,270,020 had been actually paid,
leaving a deficit of £930,496 to be accounted for” (Tanner, 1897, p. 31).

The above table is an excerpt from the letter prepared by Pepys and his staff on
23/24 September 1666 which was to accompany the accounts that were
submitted by Carteret. The letter supports Pepys’ diary entry of 23 September
that the Navy “owed” in excess of £900,000. However, the situation was much
worse as the above figures did not take into consideration a number of ‘bigticket’ items such as 10 new ships that had been ordered but which had been
hidden or ‘forgotten’ by Pepys in his letter to Parliament. Maybe this was just a
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further example of ‘the ingenuity and sheer political cunning of Samuel Pepys’
(Davies, 2010, p. xv). The Commons however were by no means disposed to
accept only the explanations provided by Carteret and, as a result, Pepys was
also called to account by the Committee of Accounts that October. With
admirable courage and presence of mind, he quietly and effectively bore the
brunt of the questioning undefeated (Bryant, 1933, p. 310).

It is obvious that the mode of accounting and the quality of the records were
only basic and hence it is understandable why Pepys was very satisfied that he
and William Coventry were able to prepare a set of accounts for the inspection
of Parliament while admitting “our method of accounting, though it cannot, I
believe, be far wide of the mark, yet will not abide a strict examination if the
Parliament should be troublesome”. From the comments made by Pepys,
Chubb’s (1952, p. 15) description of departmental accounting records as being
“embryonic” is apt.

From the Journal of the House of Commons it is obvious the Commons
remained very uneasy about the reliability of the accounts as exemplified by a
proposal made in November 1666 for legislation to be introduced requiring
individuals ‘assisting’ the committee with their inspection of the accounts to do
so under oath. Although the proposal was lost on a vote the Commons then
proposed that they should join with the Lords in forming a joint committee to
examine the accounts under oath. The Lords, however, were thus placed in a
very poor position with both the King and the Commons as constitutionally the
executive was answerable to the King and not Parliament. So as not to create
difficulties for themselves with either party, the Lords tried to save themselves
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by searching for a precedent regarding the form of the joint committee.
Eventually ways were found for the king and Parliament to navigate their ways
through this difficult situation; the result was that it was the king who issued a
commission for the inspection of the public accounts and, in doing so, named
those he had chosen to be commissioners. This occurred on 29 December 1666
and was followed by Parliament being prorogued by the king on 8 February
1667.

While the situation appeared to reach a conclusion during the following month
during which the king issued his commission for the taking and examining the
accounts of the monies voted for the war, the situation changed dramatically
when the Dutch raided the Navy’s base in the Medway River on 12 June 1667,
which followed the Great Fire of London of September 1666. A vengeful
Parliament demanded to know why the First Dutch War, fought a dozen years
earlier, had resulted in a resounding victory, while the Second, in spite of the
generous grants by Parliament, had resulted in defeat. Parliament was very
sure that only the “grossest corruption could explain the inadequacy of the huge
sums they had voted” (Rodger, 2005, p. 101).
For the Commons with their Hotspurs enquiring into all things, were
in a nasty temper; men said that the King had received two millions
more for the war than he could account for, and though these
accusations were not supported by figures, they were universally
believed (Bryant, 1933, p. 310).
However, Pepys, in his diary of 10 October 1666, had prepared a statement of
the situation, as follows.
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FIGURE 2.3

Charles’ ‘lost millions’

Royal Ayde
More
Three months tax given the King by a power
of raising a month’s tax of £70,000 every year
for three years
Customes, out of which the King did promise to
pay £240,000, which for two years comes to
Prizes, which they moderately reckon at
A debt declared by the Navy, by us
The whole charge of the Navy, as we state it
for two years and a month, hath been but
So what is become of all this sum?

£2,450,000
1,250,000

210,000
480,000
300,000
900,000
£5,590,000
3,200,000
£2,390,000

(Source: Diary of Samuel Pepys)

This was a very large amount to have been ‘lost’ but the situation was
exacerbated by the continuing financial crisis and as a result Parliament
commenced a search for scapegoats. As the king understandably did not wish
to continue with the matter of the accounts, he left Parliament to it: “Examine
them in what way and as strictly as you please” (‘Introduction’, Calendar of
Treasury Books, Volume 2: 1667-1668 (1905)). Charles II’s Commission of
Accounts was no more.

Three committees investigated the “grossest corruption”, the Parliamentary
Committee on Miscarriages (1667), the Public Accounts Committee (1668-9),
and the Brooke House Commission (1667-9) which was a royal commission of
salaried experts. The Navy Board was the target of each of the committees and
Pepys was the Navy Board's chief defender, an easy target “being its youngest
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member, and the only one with no social, political or naval standing” (Rodger,
2005, p. 101) He was to emerge from the hearings, however, with his reputation
as a technical expert intact. Carteret’s accounts though were found to be
defective and that over £500,000 had been spent on other naval uses, mainly
pre-war debts, “but many chose to understand that the money had been illegally
diverted into the pockets of the king, his mistresses, or his naval
administrators”(Rodger, 2005, p. 101).

Under the financial pressure of the wars that William III and Anne had to
contend with, other commissions were appointed to examine the accounts, but
these commissions were of a party character, with the result that the reports
were prepared for party purposes and hence not trustworthy (BPP 1902(387),
App. 13, p. 228). Furthermore, because the commissioners and commissions
did not trust the administration, they often made up their own accounts. The
major difficulty though was that there was no link of responsibility between the
executive and legislature (Chubb, 1952, p. 15). During the “long peace” in the
first half of the 18th century, there was no demand for such commissions and it
was not until late in that century that a commission of examination of the public
accounts (the Commission Appointed to Examine, Take, and State the Public
Accounts of the Kingdom 1780-1786) was instituted. While this commission was
greatly acclaimed by many when its reports were published, it had no continuity
and had none of the elements of an audit (BPP 1902(387) App. 13, p. 228).

The legislation for the first post-Revolution commission received royal assent in
January 1691 by which commissioners were appointed and enabled to examine,
take and state the public accounts of the kingdom for the purpose of scrutinising
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government revenue and expenditure. “Country” politicians of both Whig and
Tory persuasion, men such as William Clarges, Thomas Foley and Robert
Harley, played the part of fiscal watchdogs, using the power of the commission
to requisition departmental accounts and to examine administrative expenditure.
The commission was another instance of the Commons’ determination to set
financial constraints on the Crown and to ensure that the Commons exacted the
right to detailed scrutiny of public monies in return for its unprecedented grants
of revenue. The commissions were also major sources of fiscal ideas and
financial information for those who wanted to cut government expenditure to a
bare minimum, attempting to be frugal by good management. In 1694-5 the
Commons ordered the commissioners to examine the receipts of the various
revenue departments and prepare accounts for each of them. These accounts
were examined by the Commons in “Grand Committee” from which a series of
resolutions issued laid down limits for civil service expenditure and had a
decisive bearing on the matter of Parliamentary control of the nation’s finances
in the future.

Although these commissions had none of the elements of an audit, there was
an audit conducted by officers of the Exchequer under regulations framed for
the times of the Tudors and Stuart’s by Elizabeth in 1560 when she revived the
two “auditors of imprests” who had been members of the Court of
Augmentations which had been amalgamated with the Exchequer in 1554
(Roseveare, 1969, pp. 41-42). It was left unaltered at the Revolution and for
nearly a century afterwards “it limped leisurely along, so much so, that in 1782
great accounts of 20 to 30 years old were still open, and there were accounts
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not yet settled which went back to the reign of William III” (BPP 1902(387)).
Roseveare (1969, p. 125) described the Exchequer audit as follows:
Ever since the restoration of its control in the mid sixteenth century,
the mills of the Exchequer had ground fine but exceedingly slow. And
they were invariably grinding the wrong things. Accounts were fed
into it ... twenty or more years later they might re-emerge, their
authenticity approved. But it was a spurious authenticity, a mere
arithmetical, formalistic check of expenditure against authorisation.
Furthermore, this “limping audit”, as it was described by

Welby, the ex-

permanent secretary of Treasury, in a memorandum he submitted to the Select
Committee on National Expenditure in 1902 (BPP 1902(387) App. 13, p. 228),
was not an audit for Parliament. The audit reports were not submitted to
Parliament as they were declared before and passed by the Treasury and
Treasury’s authority was never questioned (BPP 1902(387) App. 13, p. 228). It
was time for a complete review of national accounting that would bring
“together within one coherent system the whole ebb and flow of expenditure
and receipt, subject to independent audit” (BPP 1902(387) App. 13, p. 13). As
to the provision of accurate and useful accounts to Parliament, there was a
total absence of reports from the June of the Revolution until 1802. Welby
reminded the committee that
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It is important ... to note that the returns presented to Parliament,
such as the Finance Accounts, were not based upon the results of
this audit. The public revenue is paid into the Exchequer, and money
required for the public services is issued from the Exchequer, but
issues from the Exchequer do not represent actual expenditure. They
are imprests to the different Departments, and the Departments
defray the actual expenditure of the State out of those imprests. The
statements of expenditure in the budget, in the Finance Accounts,
and in almost all other accounts laid before Parliament, did not give
the actual expenditure of the issues from the Exchequer. The
Appropriation Accounts alone give the audited expenditure. It will be
seen, then, that from the Revolution until 1802, the Commons
received no information as to the public expenditure except that
which the Chancellor of the Exchequer might think fit to give them in
his budget speech and that was usually of very meagre character. It
may be added that from 1802 to 1866 (the date of the Exchequer and
Audit Act) the House learned only the issues from the Exchequer.
Thus it knew the sums which had been imprested to the Departments
from the Exchequer; it did not know how the Departments had
actually expended those imprests.
Here was the great blot of our financial system. Defects in the
Estimates and in the method of voting them were gradually removed,
but the chief defect of all, that the Commons did not know how its
grants had been expended, remained unremedied until the
Exchequer and Audit Act (1866) came into force (BPP 1902(387)
App. 13, p. 228)41.
The “Finance Account” is an account of public revenues and issues from the
Exchequer (Chubb, 1952, p. 19, fn. 1). An Appropriation Account shows on one
side the sums appropriated, and on the discharge side the sums finally paid
during the year (BPP 1868-69(366) (366-1), p. 330). When questioned by the
Chairman of the Select Committee on National Expenditure as to why he had
said in his memorandum, referred to above, “the Finance Accounts were not
based on the results of (an) audit”, Welby replied that,

41

An excerpt from Welby’s important paper is shown in Appendix 2.1.

95

The whole of our financial system is based upon the principle of
getting financial facts as quickly as possible into the hands of the
Members of the House of Commons. For that purpose the accounts
ordinarily used by Members of Parliament are based on Exchequer
issues ... It is clear that if we want a system of actual receipts and
payments of the year such an account as that could not be available
for many months (BPP 1902(387), Q.2510).
The question that needed to be answered was whether the presentation to
members of Parliament of national accounts in which ‘expenditure’ was based
on issues from the Exchequer was of little or no use to Parliament. Many would
argue that without the use of the final figures, such reports would be useless.
Welby, however, was a pragmatist:
It may be objected to our system that an account based upon
imprests is a very imperfect account. But practically, it is not; it is
quite sufficient for all practical purposes. I remember at the Treasury
... in ordinary times I considered that the audited expenditure should
not differ from the Exchequer imprests by more than a quarter of a
million. Therefore, for all practical purposes the account based on
Exchequer issues is one upon which the House of Commons can
rely for practical purposes (BPP 1902(387), Q. 2510)
As noted earlier, it was considered that the greatest defect in government
financial control was that Parliament did not know how its grants had been
expended and this was not remedied until the advent of the Exchequer and
Audit Departments Act of 1866. Welby points out that “it is singular that two of
our greatest Chancellors of the Exchequer, Mr. Pitt or Sir Robert Peel, did not
seize the point”. He goes on to point out that “(i)t is more singular as regards
Mr. Pitt because he reformed the system of audit, he swept away the old audit
by Officers of the Exchequer, and transferred the duty to a new authority, the
Board of Audit” (BPP 1902(387), App. 13, p. 228) but in so doing he made no
provision for laying the audit results before the Commons. This was
compounded by a fundamental error occurring in that some of the wording of
the old patent had been brought forward to the patent of the new auditors The
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error, which was pointed out by Lord Monteagle in his “Observations upon the
Memorandum on Financial Control”(BPP 1857 Session 2 (279), pp. 67-130)
was that the auditors continued to be “empowered to audit and determine
accounts “by and with the advice, authority, and consent of the Treasury and
Chancellor of the Exchequer”” (BPP 1857 Session 2 (279), p. 96) with the
consequence that “the Treasury and the Chancellor of the Exchequer were
rendered necessary parties to the audit of every account” (BPP 1857 Session 2
(279), p. 96). Under such circumstances it was not possible for the Audit Board
to be independent of the executive. Reform had to await the recommendations
of the Select Committee on Public Monies of 1857 concerning the position of
the Audit Board (BPP 1857 Session 2 (279), p.6) which were embodied in the
Exchequer and Audit Departments Act and which were to profoundly alter the
situation firstly, by uniting the Exchequer and the Audit Departments and
secondly, by creating a position of Comptroller and Auditor General
independent of Treasury.

2.5 Reforms in financial control
The British Constitution was based upon a balance between the king,
Parliament and the executive and when as most famously during the American
War of Independence it was perceived that the balance had been disturbed and
the independence of Parliament was threatened, calls for reform were received
by the Whigs who had been out of power for a considerable time. As a
consequence, the winter of 1779-80 “saw the beginning of a movement which
was to introduce into public life a new morality, into finance a new probity, and
into government as a whole new standard of efficiency and economy”
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(Roseveare, 1969, p. 118). This was the Economical Reform Movement, the
principal object of which was finding the means of diminishing the system of
royal and ministerial influence and of restoring the true balance of the
Constitution. The petitions from the counties emboldened the opposition in
Parliament which led to Dunning’s resolution of 1780 that the influence of the
Crown had increased, was increasing, and ought to be diminished (but not
abolished), and Burke’s Civil Establishment Bill which reached the committee
stage. The reduction of Crown patronage had to await administrative reform by
government over the next 50 years as the legislation passed in 1782 when the
Rockingham group was in power proved to be ineffectual.

In the interest of efficiency, the administrative reforms were carried out largely
on the initiative of the king’s ministers (Kemp, 1968, p. 103), and began with
two great government enquiries, the Public Accounts Commission of 1780
which reviewed the methods and organisation of the government departments
concerned with the collection and spending of revenue, and the Fees
Commission of 1785 which reviewed the numbers, duties, and payment of
public servants in the major departments (Kemp, 1968, p. 104). There were
other parliamentary committees such as the Finance Committees of 1782,
1786, 1791, and 1797 but “it is significant that the most far-reaching reform
proposals of the 1780’s came not from the parliamentary opponents of the
ministry ... but from middle and high-ranking officials within administration (such
as) Sir Charles Middleton ... the Comptroller of the Navy” (Brewer, 1988, p.86).
They were individuals who were concerned with the securing a better
regulation of business (Kemp, 1968, p. 104).
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The result of these administrative reforms was a very large reduction in the
patronage left to the king with the result that government ministers raised
concerns that it was not adequate for the purpose of linking king and Commons
(Kemp, 1968. p. 107). The elimination or reduction of the various forms of
influence reduced the power of Ministers to control the Commons and was a
factor in the increase in

its power

and the greater dependence of the

Executive upon it (Chester, 1981, p. 78). However, influence was very far from
being destroyed by the reforms that were made. It was not until after the
Reform Act (the Representation of the People Act), 1832 (2&3 Will. 4) c. 45 that
the ministries began to be significantly independent of the favour of the Crown.

By the mid-19th century, Blackstone’s assertion that “supreme executive power
of these kingdoms is vested by our laws in a single person, the king or queen”,
could no longer be supported for by then “the Executive power and the power
of Legislation were virtually united in the same hands” (Chester, 1981, p. 81).
Nevertheless, the transfer of power which had occurred did not see a change in
the legal basis of the Constitution and as a result there was no requirement for
the promulgation of new laws or regulations. The administrative system
continued as before except that the king’s powers and status remained, with
the king de facto even though they had passed to the cabinet de jure (Chester,
1981, p. 82).

As mentioned above, the administrative reforms began in the 1780’s with two
great government enquiries: the first was a statutory commission that was
required to “examine, take and state the Public Accounts of the kingdom; and
to report what balances are in the hands of Accountants which may be applied
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to the public service; and what defects there are in the present Mode of
receiving, collecting, issuing, and accounting for public Money”.42
Towards the end of the American war numerous Petitions were
presented to Parliament by different Counties and Public Bodies,
praying for reform in the Public Expenditure; in consequence of
which, and of the large expenses which gave occasion to them, an
Act was passed, (1780) 20 Geo III c. 54 (BPP 1810(371-1), p. 15).
The decision to appoint a ‘statutory commission’ and not a ‘committee’ was
based upon the Commons being unable to invest a committee with the power
of calling for documents of all sorts or of examining witnesses under oath. The
Commission for Public Accounts presented 15 reports dated from November
1780 to December 1786.
The merits of these Reports are well known. They are remarkable for
the distinctness and perspicuity of the style, and the great accuracy
of their details, and contain a greater mass of information, relative to
the mode of transacting business in some of the most important
Public Departments, than can elsewhere be found.
The subjects treated of in these Reports are of great importance and
variety, and may be classed under the following heads.
1st. Balances in the hands of Receivers of the Land Tax and other
descriptions of Accountants, especially the Treasurers of the Navy
and Paymasters General of the Army.
2nd. Pay of the Army and the Navy, and the stoppages and
deductions to which such Pay was liable.
3rd. Nature and constitution of the Army and Navy Pay Offices, of the
Receipt of the Exchequer, and Auditors of the Imprests.
4th. Manner in which the Auditors of the Imprest examined and
passed the following Public Accounts; viz. those of the army, Navy,
Army Extraordinaries and Widows Pensions, Bank, Ordnance, and
Customs.

42

For the sake of brevity, this commission is referred to as the “Commission for Public
Accounts”
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5th. Management of the Customs Duties, in the Port of London and
the Outports (BPP 1810(371-1), p. 15).
The Select Committee on Public Expenditure, which was appointed to examine
and consider what regulations and checks had been established in order to
control public expenditure, their effectiveness, and whether further such
measures should be established, pointed out that although a number of
suggestions contained in the reports of the Commission for Public Accounts
had been adopted, “many useful recommendations your Committee observe
have been hitherto overlooked or neglected” (BPP 1810(371-1), p. 15). Even
so, two of the most important consequences of the Commission’s reports were
that they reduced the ignorance of parliamentarians in regard to the
administrative processes within government and they provided templates for
future reform in those processes against which progress in reform could be
measured.

From both their acceptance and the administrative reforms arising, the reports
played a small but significant part in the transition to DEB in the public
departments (Edwards and Greener., 2003, p. 52). The Commissioners had
enunciated “principles that are fundamental to that improvement and
modernization that has taken place since, and are now accepted as a matter of
course, but which in those days wore a certain air of novelty” (Binney, 1958, p.
14). After summarising the principles, Binney (1958, p. 15) concluded that
(i)t needs little consideration that these principles all tend towards
economy, efficiency, and purity in public administration – or that they
constitute a serious reflection upon the state in which the
administration had been allowed to remain.
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In February 1785 Pitt brought the reports of the Commissioners before the
Commons and announced his intention to put into effect the reforms they had
proposed.

The subsequent legislative output of his government was impressive, and it
commenced with the appointment in 1785 of the Commission on Fees and
Emoluments (25 Geo. III, c. 19), which was the other great enquiry that Kemp
(1968, p. 104) refers to, for the purpose of enquiring into fees, gratuities,
perquisites and emoluments received in the public offices. in answer to the
recommendation of the Commissioners of Public Accounts that “in the Place of
all these Salaries, Fees, and Gratuities, there should be substituted and
annexed to each of these Offices, of whatever Rank or Denomination, One
certain Salary” (Commission of Public Accounts, Sixth Report). This was a
crucial issue in the case of the Auditors of the Imprests whose fees had
increased significantly with the increase in the government budget. Each of the
Auditors in 1783 had received some £16,000 in fees even though their duties
were performed by their deputies and associated clerks (BPP 1810(371-1) Part
II, p. 15) but as the Commissioners of Public Accounts observed, “the
examination of the Accounts by the Auditors of the Imprest was attended with
no public utility” (BPP 1810(371-1) Part II, p. 16). While the Commission for
Fees and Emoluments, produced a further ten reports between April 1786 and
June 1788, it was the work of the first commission that was well received,

In accordance with the provisions of the Audit of Public Accounts Act, 1785 (25
Geo III) c. 52, which was passed before the Commissioners of Public Accounts
had closed their enquiries, the offices of the Auditors of the Imprest were
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expressly abolished in order to remedy those defects in the mode of examining
and passing the Public Accounts, which had been pointed out by the
Commissioners in their reports. It also prevented the payment of fees and
gratuities for the auditing of public accounts. The Auditors of the Imprest were
replaced by a board of five Commissioners for Auditing the Public Accounts.
However, the Act did not change the role or character of the audit which were to
achieve economy and to reduce the work that was outstanding (Chester, 1981,
p. 210).

In their Fifth Report of 1810 the Select Committee on Public Expenditure were
critical of the operation of this Act in that it remedied only a few of the defects
pointed out by the Commission of Public Accounts and produced little
improvement in the general system (BPP 1810(371-1) Part II, p.16). However,
even though the Committee were critical of the Act, they were concerned only
with the loss and waste of money due to wrongful acts and mismanagement, for
in their report they reminded the Commons “that there was an essential
difference between the examination of a mere Cash Account ... and that of the
actual Expenditure; which latter is the real and substantial Audit of the
Accounts” (BPP 1810(371-1) Part II, p. 22). They were not referring to the role
of the auditor in seeking confirmation that the intentions of Parliament set forth
in the Appropriation Acts had been complied with. The significant difference
between controlling the issue and auditing the expenditure was not formally
addressed until the advent of the appropriation audit in 1832 through the
Admiralty Act.
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A second piece of legislation, the Treasurer of the Navy Act, 1785 (25 Geo III)
c. 31, extended the principles that applied to the Paymaster of the Forces to the
Treasurer of the Navy and was designed to overcome a major deficiency in
fiscal administration that had been described by the Commission for Public
Accounts in their Third Report, namely the accepted practice whereby
accountants were able to retain unused cash balances and treat them as
private holdings. The Commissioners for Public Accounts had found this
practice to be totally unacceptable and recommended that unused balances
should instead be held by the Bank of England in the accountants’ official
capacity. The problem applied particularly to the Treasurer of the Navy and the
Army’s Paymaster General. On leaving the Navy the Treasurer invariably took
with him the balance remaining in his hands together with the books of account
and supporting records. He continued to make payments arising from
expenditure incurred during his time in office against the balance but this could
continue for many years particularly the payments to the crew of ships on
foreign stations and for which Ships Books43 had been opened during his
treasurership. The payments made included the cost of preparing his accounts
and the fees of the Auditors of the Imprest. At the time of making their report
the Commissioners had ascertained that there were five ex-Treasurers who
owed a total of £104,000 and at the head of the list stood a person who owed
£27,611 dated back to 1689 (BPP 1805(21), p. 128).

43

B&B in their Report observed “that it was possible for a Treasurer of the Navy, retiring from
office in ill-humour, to stop the payment for eight months, or more, of the Seamen unpaid on the
numerous volumes of Ships Books open at the several ports in his Treasurership” (BPP
1829(290), p. 16).
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In the Treasurer of the Navy Act, which was promoted by Henry Dundas, the
first Lord Melville, then Treasurer of the Navy, the principles espoused by the
Commission were to be adopted by which all funds for the use of the Navy
were to be issued to and drawn from the account held by the Bank of England
in the name of the Treasurer of the Navy. On the death or removal of a
Treasurer of the Navy the balance of funds held by the Bank were to vest in his
successor. The latter provision was not only administratively convenient; it
should also have been an important reform in that it changed the status of the
Treasurer of the Navy whereby in place of a personal position it had become an
impersonal public office. However, the “reform” was ignored, as can be seen
from B&B’s recommendation forty years later for the use of an accounting
system that was based upon the concept of personal accountability, even
though in their report to the Lords of the Treasury they had criticised the
existing system as having “been modelled for the purpose of checking the
Accounts of the Treasurer of the navy, than for affording any explanatory detail
of the Naval Expenditure” (BPP 1829(290), p. 18). As a consequence of this
legislation the position of Treasurer of the Navy became a sinecure but the
change necessitated the establishment of an accounting office within the Navy
Office. The Act, however, was a failure for it did not succeed in preventing the
accumulation of small balances in the hands of the Treasurer or his deputy.
The total of these balances was considerable, the Commissioners for Naval
Enquiry discovering “that the Sums standing in the name of the Treasurer of the
Navy at the Bank (of England) were, for the most part, considerably less than
his unappropriated Balances” (BPP 1805(21), p. 128). The balances not
deposited at the Bank had been used by the Deputy Treasurer for personal
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speculations, and it is ironic that this led to the resignation and impeachment of
the first Lord Melville.

The creation of official accounts at the Bank of England facilitated an important
reform through the establishment of the Consolidated Fund. In 1780 the
financial system was characterised by the “earmarking” of taxes and duties for
particular purposes. Earmarking was partly a device to satisfy lenders that their
principal and interest were secure: partly to avoid annual appropriations; and
partly because of the belief that some of the expenditure was temporary. The
result was “a complicated patchwork of a financial system in which authority to
incur expenditure was usually closely linked with the source from which such
expenditure

should be financed” (Chester, 1981,

p.178). Under the

Consolidation Act, 1787 (27 Geo III) c. 13, a fund was created “into which shall
flow every stream of revenue, and from whence shall issue the supply of every
public service” (s. 47).The idea for a single fund was not new for in 1714 a
General Fund had been set up ((1 Geo. I) c. 12) into which the proceeds of
specific taxes were paid and out of which certain specific expenditure was paid.
There was also Walpole’s Sinking Fund Act, 1716 (3 Geo I) c. 7 which had
similar aims. The 1787 Act introduced remarkable changes to Treasury
accounting for “(i)n place of sixty or seventy folios of accounts, the complexity
of which beggars description and is hardly to be believed except after
attempting to unravel the transactions entered therein, about a dozen folios
now sufficed” (Binney, 1958, p. 110). Though the Act can be viewed as being
the climax of William Pitt’s efforts to improve the revenue and to reform the
economy, it was another 70 years before every part of the revenue and
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expenditure came to pass through the public accounts that were considered by
Parliament.

An area Pitt was anxious to reform was customs and in 1785 he instructed the
Commissioners for Public Accounts to carry out a review from which they
prepared Reports 13, 14 and 15.They ascertained that the extant systems were
overly complicated, intricate and perplexing and they recommended that the
customs duties should be consolidated and simplified. However, they also took
the opportunity to suggest that the concept of consolidation could apply to other
departments as well. Pitt’s resultant Consolidation Act which was to follow
closely the Commissioners’ recommendations and involved 2,537 resolutions,
greatly simplified the Nation’s financial system.
Parliament need now provide money only for the Consolidated Fund:
payments out of it could be treated as quite a separate operation. It
also placed the whole of the national revenues under the House of
Commons, for all had to go into the Fund and nothing could be taken
out of it without their specific authority (Chester, 1981, p. 182).
As a consequence of the French wars from 1793 to 1815 bringing to light
deficiencies in administration which impeded the state’s responsibilities in the
area of war making, a number of commissions and select committees were
appointed to find ways of rectifying them. They were successors to the 1780’s
Public Accounts Commission and included the 1797 Finance Committee which
issued thirty-six reports, the Select Committee on Public Expenditure of 18071812 which issued 13 follow-up reports, and the Commissions of Naval and
Military Enquiry and a Commission for Revising and Digesting of the Civil
Affairs of the Navy which issued a total of forty-six reports. These various
committees and commissions “prepared the way for a series of administrative

107

reforms that made the central bureaucracy a more effective and less expensive
instrument of executive authority” (Harling and Mandler, 1993, p. 55).

2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has provided a brief history of an important but very complex
subject, British parliamentary financial control, which is held to be a basic tenet
of the British Constitution. Having provided a general description of the
Constitution, two aspects of it, namely government revenue and expenditure,
were discussed with particular emphasis upon the latter covering the
development of appropriation, accounting, and parliamentary control of the
Exchequer and Audit Department which preceded the establishment of an
effective Select Committee of Accounts which presupposed their existence. In
examining accounting in government it was considered that its purpose required
elucidation in the form of a conceptual framework upon which a system of
government accounting could be established. The final section described some
aspects of the reform of parliamentary financial control. Throughout the many
attempts to reform the public accounts and finances, those which have
dominated have been those of the largest spending department, the Navy.
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CHAPTER 3
THE NAVY AND THE NATION
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Chapter 3
The Navy and the Nation
3.1 Introduction
The role played by the Navy in the development of the Nation was of major
importance for it enabled the British to turn away from Europe and towards a
wider world that eventually was to bring to their country unprecedented power
and wealth. Over the years the Navy became “a national endeavour, involving
many, and in some ways all, aspects of government and society” (Rodger 2005,
p. lxiv), To appreciate one of those aspects, namely the Navy’s financial and
accounting requirements requires some knowledge of the Navy’s history, its
evolution, and an awareness of such matters as its size, the numbers of men
employed on land and at sea, and the extent of its operations both at home and
abroad. This in turn requires an understanding of Britain’s national security
policy with particular reference to the country’s ‘blue water policy’ which relied
upon a number of conditions and capabilities, specifically naval skills, superior
naval tactics and equipment, and, most importantly, an abundance of finance.
However, recognition must also be given to the Nation’s affection for its Navy,
an affection that had accrued through the populace’s inestimable pride in the
Navy’s triumphs on the high seas, the fact that the Navy had acted as the
Nation’s saviour from the threat of invasion, and the Navy’s inability to act in the
role of a standing army which could threaten liberty.
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3.2 The evolution of the Navy
A navy has been described as a means by which naval power is exerted (Till,
201, p. 632), while naval power has been described as the projection of force by
navies (Rodger, 2001, p. 639). Accordingly, a navy can be said to be a means
by which a nation projects force by either threat or use of maritime combat
capabilities to achieve results in support of the national policy objectives. In a
country like Britain where the economy was dominated by maritime trade and
whose security depended entirely on maritime power, a navy came to figure
highly in its history. The remains of the sophisticated warships used for Saxon
ship burials found at Snape (c. 550) and Sutton Hoo (c. 625) in England
confirms the importance of naval forces as far back as the 6 th century. Three
hundred years later the British Isles were invaded by the Vikings which led to
the devastation and collapse of the kingdoms of Northumbria, East Anglia, and
Mercia. By 880 only one Anglo-Saxon kingdom had survived, Wessex under
Alfred the Great. Wishing to live in peace with the Viking invaders, Alfred was
prepared to enter into a treaty with them but at the same time he backed this
with a weapon the Vikings knew intimately, the warship. With a fleet of
longships constructed in the 890s, Alfred was able to repel the Vikings in seacombat. Following Alfred’s death in 899, the fleet initially fell into disrepair but it
was to be resuscitated by a number of kings who wished to maintain a standing
fleet, including King Harold Godwinson who had ships cruising off the Isle of
Wight in the summer of 1066. Most unfortunately for the Anglo-Saxons he
ended their vigil only three weeks before the Norman invasion led by William,
the Duke of Normandy.
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After the Norman Conquest, England’s strategic position was significantly
altered now that it was a major part of Norman Europe. Under the kings of
Anjou, and particularly Henry II (1154-1189), the Normans were to expand their
empire to include two-thirds of modern France. In those times France
possessed only a few miles of coastline around the mouth of the Somme which
meant that the Norman kings were able largely to ignore naval warfare,
although the fleets of Denmark and Norway continued to pose a distant threat.
Still, the need for sea transport across the English Channel remained a major
requirement but this situation was to change dramatically with France’s ‘drive to
the sea’ in 1202-1204 which was to determine the “strategic history of the next
250 years” (NRS: Vol. 131, p. 3).

Naval power can be derived not only from the threat of engagement but by
forcing strategic change upon an existing or possible enemy. The conquering by
France in 1202-04 of Normandy, Maine, and Anjou, the original lands of the
Norman conquerors of England, resulted in the English possessing not “a
unitary empire, divided only by the width of the Channel, and facing allies,
dependencies and potential enemies across land frontiers” but an empire that
was “divided into two widely separated parts, England and Gascony” (Rodger,
2005, p.50). They were “connected only by a long and dangerous voyage down
Channel, round the cape of Brittany, and down into the Bay of Biscay” (Rodger,
2005, p. 50). The seas around the coast of Brittany were some of the most
dangerous with the danger multiplied by the poor handling qualities of the ships
in the 13th century. The situation worsened in 1224 with the capture by France
of Poitou and La March which provided them with access to the Atlantic and the
seaport of La Rochelle (NRS: Vol. 131, p. 3). Thus, the French were now able
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to interdict Anglo-Gascon communications both in the English Channel and in
the Bay of Biscay, an ability that was to create difficulties of prodigious
proportions for England and Britain for the next 600 years.

England, Wales and Scotland occupy an island with a long coastline and
numerous rivers but most of them are minor in size and fail to penetrate the
country sufficiently to be useful in the transport of goods, a problem which in
medieval times was exacerbated by bad or non-existent roads. As a
consequence it was easier, faster, and cheaper to transport goods by sea which
led to the development of the coastal ports and a merchant fleet. The growth of
trade with other countries, particularly in the 15th century, and the extension of
England’s fishing to as far away as Iceland in 1412 (Moorhouse, 2006, p. 32),
created the need for bigger ships. The English merchant fleet was large enough
to enable the king, during times of trouble, to assemble a royal fleet made up of
merchant ships, some by ship service and some by commissions of
impressment, some to be armed as fighting ships and some to be used as
transports for troops and their accoutrement. The conversion of a merchant ship
to a fighting ship required little time or effort as it was only necessary to
construct wooden castles at either end of the vessel from which troops were
able to launch their missiles at the opposition. At the conclusion of the trouble
these castles were easily removed for possible use in the future. As an
example, in 1347 Edward III assembled a massive flotilla of over 700 vessels of
which 50 were fully equipped fighting ships while his own contribution was less
than 30 ships (Loades, 1992, pp. 11-12).
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In the Middle Ages the term ‘navy’ described the entire maritime resources of
the realm, not only the royal fleet (Loades, 1992, p. 11). “Ship service” was “a
quasi-feudal arrangement whereby a port, or group of ports, enjoyed specified
jurisdictional and commercial privileges in return for providing a given number of
ships, fully manned and equipped, when called upon for the king’s service”
(Loades, 1992, p. 12). An example of such an arrangement was that between
the king and the Cinque Ports which was to last until the silting-up of the various
ports and replacement of armed merchantmen by custom built warships. 44
While these ships were adequate as long as the guns carried were primarily for
anti-personnel purposes, the situation changed with the availability of the larger
calibre muzzle-loading smooth bore guns designed primarily as ‘ship-killers’.
However, ‘larger calibre’ equated to greater weight which necessitated greater
strength in the construction of the ships. Furthermore, commensurate with the
change was the need to carry larger numbers of men to man the guns and this
in turn required the ships to carry larger quantities of victuals and stores. Armed
merchantmen which were of lighter construction were no longer adequate in the
role of king’s ships. This inadequacy was to be finally demonstrated during the
Anglo-Dutch wars of the 17th century after which they were relegated to the
auxiliary duties of transports or perhaps commissioned as privateers.

44

The Confederation of the Cinque Ports was a series of coastal towns in Kent and Sussex
consisting of five ports: Sandwich, Dover, Hythe, New Romney, and Hastings which was also
the head port. It was established by Royal Charter in 1155 by which it was required to maintain
57 ships ready for use by the king. The ships had to be available to the king for 15 days service
each year, each port bearing a proportion of that duty. In return the ports received a number of
privileges including exemption from taxes, self-government, and permission to levy tolls. By the
reign of Elizabeth I the Cinque Ports had lost their significance as some of the harbours were
silting up as a result of the English Channel’s eastward movement with the result that their
functions had been absorbed into the balance of the realm.
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The English Navy was to play a vital role in the ‘Hundred Years War’, a term
coined to describe the wars between England and France from 1337 to 1453. At
that time the Channel was still a means of communication between two parts of
the kingdom and it was to remain that way until the fall of Calais in 1558 when it
became a frontier. Even so, during that period there were a number of crossChannel raids both ways which were largely unopposed due to a lack of
effective communication. In all this activity the king’s ships made only a small
contribution. The English though were to gain significant victories at the Battles
of Damme in 1214 and Sluys in 1340 when they destroyed the French fleets
which on both occasions were finalising preparations to invade England.

In the 1370s English naval fortunes fell due to the considerable opposition by
merchants for the continual impressment of their ships by the king and the
reduced number of king’s ships. With only two in commission in 1409, it was left
to Henry V to revive the Navy for he was bent on war with France. Importantly
he planned to use his own ships in that endeavour and “was the first king since
John to follow a naval strategy which transcended the normal ad hoc
arrangements” (Loades, 1992, p. 17). In accordance with those plans, he had
balingers constructed, small ships propelled by both oar and sail, and great
ships, the biggest being the Grace Dieu of about 1,400 tons, which carried guns
for anti-personnel purposes.

In 1415 Henry invaded France and in 1416 defeated a combined FrenchGenoese fleet at Harfleur at the mouth of the Seine which was the location of
the English bridgehead protecting its invasion. By 1419 Henry had sufficient
ships of his own to sustain a significant naval presence “to keep the seas”
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without the need to call upon the merchants. “A successful naval strategy was
therefore not a question of capability, but of political will and priority” (Loades,
1992, p. 22). It is accordingly difficult to understand the reasoning behind the
instructions he left on his death in 1422 that his ships were to be sold to
discharge his debts. According to Loades, his actions were “simply a return to
the status quo ante, and all that it really demonstrates is that Henry V, for all his
purposeful activity, did not transcend his predecessors, or entertain any new
vision of naval strategy” (1992, p. 19). By 1430 the only ship in commission was
the balinger Little Jesus and on the sale of the last piece of salvage there was
no longer any requirement for a naval administrator such as the Clerk of the
Ships (Loades, 1992, p. 21).

By the mid-15th century England had lost its overseas possessions with the
exception of Calais and parts of Ireland and was on the verge of civil war. Naval
forces were to play an important role in the subsequent War of the Roses which
was a sequence of conspiracies, rebellions, and battles occurring in the period
from 1455 to 1487 between the dynasties of Lancaster and York. It was a lack
of ships loyal to the Yorkist Richard III that led to Henry Tudor in 1485 being
able to sail unopposed from Harfleur to Milford Haven with a small force that led
to the defeat and death of Richard III on Bosworth Field and the accession of
Henry VII. He was to dispose of all the ships he inherited, subsequently adding
only a small number of ships to the fleet and as a consequence he had to rely
upon hired merchantmen to bolster the nation’s maritime strength. Although this
was not a problem at that time with the benign political conditions on the
continent not necessitating the numbers of ships as were required in the
previous century, Henry, however, was well aware that the manner by which the
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Navy was constituted required a strong merchant fleet that the Crown could call
upon.

To this end, Henry introduced a bounty system to encourage the construction of
large commercial vessels that were suitable for war as well as trade. The
system, by which a bounty of usually less than five shillings a ton was paid, was
to remain in use for the next 150 years (NRS: Vol. 8, p. xxix). A further positive
feature associated with Henry VII’s formation of a strong navy was his
instigation of a more active and more firmly based naval administration than had
existed for many years; “(i)t had a base at Portsmouth, with improved facilities,
a small number of good ships in seaworthy condition, and a programme for
expansion (Loades, 1992, p. 53).

The development of the English Navy during the reign of Henry VIII occurred at
a time when Henry was centralising government in a number of ways which led
to the steady growth in the importance of royal commissions of all kinds. Firstly,
he reformed bodies such as the Councils in the Marches of Wales and in the
North, due to his unwillingness to rely upon personal or ad hoc arrangements in
the remoter parts of the kingdom. Secondly he reorganised his Privy Council by
reducing its size and appointing a clerk to document and detail the decisions
and, thirdly, he implemented a new financial system through the establishment
of four revenue courts,45 each responsible for a particular kind of revenue and
with its own specialised officials (Loades, 1992, p. 3).

45

The four Revenue Courts were: Augmentations (1536); Court of First Fruits and Tenths
(1543); Court of Wards (1543); Court of General Surveyors (1542). As well, there were two
older courts already in existence: Duchy of Lancaster, and Exchequer.
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It was in this context that the Council for Marine Causes was created in 1545-6,
a council that “strongly suggests the final recognition of the standing navy as a
strategic concept” (NRS: Vol. 131, p. 59). “The significance of this
reorganisation can hardly be emphasized too strongly. For the first time there
was a ‘line management’, officers with clearly differentiated functions, and a
committee exercising collective responsibility” (Loades, 1992, p .82). The only
aspect of naval administration not under the control of the Council was
victualling but this was not a negative feature for, even when fully developed,
the primary role of Henry VIII’s navy was coastal defence and the control of the
Channel. From a strategic view-point it remained tied to the shores of England
as the galley fleets of the Mediterranean had been for centuries (NRS: Vol.
131, p. 60). The change had occurred when, during the 16th century, the focus
of naval warfare moved from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic due to a
technical innovation, the transition from the galley to warfare under sail.

Although the Tudor fleet has been described as “basically a water-borne home
defence squadron” (Kennedy, 2004, p. 66), under Elizabeth England became
involved in a war with Spain which saw privately-owned ships and those of the
Navy Royal profitably raiding Spanish colonies and its sea-borne commerce. In
1588, the Spanish king dispatched the Spanish Armada to bring this activity to a
halt, to end English support for the Dutch rebels, and to depose Elizabeth. It
was to end in abject failure as a result of appalling weather, poor planning,
deficient command, control, communications and intelligence, a collapse in
Spanish morale, and the English Navy’s harrying attacks and fire ships.
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By the end of the Tudor era the Navy’s fighting prowess had deteriorated which
resulted in Charles I having to undertake a programme of ship-building,
although the method of financing it was to have dire consequences. “Shipmoney” was a non-parliamentary tax where the maritime counties and towns
were required to supply ships and crews or to provide the equivalent in money
to help reduce the cost of defence in times of emergency. It was the cause of
considerable discontent. In the early 1630s when Charles was in dire financial
straits it was suggested that ship money should be reimposed, which it was in
1634 when the tax was levied on the coastal towns without too much
protestation. However, in the autumn of 1635 Charles made the mistake of
extending the tax across the country provoking increasing resistance, especially
after a Member of Parliament, John Hampden, refused to pay. Apart from a few
pirates operating in the Channel there was no existing emergency on which
Charles could support his tax. Hampden provided the test case of the legality of
the tax arguing that it was illegal as Parliament had not given consent for it.
Although Charles won the case by a small margin the absolute power he gained
as a consequence of the case alienated almost the entire country.
Subsequently, the tax was made illegal by the Long Parliament in 1641 which
declared it to be ‘contrary to law’.

In the wake of the English Civil War (1642-1651), the Commonwealth
dramatically expanded the Navy and as a consequence it became the most
powerful in existence. In 1689 following the Glorious Revolution, England joined
the coalition fighting France which was seeking hegemony in Europe. France
had noted the rise of the English and Dutch fleets over the years with some
trepidation and set about developing a navy of its own to match the English and
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Dutch in both quantity and quality. It was this navy that defeated the allies at
Beachy Head but was in turn defeated by the allies at Barfleur-La Hogue
(1691). In the next war, the War of Spanish Succession (1702-1714), Britain’s
Navy was allied with that of the Dutch against the combined navies of France
and Spain. Although the Royal Navy won a major victory against the French
and Spanish fleets at the Battle of Vigo Bay (1702) and captured Gibraltar
(1704) and Minorca (1708), the allies found it hard going in the Mediterranean
for want of a naval base there.

To overcome that difficulty it was planned to capture the French base at Toulon
and to this end an allied army undertook a siege of the base. Fear of being cutoff by a relieving French force led to a retreat but the ships were able to bring
bomb-ketches46 into range which, after the sinking of two of their ships in the
ensuing bombardment, frightened the French into scuttling the remainder in
shallow water which would enable them to be raised once the danger had
passed. The hulls were raised after the war but only a few were fit for further
service (Rodger, 2005, p. 171). The allies thus had achieved control of the
Mediterranean. “It was at this point (not as older histories used to say, after the
battle of Barfleur) that the French government effectively abandoned its main
fleet in favour of the privateering war” (Rodger, 2005, p. 172). The French
guerre de course was to cause heavy British losses and was to support the

46

When attacking land targets which were above sea level ships were inherently disadvantaged
because of the need to increase the elevation of their guns. However, the elevation was
restricted by the size of the ship’s gunports, the problem being exacerbated by the need to carry
the larger calibre and heavier guns below the upper deck. The answer to this problem was the
construction of specialised bomb vessels equipped with a mortar, with its high angle of fire,
firing explosive mortar-bombs (Ware, 1992, p. 89).
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Tories in their opposition to war on the continent, particularly Marlborough’s
costly operations in Flanders.

After some years of peace the Navy was engaged in the War of Jenkins’ Ear
(1739-1742) which was quickly followed by the War of Austrian Succession
(1744-1748), and the Seven Years War (1755-1763). During the forty years
after the end of the War of Spanish Succession to the commencement of the
Seven Years War, the Royal Navy grew at an unprecedented rate. At the
conclusion of the Seven Years War the Navy had increased to 239 ships,
including 90 ships of the line and had reached a new level of “sea power”47. Its
possession of this sea power enabled Britain to gain “command of the sea”, a
position of advantage that made it possible for it to enjoy “a security from
invasion across the oceans, a mobility and capacity to reach the enemy’s
shores, and a freedom to travel and trade across the seas” (Kennedy, 2004, p.
2). The rise of the Navy to this level was followed by a brief period when it lost
the command of the sea during the American Revolutionary War (1775-1783)
when it was pitted against the combined naval forces of France, Spain, and the
Netherlands, and beleaguered by several neutral powers who resented British
interference with their shipping (Brewer, 1988, p. 177). The Seven Years War
had shown France that the only way it could contain British naval power was to
confront the problem head-on and as a consequence it had used considerable

47

As pointed out by Kennedy (2004, p.1), the term “sea power” is an “elusive and emotive
expression” and “remains difficult to define precisely in few words”. He refers to a description of
sea power by Herbert Richmond: “Sea power is that form of national strength which enables its
possessor to send his armies and commerce across those stretches of sea and ocean which lie
between his country or the countries of his allies, and those territories to which he needs access
in war; and to prevent his enemy from doing the same” (Kennedy, 2004, p. 2). This description
was used by Kennedy as a ‘working definition’ in his book.
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financial resources in the construction of new ships and on naval infrastructure
while avoiding expensive military entanglements in Europe (Brewer, 1988, p.
177).

The outcome of its victories in the Seven Years War was that Britain found
itself diplomatically isolated and unable to mobilise its usual European allies
against France as it was a time when other countries in Europe wanted Britain’s
power to be reduced. Britain was forced to fight on its own, a situation that was
exacerbated by delays in its preparations and the requirement to keep pace
with France’s building programme. The unfortunate consequence was that the
number of ships in the combined fleet of France and Spain was greater than
that of Britain. Such superiority was to raise fears in Britain of invasion by
France and Spain, resulting in most of the British ships-of-the-line being
retained in British home waters at the expense of providing effective support to
the army in America. Privateering also took their toll with 3,386 British merchant
ships being lost over six years which had a major effect on foreign trade.
However, “(t)he zenith of British political power and economic predominance
was now approaching – and with it, the zenith of British naval mastery too”
(Kennedy, 2004, p. 120).

The gaining of almost a monopoly of naval power across the world by Britain
had been checked by the American War of Independence and would be
delayed by the renewed struggle against France in the two wars against
Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. The period of conflict from 1793-1815
was one of continual British success: Pellew’s extraordinary destruction of the
French Droits de l’Homme near Brest in 1797, the Battle of St Vincent in 1797;

122

the Battle of the Nile in 1798; the Battle of Camperdown against the Dutch in
the same year; the Battle of Trafalgar in 180548. Add to these successes the
British blockade of the French Atlantic ports which not only shielded Britain
from invasion but caused grievous harm to French trade, the frigate actions and
the attacks on such ports as Copenhagen in 1801 and 1807 and Aix in 1809,
and “it is scarcely surprising that the Nelsonic period has been regarded as the
high point of British naval history” (Kennedy, 2004, p. 124). The successes of
the Royal Navy in the 18th and 19th centuries can be traced to the total
professionalism and efficiency of the men of the Royal Navy across the board,
from the admirals such as Nelson, Duncan, Cornwallis, Collingwood and Howe,
the captains of the quality of Troubridge and Hardy to the brilliant frigate
commanders such as Blackwood and Cochrane. Behind them stood men of
competence such as St Vincent and Barham who developed the administrative
arm that was able to furnish these men with the ships, seamen, victuals and the
requisite matėriel that in the end resulted in a navy that was master of the seas.
However, without a national security policy to guide it, the Navy would have
been a flawed weapon.

3.3 Britain’s national security policy
When compared with the European land powers, particularly France and Spain,
in the 16th and 17th centuries, England, as a European military force, was less
advanced than in the so-called military revolution of those years. Although the

48

“In 1790 the Royal Navy consisted of 175 ships-of-the-line, 146 frigates and 120 sloops. …
By the start of 1799, overall strength had risen to 192 ships-of-the-line, 25 old 50-gunners no
longer considered as line ships, 226 frigates and 345 sloops or similar vessels” (Pope, S., 1999,
p. 415).
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concept of a ‘military revolution’ has been criticised as being exaggerated,
misleading or even simplistic49, nevertheless, there were major changes in
European armies over those centuries, in particular the increase in their size
and the cost of an army able to take the field of battle.

Furthermore, over this period the military powers had to accommodate many
changes in military warfare and weapons. As an example, the matchlock
mechanism, which had been used in various types of portable firearms but was
slow-firing, clumsy to operate and vulnerable to wet weather, was replaced at
the beginning of the 17th century by the flintlock mechanism which, although
doubling the rate of fire of the infantry, required the introduction of complicated
drill. For example, the loading of the musket involved about 60 motions and at
one time over 30 orders (Wintringham and Blashford-Snell, 1973, p. 108).
Artillery had only been used for siege warfare but with the advent of guns cast
from iron came a reduction in weight which enabled the field-gun to appear. The
development of the bayonet, which led to the demise of the pike, and the advent
of grenades were also part of the revolution. To take advantage of the improved
weapons and their increased firepower, linear tactics, particularly thinner
formations, were developed which necessitated greater initiative and flexibility
on the battle field. As a consequence of this and the emphasis on drill and coordinated movements, the priority was for well trained and disciplined soldiers
which necessitated many more officers and non-commissioned officers.

49

For example, Rodger is suspicious that the term “is just a big name for the ordinary process of
development over time which has been present throughout history” (Rodger, 2011, p.120) He
goes as far as to describe it as being “dangerously close to what David Edgerton has called
‘anti-history-: the invention of imaginary explanations to account for things that never happened”
(Rodger, 2011, p. 120).
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These major changes in the conduct of war led to major changes “in military
organisation and administration both reflecting and further influencing wider
technological, political, administrative and social change” (Bellamy, 2001, p.
587). Combined with the very large increases in the national armies over this
period the consequence of the changes was the emergence of standing armies
which played a significant influence on the development of the modern
European states. The increases in the size of the national armies and the
number of soldiers deployed on the battlefield over the 16th and 17th centuries
were remarkable. As Brewer points out, “(b)y the last quarter of the 17th century
the Spanish army consisted of 70,000 troops, the Dutch of an astonishing
110,000, the French 120,000, the Swedish 63,000 and the Russian army of
130,000. In contrast the British army had only 15,000” (Brewer, 1990, p. 8). It
was an era during which

the size of an army was no longer dictated by

logistical constraints. The cost of developing and maintaining armies of such
size had significant economic repercussions50 with the consequence that states
needed to be economically realistic if they decided to develop and maintain a
navy at the same time. Basil Liddell Hart in his book Europe in Arms51 (1937, p.
117) pointed out that,
a nation’s capacity to stand the strain (of arming itself) depends not
merely on the extent of its resources but on their economic
distribution. That lesson is engraved in our history. Where Spain,
Holland, and France broke down in turn under the double strain of
spreading their military effort in the attempt to bestride both the land
and the sea, we conserved our strength, helped by geography, by
concentrating on superiority in one element.

50

In Baugh’s opinion (1987, p. 87) the large expensive armies of the Continental military powers
were their Achilles’ heel.
51
In this book Liddell Hart discussed the rearmament of Europe prior to the Second World War.
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Liddell Hart had also spoken about the ‘strain’ in his earlier book The British
Way in Warfare (1933, p. 30)52 when he referred to the third Anglo-Dutch War of
1672-74. “Holland, although checking the land invasion and successful in her
sea actions, was irreparably exhausted by the double strain. From this point her
decline began (while) England ... drew the ultimate profit, extending her
colonies and her trade”.

England had realistically understood that it could not handle the economic
‘strain’ of both an army able to play a decisive role in European land warfare
and a navy able to provide a defensive barrier to invasion by its European
neighbours. Navies by their nature are capital-intensive and require over many
years heavy investments in dockyards, stores, and industrial plant to build and
maintain the ships, particularly ships constructed of wood which existed in an
environment of unrelenting decay and decrepitude. Furthermore, the artisans
required to carry out such work were difficult to recruit, train and retain. These
problems applied as well to the seamen and officers. The result was that only
one of the alternatives, a large standing army or an effective navy, could be
pursued but its selection was not clear cut for there had developed two
opposing schools of thought that should “be seen as setting limits on what kinds
of diplomatic and strategic plans would be allowable” (Baugh, 1988, p. 34). The
two schools were the ‘British or maritime or navalist’ and the ‘continental’

52

Baugh refers to the “Achilles’ heel of the Continental military powers; namely the expense of
large armies and consequent embarrassment of their treasuries in any war that England could
manage to prolong” (Baugh, 1987, p. 88).
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schools. During the reign of William III it was the former that had garnered the
more vociferous support when the ruling Tories as well as Country MPs began
to criticise the continental direction of William’s strategy. However, the
continental orientation was steadily supported by the Hanoverians and those
politicians who shared their views. Baugh (1988, p. 34) argues that
(t)he role of the two schools should therefore be seen as setting
limits on what kinds of diplomatic and strategic plans would be
allowable. In the course of the (18th) century the plans leaned one
way or another according to circumstances of domestic politics, to
diplomatic conjunctures, and to strategic opportunities. On balance,
the decisions tended against military commitment on the Continent.
These decisions were fortunate for even though the army had won a number of
significant victories over the French, it was, nevertheless, not considered to
rank among the leading forces in Europe (Black, 1989, p. 1). Britain, says
Rodger, “failed the military revolution test-paper” (2011, p. 120) in that
Parliament had retained the power it had amassed, the monarchy had not
become autocratic, as in France, and a great standing army had not been
established. “It is something of an embarrassment to the military revolution
theorists that the early modern European country which most conspicuously
succeeded in economic and military terms was the one which declined the
challenge of the ‘military revolution’” (Rodger, 2011, p. 121). Even though it
failed this ‘test’ Britain still became a ‘fiscal-military state’ (Brewer, 1988,
passim), a nation state devoted to making war and equipped to do so by the
efficiency of its administration, and especially its revenue-raising machinery
(Rodger, 2011, p. 121). Britain’s requisite financial strength had arisen through
the authority of Parliament which established an honest and efficient tax-raising
administration that was able to borrow the requisite sums required to prosecute
modern wars (Rodger, 2011, p. 121).
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Although he agrees with Brewer that Britain’s rise could be explained in terms
of parliamentary government and fiscal strength, Rodger does not agree with
him that ‘geographical determinism’ also played a part. Brewer’s argument is
that because Britain was an island it had been spared the major costs of
defence53. In contradiction to this, Rodger points out that Britain was successful
in the 18th century wars only because it was spending much more than her
rivals, not less. “During the ‘long eighteenth century’ Britain was consistently
spending double the amount of France, as a proportion of national income, and
three times as much per capita” (Rodger, 2011, p. 122). Rodger’s views are
supported by the table from O’Brien’s paper on British taxation (1988, Table1,
p. 2), a copy of which appears on page 136 of this study, which shows that
between 65 and 70% of total government funds was allocated to the services
during wartime between 1689 and 1815.

Since “navies have always been far more complex and capital-intensive than
armies, (t)he industrial, technical and managerial resources required to build
and operate warships vastly exceeded in kind and quality anything needed by
an early modern army” (Rodger, 2011, p. 123). As the allocation of funds to the
development and maintenance of a navy depends primarily upon a
government’s assessment of the value of naval power to the nation’s interests
in view of the strength of its possible enemies and trade rivals, the government,
in undertaking this assessment, has to understand the enduring and emerging
functions required of its navy in order to incorporate successfully a capabilities
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Rodger (2011, p. 121) points out that Britain being an island did not preclude it from invasion
and cites the nine occasions since the Norman Conquest on which Britain had been invaded
from the sea: 1139, 1153, 1326, 1399, 1460, 1470, 1471, 1485, and 1688.
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approach to a naval building programme. Governments must also understand
that navies are not only capital-intensive, they are also ‘time-intensive' in that
the design, the building and the maintenance of a warship takes considerable
time, whatever material it is constructed of. These differences between armies
and navies highlight the fact that navies require considerable planning that
requires guidance from an up-to-date and flexible defence policy that includes a
maritime strategy based upon the principles and constants of naval warfare.

3.4 ‘The British Way in Warfare’ or ‘Britain’s blue water policy’
In his paper Great Britain’s Blue-Water Policy, 1689-1815, Baugh (1988, p. 37)
states that the Rump Parliament’s Navigation Ordnances of 1650 and 1651,
which were designed to protect English commerce from foreign competition,
introduced a new maritime warfare policy which he refers to as the ‘blue-water
policy’54. In an earlier paper he had described the policy, adopted when
England’s enemy was a maritime power, namely the Dutch during the first of the
Anglo-Dutch Wars in 1652-1654, as a form of warfare that
focused on the Achilles’ heel of the Continental powers; namely, the
expense of large armies and consequent embarrassment of their
treasuries in any war that England could manage to prolong (Baugh,
1987, p. 87).
Baugh (1987, p. 88) explained that this form of warfare was
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Baugh considers this term is preferable to that espoused by Liddell Hart, “The British Way of
Warfare”, for a number of reasons, but mainly because it does not stress the non-Continentalist
character of the system (Baugh, 1988, p. 36).
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technically advanced ... emphasizing economic pressure. The
military weight of the Continental powers was to be opposed by naval
skills, superiority of equipment, and abundance of money and
resources, as well as access to resources. All of these were chiefly
derived from domestic industry and seaborne commerce (Baugh,
1987, pp. 87-88).
As Baugh contended in this paper, the blue-water policy relied “upon a set of
conditions and capabilities ... One condition was that England had to become
truly an island realm, no longer dynastically tied to Continental possessions and
secure on its northern border” (Baugh, 1987, p. 86). The former had occurred in
1558-59 with the loss of Calais and the latter with the Treaty of Edinburgh in
1560. The other conditions and capabilities on which the development of
Britain’s blue-water warfare policy relied, expert naval skills, superior naval
tactics and research, an abundance of finance, will be examined in turn.

3.4.1. Expert naval skills
In comparison with the slow nurturing over generations of the multifarious skills
required for successful naval operations, the physical construction of the ships
used in those operations was straightforward. However, to be able to carry out
the construction and then operate the ships required a plethora of technical,
industrial and professional skills, both ashore and afloat, bound together by a
sophisticated system of management (Rodger, 2005, p. 430). The ships having
been built, maintained and victualled, the skills that were then required were
those generically described as ‘seamanship’, that is the expertise, techniques,
and practices required for the safe and efficient handling of a ship or boat when
afloat and it was in such skills that the men of the Royal Navy abounded.
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Their remarkable skills, combined with their being the healthiest, and least
discontented in Europe, were to be prominently displayed during the closed
naval blockade of the French Fleet during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic
Wars, with Nelson blockading Toulon, Cornwallis off Brest, Collingwood off
Rochefort, and Pellew off Ferrol. A naval blockade was designed to seal off a
weaker adversary from the open ocean by either preventing his ships from
leaving a port, harbour or anchorage, the ‘close’ blockade, or making certain it
would be brought to action before it could carry out the ulterior motive that
caused it to put to sea, the ‘open or distant’ blockade. These two ways of
implementing the strategy only differed in the amount of sea room allowed the
blockaded side.

Today it is not unusual for a navy to have available a logistical supply service
which is able to victual and fuel its and/or its allies’ ships at sea for protracted
periods, such as that required by the ships of the international naval patrol that
were

used to contain the Somali pirates. The ability to carry out such

operations is an indicator of a navy’s level of technological sophistication,
experience and skills. During the Napoleonic War the Battle of Trafalgar of 21
October 1805 was fought to block Napoleon’s plan to invade Great Britain and it
was carried out by Britain after “performing one of the most remarkable feats of
sustained seamanship in the annals of maritime history” (Massie, 1993, pp. xivxv), the closed blockade of the French fleet. “It was the blockade fleet and its
success in stalemating the Emperor at Boulogne that Admiral Alfred Thayer
Mahan described when he wrote: ‘those far distant, storm beaten ships, upon
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which the grand Army never looked, stood between it and the dominion of the
world’”55 (Massie, 1993, pp. xiv-xv).

Although the time on station could be used to train the crews in seamanship
and gunnery, which was important at the times of battle, the wear and tear on
both the crews and the ships of the Royal Navy on close blockade duty off the
coasts of France and Spain was prodigious and it was necessary for the ships
to be rotated to home bases to enable them to be refitted and to rest the men.
Captain Philip Patton who became Second Sea Lord under Lord Barham in
1805, wrote to Barham in June 1794 with regard to the blockade of Brest
recommending that to maintain an effective close blockade two sets of flag
officers were necessary, relieving each other in turn, but that a quarter of the
ships should always be in port with three quarters at sea. Patton further
suggested that the three-decked ships should be kept in port during the winter
months, with all others returning to port during westerly gales. Ships remaining
on station were victualled in all weathers by small ships that provided them with
water and food56, including live animals. With only the basic navigation
equipment the supply ships, the ‘victuallers’, had to seek out the blockading
ships of the line before transferring the supplies by coming alongside the
receiving vessels. Today the transfer of fuel and supplies is one of the most
complicated and sophisticated operations required of naval ships even with the
aid of satellite-based navigation, powered ships, helicopters and other facilities.
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This quotation comes from Mahan’s book: “The Influence of Sea Power upon the French
Revolution and Empire 1793 – 1812”, Boston, 1898, p. 118.
56
Patton describes the food as “fresh provisions, corned beef, potatoes, onions, greens and
beer, during the summer” (NRS: Vol. 38, vol. II, p. 393).
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It is in this context that the exceptional skills displayed by the Royal Navy during
the blockade of the French ports must be recognised for in the absence of these
naval skills the blockade of the French bases would have been impossible.

Another area of naval skills in which the Royal Navy was envied was gunnery.
With the arming of warships with guns, the sailing warships became floating gun
batteries, the effectiveness of which being a function of the number, calibre and
efficiency of its guns crews (Gardiner (b), 1992, p. 146). For maximum
efficiency training in the use of these weapons was vital. The typical gun crew
for each of the 32 pounders on Nelson’s Victory consisted of 14 men, each of
whom had particular tasks to perform in the sequence of firing orders, a
sequence that had to be followed precisely to facilitate rapidity of fire which was
the single most important factor in British naval gunnery. As a consequence, the
ships of the Royal Navy possessed greater destructive power even though their
weight of broadside may have been to the enemy’s advantage.

In his book The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy, Rodger
(1986, p. 57) provides a table showing some examples of single-ship actions in
support of his contention that French ships suffered heavier casualties than
their British opponents. He refers to a particular action in 1758 when the British
Monmouth of 64 guns, which gave it a weight of broadside of 504 lbs., defeated
the French Foudroyant of 80 guns with a weight of broadside of 1,222 lbs. so
providing the French ship with a theoretical destructive ratio of 2.6:1. The
rapidity of firing, however, gave the British a great advantage which, on
occasion, even astounded the British army artillery, such as during the siege of
Spain’s Morro Castle in Havana, Cuba during the Seven Years War (1762)
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when Navy gunners were landed to assist the army. The. naval firepower of the
British Fleet gave it a huge, battle-winning advantage as was seen in its
overwhelming victory at the Battle of Quiberon Bay in 1759. However, as well
as the naval skills and courage displayed at this battle, Rodger (1986, pp. 5960) refers to an account of the battle which strongly hints that the underlying
cause of victory was the discipline and training of the ships’ companies. They
knew their ships and their officers for they had endlessly practised what they
would be required to do in action and accordingly were at an enormous
advantage compared to the ill-directed bravery of the French.

Although it is possible to outline glowingly the naval skills of the Navy with ease,
it must be remembered that they were rendered against a background of
courage, cowardice, corruption, nepotism, patronage and long-standing fraud
by politicians and merchants, and most importantly sicknesses which killed a
100 times more men than perished in battle (Pope, 1981, p. 1).

3.4.2. Superior naval tactics and technology
During their war against the Dutch in 1652-4 the English introduced the lineahead battle formation which was an innovation of the first importance in naval
tactics. The introduction of this formation was to be promulgated in Fighting
Instructions issued by the Commonwealth’s ‘generals-at-sea’ (Blake, Deane,
and Monck) in March 1653 in the midst of the First Anglo-Dutch War. England’s
Blake had been defeated by Tromp off Dungeness in November 1652 and it
was reported that some of Blake’s subordinate ship captains had performed
‘badly’. As a result there was an enquiry from which arose the Laws of War and
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Ordinances of the Sea prepared by Harry Vane by order of Parliament.
Although these orders were vigorously pursued, it was not until the first action in
1653 off Portland with the narrow defeat of Tromp that it was acknowledged that
there was an urgent need for greater cohesion between the English squadrons.
As a consequence the extant Parliamentary Orders were dramatically amended
by the Commonwealth Orders, 1653, the Instructions for the better ordering of
the fleet in fighting. By Article 3, instead of the ships engaging ‘according to the
order presented’, they were required ‘to endeavour to keep in line with the chief’
in order ‘to take the best advantage they can to engage the enemy’. Article 6
directed that “where a flagship is distressed captains are to endeavour to form
line between it and the enemy”, while Article 7 went still further and required
“that where the windward station has been gained the line ahead is to be
formed ‘upon severest punishment’ and a special signal is to be made of the
manoeuvre” (NRS: Vol. 29, p. 95). Much to the consternation of the Dutch, the
battle formation was successfully used by the English in their ensuing battles.
Subsequently adopted by the Dutch it eventually became the battle formation of
all navies during the age of sail.

The British also introduced changes of a technical nature. In gunnery, the line of
battle, which inferred heavy and sustained firing, required improved metallurgy
in gunfounding. It was the quality of iron and the burgeoning industrial revolution
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which gave Britain a deadly advantage in this area57. In the early 17th century
they introduced the loading of the guns inboard, which resulted in a notable
increase in their fire rate, the goose quill priming tubes which replaced priming
powder altogether, and the adoption of the carronade which gave frigates
firepower greatly in excess of their nominal rating. The introduction of copper
sheathing, which greatly retarded fouling, was a major change for it, firstly, was
a force multiplier in that ships were able to remain at sea for longer periods
between cleaning and, secondly, ships were able to sail faster. One other
important innovation was the introduction of improved methods of seasoning
and treating timber which increased a ship’s life as well reducing the amount of
maintenance over that time.

While not a change of a technical nature, an important factor that facilitated the
close blockade of Brest was the medical requirement that seamen were to be
given lime or lemon juice in order to combat the dietary disease scurvy. It had
been a major problem particularly on long voyages such as that of Anson who,
during his circumnavigation of the world, lost 1,051 men out of 1,955, most of
them victims of scurvy (Pope, 1981, p. 145). The use of fruit juice to combat
scurvy had been well known in Elizabeth times but, by the middle of the 18th
century, this had been forgotten. However, in 1759, during the Seven Years
War, the Admiralty ordered that Hawke’s Squadron off Brest was to be effects,
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In 1812 it was determined that some British 24pounders made of iron had been fired 3,000
times without accident; even the norm was 1,000 firings (Gardiner (b), 1992, p. 150). The term
‘accident’ usually refers to the gun bursting with dire consequences for the gun crew and those
nearby. An ‘advantage’ of a bronze gun, the predecessor to guns made of iron, was that they
did not usually burst but overheated relatively quickly when they would bulge rendering them
equally useless as if they had burst. Accordingly, they would have not have been able to sustain
the firing required in a line of battle which would have been of considerable disadvantage to the
ships of the Royal Navy.

136

for by the time of his action in Quiberon Bay “there were fewer than twenty men
sick in a squadron of twenty sail” (Rodger, 1986, pp.100-101). In 1795 the
Admiralty authorised the issue of lemon juice to seamen as a preventative but
initially it was only issued to fleets on request and it was not until 1800 that the
policy of giving lemon juice to seamen in the Channel Fleet, that was
responsible for the blockade of the French ports, was inaugurated (NRS: Vol.
141, p. 14).

3.4.3. Abundance of finance
Without sufficient financial resources58 combined with efficient and effective
administration it would have been impossible to develop and maintain the Navy.
Navies, being capital intensive, relied heavily on manufacturing which required
capital resources such as ship building yards, and huge quantities of resources,
particularly wood, tar, hemp, canvas, and iron in the era of ships propelled by
sail. As well as the technical skills of the various trades required in a ship’s
construction and its ongoing maintenance, management and co-ordination skills
were required in the shipyard. Britain was able to shoulder this burden thanks to
a radical increase in taxation, the growth of government borrowing on a
unprecedented scale, and the development of a sizeable public administration
devoted to the fiscal and military activities of the state. Together, these three
components enabled Brewer’s “fiscal-military state” to be created (Brewer,
1988, p. xvii). Most importantly, it was the radical increase in taxation, both
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“Total navy budgets in 1792 were almost £4 million (which was comparable with the entire
national budget of the Netherlands). … Navy budgets occasioned no serious popular or political
opposition in a nation that understood (sometimes even exaggerated) the importance of naval
power to its safety and prosperity” (Pope, S., 1999, p. 414).
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direct and indirect, and the government borrowings that provided the
abundance of finance that enabled the allocations shown in the following table
to be made .

FIGURE 3.1

The allocation of government expenditures, 1688-1815

Period

Military
expenditure

Civil
government

Interest
payments

%

%

%

1689-1697 (war)

79

15

6

1698-1702 (peace)

67

9

24

1702-1713 (war)

72

9

19

1714-1739 (peace)

39

17

44

1740-1748 (war)

65

10

25

1750-1755 (peace)

41

15

44

1756-1763 (war)

70

8

22

1764-1775 (peace

37

20

43

1776-1783 (war)

62

8

30

1784-1792 (peace)

31

13

56

1793-1815 (war)

61

9

30

The radical increase in taxation, both direct and indirect, and the government
borrowings provided an abundance of finance, As was discussed earlier in
Chapter 2 the main direct tax at the end of the 17th century was land tax which
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was introduced in place of a poll tax as an extraordinary impost but within a few
years had turned into an annual tax. Land tax was notoriously complex as were
the principal indirect taxes of excise and customs duties. The increases in
direct and indirect taxes are shown in Figure 3.2 below which has been
adapted from a table prepared by O’Brien (1988, p. 9) through the addition of
an extra column showing the total amounts of direct and indirect taxes levied in
the years from 1665 to 1810 inclusive.

FIGURE 3.2

Sources of taxation, 1665 to 1815

5 year
averages
centreing
on

Excises & stamps

Customs duties

Direct taxes

Totals

£m

%

£m

%

£m

%

£m

1665

0.3

23

0.4

31

0.6

46

1.3

1670

0.2

14

0.2

14

1.0

72

1.4

1675

0.5

31

0.5

31

0.6

38

1.6

1680

0.4

28

0.5

36

0.5

36

1.4

1685

0.4

36

0.6

55

0.1

9

1.1

1690

0.9

30

0.7

23

1.4

47

3.0

1695

0.8

27

0.8

27

1.4

47

3.0

1700

1.7

35

1.2

25

1.9

40

4.8

1705

1.8

34

1.5

28

2.0

38

5.3

1710

1.9

36

1.3

25

2.1

40

5.3

1715

2.4

44

1.5

28

1.5

28

5.4
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1720

2.8

46

1.7

28

1.6

26

6.1

1725

3.1

53

1.6

27

1.2

20

5.9

1730

3.0

49

1.6

26

1.5

25

6.1

1735

3.2

55

1.6

28

1.0

17

5.8

1740

3.2

52

1.5

24

1.5

24

6.2

1745

3.1

48

1.3

20

2.1

32

6.5

1750

3.5

51

1.4

20

2.0

29

6.9

1755

3.8

54

1.7

24

1.5

21

7.0

1760

4.1

49

1.9

23

2.3

28

8.3

1765

5.5

55

2.2

22

2.3

23

10.0

1770

6.0

57

2.6

25

1.9

18

10.5

1775

6.3

58

2.6

24

1.9

18

10.8

1780

6.6

56

2.6

22

2.6

22

11.8

1785

7.8

57

3.3

24

2.7

20

13.8

1790

7.5

43

6.3

36

3.6

21

17.4

1795

8.9

44

7.2

36

4.0

20

20.1

1800

11.5

36

11.5

36

8.8

28

31.8

1805

19.4

41

16.4

35

11.2

24

47.0

1810

22.9

36

18.8

30

21.2

34

62.9
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The other substantial pillar on which the British fiscal system rested was
government borrowing which was introduced in the late 17th century when . in
January 1692 a parliamentary committee was appointed to receive proposals
for raising £1 m. “upon a Fund of perpetual Interest” (Quoted in Dickson, 1967,
p. 50), the use of the word ‘perpetual’ indicating ‘long-term’.

Government borrowing long-term commenced tentatively in1693 with a tontine
loan of £1m.,59 but if only partially successful the balance was to be raised by
the sale of ordinary life annuities carrying 14% interest. The tontine was viewed
with suspicion due to its perceived complication and raised only £108,100 (in
1692) as against £891,900 in annuities (£773,394 in 1692, and £118,506 in
1693) (BPP, 1868-69 (366) (366-1), pp. 8-9). Lottery loans were also used but
it was the public loan which was to provide the decisive variable element in
British public revenue.

Although the first steps taken to create a system of long-term government
borrowing were marked by haste, carelessness, and episodic failure
government

the

learned some valuable lessons in particular the connections

between long- and short-dated finance and, consultation with the City of
London where marine insurance companies were rapidly developing, which
was to be of such great importance to Britain’s burgeoning trade, and
partnership banking was growing rapidly. As well the government learned about
the relative popularity of the different kinds of loans and the need for foreign
confidence in sterling (Dickson, 1967, p. 58). Perhaps most importantly it came

59

Survivorship or Annuity Act (4 Will. & Mary) c. 3
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to appreciate that in connection with a public loan it was necessary to reinforce
the creditworthiness of the nation and to do this it was essential for a public
debt to be a funded debt whereby the indebtedness of the government had to
match the claims of the private creditors. A further change that was to have farreaching ramifications was the establishment of the Bank of England in 1694
which

gradually assumed

from the Exchequer the administration of

government borrowing. Eventually the Bank was to become the centrepiece of
the government’s “system of public borrowing ... which enabled England to
spend on war out all proportion to its tax revenue, and thus to throw into the
struggle with France and its allies the decisive margin of ships and men without
which the resources previously committed might have been committed in vain”
(Dickson, 1967, p.9). As well as government credit, the fighting services had
their own systems of credit which by the middle of the 18th century formed an
important sector of the London market in short-term paper and an integral part
of government credit as a whole (Dickson, 1967, p. 393).

3.4.4 The blue-water policy
In history there have been a number of naval strategists who published their
strategic theories, the names of the two pre-eminent strategists being Alfred
Thayer Mahan, who published his book The Influence of Sea Power Upon
History 1660-1783 in 1890, and Julian Stafford Corbett whose theories are to
found in his book Some Principles of Maritime Strategy which was published in
1911. Although Corbett’s work was an adjunct to that of Mahan, it is more
logical and better structured. Prior to espousing his theories Corbett had studied
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the military theories of Clausewitz which he applied to the maritime
environment. Corbett, (1988, p. 26-27) recognised that
(w)ith the conception of war as a continuation of political intercourse
before us, it is clear that everything which lies outside the political
conception, everything, that is, which is strictly peculiar to military
and naval operations, relates merely to the means which we use to
achieve our policy ... Clausewitz held that policy must always be the
master ... military action must still be regarded only as a
manifestation of policy. It must never supersede policy.
Corbett also made reference to a statement by Clausewitz in regard to the
criticality of the determination by statesmen and military leaders of the nature of
the war and not to mistake it for something which from its inherent conditions it
can never be. Only at this juncture would it be possible to dictate the strategy
under which the naval fleet was to operate.

Naval strategy defines the methods by which naval forces accomplish strategic
or operational objectives. The first writing on the subject of naval strategy by an
Englishman was probably the anonymous jingoistic poem The Libel of English
Policy (Holmes, 1961, p. 193) which was written sometime between 1436 and
1438 and was directed to the Duke of Gloucester as Lord Protector. The policy
enunciated by the Libel was to concentrate against the Burgundians who were
besieging the English port of Calais, which required the English to develop their
naval power in the Narrow Seas in order to keep open the supply line between
England and Calais, and to intercept the ships of the Flemish ports. “This was
well short of a grand theory of seapower, but it shows an intelligent
understanding of how it might profitably be used in a specific, local situation”
(NRS: Vol. 131, pp. 8-9). The same sentiments were articulated about ten years
later by a John Capgrave: “if the sea were kept by our navy many good results
would follow – it would give a safe conduct to merchants, secure access to
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fishers, the quiet of peace to the inhabitants of the kingdom, to our king himself
a large measure of glory” (Quoted in Loades, 1992, p. 26). To achieve this
supremacy it would be necessary to make many operational changes, one of
which would have major strategic ramifications, specifically a permanent naval
organisation.

The significant victories won at Damme in 1214 and Sluys in 1340 were both
due to the English fleets being mobilised and at sea prior to the enemy
completing its own preparations. “The fleet should exist as a unit, in one place
where it could be rapidly and conveniently mobilised. Whoever got his navy to
sea first should be able to destroy his enemy while the latter was still
endeavouring to complete his preparations” (Loades, 1992, p. 27). That strategy
was formalised in 1545/6 with the creation of the Council of Marine Causes
which “strongly suggests the recognition of the standing navy as a strategic
concept” (NRS: Vol. 131, p. 59). In 1547 the strategy was “formalised in the
conditions laid down by Lord Treasurer Winchester for assuming responsibility,
and particularly in the allocation of a peacetime ‘Ordinary’ or budget of £14,000
per annum” (NRS: Vol. 131, p. 59).

In his book, Drake and the Tudor Navy Vol.1 (1898, pp. 344-345), Julian
Corbett made reference to a paper that had been prepared by a John
Montgomery in 1570 entitled A treatise concerning the Navie of England60
which, Corbett (1899, p. 344) said, presented the reader “with a marked
development in naval thought”. The treatise “stated the first strategic views of

60

The treatise is to be found in Censura Literaria, Second Edition, Volume V, 1815, pp. 255276.
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sea power that are recorded” (Moffat, 2001, p. 13). Corbett’s views parallel
those of Montgomery in that he did not call for absolute Command of the Sea,
but rather a fleet strong enough to dispute command. This would be enough to
protect England from invasion. ”Montgomery demanded what Corbett later
called a defensive Maritime Strategy using a ‘Fleet in Being’61. This was the first
indication of this strategy and can be considered the basis for Corbett’s later
strategic thought” (Moffat, 2001, p. 13).

Although after 1570 England went about building up the Navy, Elizabeth was
criticised by her admirals for the priority she and her leading adviser, Lord
Burghley, gave to the expeditionary efforts to prevent Spanish-Catholic League
forces from controlling the opposite shores of the English Channel (Baugh,
1988, p. 37). “She expended a sum of 4.5 millions upon land campaigns which
yielded no offensive dividend while spending approximately one million only
upon the sea forces which were capable of severing Spain’s life-line” (Kennedy
2004, p. 26). There were a number of reasons behind this policy. First, the Low
Countries were too important to allow Spain, the most threatening power of the
time, to occupy them and so impose a strategic threat of invasion. The second
reason was economic for the Low Countries was the key market for England’s
main export good, semifinished wool cloth. The third reason was that the Navy
did not possess the requisite technical and administrative competence, which,
Baugh says (1987, p. 88), arose chiefly from a “lack of planning and consistent
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A ‘fleet in being’ is a naval force or capability that extends a controlling influence over the
naval assets of an enemy or prospective enemy through the assumption of a general defensive
attitude. Though a ‘fleet in being’ is a power too weak to win command by offensive operations,
it may yet succeed in holding the command in dispute.
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support, which displays lack of priority to some extent”. The Elizabethan Navy,
Baugh says (1988, pp. 37-38) was regarded as the second line of defence,
after the expeditionary efforts against the Spanish-Catholic League forces, with
the military forces for coastal defence providing the third.

In his paper Baugh (1988, p. 38) further contends that the indispensable
conditions for a viable blue-water policy were not achieved until the first half of
the 17th century. They were, firstly, English commerce became no longer
dependent on the markets of north-western Europe, the Mediterranean having
become much more attractive and, secondly, the Parliamentary Navy proved
remarkably effective in enforcing isolation and keeping the royalists out of the
country (Baugh, 1988, p.38). This contradicts his contention in his 1987 paper
that “the long reign of Elizabeth I, with its essentially defensive stance towards
Europe, was of fundamental importance in setting the normal political
conditions for a blue-water policy” (Baugh, 1987, p. 86). He then went on to
raise the question as to whether “Elizabeth and her leading advisers were the
first to adopt a blue-water policy” based upon the technical capabilities
emerging during her reign, the Navy’s transformation from a force designed for
the Narrow Seas to one designed for the oceans, and the defeat of Spanish
Armada in 1588 (Baugh, 1987, p.86). Support for such a possibility can be
found elsewhere; for example, it is stated in NRS: Vol. 131, p. 60 that “by the
1590s a fully-fledged ‘blue-water’ strategy was emerging”.

The role of the Navy in the defence of the country and its future development
was referred to in a speech by the Lord High Admiral Robert Rich to the House
of Lords in February 1644 as to the likely dangers arising from the Navy’s
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neglect. In his opinion, “if speedy course be not taken to quicken the
preparations to sea ... these inconveniences will necessarily fall upon the
kingdom:
1. First, it will be open to invasion from foreign states ... .
2. …
3. The merchandise of the kingdom will be ruined, and consequently
the Custom and Excise (which are the maintenance of the Navy and
army by land) will be lost.
4. The trade of the kingdom will be transferred to others, and not
easily recovered; whereby will also be contracted the decay of
navigation, having been hitherto to the strength and honour of this
nation.
5. …
(NRS: Vol. 131, p. 154)

The two essential features of the blue-water policy were naval command of the
North Sea and the English Channel, which was critical to the defence of the
nation against invasion, and the ability to finance the required naval force.
Command of the seas required an efficient and effective navy, which was
eventually provided by the Parliament during the Civil War. The keys to
financing the Navy were trade and shipping62, the former supplying “the liquid
funds, taxable and lendable, as well as a source of government revenue in the
form of custom duties (while) shipping provided four things: profits to be taxed
or lent, auxiliary vessels in time of war, shipbuilding skills and facilities, and
above all trained seamen” (Baugh, 1988, p. 40). The Navigation Act, 1651
which, like other legislation of the Commonwealth (considered a ‘usurping
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It is worth quoting Walter Raleigh’s maxim: “Whosoever commands the sea commands the
trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and
consequently the world itself” (Corbett, 1899, inside cover). However as Baugh says in regard to
the maxim, “On the other hand the influence of French military power upon western Europe
after 1670 suggested that his idea might have serious limitations, and understandably, opposing
schools of thought grew up – ‘Maritime’ and Continental’ which had an impact on British foreign
th
policy throughout the 18 century (Baugh, 1988, pp. 33-34).
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power’), was declared void on the restoration of Charles II, was reprised in
1660 and remained in force, with amendments, for nearly two centuries.
Overall, this legislation was to be important to the dynamic of British
imperialism based upon the ‘blue-water’ policy for it protected entrepreneurs
from foreign competition and benefited them through the absence of local tariffs
after the union with Scotland in 1707 (Black, 2004, p. 61). Supported by this
legislation, English trade, which after 1620 had started to move away from the
markets of north-western Europe, changed remarkably firstly, with the opening
of the trade routes to the East Indies, secondly, the importation of plantation
products from Virginia and the Caribbean, and thirdly, the very large increase in
trade with the countries and states of the Mediterranean. As a consequence,
there was a decrease in England’s commercial dependence on Europe and it
was this that made England’s blue-water policy viable (Baugh, 1987, p. 89).

In accordance with the blue-water policy, England was essentially defensive at
home, in order to counter the threat of invasion, but expansionist and
aggressive overseas in order to enlarge its maritime and commercial base at
the expense of its existing or future enemies (Baugh, 1988, p. 41). It was a
policy whereby England in war would not possess the power to inflict decisive
damage upon an enemy but instead would be enriched through the seizure of
the enemy’s share of the burgeoning world trade together with their colonies
(Harding, 1999, p. 142). It was during the Interregnum in the 1650s that
England commenced pursuing this blue-water policy initially during the Second
and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars and then during the extended period during which
Great Britain had to confront France, which was powerful on both land and sea.
However, the policy’s relevance and resilience were proved for Great Britain’s
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sea power grew to levels of superiority such that it became a determining factor
in European history.

The use of the term ‘policy’ makes it seem that the user is dealing with a plan, a
strategy, or a set of guidelines that has been promulgated and codified by
government, in this case to be used or followed in the defence of the nation.
However, Britain’s ‘blue-water policy’, was an unwritten policy and, as a
consequence, there are only a few available documents which clearly and
explicitly link the broad objectives of the policy with the direction and control of
naval operations in the early years.
Those few (documents) suggest that statesmen and admirals had a
concept of what they were trying to achieve with the use of naval
force, although it may have been only a series of broad assumptions
about strategic objectives upon which they grounded their broad
discussions about operations. … even at the highest level of
government the focus of discussion was on the operational level
(NRS: Vol. 131, p. 193).
While these comments refer to the period from 1648 to 1714, the comments by
different authors in the same publication in regard to the 101 years from 1714 to
1815 were similar.
Statements of general strategic principle are not easy to find in the
eighteenth century, particularly in the early years, and ideas have to
be gleaned from documents which deal with more practical matters
(NRS: Vol. 131, p. 321).
Accordingly, in order to examine the blue-water policy of England and Great
Britain it is necessary to refer to the writings of Alfred Mahan and Julian Corbett.
In Mahan’s opinion “(c)ontrol of the sea by maritime commerce and naval
supremacy means predominant influence in the world ... (and) is the chief
among the merely material elements in the power and prosperity of nations”
(quoted by Till, 2001, p. 632). He also laid down what were, in his opinion, the
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principal conditions affecting the sea power of nations, namely: geographical
position, physical conformation, extent of territory, number of population
connected with the sea, national character, and character and policy of
governments. Mahan’s discussion regarding these conditions have been
succinctly summarised by Kennedy (1988, p. 4).
A state that had neither to defend nor to extend itself by land was
much more favourably placed to concentrate upon the growth of its
sea power than one that had constantly to be prepared against land
neighbours; that a well- situated position, flanking important oceanic
waterways, provided a further crucial advantage, as did good
harbours and a seaboard not too great for a country’s defence
requirements, and not (like France’s seaboard) divided; and that a
sparse soil and climate was often an inducement to overseas
endeavours, whereas the inhabitants of a richly endowed nation had
less inclination to leave home. ... national character referred to the
proclivity to exploit the sea, as would be the case with a nation of
enterprising traders, willing and able to make a sufficient standing
investment in naval strength to protect its interests upon the oceans.
The government’s role was to foster the country’s maritime and
commercial potential in time of peace and, by the skilful exploitation
of sea power in wartime, to secure a victory that would enhance the
country’s position in the world when the conflict was over.
Mahan’s six conditions for the successful development of sea power as an
influence in world affairs (Kennedy, 2004, p. 6) were based upon his
examination of events over a particular period of history and of a certain group
of states which had developed colonial and maritime empires in those years.
However, importantly Mahan (1890, p. 90) was not prepared to over emphasise
what he called ‘sea history’.
Sea history, however, is but one factor in the general advance and
decay of nations which is called their history; and if sight be lost of
the other factors to which it is closely related, a distorted view, either
exaggerated or the reverse, of its importance will be formed.
Such a caveat was ignored by those who used the writings of Mahan in their
political struggles to finance a larger navy, such as the State Secretary of the
German Imperial Navy, Rear Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, the advocates of
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American expansion into the Pacific and the Caribbean, Cabot Lodge and
Teddy Roosevelt, and those within the British Government and establishment
who had no wish to admit that there were limitations to sea power or to accede
to a proposition that it was but one factor in the rise and fall of nations
(Kennedy, 1988, p. 5). Both the influences and limitations of sea power
depended upon the historical and geographical context of period and the war in
question and to argue otherwise would result in a distorted view of the influence
of seapower (Kennedy, 1988, p. 7). Although Corbett was utterly convinced that
sea power was of major importance in war, he argued that it did not win wars by
itself. It was his view that armies and navies must work together, using as an
example the logistical dependence upon the Royal Navy of Wellington’s
campaign in the Iberian Peninsula against the armies of Napoleon. To reinforce
this view he preferred to use the term ‘maritime power’ in place of ‘sea power’.
To Mahan, however, the ultimate object of naval warfare was to cut the enemy’s
communications and so dry up his commerce and close his ports which
required the establishment of command of the sea by directing the total
available naval power to the annihilation of the enemy’s naval forces (Mahan,
1890, p. 288).

Mahan’s views were moderated to a limited degree by Corbett (2001, p. 4) who
saw “(t)he function of the fleet, the object for which it was always employed, (as
being) threefold: firstly, to support or obstruct diplomatic effort; secondly, to
protect or destroy commerce; and thirdly, to further or hinder military operations
ashore”. While agreeing that the best way of ensuring your own fleet would be
in a position to discharge these functions was by securing the command of the
sea through the destruction of the enemy’s fleets, Corbett emphasised that
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securing command of the sea was only a means to an end (Corbett, 2001, p. 5).
He was a great admirer of Pitt’s performance during the Seven Year’s War,
describing him as “a true War Minister with almost undisturbed control of army,
navy, and diplomacy, and in his hands we see the fleet slipping neatly into its
place; shoulder to shoulder with its comrades” (Corbett, 2001, p. 6). He looked
upon Pitt’s strategy during that war as
a most brilliant lesson of the way in which the weak army of a strong
naval power can be used, of how great Continental armies may be
made to feel the shocks of fleets, and of how mere superiority at sea
may be made to thwart Continental Cabinets, to tangle their strategy
and upset their moral balance (Corbett, 2001, p. 6).
The subject of his theory set forth in his book Some Principle of Maritime
Strategy is ‘maritime’ rather than ‘naval’, for he wished to support his viewpoint
that it was indisputable that a war could not be decided by naval action alone63
(Corbett, 2001, p. 15). In the first part of his book, in which he advanced his
theories of maritime power and command at sea, Corbett emphasised the
interaction and interdependence of land and sea forces. In the second part he
examined the conduct of naval war in which he explained the differences
between war on land and war at sea. On land the enemy’s military force was
the main objective but striking the enemy’s fleet was not always possible since
the enemy could choose not to do battle by either remaining in port or hiding in
the vast ocean areas ready to attack the lanes of communication. While Corbett
was not as well-known as Mahan, Corbett’s theories eventually became the
accepted way of conducting maritime conflicts (Moffat, 2001, p. 11) and to this
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Although not a maritime conflict the air war over North Vietnam by the United States in the
1960s is an example of a biased conviction that one arm of the armed forces alone can decide
the outcome of a conflict.
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day the Royal Navy acknowledges his theories on Command of the Sea as the
basis of its maritime strategy (Moffat, 2001, p. 29). Corbett’s theories are
supported strongly in another recent paper on the subject of maritime strategy,
this time as it applies to the United Sates Navy, the thesis of which being that
“(i)n order to properly balance the fleet and fulfil its roles in the 21 st century, the
Navy must apply the principles of maritime strategy laid forth by Julian Corbett
and reorganise its policy around the enduring functions of the Navy” (Rexrode,
2004, Report Documentation Page).

3.5 The Nation’s affection for its Navy
At the conclusion of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars with France (17931815), the remarkable achievements of the British Royal Navy during these
conflicts had reinforced the British peoples’ long standing esteem and affection
for their Navy. However, not only was it the Nation’s pride and glory, it was also
its best defence. While such positive sentiments had been part of the British
identity for many generations, they unfortunately did not extend to Britain’s
army. Although the origins of the army can be traced to Henry II’s Assize of
Arms in 1181, which created a military obligation for service by all adult males
of England, the direct ancestor of the modern British army is considered to be
the parliamentary New Model Army of 1645. However, the odious role it played
in enforcing Oliver Cromwell’s rule in England and in the subjugation of the
peoples of Scotland and Ireland left the British people with a prejudice against
soldiers and standing armies that was to remain until the 20th century. Based
upon Lynn’s seven styles of armies, the New Model Army was typical of a
‘state-commission’ army of the mid-17th to the late 18th centuries. These were
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standing armies in which command and administration were more regular,
which helped to sustain larger forces. They “influenced the development of
more powerful, centralized, and bureaucratic governments. ... More powerful
states demanded higher levels of taxation and greater political and commercial
control, and they enforced these demands with armed force when necessary”
(Lynn, 1996, pp. 518-519).

Following its army’s successes at the battles of Naseby, Langport, and Bristol in
1645 and the subsequent capture of King Charles, Parliament began to press
Presbyterianism upon the country, including forbidding ‘independents’, that is
those who believed that each man must establish his own relationship with God
without direction from any form of religious authority, from preaching and
purging them from the officer corps of the New Army. The situation was
exacerbated when Parliament proposed to disband the army without paying the
arrears of pay, a matter that quickly raised the ire of the troops and resulted in a
disastrous split between the army and Parliament. Worse was to follow, for the
army, to its chagrin, found that Parliament was continuing to negotiate a peace
settlement with Charles, regarding him as a bulwark against the army’s religious
and political extremism. To circumvent this, the army occupied London, purged
the Commons (the ‘long Parliament’) of those members intent on such
negotiations and those who were not in sympathy with the army’s ideals,
leaving just a ‘Rump’ of army sympathisers, and, finally, engineered the trial and
subsequent execution of the king in 1649. This split the Puritans again and as a
consequence the army thereafter became the centre of English life supported
by only a narrow section of public opinion in the country, a situation that was to
be compounded by Cromwell’s abolition of the ‘Rump’ Parliament and its
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replacement by the ‘Barebones’64 Parliament in 1653. Eventually the return to
monarchy was seen to be inevitable, particularly by prominent individuals such
as General Monck who had been appointed by the Republican Council of State
as Commander-in-Chief of the army. When Monck’s army marched south from
Coldstream it was welcomed everywhere as the Nation’s saviour for there was
a generalised fear of Quakers and other Radicals65. In London, he called a free
Parliament in 1660 which invited Charles II to return to England as King
(Barnett, 1974, pp. 100-109).

The Puritan experiment “left a deep scar on British minds and memories as far
as a national army was concerned. From 1660 to the present day the history of
the army as an institution has been constantly governed by this national
aversion to a standing army as a major state institution” (Barnett, 1974, p. 110).
James II did nothing to alleviate this aversion with his actions prior to the
Glorious Revolution of 1688, which included the encamping on Hounslow Heath
of the large army he had recruited in order to intimidate the people of London66.
The ultimate consequence was that a significant standing army of continental
stature became an impossibility for any monarch after the Glorious Revolution
and, as a consequence, the Bill of Rights of 1689 declared that a standing army
‘within this Kingdom’ in peacetime was illegal ‘unless it be with the consent of
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It was named after the renowned Puritan fanatic ‘Praise-God Barbone'. (Barnett, 1974, p.
106).
65
th
The Radicals were a parliamentary political grouping in the early to mid-19 century. The
th
movement arose in the late 18 century to support parliamentary reform together with free trade
and Catholic emancipation.
66
“In 1685 alone nine new foot regiments, five regiments of horse and two of dragoons were
raised” (Barnett 1974, p. 119). “(B)y 1688 James had brought the strength of the armies in his
three kingdoms to over 34,000 men” (Barnett, 1970, p. 120). “At a very reasonable estimate
James more than trebled Charles’s standing Army” the pretext being Monmouth’s rebellion
(Calendar of Treasury Books, Volume 8: 1685-1689 (1923), pp. LIV-XCV).
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Parliament’. This action was acceptable to the Commons and the Nation as
both “preferred a means of military action that could be regarded as
constitutionally safe, and which therefore could never be a threat to liberty”
(Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, Vol. LXXIX, February 1856, p. 233, quoted
in Funnell, 2003, p. 62). The only means that met this requirement was the
militia, usually referred to as the ‘Constitutional Force,’ as much of the
opposition to a standing army can be viewed in terms of glaring selfinterest and economic sense; it was better to have an inexpensive,
though ineffective militia, and devote more resources to a
constitutionally benign but aggressively potent navy than run the
constitutional gauntlet of a large standing army (Funnell, 2003, p.
66).
In stark contrast to the army, the Navy, being regarded as ‘constitutionally
benign’, did not represent and had never been a threat to civil liberties. These
positive feelings were reinforced historically by the deep regard the English had
for their Navy which had been instrumental in the development of a national
identity which had been such a prominent feature of Elizabethan England. Even
during the period of Cromwell’s Commonwealth the Navy gained credit for itself
through its successes, such as those of the dour and humourless but brilliant
General-at-Sea Robert Blake (Howarth, 1978, p. 49) who, having been
humiliated by the equally brilliant Dutch commander, Admiral Maarten Tromp, at
Dungeness in late 1652, avenged this humiliation at Portland and Beachy Head
the next year (Howarth, 1978, p. 48). Blake’s resultant standing in the eyes of
the people of England was reinforced through his annihilation of the Spanish
West Indies fleet at harbour in Teneriffe in 1657 which led to him being the
subject of a public thanksgiving in London.
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While victory at sea still stirred the hearts of the English, the successes of the
army, for example the 1658 victory of the English troops under William Lockhart
when they defeated the troops of Spain in the Battle of the Dunes of Dunkirk,
did little to assuage the fear of being governed in an arbitrary way by a standing
army. This fear and England’s geographical position “ensured the Navy’s
standing as the pre-eminent service, carrying not only the great bulk of the
responsibility for defence but also the Nation’s affection” (Funnell, 2003, p. 57).
It cannot be assumed, however, that the relationship between the populace
throughout the Nation and the Navy was always cordial. For example, in towns
in which the Navy maintained bases, the relationship often was strained, in part
because of such matters as the impressment of men by the Navy, differentials
in the pay paid to Navy and merchant seamen, and the difficulties in obtaining
materials and facilities to repair merchant ships. A good example of such a town
was Portsmouth which, although by the late 18th century it had developed into
“a confident, cohesive and affluent mercantile community that was linked to its
prominence in trans-oceanic trade” (Black, 2004, p. 129), the different values
and priorities of the Navy from those of the merchant community in Portsmouth
led to disputes over convoying requirements and responsibilities. The situation
was not improved by the existence of a local conflict that had developed
between smugglers and revenue men (Black, 2004, p. 129).

The Nation’s pride in and affection for its Navy was to rise inexorably over the
coming generations with the expansion of the Navy and its success in the
battles in which it fought and the gaining of the virtual monopoly of world-wide
naval power. The preamble to the Sixth Report of a Parliamentary Select
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Committee on Finance exemplifies the almost uncritical affection of the Nation
for the Navy, even though it was expensive to maintain and operate.
Esteeming the Naval superiority of this Country as the principle on
which its external power, internal safety, and general prosperity, in
the highest degree depend, your Committee are of opinion, that the
sense which they entertain of the necessity for economy, cannot,
with a due regard to the interest of the State, be allowed to interfere
with the support of such a Maritime Force as may be deemed
necessary in time of peace, nor with the preparations for its adequate
augmentation in the event of war. And as Naval Expenditure in time
of peace is principally connected with the purchase and preparation
of materials for future exigency, there is no part of the Public Service
in which an ill judged temporary economy might be ultimately
productive of such considerable expense (BPP 1817(410), p. 1).
With words of esteem such as these emanating from a committee of the
Commons, it is understandable how the annual estimates of the Navy became
to be treated so liberally and so loosely. Most importantly, Britain, being an
open and pluralist state, had been able to pursue sea power largely with the
support of the populace and this had made the task of funding the development
and maintenance of the Navy an easier task.

Although the army was to gain glory in battles such as those under the Duke of
Marlborough at Blenheim, Ramillies, and Oudenarde in the early 18th century,
the army’s successes over the years did little to alter its standing in the eyes of
the British populace. Even subsequent to the French Revolution in 1793, it was
not considered necessary to make changes, the result of which was that British
soldiers were deliberately segregated from the rest of society through the
building of barracks, the army’s budget was tightly controlled by Parliament, the
system of command was deliberately divided, and inefficiency was tolerated in
order to keep the army politically weak (Badsey, 2002, p. 49). Even after taking
into consideration the differences in the values of today with those of the 19 th
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century, both the treatment accorded the returning troops from Waterloo,
particularly the wounded, in 1815 and the apparent indifference displayed by
Treasury’s Commissariat for the suffering of the army in the Crimea in 18541856 (Funnell, 1990, p. 328) do not evoke a picture of a society which then held
its army in positive esteem.

3.6 Conclusion
As described by Ehrman (quoted in Rodger, 2004, p. xxiii) naval history is a
microcosm of national history and if it was compared to a cake, the different
layers of which are different aspects of national life, then naval history is not a
layer but a slice of that cake. As one of those layers is finance and
administration it is considered indispensable to this study that the history of
Britain’s Navy be reviewed albeit briefly in order to place the adoption of DEB in
the context of the decisions and the factors which determined where and when
the ships of the Navy were required to fight, for what objects, with what kinds of
ships, and against what odds. The next chapter will examine the Navy’s
administration in order to place the adoption of DEB in the context of the
administration of this vast enterprise.
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OF THE ROYAL NAVY
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Chapter 4
The Administration of the Civil Departments of the
Royal Navy
4.1 Introduction
The development of the Royal Navy into a navy of such remarkable size and
complexity had demanded the existence of an administrative system that was
sound and sufficient in itself. British naval administration can be described as
the organising force which shaped and broadly directed British sea power over
the centuries. It was “that system and that machinery” that existed for the
“proper constitution, maintenance, and disposition of the fleet in its material and
personal elements” (Vesey Hamilton, 1896, p. 1-2). It was Richard Vesey
Hamilton’s opinion that the historic development of British naval administration
was founded upon a combination of circumstances, thereby emphasising that it
was not the product of the organising skills of one or a few individuals or of a
single period.
It is, if I may be permitted the expression, an organic growth, having
its roots far back in medieval history or earlier, developed under
constantly expanding conditions, but owing its special character to
the original circumstances out of which it grew (Vesey Hamilton,
1896, p. 3).
“Englishmen”, he said, “may certainly congratulate themselves upon the finally
successful conduct of their maritime affairs in the past, and upon the
possession of an organisation which provides for the Empire a Navy that is
cheaper and more efficient than any other in the world” (Vesey Hamilton, 1896,
p. 2).
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This chapter will retrace those roots of naval administration and describe the
moulding of the Navy’s development with particular reference to the financial
management of the civil departments, the Navy and Victualling Boards, and will
include an examination of the operation of the Dockyards which were of such
vital importance to the success of the Navy.

4.2 Naval administration prior to the Restoration
In medieval times, the Navy (“like the parliament – less an institution than an
event”) was more than the small number of the king’s own ships and consisted
of the realm’s entire maritime resources assembled under the king’s orders for
some specific military purpose. (Loades, 1992, p. 11; Starkey, 2011, p. 128). As
well as the king’s own ships which formed the nucleus of the Navy, there were
two sources available to the English Crown from which it could draw vessels for
naval purposes: those from the Cinque Ports, and the merchant fleet of England
(NRS: Vol. 131, p. 33). As the merchant ships were able to be easily converted
into fighting ships simply by the addition of castles at both the bow and the
stern, it was therefore very simple to increase the size of the fleet through the
exercise of the king’s prerogative of impressment of the merchant ships.
However, while the navy could be expanded easily through the use of
impressed merchant ships the system could create a major problem for the
country and the merchants through the disruption of trade, particularly in a long
war.

In times of war it was expected that all subjects would serve the king and
merchants in possession of a ship were expected to make his or her ship
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available when called upon without payment or by charter at set fees67. Today
the owners would have little or no doubt of receiving payment from the
government for the use or loss of their vessels, but that was not the situation in
medieval times. Up until the late 14th century a shipowner did not receive
payment for the use of his ship and when called upon to provide the services of
his ship the owners were expected to feed and pay their crew from the time of
assembly of the ships up to the time of the commencement of the sailing on the
king’s business. At that time the king commenced paying the men but still paid
nothing for the use of the ships (Rodger, 2005, p. 121). Furthermore, there was
no such thing as marine insurance and invariably there would be no
reimbursement from the government for loss or damage to the vessel. A further
inequity that existed was that it was common for the owner not to be paid during
the period of service and either he or the town that had been called upon to
provide the services of the ship (‘ship service’) would have to pay and victual
the crew.68 From 1380, however, limited allowances for wear and tear were
sometimes paid but nothing was paid the owners in compensation for the loss
of a ship in the king’s service. Although such a short sighted policy was as
detrimental to English sea power as was successful enemy action, there was
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Using an acronym of today, it would be said that in wartime a government would charter
“ships taken up from trade” (“STUFT”), as was done, for example, during the Falklands War with
Argentina in 1982.
68
Military service also entailed he recruitment of “merchant vessels to serve as auxiliary craft or
transports engaged to convey the tools of war to overseas theatres of conflict. As early as the
th
14 century, such logistical operations were executed on a major scale. In 1342, for example,
Edward III’s invasion of Brittany was accomplished through the deployment of 609 ships,
manned by over 13,000 mariners, to transport three land forces, totalling no more than 7,000
men, including non-combatants. All but eight were privately owned, some being prizes and
some being recruited from the Cinque Ports, according to feudal obligations, while others were
hired and, most commonly, requisitioned for Royal service” (Starkey, 2011, pp. 128-129).
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little that could be done to alleviate the situation without an increase in the
nation’s wealth (NRS: Vol. 131, p. 9).

Outside those times when the Navy Royal was gathered, and particularly
following the loss of Normandy in 1204 and the appearance of France as a
maritime power, it was normal for fleets of armed ships to assemble in
March/April in order to ‘keep the seas’ clear of raiding parties, and pirates until
the beginning of following winter, separate fleets being assembled for both the
North Sea (the Northern Fleet) and the Channel (the Western Fleet) and, if
required, for operations in the Irish Sea. The primary reason for separate fleets
was the ease of administration but there were operational reasons as well, such
as the ease of assembling the individual fleets. Each of these fleets was under
the command of an admiral who was usually a knight or a baron, although
occasionally he may have been a merchant or a shipowner, especially an
individual from the Cinque Ports (Rodger, 2005, p. 134). The word ‘admiral’ in
England at that time was the title used for an individual who had been made
responsible for the gathering together of the ships that had been impressed.
These ‘admirals’ were described as admirals of a particular fleet, for example,
“Gervase Alard, captain and admiral of the fleet of the king’s ships of the Cinque
Ports and of the other ports from Dover by the sea westwards to Cornwall and
of all that country” (Close Rolls Edward I: July 1306). As the major responsibility
of the admirals was the assembling the fleets, it was not necessary that they
had sea experience nor was it a necessity that they had to go to sea as part of
their appointment. William Monson (1569-1643) noted in his Naval Tracts that
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for a long period although the same man might be re-appointed as
Admiral in successive years his authority, limited to the time of his
command, was confined to his fleet, and to the exercise of restricted
judicial functions in connexion with it and in such ports as were
situated on the coast immediately under his charge and were not free
by charter from external interference (NRS: Vol. 23, p. 423).
Vesey Hamilton noted that until the century “(t)he executive control of the fleet
was vested in “Keepers of the Sea”, afterwards designated “Admirals”“(1896,
p.5). ‘Keepers of the Sea’, however, were normally local officials appointed
particularly for the mustering of merchant shipping although there was nothing
that could be called a settled system (Rodger, 2005, p. 128). With the duties of
the keepers being closely related to those of an admiral, they were sometimes
discharged by the same person. Monson described the holders of these
positions as having had no connection with either the sea or the men that used
the sea with the result they knew little or nothing about the needs of those
people or the requisite administrative system (NRS: Vol. 23, p. 424). While this
may have been true of some, an examination of the list of those who were
appointed admirals of the various fleets show that many of the appointees were
those of high position and many also were very keen to lead their fleet, for
example Richard FitzAlan, the Earl of Arundel (Rodger, 2005, pp. 505-506;
Close Rolls, Richard II: March 1387)69.

While the fleets were temporary assemblies, there was no requirement for a
permanent administrative structure, but the increasing responsibilities of the
admirals in the 14th century necessitated the appointment of clerks to assist the
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In the roll of 20 March 1387, there is a reference to “Richard earl of Arundel admiral of
England” being appointed by the king “to sail on his service at sea” (Close Rolls, Richard II:
March 1387). This “service” was the naval operation in which the English defeated a combined
Franco-Spanish- Flemish fleet off Margate.
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admirals with correspondence and the maintenance of records. Although further
administrative work was assumed by the admirals when they were delegated
responsibility for the Admiralty Court, the extra work was made palatable by the
payment of fees and the profits arising from causes tried in the court and from
wrecks upon the coasts. The admirals were to come and go but their clerks
remained at their posts and it was from their provision of continuity and
experience in maritime administration that the position of Clerk of King’s Ships
evolved, not as sometimes asserted from William of Wrotham 70, the
Archdeacon of Taunton who had been the Keeper of the King’s Ports and
Galleys for King John over a century before. The Clerks, who were usually
drawn from within the Exchequer and Chancery, did not have a monopoly on
naval administration for there were other officials who continued to transact
naval business (Rodger, 2005, p. 128).

From the early 14th century to the end of the 15th century the Clerk was the only
official under the Admiral of England71 who was responsible for naval
administration. However, from the reign of John to that of Henry VIII (1199–
1547), when the position became merely a subordinate official, the Clerks were
either persons who held minor appointments or successful merchants who were
able to assist the king financially. The Clerks were accountable for a wide
spectrum of responsibilities from the organisation of the repair and maintenance
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“As an administrator his authority was extensive: he built, repaired, victualled and paid ships”
(Rodger, 2005, p. 53). He was also skilled in other areas, for example, he supervised the
construction of walls and buildings at the Portsmouth Dockyard in 1212 (NRS: Vol. 131, p.42)
which is described by Rodger (2005, p. 53) as being “an advanced piece of engineering for the
time”.
71
th
th
The title changed in the 16 century to “Lord Admiral” and to “Lord High Admiral” in the 17
century.
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of the ships to the construction of docks when they were needed, the building or
rental of storehouses, and the provision of shipkeepers. Although victualling
was the responsibility mainly of the royal clerks, the clerks were also
responsible for transport but even with this wide range of duties they were not
allocated any specific sum for the upkeep of the Navy, the payment of accounts
received from suppliers being made by special warrant drawn from the
Exchequer as required, each warrant being signed by the King (NRS: Vol. 131,
p. 90) specifying the particular use for which the money was intended (Davies,
1965, p. 270).

The Clerks were not responsible for naval policy, this being within the domain of
the Lord Admiral, a position of state which had been held by John de Vere, the
Earl of Oxford, prior to his death in 1512. It was a position that had arisen from
the amalgamation of the responsibilities of the Admirals of the Northern and
Western Fleets but by the 16th century it was a court appointment based on
patronage and highlighted by the possession of a golden whistle of rank and
glittering perquisites.

The increasing naval activity that emerged with Henry VIII’s French War of
1512-1514 led to him making sweeping changes which included the
appointment of commanders with naval experience to the position of Lord
Admiral. The first of them was Edward Howard who in 1512 was appointed
Admiral of a naval expedition and in 1513 succeeded the Earl of Oxford as Lord
Admiral of England. Killed in action later that year he was succeeded by his
brother, Lord Thomas Howard, as Lord Admiral who as commander of the fleet
extended his functions to include the control of naval administration (de Beer,
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1927, p. 47). However, “the real germ of a future naval administration seems to
have sprung from storekeeping” (Rodger, 2005, p. 222). The declaration of war
in 1512 and the consequential increased naval activity required the building of
extra ships which in turn necessitated extra naval storehouses, two being built
on the Thames, one at Deptford and one at Erith further downstream. Erith was
also the site of an advanced base for routine maintenance, instead of ships
having to sail further up the Thames to Deptford, and also as a centre for naval
administration from 1514 into the 1540’s (Rodger, 2004, p. 222). As to whether
storekeepers were appointed at the time of the storehouses’ construction, and
whether responsibility for the administration of these stores was added to those
of the existing Clerk of the King’s Ships, there is no consensus. There is no
consensus either as to the date of the appointment of the Clerk Comptroller and
whether or not it was set apart from an expanded Clerk of the King’s Ships
position (Rodger, 2005, p. 222; Moorhouse, 2006, p. 206; NRS: Vol. 157, p.
xxvii). In the absence of an administrative structure and a budget these nonpermanent positions reported directly to the Privy Council which, in effect,
meant Cardinal Wolsey until his sudden loss of all offices in October 1529. He
was followed by Thomas Cromwell from 1532 until his execution in July 1540.
Both men, although supported by Henry, had preferred to exercise control
through informal groups of officials instead of structures which would in all
likelihood reduce their authority (Rodger, 2004, p. 223). The result of this
personal style of management was that the Navy was run through “a small
group of officers who had no clearly-defined relationship to each other, and the
definition of whose duties was partly a matter of custom, and partly of
convenience” (Loades, 1992, p. 77).
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Up until the period from 1512 to the 1540’s naval administration had been a
fragmented and erratic business. Although it was fortunate that several
individuals possessing a wide knowledge and experience in the navy and
shipping in particular had gained high positions in the administration of the
Navy, such as William Gonson who had been appointed the Clerk Keeper of the
Storehouses (from approximately 1524 to 1544), and Thomas Spert who had
been appointed Clerk Comptroller (from approximately 1524 to 1541), it is clear
that the responsibilities attaching to the positions and their interaction had not
been clearly thought through, let alone clearly defined and communicated. One
of the effects of such poor management was allowing responsibility and power
to become concentrated in the hands of individuals such as Gonson which
caused considerable problems when he suddenly died by suicide. “What was
needed was a body of knowledgeable individuals with well-defined and
guaranteed separate roles, who collectively “ran” the navy in collusion with its
principal sea-faring officers” (Moorhouse, 2006, p. 282). Between 1542 and
1545 there had been created a number of new offices, “although the policy
decisions which led to these creations are obscure and unrecorded” (NRS, Vol.
131, p. 91). The offices were those of the Lieutenant of the Admiralty (or ViceAdmiral of England), the Master of Naval Ordnance, the Surveyor and Rigger of
the Ships, and finally a Treasurer, and it was these together with the three
existing offices (Clerk Comptroller, the Clerk of the King’s Ships, and the Clerk
of the Storehouses) that in or about 1545 72 came together to form the
“Counseall of His Mareyn” (the Council of the Marine) to be known eventually as
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There are no documents which refer to the appointment of this council. The first indication of
such a development appeared when the Governor of Hull made mention of it on 11 March 1545
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the Navy Board.73 The evolution of this sophisticated bureaucratic body, “linked
to the “Tudor revolution” in governmental administration” (Smith, 1974, p. 48),
has been called “the most important change in naval administration that had yet
occurred” (Oppenheim, 1988, p. 85). It is difficult to exaggerate the importance
of this change for it was the first time the Navy had a permanent administration
with clear lines of command, supervised by well-paid officials (Rodger, 2004, p.
226). It was a transformation in naval administration that constituted the
beginning, however imperfect, of a bureaucratic department of state (Davies,
1965, p. 268).

As to Henry’s motives for forming the Council, there are various opinions,
including that of Oppenheim who considers that Henry, after the death of the
experienced William Gonson, was dissatisfied with the existing system of
administration, not only for its obvious inefficiencies but, more importantly,
because he recognised that it would be unable to accommodate the future
requirements of an expanding Navy (1988, p. 85)74. According to Monson (NRS,
Vol. 23, p. 425), “it must have been the experience (of the Lord Admiral going to
sea) and the succeeding wars with France, together with the inability in time of
peace, of the Clerk of the Ships to deal with the extended administrative
necessities attendant on the vastly increased matėriel of the Navy, that decided
Henry to make such a sweeping change”. All of the men who were initially

that he had “lately received letters from the vice-admiral of England and others of the King’s
“counseall of his mareyn” purporting that the owners of two ships, the Trynetie of Beverlay and
the Trynetie of Hull, should prepare and victual them for a month against 21 March” (Add. MS.
32,656, f.198 B.M. Hamilton Papers).
73
In 1546 the Council was also known as the “Admiralty”, the “Chief Officers of the Admiralty”,
or the “Officers of the Navy”.
74
Rodger (2004, p. 227) considers that John Dudley, Viscount Lisle, may have been the
originator of the Navy Board of 1546.
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appointed to the Council were very knowledgeable about ships and shipping
with three of them in August 1545 commanding ships or squadrons at sea.
Although “(t)hese men did not cease to be shipowners and merchants when
they became royal officials, and inevitably their work involved numerous cases
of what the twentieth century calls conflict of interest and the 16 th century
regarded as legitimate opportunities” (Rodger, 2005, p. 226). Both the Navy and
the individuals gained through this close symbiotic relationship: the Navy, as
this was the only way to secure the essential skills, and the individuals, as they
gained control over the king’s ships and so were able to exploit their availability
for charters for private voyages.

The use of the board structure raises questions even though prior to the 19 th
century the use of boards of public officials was common throughout Europe as
well as in Britain (Parris, 1969, p. 82). There were several reasons for their
popularity. One reason was the desire on the part of the king to spread the risk
and reduce the power available to an individual. On the other hand, instead of
the risks of individuals growing into ‘over mighty subjects’ there were always the
problems arising from an individual being given responsibilities they were
unable to fulfil. Boards tended to avoid both extremes. The career of Thomas
Danby, the master political manager and ‘fixer’ during the reigns of Charles II
and William III, was an example of the former, while the career of the Earl of
Southampton, the Lord Treasurer who crippled the government of Charles II,
exemplifies the latter. A commission could be efficient without causing jealousy
and had the great advantage of increasing the representation of the Court in the
Commons. Perhaps, equally important, it was a means of securing continuity.
Commissions were considered to be less wasteful of the king’s money than a
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minister and a department because each member acted under the eyes of the
other. There were advantages when it was desirable to decentralise functions of
central government and, from the king’s point of view, the advantage of boards
was that they increased the amount of patronage available (Parris, 1969, pp.
82-83). Boards however have a number of inherent problems. They have a
tendency to grow and as a result can become too large which reduces the
volume and quality of the business transacted, but perhaps the biggest problem
is that when sharing responsibility members lose that sense of responsibility of
a person acting alone. It was these problems that Charles Middleton described
during his sojourn at the Navy Office and which are discussed below.

Over the years changes were to be made to the Council of Marine Causes.
Firstly, in 1550 the post of Controller General of the Victuals was created and
added to the Council but eventually responsibility for naval victualling was
transferred to a separate board. Secondly, with the decline in the volume of
business transacted by the Council following the transfer of responsibility for
Navy finance to the Lord Treasurer, the office of Vice-Admiral declined in
significance and the office was allowed to lapse in 1565. Thirdly, although
initially all the naval accounts had been handled centrally by the Navy
Treasurer, in 1557 the Privy Council gave the Lord Treasurer, William Paulet,
the Marquis of Winchester, overall responsibility for naval finance, but with the
advice of the Lord Admiral. For the reason that in practice the Treasurer of the
Navy presided at the Board, the Lord Treasurer thus secured from the Lord
Admiral control of one of the largest and most expensive departments of state,
and confined the Lord Admiral to his ancient functions. Fourthly, the victualling
of the Navy was addressed, which is discussed in a separate section below.
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Finally, as the duties of the Master of Marine Ordnance concerned only the
purchase of small pieces of artillery, gun carriages, small arms including
arquebuses (which were now starting to be issued), longbows and arrows, bills
and morrispikes, and their repair, (for anything larger, such as the curtalls,
culverins, fawconnettes, the Navy was dependent on the Royal Ordnance Office
in the Tower of London), it was decided to allow the Mastership to lapse in
1589.

Much of the duality within the Navy Board discussed above also marked the
office of the Lord Admiral of England (Rodger, 2005, p. 227) in that it was not
seen as an imperative that the position should be held by a seaman. For
example, a child, even though he was the Duke of Richmond, was appointed to
the office in 1525 which he held for eleven years. In such circumstances it was
Wolsey and Cromwell who acted as the Lord Admiral during his lifetime. Duality
also could75 be found in the Lord Admiral’s involvement with the Admiralty
courts which has been noted above. With his position then being one of honour
and profit and with the pre-emptive takeover of the Navy Board by the Lord
Treasurer, the Lord Admiral had little involvement in the Navy’s administration.
Following the creation of the Council, it was not until 1660 following the
Restoration when James took active control of the Navy that the Lord Admiral
interfered greatly in its administration. In the meantime, the Council, now more
commonly referred to as the Navy Board, was responsible for the administration
of the fleet whereby it was to prepare the fleet and have it ready to fulfil its

75

The High Court of Admiralty commenced in about 1361, remaining a separate court until it
was merged with the matrimonial and probate courts into the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty
division of the High Court of the United Kingdom in 1873.
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maritime duties in accordance with the directions of the government. The
Admiralty, consisting of the Lord Admiral and his captains, was responsible for
the development and maintenance of naval policy, command and discipline.
There was now a clear distinction between the two Boards.

The administration of the Navy, however, was destined to be impacted by 15
years of neglect following the end of Elizabeth’s reign and the accession of
James I. The Lord Admiral at the time of the Spanish Armada had been
Charles, Lord Howard of Effingham (later the Earl of Nottingham), who had
been appointed to that position in 1585 and, unfortunately for the Navy, was to
remain in that office until 1618 when he died. In many ways Nottingham was
considered by some to be the last of the medieval Admirals (Rodger, 1979, p. 9)
who was not greatly interested in administration. He was however greatly
interested in patronage and the power which came with the control of it. With
the accession of James 1 the country was ripe for the appointment of his kin
and cronies to the offices of the Navy Board. Two of the offices in particular fell
to forceful and totally unscrupulous men, the office of Treasurer of the Navy to
Robert Mansell, and the office of Surveyor of Ships and Rigging to John Trevor.
Under these men “fraud was elevated to a level seldom matched in the long and
extravagant history of corruption” (Rodger, 1979, p. 9). The Navy was to suffer
by the steadily decreasing numbers of seaworthy ships and the increasing
disorganisation throughout. As long as the Howards remained in James’ favour
their misdeeds went unpunished. Even so, trouble arose in 1608 when a
Commission of Enquiry was appointed to examine naval administration, the
prime mover ironically being the cousin of the Lord Admiral, the Earl of
Northampton. Although nothing could come of it, for to attack the king’s
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favourites (in particular Robert Mansell) was to attack the king’s prerogative,
James had to be seen to do something about the peculations described in the
Commission’s report and this he did by way of a mild lecture to Mansell and
Trevor as to the worthiness of honesty. However, “an oration” in broad Scotch
from the lips of the conceited pedant staggering under the weight of the Tudor
crown did not prove an effective method of reform (Oppenheim. 1892, p. 479).

The ‘old knaveries’ then continued as they had before the perpetrators had
been interrupted, but two years later their activities led to another Commission
of Enquiry which was also instigated by Northampton. James’ demonstrable
favour towards Mansell eventually led to the Commission being allowed to slip
into oblivion. However, over the next ten years the political environment
changed and calls for reform were answered by the Privy Council when in 1618
a Royal Commission was set up once again to enquire into naval
administration. Not only did it expose the graft and corruption which was
endemic in the Navy and in other departments, such as the Household, it made
recommendations as to future naval policy. The Commission found that the
Treasurer was unable to provide full accounts and “(t)he only figures that could
be produced from 1613 onward were contained in abstracts of expenditure for
each year, with no account of what had been received” (NRS: Vol. 116 p. xxv).
Naval administration by the Navy Board was replaced by a standing Navy
Commission under the guidance of the Lord Admiral. While the 1608
Commission of Enquiry had been a total failure the 1618 Commission was most
successful for a number of reasons. Most importantly James realised that
economies were essential and he saw the savings that had been achieved in
the Household. Also, the Commission was powerful, containing men with wide
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experience in naval matters who were able to meet the king’s prejudice in
favour of individuals such as Mansell.

Immediate benefits flowed from the reforms arising from the Commission of
Enquiry: the fleet and the dockyards were kept in repair, theft was checked and,
importantly, over five years two new ships were launched each year. However,
the 15 peace-time years of neglect and decay and the six years of reform was
followed by a further investigation of the Navy which was carried out in 1626-7
following the Cadiz fiasco, a naval expedition against Spain by English and
Dutch forces, and the failed expedition to assist the Huguenots at La Rochelle.
Much of the money voted in 1624 had been spent by Charles I and the Lord
High Admiral76, the Duke of Buckingham, on refurbishing the English fleet and
they decided to emulate the triumphant attacks on Cadiz by Elizabeth years
before in an attempt to return respect to England and its people after the
political stress of the preceding years. It was a humiliating experience
particularly as a result of the English commander finding himself in command of
a landing force which had rapidly degenerated into an army of undisciplined
inebriates through the failure to provide the troops with drinking water. All blame
was placed upon Buckingham and as a consequence Parliament initiated the
process of his impeachment. It did not proceed far for in 1626 Charles chose to
dissolve Parliament rather than risk a successful impeachment.

In December 1627, the Navy Commissioners reported that there were
outstanding amounts payable for seamen’s wages, freight, repairs, stores and
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Buckingham was the first to be called the “Lord High Admiral”.
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other items for 1625, 1626 and 1627, totalling in excess of £200,000. This
resulted in the Commissioners losing the confidence of Charles and
Buckingham and as a consequence the Navy Commission was superseded and
the Navy Board restored. Although Buckingham’s death at the hands of an army
officer in 1628 was a deliverance to Charles, it unsettled the Navy’s
administration even further and as a consequence Charles placed the office of
the Lord High Admiral into commission, and separated the High Court of the
Admiralty from the Admiralty. The jurisdiction of the Court was transferred to the
High Court of England and Wales while the Admiralty Board became another
committee of the Privy Council and “explicitly subordinate” to it (Rodger, 2005,
p. 372). Even so, “ten years later financial embarrassment suspended the
activities of this body and, as Charles I was also anxious to secure the support
of the influential nobility, the office of Lord High Admiral was restored in favour
of the powerful (Algernon Percy) earl of Northumberland” (James and Murray,
1936, p. 11).

During the Civil War and the Interregnum the Navy’s administrative structure
was almost completely dismantled and for a few years (1643-1645 and 16481649) Parliament appointed its own Lord High Admiral, but many of his powers
were exercised by the committees of the Commons. During the Commonwealth,
government by Navy and Admiralty committees became the norm. Members
were nominated by the Council of State which, like the previous Privy Council,
often intervened in naval affairs. The individuals selected were not courtiers and
politicians who formed the bulk of the administrators in the past, but men with
naval and/or mercantile experience, paid by salary instead of by fees, who left a
formidable reputation behind them. An Admiralty Commission of twenty-eight,
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appointed by the Rump Parliament in December 1659, with a Navy Commission
of nine experts under it was in office when Charles II was restored. The Navy
they left, while it was the most powerful in Europe with over one hundred ships,
had one serious flaw; it was very costly to maintain, a catastrophic feature when
the country as a whole was suffering through a chronic shortage of money. “The
Navy of the Restoration” says Rodger “was powerful but bankrupt. In the spring
of 1660, with some ships in commission which had been unpaid for over four
years, the Navy owed 1¼ million pounds” (Rodger, 2005, p. 95).

4.3 Naval administration from the Restoration to the Revolution
The Restoration brought with it the re-establishment of the historic structure of
the Admiralty and the Navy Board. While the Duke of York, as a child, had been
nominally appointed to the office of the Lord High Admiral by his father, Charles
I, this was ratified under Letters of Patent in June 1660. Until the Navy
Commission of the Commonwealth was replaced, the former Commissioners
continued to act for a short period during which the members of the Navy Board
were selected. The new Board was established in July 1660 and consisted of
the four Principal Officers, namely the Treasurer, the Comptroller (who
exercised general control over the work of the Board and was primarily
concerned with finance), the Surveyor of the Navy (previously the Surveyor and
Rigger of Ships), and the Clerk of the Acts (previously the Clerk of the King’s
Ships), and three extra Commissioners, two of whom were full Commissioners
and one a local Commissioner supervising the dockyard at Chatham. The four
Principal Officers had departmental duties to perform while the two extra
commissioners in London had no special duties assigned to them, a feature
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which was considered as one of the special advantages of the system now
established, since their responsibilities were not limited to any aspect of the
Board’s operation. A further Commissioner was appointed in 1662 making a
total of eight officers to whom the administration of the Navy under the Lord
High Admiral was entrusted.

The departmental duties which were the “standing traditions of naval
administration” (Tanner, 1897, p. 27) of the Principal Officers are set out in
Appendix 4.1. Guiding the work of the Board were the instructions of the Lord
High Admiral which were very explicit. Instructions had been issued to the
Council of Marine Causes in 1546 but the procedures for the various offices
within the Council “must have been defined verbally, because no instructions
were issued until the reign of Elizabeth, when the omission to do so earlier was
duly noted” (NRS: Vol. 157, p. xxix) in 1560 within the “Ordinances and decrees
made by the Queen for the regulation and government of the office of Admiralty
and Marine affairs, the Navy being the chief defence of the realm” (Cal. S. P.
Dom.: Elizabeth, Vol. 15, No. 4). It was a custom for the Lord High Admiral to
re-state and supplement the traditions and precedents by issuing his formal
instructions as to the manner by which the duties of his subordinate officers
would be affected by the traditions and precedents. (Tanner, 1897, p. 28)
makes reference to instructions that had been issued by the then Marquis of
Buckingham during the reign of James I.

The Duke of York issued his formal instructions in January 1662 advising that
he thought it fit to ratify and confirm certain orders which he understood were
formerly published by the Lord High Admiral, the Earl of Northumberland, in
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1640 but with some small additions and alterations. Yet despite the growth in
the size and cost of the Navy in the intervening years nothing was done to
upgrade its financial management and, because of this and the fact that the
1640 Instructions were generally behind the times, the 1662 Instructions were
quite inadequate. Between 1662 and 1671, when the Duke of York circulated a
revised set of instructions, a number of organisational changes were made
within the Navy Board, most of them arising from the increased volume of
business transacted through the Navy Board during the Second Anglo-Dutch
War. Assistant Comptrollers were appointed within the office of the Comptroller:
the Comptroller of the Treasurer’s Accounts, the Comptroller of the Victualling
and Purser’s Accounts, and the Comptroller of Stores. Two extra Resident
Commissioners were also appointed, each now with the power to act
independently of the Board in cases of urgency.

The Duke of York’s 1671 instructions, when compared with his 1661-2
instructions, made three important changes; the Board members were
prohibited from trading in any commodities that were used by the Navy; the
Board members were to live as close as possible to one another, and the Clerk
of the Acts was to be aware of the market prices of those items of materials
which are purchased for immediate use. In a separate letter the Duke of York
issued a further instruction requiring that in future security was required from
pursers serving on Navy ships. Prior to the 1671 instructions, the Navy
Treasurer had a level of independence which, together with the fact that he was
the senior of the Principal Officers, was of concern to some who considered that
he possessed too much power. The 1671 instructions reduced his status and
required that he submit weekly accounts to the Navy Board for perusal which, if
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accepted, would be transmitted to the Comptroller of the Treasurer’s Accounts
for the purpose of audit. These instructions were to continue in force until the
mid-19th century and, as Charles Middleton (cr. Lord Barham 1 May 1805) said
in his papers, that while they were admirable in the time of a small navy with a
small establishment and small volumes of correspondence, they needed to
reflect realistically the needs of the navy of the day. He was critical of the
instructions as they applied to the Navy Board in 1788, particularly the volume
of work required of the Comptroller, the organisation of the Board, and aspects
of the overall financial control in the Navy Office (NRS: Vol. 38, vol. II, pp. 300304).

In 1673 the Duke of York resigned his post as Lord High Admiral due to the
‘test’ declaration against Roman Catholicism which was imposed on
officeholders by Parliament. The solution as to how to replace the Duke, which
was suggested by Samuel Pepys, the Clerk of the Acts, was to give patents to
each of the 15 men of the Admiralty Committee of the Privy Council, appointing
them Lords Commissioners of the Navy. While this suggestion was approved,
the Commission was delegated only a portion of the functions of the Lord
Admiral’s office, the balance being retained by the king himself assisted by
Pepys who had been appointed the Secretary of the Admiralty Commission. In
May 1684 Pepys was appointed “Secretary for the Affairs of the Admiralty of
England” (Davies, 2010, p. vi) by Charles II when the latter dissolved the
Admiralty Commission and for four years the office of Lord High Admiral was
held by Charles acting de jure and James acting de facto.
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Following the death of Charles II in 1685, James undertook a review of the
Navy commencing with a paper A Memorial and Proposition from the Secretary
of the Admiralty touching the Navy, dated 26 January 1686. The paper, similar
to one Pepys had prepared for Charles, examined the state of the Navy and the
measures that were required to restore the fleet to the condition that would
enable it to fulfil the country’s strategic and tactical maritime requirements. In
his paper, Pepys, while deploying statistics that displayed “a breathtaking
audacious disregard for the context” (Davies, 2010, p. x), submitted an estimate
that the cost of restoration would amount to £400,000 over three years. Pepys’
proposition was approved as practicable by the Navy Board, although it was
found at a later date that it would be necessary to supplement the estimated
cost for certain permanent works described as ‘indispensable’ (Tanner, 1899A,
p. 60). The memorandum precipitated the establishment of a special
commission which consisted of persons “best fitted for the king’s service on this
great occasion” (Tanner, 1899A, p. 60) and who were given special powers to
carry out the required programme of replacement and repair. The existing Navy
Board patents were suspended during the term of this special commission
which was expected to last for a period of three years. However, the
commission’s industry resulted in the work being completed in two and a half
years and in late 1686 the special commission was dissolved and the regular
Navy Board restored. “The work done by the special commission appears on
the whole to have given great satisfaction both to the king and Pepys” (Tanner,
1899B, p. 262).
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4.4 Naval administration following the Revolution
4.4.1 The Admiralty
On William’s accession in 1689 the political necessities resulted in the Admiralty
being placed in commission for the next twelve years with a board being chosen
from members of the Commons77. As a consequence, party politics decided its
personnel while the controversies about its composition were endless with
every commission meeting with fierce criticism in the Commons and bitter
attack in contemporary pamphlets (James and Murray, 1936, p. 12). With the
Commons so involved in the Admiralty’s administration it appeared that the day
of the powerful Lord High Admiral responsible to the crown for all sea-causes
had come to an end. It is true that for one brief period in the 18 th century, from
1701 to 1709, first the Earl of Pembroke, appointed by William, and Prince
George, Queen Anne’s Consort, assumed the title, while in the 19 th century the
Duke of Clarence was appointed Lord High Admiral for a brief period in 1827
before being forced to resign because of errors of judgement.78 However, it is
not possible to perceive any of these individuals in the guise of a ‘powerful lord
high admiral’.

William, as a king whose only claim to legitimacy and acceptance was provided
by his wife, relied upon a government that was a personal one acting through a
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Following the Revolution, the powers and functions of the Admiralty were vested in the office
of Lord High Admiral except for the years 1684-9 when they were exercised by the crown. The
office was held by individuals during the years 1660-73 (Duke of York), 1702-9 (Prince George)
and 1827-8 (Duke of Clarence), and at other times it was placed in commission (Sainty, 1975,
p. 18).
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In both cases a council was appointed to assist and advise the Lord High Admiral in the
conduct of the business of the office.
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small number of advisers. Furthermore, he was a landsman with little
understanding of navies and maritime strategy and accordingly required
competent and confidential advice on naval matters. Hence, his Cabinet Council
played an important role. However, a repercussion was that the Navy received
many of its orders from William and his Cabinet Council through the Secretaries
of State without the Admiralty’s involvement. In his Naval Minutes Samuel
Pepys presumed that the practice of by-passing the Admiralty was founded
“upon the Minister’s consciousness of the ignorance and in-experience of the
said Commissioners” (NRS: Vol. 60, p. 217). Although it was done to expedite
orders and preserve secrecy, it created a serious fault in the command structure
as it led to uncertainty, an example of which can be seen from the stand that
Admiral Edward Russell (created Earl of Orford in 1697) took in 1691 when he
refused to obey the orders transmitted by the Secretaries of State on the
grounds that he was not required to obey orders from this source. Unless
otherwise directed he would take orders only from the Admiralty. In this case
the necessary orders sorting out the confusion were quickly prepared but, in
1692, the failure to set clear lines of command for the Navy created a very
dangerous situation, the reason being that James II and the French were
preparing to invade England. It was only by good luck that the commander of
the Channel fleet (Russell) learned of the presence of the French fleet in the
Channel which resulted in its near-annihilation at the double battle of Barfleur La Hogue, so restoring control of the Channel to England after its defeat at
Beachy Head in 1690. The Commons took the command structure into
consideration and in January 1693 adopted a resolution “That, for the future, all
orders for the Management of the Fleet do pass through the Hands of the
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Commissioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of England” (JHC.,
vol. 10 1688-1693, 11 January 1693, (1802), pp. 774-775). Yet, despite the
resolution, William chose to ignore it due to concerns in regard to the possible
leakage of confidential information. On the death of Prince George in October
1708, the office of Lord High Admiral was retained but after only a short period it
was once again placed in commission with the Earl of Orford79 as First Lord.
“The experiment of amateur Lords Admiral had been tried and found to answer
neither political nor naval requirements. Henceforward the safe and unexciting
alternative of a commission was to be preferred” (Rodger, 1979, p. 46).

Although in theory the standing of the Commissioners of the Admiralty was the
same in practice, the First Commissioner or First Lord exercised an ascendancy
over his colleagues from an early date (Sainty, 1972, p. 18). The position and
authority of the First Lord of the Board of Admiralty was described by Graham
before a Select Committee on the Board of Admiralty when he observed that
“the Board of Admiralty would never work, whatever the patent might be, unless
the First Lord were (sic) supreme, and did exercise constantly supreme and
controlling authority” (BPP 1861(438), p. 103). To maintain that authority it
would have been necessary for the incumbent to have been a member of
Cabinet for without that the Admiralty would have been reduced to the status of
a minor department subordinate to the principal Secretary of State. Rodger
(2005, p. 185) says that “(w)hen the Earl of Strafford was appointed First Lord in
1712, he was explicitly warned that “the employment of First Commissioner of
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The Earl of Orford had been offered the office of Lord High Admiral but he had refused it,
insisting upon a return to a commission on which he would preside as First Lord.
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the Admiralty brings your Lordship into Cabinet”. This may be regarded as the
moment when constitutional convention provided the Navy with a minister
(albeit not an expert minister) for the first time since 1688” (Rodger, 2005, p.
185). A month later the Earl of Strafford was appointed and the new
Commission for the Admiralty Board was finalised. Strafford went immediately
to the Cabinet Council (TNA: ADM 3/27). In a 1794 document held by the
Admiralty Library, The Former & Present State of Public Offices – Admiralty
(Da133), it is stated that “(f)rom the reign of Queen Anne to the present time,
the office of Lord High Admiral has been executed by seven Lords
Commissioners, the first of whom has the chief responsibility, and is constantly
a Privy Counsellor and one of the Cabinet”.

During Anne’s reign the Parliament and the Admiralty drew closer, the former
gaining knowledge and experience in naval matters through enquiries into such
areas as victualling and this led to a gradual but subtle erosion of the royal
prerogatives. This erosion was such that on 9 April 1713 Queen Anne
announced in her opening address that “(w)hat Force may be necessary for
securing our Commerce by Sea and for Guards and Garisons, I leave entirely to
my Parliament. Make yourself safe, and I shall be satisfied” (JHC: vol. 17: 16881834, p. 278).

As for the Admiralty generally, while its position within

government during the reigns of William and Anne had been reduced 80 and its
work was not at the level of strategic policy, it still had an important role to play
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Rodger says that during these periods “often it seemed that he usefulness of the Board had
been ground so fine between the upper millstone of the Cabinet taking decisions, and the
nether of the Navy Board and the fleet at sea executing them, that there was nothing left for the
Admiralty to do” (Rodger, 1979, p. 49).

186

in the co-ordination and administration of naval policy and its administration
(Rodger, 1979, p. 49). Even though this meant that the Admiralty generally
issued orders in regard to the conduct of operations and matters of a routine
nature such as the convoying of merchant ships, the deployment of individual
ships, the stationing of cruisers and personnel, its only role in the formulation of
naval strategy was advisory. However, Rodger (2005, p. 295) points out that
“(t)he Admiralty was the centre of the naval system rather than its head” and
accordingly “the smooth functioning of the Admiralty Office was essential to the
effectiveness of the apparently disorganised collection of different naval boards
and authorities” (Rodger 2005, p. 295). Furthermore, through the politicisation
of the Admiralty with the fortunes of party politics deciding its membership, and
with commissioners having other duties to perform, it was very necessary that
there exist a means by which the requisite continuity and experience could be
made available to the Commission (Rodger, 2005, p. 295 describes this as
“institutional memory”). These requirements were to be furnished through the
appointment by the Admiralty Commissioners of an official Admiralty Secretary
acting on their behalf in place of previous purely personal one acting as private
secretary to the Lord High Admiral.

The first person mentioned in this position is Thomas Aylesbury who was
secretary to the Lords High Admiral, the Earls of Nottingham and Buckingham,
leaving Buckingham’s employment when appointed Surveyor-General on the
Navy Board. The importance of the position steadily grew with the increasing
volume of business and the type of work required of the incumbent. For
example, during a lengthy absence by Buckingham, Edward Nicholas, who had
replaced Aylesbury in 1625, assumed full responsibility for Admiralty
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administration including the issuance of warrants for letters of marque for
privateers, and requiring ships that had supplied the enemy to be confiscated
(Cal. S. P. Dom. Charles I, 1625-26 (1858)). In 1642, there was an increase in
the prominence of the office when, by an ordinance, Parliament appointed
Thomas Smith to the position of Secretary for the Affairs of the Admiralty, “by
whose, Care, Diligence, and Fidelity such Services and Negotiations as
appertain not only to the several His Majesty’s Fleets at Sea, but likewise to the
Admiralty and His Navy within the Land, may be transacted from Time to Time”.
Further, he was ordered
to give (his) constant Attendance upon both Houses of Parliament
and upon such Committees of theirs as shall have Relation to Naval
Affairs, and to act and put in Execution all such their Commands ...
as hath been accustomed or ought to have been done by any
Secretary of the Admiralty heretofore” (Acts and Ordinances of the
Interregnum, 1642-1660 (1911) pp. 29-30).
The duties of the office were set down in an Order in Council of June 1673 and
include a plethora of matters but in summary it stipulated that he was to
maintain
a perfect and fair record (of all papers and transactions) within the
cognisance of our Lord High Admiral, and that the same be
methodically by the said Secretary digested, and safely laid up in
some certain and convenient place, to be provided and employed as
a standing office to that purpose, there to remain to the use of His
Majesty and information of all succeeding Admirals as any occasion
of service, calling the same (TNA: ADM 7/726, p. 42).
The Order provided the office with an air of prestige and permanence, having
been occupied by Samuel Pepys who had exercised such a remarkable
influence upon the whole of naval affairs in both policy and administration.
However, the Revolution had brought Pepys’s remarkable career to an end
and, with William deciding to act through the Secretaries of State, the office of
Secretary for the Affairs of the Admiralty was reduced in status becoming
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instead the Secretary of the Admiralty Office, appointed by and acting on behalf
of the Admiralty Commissioners.

Eventually, a continuing rise in the volume of business passing through the
Secretary’s office resulted in the recognition in 1694 of the need for two
persons to undertake the work required. Various ways of doing this were
attempted, two joint Secretaries, then a Secretary and a Deputy, and finally a
Secretary (or First Secretary) and a Second Secretary, but it was not until 1783
that the latter combination was established on a permanent basis (Sainty,
1975, p. 34). From 1807 it was accepted that the office of First Secretary
should be held by a member of the

Commons while that of the Second

Secretary should be non-parliamentary and held on a permanent tenure
(Sainty, 1975, p. 34). The names of John Croker, First Secretary (or Financial
Secretary as the office came to be known (Rodger, 1979, p. 96)) from October
1809 to November 1830 when Wellington lost office, and John Barrow, Second
Secretary from May 1804 to February 1806 and then April 1807 to January
1845, figure strongly in the history of naval administration, particularly in the
matter of the abolition of the Navy and Victualling Boards in 1832.

Although Parliament at this juncture was more knowledgeable about the Navy
that did not mean that the needs of the Navy were recognised by Parliament.
The Navy’s biggest problem in the late 17th century was the lack of funds but, in
the absence of a viable, effective and efficient system of public accounting,
Parliament was not able to properly control public revenue and spending. It
would be decades before departmental finance accounts, let alone the
departmental appropriation accounts, were prepared and tabled in Parliament.
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As for the Navy Treasurer’s declared accounts, which were focused upon
personal accountability, they were completely useless as a means of informing
Parliament and supporting calls for funds by the Navy as the Treasurers
invariably had their own perceptions as to when these accounts should be
prepared and audited.

4.4.2 The Navy Board
It could be argued that a consequence of the diminished role of the Board of
Admiralty following the accession of William and Mary was that it had for now
outlived its usefulness as an advisory body to the Crown. This was certainly not
the case with the Navy Board for the manner of William’s government
necessitated efficient administration which in turn required continuity and
experience. While the Admiralty Board could be ignored with impunity, the Navy
Board was indispensable to the Navy (Rodger, 1979, p. 42) for its
responsibilities could not be put aside. Ships continued to be built and to require
repair and maintenance while crews needed to be sustained and paid. For as
long as a navy was required by the Nation, the Board’s tasks were never ending
and required men of experience to fulfil them which must have rankled the
Board of the Admiralty, having been relegated to a lower level in the naval
bureaucracy. Even so, during the Walpole era the Admiralty Board and the
Navy Board were able to work closely with one another but this situation was to
change with the coming of the Broad Bottom81 coalition led by Henry Pelham
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“Broad Bottom: “... it is the reigning cant, and means, the taking of all parties and people,
indifferently into the ministry” (Horace Walpole to Horace Mann, 18 Feb. 1742 quoted in Baugh,
1965, p. 25).
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and his elder brother, the Duke of Newcastle in 1744. Three members of the
replacement Board of Admiralty, the Duke of Bedford, the Earl of Sandwich, and
Captain George Anson, were not content with such a relationship as they
recognised that the Board of Admiralty played a subordinate role to the Navy
Board due to the latter’s “monopoly of information” (Rodger, 2005, p. 300). In
order to strengthen the position of the Board of Admiralty, the Navy Board was
requested to provide the Board of Admiralty with information on most aspects of
its activities. The Board of Admiralty however did not understand that the Navy
Board were jealous guardians of their domains with the result that they resisted
interference of the likes of the Board of Admiralty. “Of this there is ample
evidence; for example, a directive of 1749 to make a trial of task work and that
of 1767 to codify the standing orders, both of which were simply shelved. In
order to preserve their autonomy, the Navy Board preferred, indeed, to keep
their superiors in ignorance” (Haas, 1970, p. 203). The Navy Board was also
well aware that they could openly defy the Board of Admiralty as they were
difficult to remove from office while the members of the Board of Admiralty were
political appointees without permanency of position. All the Navy Board
members had to do was bide their time. With Sandwich’s appointment as First
Lord in 174882 a semblance of peace returned to the relationship between the
two boards. “Knowledge was power, but Sandwich had learned from
experience, and did not try to use it to confront the Navy Board” (Rodger, 2005,
p. 372).
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Sandwich was First Lord from February 1748 to June 1751; April to September 1763; and
January 1771 to April 1782.
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By the second half of the 18th century, the Royal Navy had developed into a
department of government of incredible size and complexity that “faced
challenges of management and control which were as yet unknown to private
business, or to any other part of government“ (Rodger, 2005, p. 310). In 1778,
Sandwich appointed Middleton83 to the position of Comptroller of the Navy
Board which at that time consisted of eight members, including the Comptroller.
By all accounts, Middleton was an exemplary administrator, highly regarded
both within and outside the Navy, notwithstanding that he was an individual who
had a considerable belief in his own abilities and was prepared to argue his
case with all about him. Middleton however was in an invidious position for
although he was the Comptroller, and therefore was in name the senior member
of the Board, he was ‘first among equals’ and as a consequence he was
frustratingly never able to exercise effective control. 84. The situation was
aggravated by his contention that the Comptroller should be a member of the
Admiralty.

In order to strengthen his position on the Navy Board, Middleton offered
guidance to the Commission on Fees, Gratuities, Perquisites, and Emoluments
during its examination of the Navy Office. The Commission, chaired by Francis
Baring, had been instructed by an Order in Council of 26 August 178585 not only
to examine and report upon the fees and emoluments received by the various

83

Middleton filled the positions of Comptroller from 1778 to 1790, member of the Board of the
Admiralty from May 1794 to November 1795, and First Lord of the Admiralty from May 1805 to
February 1806. It was Middleton who issued the orders to Lord Nelson which culminated in the
victory of the Royal Navy over the French at the Battle of Trafalgar on 21 October 1805.
84
The commissioners of the Navy and Victualling Boards were appointed under letters patent.
85
Although the dates of the Reports of the Commissioners range from April 1786 to June1788,
they were not ordered to be printed until July 1806.
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office-holders within the Navy Office, but to “offer such observations that
occurred to them, and such plans for correction and improvement as, from a
minute and laborious enquiry, appear proper to be adopted” (BPP 1806(309), p.
181). Accordingly, the Commission considered that the acceptance of
Middleton’s guidance would assist them in their examination and this was
provided initially in the form of a book of Observations on the Navy Board
Department which he had prepared. In his December 1786 letter to Baring
which accompanied the book, Middleton was very critical of his colleagues,
referring to
Those gentlemen, who, contented with an easy official attendance,
came and went as inclination or convenience led them, being
unacquainted with the anxiety I felt from the responsibility of my
station and the important secret business trusted to my execution by
his Majesty’s ministers, were satisfied with an arrangement which,
when they had other avocation, gave them convenient leisure to
pursue them, and, when they were pleased to meddle, left them all
the importance of office (NRS: Vol. 38, vol. II, p. 232).
In what he referred to as a Book of Observations, Middleton described the
running of the Navy Board in similar terms.
All these Members sit together and carry on the Business jointly. The
Comptroller is only named first among those who have equal
authority; and therefore, for want of subordination in the members
and of distribution in the Business, their number often creates
confusion & difference of opinion, inaccurate inquiries into affairs,
and superficial examination at the best of Accounts, & of almost
everything else. Under such a method, delays on the one hand, in
very necessary occasions, & (what is perhaps as bad) precipitations
on the other, must necessarily happen (NMM:86 MID14/6, p. 3).
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NMM = National Maritime Museum, Greenwich
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The recipients of Middleton’s guidance, the Commission for Fees and
Emoluments, described both the business of the Admiralty and the Navy Board
in the following terms.
The business of the Board of Admiralty is to consider and determine
all matters relative to Your Majesty’s Navy, and Departments
thereunto belonging; to give directions for the performance off all
services that may be required, either in the Civil or Naval branches
thereof; to sign, by themselves or their Secretaries, all orders
necessary for carrying their directions into execution; and generally
to superintend and direct the whole Naval and Marine establishments
of Great Britain (BPP 1806(309), p. 95).87
The duty of the Navy Board is, under the direction of the Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty, to consult and advise together how
to transact to the best advantage all affairs tending to the well-being
and regulation of the Civil Establishment of Your Majesty’s Navy, and
all the subordinate instruments thereof, wherein they are to proceed
by Common Council, and agreement of most voices; to make
Contracts for Naval stores of every kind, and to attend to the proper
distribution thereof; to prepare all Estimates for the expence of the
Navy; to direct all Monies for Naval services into the Treasurer’s
hands, and to examine and certify his Accounts for the expenditure
thereof (BPP 1806(309), p. 168).88
In a letter to Lord Shelburne in 1782, the Chief Clerk to the Clerk of the Acts
voiced his view of the Navy Board in which he described “the weight of business
falling upon a few (Board members), and of those chiefly on the (Comptroller)
and Secretary, who have a pile of papers before them a foot high to digest and
minute, while two or three at the Board are looking on or reading newspapers”
(NRS: Vol. 131, p. 462). The business of the Board, Middleton said, was not
distributed across the members on the basis of the departments each was
supposed to superintend, but in a manner “where all deliberate and all examine
(if so it may be named) without distinction and without arrangement” (NMM:
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Third Report of the Commission for Fees and Emoluments 27 December 1787.
Fifth Report of the Commission for Fees and Emoluments 14 February 1788.
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MID14/6, p. 4). This was supported by the Commission when it made reference
to
the business of each Department (being) conducted by the Chief
Clerk thereof, the attendance at the Board occupying in general the
whole time of the Commissioners; and as all business is dispatched
at one Board, where each Commissioner has a voice, much
embarrassment and delay must necessarily occur, and many
important accounts passed with too light an examination” (BPP
1806(309), p. 182).
In order to remedy these and many other problems, particularly those
experienced in the conduct of the business of the dockyards, Middleton, in a
letter to Pitt of December 1785, had recommended a total re-organisation of the
Navy Board.
Instead of a the parade of nine commissioners (of which seldom
more than three can be usefully employed) sitting at one table to
obstruct business, they must be broken into committees for the more
correct examination of contracts and accounts, and giving despatch
to the variety of matters before the board (NRS: Vol. 38, vol. II p.
207).
“Committees entrusted with a particular share of Business” should replace
Board members presiding over distinct and separate departments, each having
“more counsel than a single person and more activity than a general Board”
(NMM: MID14/6, p. 25). “The members of it from having a closer attention to the
business & to each other, will be mutual checks both on the management of
that business, and the conduct of themselves and of those subordinate to them”
(NMM: MID14/6, p. 25). These recommendations by Middleton won the support
of the Commission on Fees and Emoluments who consequently proposed that
the business of the Navy Board
should be so divided as to have competent Officers of each branch,
with time and opportunity to examine, digest and conduct the part
allotted to each Committee, subject however ultimately to the opinion
of the Board at large (BPP 1806(309), p. 182).
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When the voices shall be equal upon a question in any of the
Committees, the whole of the business to which it relates should be
laid before the Board for their determination; and when the voices at
the Board shall be equal, the Comptroller to have in such case only,
a second vote (BPP 1806(309), p. 183).
The proposals were adopted and by an Order in Council in June 1796 these
changes in the constitution of the Navy Board were directed to be made which
resulted in three committees being formed. The Committee of Correspondence
was to conduct the correspondence of the Board, the Committee of Accounts to
superintend, examine and pass all accounts, subject however to the
approbation of the Board at large, and the Committee of Stores to consider the
proper quantity of stores necessary to be provided for the service in general, to
direct their distribution and to take cognizance of the receipt, issue and return of
stores of every kind and every service depending on this branch (TNA: PC
2/146). A matter that was to have future ramifications was that the Comptroller
was “to belong to and preside at every committee” (TNA: PC 2/146).

The committee structure whereby three committees replaced one large
committee did nothing to improve the management of the Navy Board. The
basic problem was that the Comptroller was not the chief executive officer with
powers to manage an enterprise the size and complexity of that which was
under the auspices of the Navy Board. As well, it was a structure under which it
was impossible to locate individual responsibility, something which was pointed
out to the Board by its Secretary, George Smith, in a memorandum dated 1
June 1821.
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The Navy Board should be so constructed that every individual
member of it should have a responsibility attached to him whereas
under the present formation of the Board into Committees, individual
responsibility is entirely withdrawn! Responsibility placed in a
committee of members collectively is misplaced; it amounts to
nothing, because under a specious appearance, it is calculated to
deceive.
I have already submitted papers89 in which I have ventured to give an
opinion that the business of the Board is not dispatched as it ought to
be or as it might be with more correctness as well as dispatch even
under the present regulations.
Every individual member ought I conceive to take up and follow up a
branch of business as his own exclusively. (Emphasis in original)
(TNA: ADM 1/3571).
Changes in the number of commissioners and the distribution of business
among the committees were subsequently made by further Orders in Council
but in January 1829 the committee structure was abolished and a reversion
made to departments. The Privy Council said that from a consideration of past
orders in council, their experience from the “mode of executing the public
service in the department, and inquiries (they) had made into the actual state
and distribution of business amongst the several commissioners”, “it appeared
to them” that the change would enable the number of existing commissioners to
be reduced with concomitant cost savings (TNA: PC 2/210). The new Board
was to consist of a Comptroller, a Surveyor, an Accountant-General, a Surveyor
General, and a Superintendent of Transports with each individual charged with
and held responsible for the respective duties with which they were presently
vested. The Board as a whole, however, would have a collective responsibility
and it was the Navy Board constituted on this basis that was to be abolished in
1832 along with the Victualling Board.
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On 24 November 1815 and 1 July 1816.
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4.5 Victualling
Not only was victualling of their ships a problem of major proportions to the
English kings but it was a perennial one as well which became more acute as
the British empire expanded. “Everything apart from pay and victuals had to be
supplied from scratch only once, with the cost and labour of replacement and
repair being intermittent and comparatively small” (Moorhouse, 2006, p. 189).

Prior to 1550, victualling90 was the only area of naval administration that was
not controlled by the Council for Marine Causes. The reason for this, Loades
(1992, p. 84) believes, arose from “the strength of custom, based upon the fact
that all foodstuffs were highly perishable, and that demands needed to be met
immediately upon a local basis”. It was only in wartime or times of heightened
tensions that the resultant increase in the number of sailors to be victualled
required the services of a central victualling service which arranged the
purchase of the victuals for delivery to the ports at which time the ships pursers
made the actual purchases using their imprests. “Originally contracted direct to
the individual ships, by the end of Henry VIII’s reign, the contractors were
supplying the clerks of the different storehouses, who were issuing to the ships
which were at that point within their jurisdiction” (NRS: Vol. 131, p. 91). A
paucity of organisation which arose from a lack of experience in the supply of
large quantities to the larger fleets remaining longer at sea initiated amateurish

90

The importance of victualling was well described by Pepys in his “Naval Minutes”. Englishmen
and more especially Seamen, love their bellies above anything else, and therefore it must
always be remembered, in the management of the Navy, that to make any abatement from
them in the quantity or agreeableness of the victuals is to discourage and provoke them in the
tenderest point, and will sooner render them disgusted with the King’s service than any one
other hardship that can be put upon them (NRS: Vol. 60, p. 250).
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and improvised systems with poor internal controls. The consequential
incessant abuse that arose eventually led to the realisation that, logically,
victualling should form part of the structure of the Council for Marine Causes. To
this end, Edward Baeshe, a purveyor and agent, was appointed in June 1550
by Letters Patent General Surveyor of the Victuals for the Seas91. Regarded as
a member of the Council, Baeshe assumed financial responsibility 92” for the
victuals instead of selling them to the pursers, drawing his funds from the
Treasurer of the Navy which enabled him to run a distinct administration
(Rodger, 2005, p. 235). In January 1557 the Privy Council made a number of
changes in the procedures of the Council including the requirement that the
Surveyor-General of Victualling for the ships was to account for his expenditure
at least once a year separately from the Treasurer of the Admiralty, Benjamin
Gonson (TNA: PC 2/6).

When the ordinances for the Council were announced by Elizabeth in about
1560, the ordinance for the “Surveyor General of our Victuals” required that he
not provide victuals in the absence of a warrant signed by three members of the
Council or two members only if one of the signatories is the Vice Admiral, or the
Surveyor of Ships, or the Comptroller. At the end of every quarter he was to
have his quarter book signed-off in a similar manner. Imprests to be used for
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The title of the office varies: “Controller General of the Victuals” (NRS: Vol. 131, p. 91);
“Surveyor General of Victualling” (NRS: Vol.157, p. 131); “General Surveyor of the Victuals for
the Seas and Marine Affairs” (Cal. S. P. Dom. Elizabeth, 1601-03: With addenda 1547-65
(1870) pp. 562-565).
92
In June 1553 there is a reference to a warrant “to pay Wm. Gonson, treasurer of marine
affairs, £500 towards discharge of sums due for victualling ships, to sundry persons within the
office of Edw. Baeshe, surveyor general of the victuals”, so confirming the administrative system
as described by Rodger. (Cal. S. P. Dom.: Elizabeth, 1601-03: With addenda 1547-65 (1870)
pp. 424-425).
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the purchase of victuals were to be paid to him by the Treasurer and at the end
of each quarter or sooner if required he was to make a declaration to the Lord
Admiral or the Vice Admiral in the latter’s absence as to the activities in the
Surveyor General’s office since the previous report. There was always to be
maintained in readiness a level of stores that would enable his office to deliver
within 14 days warning sufficient victuals to meet the needs of one thousand
sailors while at sea for a month following delivery. Finally, the Surveyor General
of Victuals was to maintain his accounts similarly to those maintained by the
Treasurer in his office (TNA: SP 12/15).

In April 1565 the system was amended when Elizabeth and Baeshe entered
into a contract, at his behest, for him to assume responsibility as a contractor
“for victualling the whole of the Royal Navy at sea or in harbour” (Cal. S. P.
Dom.: Elizabeth, 1601-3: With addenda 1547-65 (1870) pp. 562-565). The
indenture described the standard daily rations that were to be provided to each
man and the daily cash allowance per man Baeshe would receive to cover the
cost of these rations, 5d. a day for every man at sea and 4½d. a day for every
man in harbour. It allowed Baeshe to use the “Queen’s brewhouses,
bakehouses, mills, storehouses &c. at Tower Hill, Dover, Porchester, and
Portsmouth, paying the former rents, and doing the repairs, &c. &c.” (Cal. S. P.
Dom.: Elizabeth, 1601-3: With addenda 1547-65 (1870) pp. 562-565). He
agreed to be always ready, on 14 days warning, to be able to supply rations for
1,000 men for two months, to pay the wages of purveyors, and to remit
accounts on a quarterly basis. In the victualling quarter books maintained by
Baeshe was the victualling usage by individual ship.
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Although the indenture could be terminated by six months’ notice on either
side, it was to cause Baeshe considerable financial hardship because it did not
allow him to use the right of purveyance 93 unless ordered to victual more than
two thousand men at short notice (Oppenheim, 1988, p. 141). His situation was
exacerbated through the country’s increasing inflation and the daily cash
allowances remaining unchanged until November 1586. Baeshe died in 1587
and unfortunately left behind a victualling organisation that was unable to
provide the Navy in 1588 with the requisite quantity and quality of victuals. The
reserves he had agreed to have on hand were not there when called upon and
the consequent privations suffered by the men was “a source of disgrace to
Elizabeth and her ministers” (Oppenheim, 1988, p. 142). The victualling
organisation was taken over in November 1582 by James Quarles, and “his
coadjutor, “clerk of our averie”” (Oppenheim, 1988, p. 144), Marmaduke Darrell,
Quarles having been “granted survivorship to Baeshe” (Oppenheim, 1988, p.
142). Quarles and Darrell were to experience the same sort of financial
difficulties as had Baeshe but all of them had accepted the risks associated with
a contract with the parsimonious and conceited Elizabeth, the inflationary
pressures, the possible variations in the future harvest outcomes, and, as their
organisation did not manufacture or pack the items of foodstuffs, the “mercy of
their suppliers” (Rodger, 1997, p. 337).

After Elizabeth’s death victualling remained in the hands of contractors but
during the time of the Commonwealth the quality of the food and the honesty of
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“Purveyance” was forced purchase at rates fixed by the officers of the crown (Oppenheim,
1988, p. 140).
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the victualling agents steadily deteriorated and eventually the situation became
so bad that the contractor, Colonel Pride and his colleagues, decided in October
1654 to relinquish their contract. In place of a contractor the Lord Protector and
Council in August 1655 established a Victualling Department under the Navy
Commissioners. In his Second Discourse on the abuses of the Navy published
in 1661, John Holland referred to the “old and great dispute (as to) which is the
best way of victualling, whether by particular men as contractors at a certain
rate, or by the State themselves upon account”. He considered that “the best
and safest way is to victual upon account – I mean the State should keep the
victualling in their own hands” mainly because contractors “drive their own and
not the State’s interest”. This can culminate in the provision “of bad victuals or
curtail which is good” and as a consequence “the whole design of the fleet may
be destroyed, and this is not safe to commit to hazard by the temptation of that
profit that doth or may attend so great an undertaking” (NRS, Vol.7, pp. 154155).

“Victualling on account” continued until the Restoration when it was decided that
the supply of victuals should once again be by way of contract (NRS, Vol. 7, p.
155). A lack of funds in the hands of Treasury however resulted in payments to
contractors continually being delayed with the consequence that they were
always running into debt. As a result, there was a reversion to “victualling on
account” in place of contracting and in December 1683 a separate Commission
for Victualling was established, akin to the system that had been established
under the Commonwealth. It was considered that this way of victualling was
more allied with the objectives of the Navy and would provide the Navy with the
requisite good and wholesome provisions at a lower cost. In January 1684 the
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changeover was completed with the handover to the Commission of all of the
king’s victualling facilities. At the constitution of the Victualling Board a member
of the Navy Board was appointed Comptroller of the Victualling Accounts.

Under instructions from the Board of Admiralty the Commissioners were
authorised to appoint clerks, agents and purveyors at salaries to be approved
by Treasury and to make payments “at their discretion by warrant to their
cashier, such payments being inserted in quarterly bills to be allowed from time
to time by the treasury” (Tanner,1899B, p. 285). They were to prepare annual
accounts before the end of March each year of the “victualling for the preceding
year” and they were “to take care that their cashier be the treasurer of the
navy’s instrument” (Tanner, 1899B, p. 286). Originally, under these instructions,
the Board was to be under the control of one of the commissioners with each
commissioner taking the chair of the Board in rotation, no precedence having
been fixed, either according to their appointment or to their offices. With the
Commissioners having been appointed by letters of patent this was a curious
way of appointing the presiding commissioner, but this method was to remain in
force until November 1784 when the Board of Admiralty decided that the
Commissioner who superintended the branch of Accountant for Cash was to
preside and that the other members were to take precedence from their
respective departments in a listed order (BPP 1806(309), pp. 553-554).

In 1788, the Commission for Fees and Emoluments in their Eighth Report
described the Victualling Office in the following terms.
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The business of the Victualling Office is, to provide either by contract
or otherwise, all the provisions, and also certain stores required by
Your Majesty’s Navy; arranging and distributing the whole to the
several ports and places at home and abroad, as the service may
require; to take care that the different provisions and stores, when so
issued, be properly charged to the Agents, Storekeepers, Pursers,
Masters of Transports, or others, to whom they were issued; and to
compel the respective parties to pass timely and regular accounts;
also to take care that all offal arising from articles manufactured be
properly disposed of, all old stores sold to the best advantage, and
the proceeds duly accounted for; to attend to the various checks, &c.
which have been instituted for the security of the Public; with other
numerous and important objects, which are constantly and
necessarily attached to this Office (BPP 1806(309), p. 554).

4.6 The abolition of the Navy and Victualling Boards
In the preamble to the Admiralty Act by which the Navy and Victualling Boards
were abolished in 1832, it was stated that it had been deemed expedient that
the Number of Offices in the Civil Departments of the Navy should be
reduced, and to that End that the Offices or Departments of the
principal Officers and Commissioners of His Majesty’s Navy, and of
the Commissioners for victualling His Majesty’s Navy, and for the
Care of sick and wounded Seamen, should be abolished.
The Bill had been introduced by Graham who had been appointed to the office
of the First Lord of the Admiralty by Lord Grey on the return of the Whigs in
November 1830.

The need for economy in public departments was a matter of considerable
importance at that time, particularly in a department with large numbers of
administrative staff and high costs such as the Navy. Various possible avenues
of economising in the Navy had been examined by the Tories including
amalgamating the Navy and Victualling Boards. In 1828, when the Duke of
Clarence held the office of Lord High Admiral, Lord Melville had been
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requested by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Henry Goulburn, to draw up a
plan for such an action.
In 1828, when the Duke of Clarence was at the Admiralty, with every
prospect of his remaining there, I drew up at Goulburn’s request a
project for uniting the Navy and Victualling Boards, and conducting
the business of the Navy on the same principle as the Ordnance,
which Board was then the favourite hobby of the House of
Commons, or at least the Finance Committee (NAS: GD18/3335).
Melville considered that, if it was found to be practicable, such a course of
action would undoubtedly simplify matters “by concentrating the business of the
Navy”. He described two advantages arising, firstly it would “undoubtedly cut off
at once all the voluminous correspondence” between the two boards, and
secondly “it would bring the whole concern more immediately under the eye
and cognisance of the Admiralty” (NAS: GD18/3335). It can be seen that
Melville’s project assumed that the Duke of Clarence would remain in the
position of Lord High Admiral, the Navy and Victualling Boards would be
amalgamated and the resulting board would operate “under with the eye and
cognisance of the Admiralty”, in other words it would be a separate entity that
would not be under the control of the Admiralty. Under Melville’s plan the
amalgamated entity would consist of three flag officers of the Navy, a
comptroller, a storekeeper, and a surveyor. Melville’s plan was that this new
board would be established on a similar principle as the Board of Ordnance
(NAS: GD51/2/711) in which the concept of individual responsibility was
pursued in place of collective responsibility in the Navy and Victualling Boards.
This would be the end of the Navy’s existing committee system. Such a
reorganisation would enable considerable reductions in staff numbers to be
made which would lead to a large saving of public money. The Select
Committee on the Ordnance Estimates in 1828 strongly supported the concept
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of individual responsibility being of the opinion that where there was collective
responsibility, as was in the case of the committee organisation of the Navy
Board,
each individual is disposed to consider himself as in great degree
relieved from personal responsibility; but where there is individual
responsibility, no such feeling can exist; responsibility is then brought
home to each individual, and is a constant motive to render him
faithful in the discharge of his public duty (BPP 1828(420), p. 8).
The Committee’s opinion was strongly reinforced, and perhaps even biased, by
it having been based upon the opinions expressed by Wellington and Henry
Hardinge, the Secretary at War (BPP 1828(420), p. 8). The Committee’s
opinion was that the Ordnance Department model had “the advantage of a
prompt and consistent administration” through individual responsibility (BPP
1828(420), p. 8). A more radical scheme had been proposed by George
Cockburn who, as Melville recounted in a letter to Henry Goulburn of February
1832, “used to think that the whole might be brought into one Board under the
Admiralty, by uniting together the Navy and Victualling Boards” (NAS:
GD18/3335).

On coming to power in 1831, the Whigs aggressively attacked the concept of
economy in the Navy and on 1 June 1832 its bill for the abolition of the civilian
departments of the Royal Navy received royal assent. When examined by the
Select Committee on the Board of Admiralty in 1861, Graham described the
steps that were taken in this pivotal reorganisation.
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when Lord Grey appointed me to the office, he having himself been
First Lord of the Admiralty, he expressed to me a strong opinion that I
should have, as part of my duty, to look narrowly at the working of
the three Boards, the Board of Admiralty, the Navy Board, and the
Victualling Board, and he expressed his belief that experience would
lead me to the conclusion that concentration was necessary; and,
guided by that opinion, from the very first I did direct my attention to
the conjoint working of these three Boards, and, after having formed
my plan, I submitted to the Cabinet the view which I took of the
expediency, by legislation, of abolishing those three Boards, and
uniting in the Board of Admiralty concentrated power; and in
consequence of the adoption by the Cabinet of the view which I
ventured to open to them, affirmed by the much higher authority of
Lord Grey, I framed the measure with their consent, which I
subsequently submitted to Parliament, and which became law (BPP
1861(438), p. 102).
In a memorandum he prepared in December 1831, Graham had been scathing
in his criticism of the establishment and retention of the separate Boards, which
he described as an imperfect system “in direct contradiction to the principle of
undivided responsibility”. He considered this system was the cause of the
history of the civil affairs of the Navy exhibiting “the fatal effects of clashing
interests and rival powers” the consequences of which were
inattention to the public welfare, gross neglect of important duties, a
systematic counteraction of the supreme powers of the Board of
Admiralty, an extravagant expenditure of stores, gross peculation in a
variety of instances, and all the evils which have been brought to light
in the various Reports of the Commissions of Naval Enquiry and
Naval Revision” (NRS: Vol.131, p. 647).
Both the concentration of the business of the Navy and the consequential
simplification of its administration and improvement in communication were
unassailable grounds on which Graham could have relied to support his
recommendation for the abolition of the Navy and Victualling Boards. He could
also have fallen back upon the Duke of Wellington’s imprimatur but instead, in
February 1832, he embarked on a “bitter indictment of the Navy Board for
financial irregularities and failure to carry out the orders of the Admiralty. The
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spectacle of the First Lord of the Admiralty, posing as a blameless judge and
sentencing the Navy Board to be publically whipped before execution was not
an edifying one” (Murray, 1938, p. 352).

Although the abolition of the boards and the eradication of redundancy, for
example the retrenchment of multiple positions such as messengers and
watchmen, divided authority, and other administrative inefficiencies were
basically uncomplicated, the reorganisation of the Admiralty that could pick up
all the vital tasks that had been performed by the two boards was a different
matter. On the advice of John Barrow, the highly experienced and influential
Permanent Secretary of the Admiralty, the Officers of the Navy Board and the
Victualling Commissioners were replaced by five Principal Officers of the Civil
Departments of the Admiralty, namely the Surveyor of the Navy (later called the
Controller), the Accountant General, the Storekeeper General, the Comptroller
of Victualling and Transport Service, and the Physician of the Navy. They were
to carry out the work performed by the Navy and Victualling Boards and in doing
so they “were neither to act in concert nor have any form of executive authority.
Instead, a naval lord was to be placed in immediate authority over each of them,
with each Principal Officer having only the power to refer matters to his directing
naval lord for discussion at the Board of Admiralty” (NRS: Vol.154, p. 322).

Graham’s intentions were that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty should
be both individually responsible for their branches, and yet perfectly informed of
one another’s activities through the forum of the Board. However, because the
volumes of its business steadily increased, this, together with the normal
administrative business now to be transacted by the new branches resulted in

208

the Lords Commissioners being overworked. As an example, Graham had been
of the opinion that the volume of correspondence would fall (NRS: Vol.154, p.
345), but it was found by Barrow that there had been an increase of over fifty
percent in the numbers of letters received and dispatched from the Admiralty
between 1827 and 1833 (Barrow, 1847, p. 418). It has been argued that the
large increase in work resulted in the Lords Commissioners not having sufficient
time to give to the major matters of policy and strategy (Rodger, 1979, p. 99).94
The administrative burden on each of the Lords was such as to preclude them
giving any consideration to general policy (Rodger, 1979, p. 105).

Another advantage declared by Graham arising from the abolition of the Boards
was that there would be economies that would accrue through the business of
the Navy being conducted under the one and the same roof. This was not to
transpire for, as Barrow advised, after only three months it had been proved to
him that there were no grounds for such a change. He pointed out that, on the
contrary,
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Beeler argues that “... it is erroneous to conclude that, inundated by paperwork and routine,
British naval administration lost sight of “all consideration of general policy”. As an example in
support of his contention Beeler refers to the design and construction during the 1860’s and
1870’s of heavily armoured coastal-assault ships, also referred to as “costal-defence ships,” as
an alternative strategy to the close blockade (Beeler, 1997, pp. 214-215).
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any change in the local situation of the departments would be
attended with much inconvenience, and greatly embarrass the public
service. A post-script dated June 1834 was appended to his original
memorandum, in which he stated that nearly two years’ experience
had strongly confirmed his earlier comments that no change should
be made to the accommodation of the Navy’s administration in
London. Barrow also took the opportunity to state his opinion that the
consolidation of the four previous Boards under one supreme Board
was “in all respects infinitely preferable both as regards efficiency,
despatch of business, individual responsibility and economy as the
saving of many thousands which have annually been effected, since
the change of system, will prove” (NRS: Vol.131, p. 652).
Although at the time the abolition of the two subordinate boards was supported
by many members of Parliament, such as Joseph Hume, and others outside
Parliament, such as John Barrow and Briggs, the newly appointed Accountant
General, it came to be realised eventually that it had not been successful.
Graham’s twin goals of individual responsibility and improved efficiency were
not achieved, in particular the former of the goals. Decisions were still taken
around the Board Room table and as a result responsibility for those decisions
“became even more elusive” (Rodger, 1979, p. 100).This was similar to the
situation that Middleton had complained about at the Navy Board. Much of the
work of the Board could have been settled by an individual Lord or a small
number of Lords without the need for it be raised and then discussed at the
Board table. The need to take even minor matters of business to a formal Board
meeting resulted in administrative inertia and this situation was exacerbated by
the steady increase in the amount of business the Board had to contend with,
particularly that arising from technological changes arising as a consequence of
the Navy moving from wood and sail to iron and steam.

The biggest problem with the Board of the Admiralty, however, was the fact that
no change had been made giving the First Lord power by which to render the
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Board subordinate to his will. In reply to a question put to him by the
Commission of Inquiry into the Control and Management of the Naval Yards in
1861 in regard to whether the First Lord had superiority, Graham advised that
he had “(n)one whatever as he is inter pares” (BPP 1861(2790), p. 415). This
meant that decision making at the Board would have been on the basis of
collective responsibility, the very antithesis of Graham’s avowed goal of
individual responsibility. As to whether the reorganisation had been a success
Graham had earlier advised the Commission that
I would certainly reconsider the whole question of the Command of
the Navy and in the report of a Committee which sat last year upon
the Organisation of the Army, over which I presided, I inserted a
paragraph which the Committee adopted, and which is now before
the House, condemning strongly administration by Boards. The
Command of the Navy was pressed upon that Committee, who were
considering the Organisation of the Army, as an example. I stated the
opinion, which opinion the committee deliberately confirmed, that so
far from an example to be followed, it might, on the whole, be
regarded as an example to be avoided, and I think there is a
sentence in the report which I drew, in which the committee adopted,
that a Board only works well when the head that makes it as unlikely
a Board as possible, and acts as if he alone were responsible (BPP
1861(2790), p. 413).
This is exactly what Middleton had been demanding when he sought change
within the Navy Board whereby the Comptroller should not be considered equal
with other Board members. Graham accordingly was aware that his acclaimed
restructuring of naval administration in the 1830’s had been a failure and
required further reform.

Although one of the aims in advocating the abolition of the Boards was cost
saving, there would have been greater savings to be achieved if greater
attention had been paid to the administration and financial management
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associated with the manufacture and repair of ships about which the operations
in the Dockyards were centred.

4.7 The dockyards
Dockyards are establishments, either government or privately owned, at which
ships are built, fitted-out, refitted and maintained and, accordingly, are
necessary adjuncts to a decision by a country to make war at sea. Where
dockyards are developed will depend upon many factors ranging from grand
strategy to the availability of qualified staff. As an example of the former, the
decision in 1903 to develop a naval base and dockyard at Rosyth on the Forth
in Scotland was seen as a necessary part of the British strengthening of its
defences during its pre-World War I naval arms race with Germany, although it
was not until 1916 that the first ship entered one of the base’s three graving
docks.95 To meet the requirement for qualified staff, there was built as part of
the Rosyth facility a garden city to attract and to accommodate dockyard
workers.

At regular intervals ships must undergo underwater hull cleaning and, if
necessary, repair and, while this remains important today, it was of vital
importance to a wooden sailing ship. To enable this work to be done they could
be careened, slipped or dry-docked. Careening is the beaching of a vessel at
high tide, allowing it to settle onto the beach, and cleaning and/or repairing the
hull during the time until the vessel re-floats on the next flood tide. To enable
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Before the opening of Rosyth in Scotland, the nearest dry-dock was at Chatham in Kent,
although there were floating docks at Invergordon in Cromarty Firth and at Jarrow on the Tyne.

212

the bottom-most section of the hull about the keel to be reached it is necessary,
in the absence of a dry-dock96, to lie the vessel on its side. In the case of a
sailing vessel this can be achieved, after considerable preparation such as the
removal of loose items such as the guns, by attaching halyards to the tops of
the masts and hauling them in. This method is not vessel-friendly for a wooden
vessel as the hull can be seriously weakened and its life shortened. Slips (or
‘slipways’; ‘ramps’) could also be used for cleaning and repair and this was the
means favoured for the galleys which, by design, were of light construction and
easily damaged so minimising the use of careening for them. However, the use
of slips for the galleys created problems if the slips were required for the
construction of new vessels or the repair of existing ones. Slips were also used
for new construction and, at Chatham for example, after launching from the
slips, a wooden vessel was then dry docked for the coppering of its bottom. Dry
docks were also used for construction but this was not preferable as this tied up
a valuable dry dock for a considerable time thereby precluding its use for the
cleaning and repairs of other vessels.

The first dockyard in England was established at Portsmouth in 1495 97 during
the reign of Henry VII under the supervision of Robert Brigandine, the Clerk of
the Ships. With a steadily increasing fleet requiring extensive dockyard facilities
other home yards were established during Henry VIII’s reign at Woolwich (1512)
and Deptford (1513), followed by those at Chatham (1567), Sheerness (1665),
Plymouth (1690), and Pembroke (1815). In addition two further dockyards were
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Or drydock, craving dock.
Dates are from Research Guide B5: Royal Navy Dockyards of the National Maritime Museum.
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established at Erith (in existence from 1514 to 1521) and at Harwich (1657).
Royal Navy Dockyards were also established overseas, such as that at English
Harbour in Antigua (1671), Port Royal in Jamaica (1675), Gibraltar (1704), and
Halifax in Nova Scotia (1759). By the second half of the 18 th century, with ships
of the line growing in size and numbers, the older dry docks in the east were
unable to accommodate the Navy’s needs as they were of insufficient depth and
length and in locations that were difficult to access, such as Chatham. A further
problem with the eastern yards was that the waterways to the dockyards had
become too narrow and shallow for the larger ships. The Medway for instance
had many twists and turns sometimes requiring lengthy periods for a ship to
navigate it. A change in naval strategy also affected the utility of the eastern
dockyards. In the 16th and 17th centuries the Dutch were the enemy and
accordingly the dockyards along the east coast had considerable strategic
value, even when the Dutch audaciously raided the Medway in June 1667, but
with the recognition of the threat imposed by France, the yards at Portsmouth
and Plymouth assumed greater importance. As a result ships of the line had to
queue to use these yards, the wait being between two and ten months for repair
(Morriss, 2004, p.16). This of course had a deleterious effect on the number of
ships available for operations98. To overcome these problems the Admiralty
commenced a programme of new dock construction commencing at Portsmouth
(Morriss, 2004, p. 17).99
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After 1798, 20-25% of all ships of the line in a condition for sea service were at the various
dockyards. The British victories at Camperdown, Cape St. Vincent and the Nile were thus
critical to the removal of additions to French and allied battle strength (NRS: Vol. 141, pp. 4-5).
99
Also see NRS: Vol. 141, pp. 23-24 for a summary of the improvements to the Portsmouth and
Plymouth dockyards.
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As dockyards were centres of construction and repair there were concomitant
requirements for them to maintain large stores of materials such as timber,
hemp, tar and canvas, and of victuals. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the
dockyards eventually became administration centres under the control of
resident Navy Board Commissioners or their Master Shipwrights. In the waters
adjacent to a dockyard were to be found the ships in ordinary, that is the ships
not in commission, and it was more convenient to maintain these ships and to
re-commission them if they were kept in close proximity to a dockyard. The
ships of the Navy were constructed mainly in government yards but there was
also construction at private yards under the eyes of inspectors drawn from the
shipwrights from the government yards. In theory this appeared to be a sound
idea but in reality it was ascertained that a relationship could develop between
the contractors and inspectors which was detrimental to the overall quality of
the ship. Accordingly it was necessary for Navy Board Commissioners to carry
out regular inspections but this created difficulties for them in travelling to the
private yards outside south eastern England, a major reason why the majority of
private shipyards used in the construction of Navy ships was to be found in that
area of the country.

The dockyards were collectively managed by the Principal Officers, the Master
Shipwright, the Assistant Master Shipwrights, the Master Attendant, the Clerks
of the Cheque and Survey, and the Storekeeper, each officer being accountable
for his area of responsibility, there being no general manager responsible for
overall management. The man with the greatest responsibility was the Master
Shipwright who commanded most of the men in the yard. Next in levels of
responsibility was the Clerk of the Cheque, who acted as a yard comptroller and
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kept the various musters and pay books followed by the Master Attendant, who
was a former master in the sea service and attended to matters afloat including
the ships in ordinary, shifting berths, and rigging. The Clerk of the Survey, who
was responsible for ships store, also checked the issues by the Storekeeper of
stores items used throughout the yard. In regard to matters which concerned
the dock yard as a whole, the collective responsibility by the Principal Officers
required that they formulate a collective opinion which they then passed on to
the Navy Board (NRS: Vol. 120, p. 263). By the middle of the 18th century there
was also at three of the yards a resident Commissioner, Chatham, Portsmouth
and Plymouth. The Commissioner at Chatham also inspected the dockyards at
Sheerness, while no Commissioner was required at Deptford or Woolwich as
they were close to London and could be supervised from there.

The resident Commissioners were nominal members of the Navy Board but
invariably they did not attend the meetings of the Board in London. Playing only
an inspectorial role, not an executive one, their position descriptions were
poorly defined. As well as enforcing the regulations of the Navy Board their
major task was to act as the communication link between the Principal Officers
and the Navy Board by passing on to the Principal Officers instructions100
emanating from the Navy Office in London. For those yards without a resident
Commissioner, the communication was between the Navy Board and the yards’
Principal Officers. The organisational system, being highly centralised, required
strict adherence to the standing orders and instructions of the Navy Office and
as a result management of the dockyards has been described as “management
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These were based on the Duke of York’s set of instructions of 1662.
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by correspondence” (Haas, 1994, p. 8).101

Overall the yards were poorly

supervised and as a result there was inefficiency, indifference, indiscipline, and
a serious lack of trust between the Navy Board and the Principal Officers. There
were two ways in which better supervision could have been achieved: having a
general manager at each yard responsible to the Navy Board for all aspects of
the yard’s operation with clear and unambiguous lines of authority, or, having
members of the Admiralty and Navy Board make regular visits to the yards. The
first visits (or “visitations”) were carried out by the Navy Board in 1689 but the
next, by members of the Board of Admiralty and with the Comptroller of the
Navy Board, did not occur until 1749.

The 1749 visits arose from information that had come to light in regard to the
excessive time ship repairs were taking and the high levels of cost at the yards.
The visits uncovered a large number of irregularities from the standing orders
being ignored in all the yards to the widespread abuse of the privilege of chips
by the workmen. Further visits were undertaken over the years and it was only
through the efforts of Sandwich that change was begrudgingly introduced
across the yards which resulted in their improved efficiency. Sandwich’s
greatest problem that he had to confront at the dock yards was how to build
more ships without employing more shipwrights but without sacrificing the
quality of the finished product. The answer was to increase productivity and the
avenue Sandwich used to do so was task work (or ‘piece rate’) which was
introduced in 1775. Task workers were paid according to the amount of work
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In their Sixth Report the Commission for Naval Revision commented that they had found that
the instructions for the Yards were in most cases from the time of William and Mary and as such
not designed with the Navy of 1806 in mind.
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they performed on completing standard tasks in the construction of a new ship,
unlike day workers who were employed for a fixed daily wage plus overtime
(called “extra”). This required that every type of ship be divided into parts and a
standard labour cost for the construction of each part calculated, the standard
then being apportioned equally over the members of a gang of shipwrights
required to carry out the task.

This was not the first time that task work had been introduced to the Navy.
Commencing in 1694 several attempts had been made by the Board of
Admiralty to have the Navy Board introduce task work in the various dockyards
but to no avail. The conservatism of the Navy Board, the Board’s belief that task
work would bring with it inferior quality ships and the misgivings of the staff of
the dockyards, created almost insurmountable barriers to the introduction of
task work. The fact that it was used in private yards meant nothing as it was
considered by many that ships built in those yards were of inferior quality to the
ships built in the Royal dockyards where “reputation by Substantial
Workmanship, is the care of the Officers and Workmen” (Haas, 1969, p. 45). It
had been initially proposed by the Admiralty in 1694 but the proposal was
rejected by the Navy Board. Then in 1749, at the time of the dockyard
visitations, the idea was revived by Sandwich and Lord Anson with the result
that the Navy Board was instructed late that year to introduce the system for
bricklayers, joiners and sailmakers. The Navy Board ignored those instructions,
for the collective mentality of the Commissioners “is revealed in the assertion
that they “were against any Innovation, more especially the attempting to build
anything whatever by Task”” (Haas, 1970, p. 208).
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Sandwich, the Comptroller of the Navy Board, Hugh Palliser, and the Surveyor,
John Williams, persevered and task work was introduced in 1775 using rates
that allowed the men a large increase in their wages but this change was met
with widespread alarm and tumultuous strikes at Portsmouth and Plymouth
(Rodger, 1993, pp. 150-151). The problem was that the Admiralty had not
taken into consideration that the working system in the dockyard was very
traditional (Rodger, 1993, p. 151). Eventually task work was implemented but it
proved to be only partly successful for it did not see an improvement in the
standards of discipline and it did not do away with the abuses, corruption, and
general inefficiency that was endemic in the Royal yards. Nothing was really
done to improve the management of the Yards until the appointment of the
Committee on Dockyard Expenditure in 1885102. Even so, Great Britain owed
much to the ‘insatiable’ Fourth Earl of Sandwich as it would not have been
possible to have met the demands of a continuous and successful blockade of
the French Navy in Brest in the forthcoming wars with France in the absence of
its dockyards.

4.8 Conclusion
To make ready a fleet of ships able to do battle successfully with the enemy in
all parts of the globe required a first class administrative system. Firstly, the
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It is interesting to read the evidence of one Andrew Murray, the Chief Engineer of the factory
at the Portsmouth Yard, given to the Dockyard Commission in 1861 that he had successfully set
up a manufacturing accounting system for his factory based upon DEB in 1846 even though he
had been refused the requisite books and forms by Graham. Murray said that Graham had
expressed satisfaction that Murray could not produce a balance sheet in a dockyard. Murray
ignored Graham and purchased the requisite materiel himself and developed a DEB-based
system which Anderson approved some years later (BPP 1861(2790, p. 360).
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ships had to be seaworthy, able to meet the challenges of the different climates
and different tasks which required facilities for the upkeep of the ships which, in
turn, required craftsmen, secondly, these ships had to manned, gunned and
victualled, and thirdly, there had to be in existence an administrative structure
able to coordinate and manage all these activities concurrently. Without these
pre-requites being fulfilled, a navy could find itself lacking in ships which was a
situation in which the Royal Navy found itself during the American War of
Independence when Britain temporarily lost command of the sea. Nevertheless,
the Navy could pride itself on having possessed over the centuries an
administrative arm that was the envy of the navies of Europe.

As discussed in Chapter 3 one of the pre-requisites upon which the
development of Britain’s blue-water warfare policy relied was an abundance of
finance. Although this pre-requisite was achieved it was necessary to develop a
system by which those funds were properly administered and this will be
described in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5
Financial Administration of the Navy
5.1 Introduction
In an earlier chapter it was pointed out that without sufficient financial resources
combined with efficient and effective administration it would have been
impossible to develop and maintain the Navy. Being concerned with the
administration of those resources this chapter initially will examine the
determination of the Navy’s annual estimates of expenditure. It is here that an
elementary understanding of the Navy as a fighting force is necessary in order
to appreciate how complicated the development of the estimates would have
been and why the need for an accounting system that could assist in such work
was so vital. This, of course, was one of the avowed advantages that were
foreseen with the implementation of DEB in the Navy.

The difficulties associated with the estimation of expenditure led to the Navy’s
use of debt which was seen by many to weaken Parliament’s control over the
public purse and be unconstitutional. The Navy bills were negotiable and the
Navy’s creditors were able to convert them into cash by selling them to
speculators at a discount the level of which was dependent upon the date the
bills were expected to be paid out by the government. This was an unhealthy
situation for two reasons, the first being the inflationary effect on the cost of
materials and services as suppliers charged more to offset the discount, and,
secondly, the possibility of corruption in those privy to the date on which the bills
were to be paid.

222

The chapter concludes with a review of the position of Treasurer of the Navy
which by the 18th century had become a sinecure which was to be abolished in
1835 with the advent of the Paymaster General.

5.2 Navy estimates
In the context of naval finance, ‘accountability’ may be defined as the task of
enforcing the prompt, accurate and honest discharge of responsibility by those
within the Navy handling the public money voted for the service by Parliament.
The task “was to prove in large part a parliamentary, and hence a political and
constitutional, problem of considerable technical complexity” (Roseveare, 1973,
p. 47). It was to be solved ultimately by a system which consisted of a number
of interdependent features, one of which was the estimation of future
expenditure.

In his memorandum103, The Control of the House of Commons over the Public
Expenditure, which forms an appendix to the 1902 report of the Select
Committee on National Expenditure (BPP 1902(387), App. 13) Welby pointed
out that while the control of Parliament over public expenditure began with the
Revolution it extended only to the expenditure on the Navy, Army and
Ordnance. “The reality of this control”, he said, “was proved by the reduction of
the Army enforced after the Peace of Ryswick by the House of Commons
against the wishes of the King” (BPP 1902(387), App. 13). However, as Welby
points out, this control was limited in its character. Expenditure estimates were
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See Appendix 2.1.
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prepared for these services upon which Parliament voted an amount for each of
them but there was only one vote for the Navy service until 1798, unlike the
Army grant which had been divided into two or three Votes during Anne’s reign.
In both the Army and the Navy a practice developed of spending money in
advance, that is without the sanction of Parliament, which required that the
excess had to be submitted to Parliament for approval in a subsequent session.
This left the executive with a great deal of latitude “which the Government did
not fail to avail itself. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that this
imperfect control ceased with the act of voting for there were no means
available of ascertaining whether the amount had been expended on the
service for which it had been voted” (BPP 1902(387), App. 13).

The preparation of the Navy estimates on a regular basis commenced during
the Interregnum when standard monthly costs for wages and victuals were used
in the development of the estimates for various programmes such as the
provision of the summer Guard (eight months duration) and winter Guard (six
months duration) in the English Channel, convoying, and ships on particular
stations such as those off the coast of Portugal in 1651. In June 1649, the
estimate shown below (Figure 5.1) was prepared “of the whole Charge and
Expence of the Navy, for one whole year, and so from Year to Year, for every
Year, so long as the service shall necessarily require so great Fleets for the
summer and winter Guards” (JHC: vol. 6: 1648-1651 (1802), pp. 229-231).
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FIGURE 5.1

Annual Navy estimates 1649 to 1651

For 6,000 Men, for the summer’s Guard, for Eight Months

For 3,000 Men, for the winter’s Guard, for Six Months

£168,000

£75,000

For the ordinary Charge of Chatham, Deptford, Woolwich and
£30,000
Portsmouth, in Victuals, Wages, and Stores, for ordinary Repairs

For the Charge of building Three new Frigates

£10,000

Total

£283,000

Whereof payable by the Customs, per Estimation

£160,000

Which abated, there rests to be settled and assigned upon the
£123,000
Treasurer, out of other Revenues

The estimates for the summer and winter Guards included the costs for both
victuals and wages based upon standard monthly costs per seaman. The
Journal of the House of Commons: (volume 6: 1648-1651 (1802) at pp. 229231) also includes a detailed estimate for the ensuing winter Guard and the total
for that programme was slightly in excess of the amount of £75,000 shown
above. However, the total of the estimate for the summer Guard programme for
1650 was £886,220 (JHC: vol. 6: 1648-1651 (1802), pp. 339-342) versus
£168,000 as shown above in Figure 5.1, an increase of £718,220 which is not
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explained. If the total of £886,220 is ignored and the items detailed in the
estimate are added, the total is £268,802 not £168,000 as shown above, an
increase of £100,802. Parliament’s declaration that the estimates for the
summer and winter Guards would remain constant from year to year which had
been made in an attempt to keep the Navy on a tight financial rein turned out to
be unattainable through poor control over expenditure, or the original figure was
a fabrication. In May 1651, the Commons considered an estimate which
embraced, as well as the summer and winter Guards for 1651, the then existing
debts of the Navy including the unpaid wages of 1,060 seamen who had been
on operations offshore for 13 months on ships employed in Blake’s blockade of
Lisbon.

On the return of the Stuarts to the British throne estimating the expenditure was
retired and it was not reintroduced until the Revolution in 1688. In the period
between, estimating for the Navy relied upon crude and unrefined means based
upon a ship’s burden with one man to every 4 tons above 40 and under 400
tons: above 400 tons, one man to every 3 tons. However, in 1677 Samuel
Pepys drew up an exact computation of the complement of each class of ship
which was “intended ‘for a solemn, universal, and unalterable adjustment of the
gunning and manning of the whole fleet (otherwise than by order of the king and
council)’” (NRS: Vol. 26, p. 233). This general establishment was adopted on 3
November 1677 and was to serve the Navy for many years. It was determined
mainly by the number and size of guns carried on each ship together with the
additional men according to a specified proportion for the other duties that were
required to be discharged on board during an action at sea (NRS: Vol. 26, p.
239). As an example, the Royal Sovereign in wartime was designed to carry
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100 guns, consisting of 28 cannon served by 8 men per gun; 28 culverin with 5
men per gun; 28 demi-culverin with 3 men per gun; 14 light sakers with 3 men
per gun; and 4 3-pounders with 2 men per gun. In total, the guns required 490
men to serve them to which must be added the number of men required to carry
out the other tasks on such a large sailing ship such as handling the sails and
fetching the powder and ball, a total of 782 men (NRS: Vol. 26, p. 234; Lloyd,
1970, p. 74).

From the time of the Revolution until 1691 the Navy estimates were based upon
programmes as illustrated by the estimates for 1691 in Figure 5.2 extracted
from JHC: vol. 10: 1688-1693 (1802), pp. 430-432.
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FIGURE 5.2

‘An estimate for the charge of the Navy for the Year 1691, and building
some ships; in which the ordnance is included’

Summer Fleet

28,710 men for 8 months

Winter Fleet

51,150 men for 5 months

Convoys and Cruisers, being, for various Months,
7,170 men for 13 months
reduced to

Which, being reduced to Thirteen Months, amounts
to Twenty nine thousand and Twenty-six Men for

£1,603,686/10/-

that Time; and, in Money to

Ordinary Charge for the Navy

£100,000/-/-

Building Three Third-rate Ships, Eight Fireships,
£88,008/11/6
Eight Ketches, and a Dock at Plymouth

Total

£ 1,791,695/1/6

One eighth of this total was for the Ordnance for the service of the Navy in
1691.
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The above estimate was made up of three separate estimates for naval
services, the Ordinary, the Extraordinary, and the Sea Service. The Ordinary (or
“Ordinary Estimate”) was the estimate of the standing charges of the Navy in
harbour and covered the expense of the offices and dock yards, the care of the
ships in ordinary, the wages and victuals of the men employed in taking care of
the ships in ordinary; also the half pay, and the various classes of
superannuation and pensions, fixed costs of the naval establishment, the wages
and associated costs paid to staff at the naval yards, the out-ports, and those
on ships in ordinary, harbour victuals and moorings, maintenance of ships in
ordinary, and repairs to the infrastructure at the naval yards. Draft estimates of
the Ordinary were prepared by the Navy Board and then passed to the
Admiralty for approval. They were not automatically accepted by the Admiralty
which could and, on occasion, did call for the draft estimates to be amended104.
While some of the expenditure items in the Ordinary could be estimated with
considerable precision, most of the items were complicated, which would be
expected in a department of such size and complexity as the Navy. The
Ordinary was seldom debated in Parliament, although individual items were on
occasion questioned and, as Wilkinson (2004, p. 38) notes, the Ordinary
estimates submitted to Parliament between 1715 and 1787 were always
granted in full.

104

In 1772 the Navy Board requested approval by the Admiralty of the rationalisation of its
estimates and include what were contingencies in regular accounts. Norris (1963, p. 221, fn. 2)
incorrectly states that this request was blocked by the Admiralty. In its memorandum to the
Board of 26 November 1772, the Admiralty approved the request. (Shelburne Papers).
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The Extraordinary Estimate covered the costs of anything not wholly covered by
the Ordinary and included “the expense of building and repairing His Majesty’s
ships, and all new works in the dock yards or naval establishments at home”
(BPP 1817(410), p. 182). This estimate was the most difficult to determine for
the work required to repair a ship would have been clouded with uncertainty as
to the extent of the work required and the cost. What could be predicted through
a survey while afloat and what could only be ascertained after the ship had
been dry docked and a complete examination undertaken could be very
different. A ship that presented with only ‘small’ problems could end up requiring
major, ‘large’ repairs costing very much more than estimated with the work
taking a very much longer time to complete than originally scheduled. “Three or
four months usually elapsed between the time a ship of the line arrived in
harbor and the time it left of which less than half was actually spent in dry dock”
(Haas, 1994, p. 28). This had a “knock-on” effect with schedules being difficult
to maintain. “Repairs and maintenance presented intractable problems for
planning” (Haas, 1994, p. 27). Perhaps because of such problems it would have
been easier not to have bothered with such an estimate but such a course of
action would have been unconstitutional.

The Sea Service estimate (also referred to as the “Vote of Seamen” and “the
Wear and Tear” (BPP 1817(410), p. 182) was by far the largest and was based
upon the number of seamen voted by Parliament in the Committee of Supply.
This estimate was the easiest estimate for Parliament to adjust, the others
being more technical in nature and difficult to argue for or against. The
procedure followed in the determination of this estimate was that the number of
men was decided upon by the King in Council and an Order in Council prepared
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which was sent to the Admiralty which passed it on to the Navy Board. The
Navy Board then prepared the estimate and this was sent to the Admiralty but
they did not then send it to the Commons. “The number was the only item which
was voted in the Committee without either an Estimate, Account, a List, Treaty,
Message from the Throne or Report as a foundation for their Vote105”
(Strateman, 1967, p. 60). The vote was by way of a motion, usually by a
member of the Board of Admiralty, the other members of the House having no
regular information in regard to it until that time.

The Sea Service estimate for 1692 presented to the Commons was in a
different form from that for 1691 in that it was not prepared on the basis of
programmes. Instead, there was included a “Charge of Wages, Victuals, Wear
and Tear, and Ordnance Stores, for Thirty Thousand Men, serving in their
Majesties Ships at Sea, for Thirteen Months, at Four Pounds Five Shillings each
Man a Month” (JHC: vol. 10: 1688-1693, (1802) pp. 547-549). This was the Sea
Service estimate which was then considered by a committee of the Commons
whose opinion was that it should be based on 30,000 men for 13 months but at
a monthly rate of £4/-/- per man106 (or £1 a week), a reduction of 5/- per man.
This rate which comprised the components shown in Figure 5.3 was approved
by the House Committee of Supply (JHC: vol. 10: 1688-1693 (1802), pp. 552553).

105

The Earl of Liverpool in “The Liverpool Tractate” could not provide any reason for this. “Why
the method of granting this part of the Supply should be different from all others I can assign no
reason except it be that the Marine is and ever has been a favourite Service in the Country”
(Strateman, 1967, p. 61).
106
Rodger states that “the multiplier was £4 a month, except in 1691 and 1693 to 1697, when it
was £4 5s” (2005, p. 198).
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FIGURE 5.3
An estimate of the Charge of Wages, Victuals, and Ordnance Stores for
30,000 Men serving in their Majesties Ships at Sea for the Year 1692

Sea Service

Component rates per man per

Sea Service

components

lunar month (28 days)

estimates

Sea Ordnance107

5/-

£97,500

Victualling

19/-

£370,500

Wear and Tear

£1/7/6

£536,250

Wages

£1/8/6

£555,750

Totals

£4/-/-

£1,560,000

By 1699 the Navy estimates overall had been greatly improved. No longer was
there a single amount for the Ordinary charge, a break-down of the item was
now provided together with an estimate of the Extraordinary works necessary to
be performed for which no provision had been made elsewhere.

There were two variables that affected the Sea Service estimate, the rate per
man per lunar month and the number of men voted. The rate per man remained
constant at £4 per man per lunar month until 1797 when it was increased to £7

107

The Sea Ordnance estimate was paid directly to the Board of Ordnance so that in 1692 the
Navy received £1,462,500 by way of the Sea Service estimate. The inclusion of a component
for Ordnance no longer applied as from 1826.
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per man per lunar month through amendments to the individual components of
that rate. The rate of £4 had been criticised over the years as being too low, for
example Middleton in his Observations on the 1786 Estimates (NMM: MID14/3)
had commented that it had been used “ever since the time of the
Commonwealth, but even then it had been found to be inadequate. The Debt
therefore has increased invariably in Peace as well as in War”. The inadequacy
of this rate was brought to the attention of Parliament through an appendix
prepared by the Navy Board which formed part of the papers submitted by the
Select Committee on Accounts and other Papers relating to Public Income and
Expenditure in 1786, App.(P) No. 6, p. 71. In this appendix the Board said the
rate was “generally found inadequate to the expence, even in time of Peace, not
only from the increased price of provisions, but from it being subject to several
demands, not otherwise provided for by Parliament”. Even before receipt of this
information, Parliament would have been aware that something was radically
wrong with its method of funding naval services and that there was a direct
relationship between the rate and the increases in the Navy’s debt levels. In
1785 £9,404,001 was inscribed into government stock which cleared all Navy
bills issued up to June 1783 and enabled the Navy to make somewhat of a
fresh start, but by 1789 the amount of debt had accumulated again to near
£2,000,000. Accordingly, it is difficult to understand why Parliament did not
force a change in the rate upon the Admiralty prior to 1798 for it was not until
then that the Admiralty was induced to rectify the matter. Binney (1958, p. 143)
notes that the responsibility for this “appears to rest upon successive Boards of
Admiralty”. While this is undoubtedly correct in part, he makes no mention of the
responsibility of both Parliament and Treasury in this state of affairs. In 1798, in
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pursuance of a precept from the Select Committee of Finance the Navy Board
explained the need for change in the rate.
The usual Grant of £4 per Man per month, being very inadequate to
the Expenses of the Navy, when the Demands and Prices of every
species of Stores and Provisions are considerably increased since
that Establishment; besides a great variety of Expenses in
consequence of the War; it was considered to be a preferable system
to make a new calculation of the various branches of the
Expenditure, than to continue one that was known to be fallacious,
and required an additional Vote from Parliament to discharge the
Debt of the Navy thereby incurred (Select Committee on Finance,
Twenty-Fourth Report, Appn (E. 4.), p. 169).
A comparison of the Sea Service component rates for 1699, 1740 (Baugh,
1965, p. 456), and 1798 following the amendments is set forth in Figure 5.4.

FIGURE 5.4
Comparison of the Sea Service component rates per man per lunar month
1699, 1740, and 1798
Sea Service

Component

Component

Component

components

rates 1699

rates 1740 *

rates 1798

Sea Ordnance

5/-

4/-

5/-

Victualling

19/-

19/-

£1/18/-

Wear and Tear

£1/7/6

£1/7/-

£3/- /-

Wages

£1/8/6

£1/10/-

£1/17/-

Totals

£4

£4

£7

*These rates were amended in 1797, effective 1798.
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The rate of £7 per man per lunar month remained unchanged until 1808 when it
was increased to £7/2/- for both that year and 1809. For the years 1810 to 1813
it was reduced to £6/8/9; for 1814 to 1816, the rate was increased to £6/15/9.
The rate from then to 1826 was reviewed annually with movements in the rates
reflecting changes in the costs of the various components as shown in Figure
5.5 for that period. Depending on the accuracy of the costs ascribed to the
components, this was a far more realistic method of estimating.
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FIGURE 5.5
Comparison of the Sea Service Component rates per man per lunar month
from 1817 to 1826

Components 1817

1818108

1819

1823

1824

1825

1826

Sea
4/-

7/-

7/-

5/-

5/-

5/-

NA

£2/1/-

£2/-/-

£2/-/-

£1/8/-

£1/11/-

£1/12/-

£1/15/-

£2/3/-

£2/3/-

£2/1/-

15/-

15/-

17/-

NA

Wages

£1/18/-

£2/7/-

£2/3/6

£2/7/-

£2/7/-

£2/9/-

£2/9/-

Totals

£6/6/-

£6/17/-

£6/11/6

£4/15/-

£4/18/-

£5/3/-

£4/4/-

Ordnance

Victualling

Wear and
Tear

After 1825 the Sea Service Estimate (now called the ‘Estimate for Wages and
Victuals’) no longer included either an Ordnance component, being included
thereafter in the Board of Ordnance estimates, or a Wear and Tear component

108

Joseph Hume criticised this increase, asking why it was warranted, “”unless the officers fired
off the balls for their amusement, or threw the powder overboard” (Hansard, Second Series Vol.
6, February 1822, Cols. 457-458).
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which was included thereafter in the Navy’s Ordinary Estimate. However, the
reduction in the Ordnance component prior to 1826 was due to the availability of
the excess ordnance and ordnance stores accumulated during the Napoleonic
Wars and the considerable decrease in consumption during peacetime. It would
be expected that the Victualling rates would fluctuate because of changes in the
prices of the provisions, while the Wear and Tear component would be lower in
peace-time due to less wear and tear on the ships and lower prices for naval
stores. With regard to the Wages component, the rate in peacetime would be
expected to be higher than in wartime as there would be a higher proportion of
officers to men on the payroll. While that proportion would remain relatively
constant, the rate for wages would increase in line with increases in wages
paid.

The other variable applicable to the estimation of the cost of Sea Service was
the number of men voted. “This figure was purely a financial abstraction; it bore
no fixed relation to the number of real men actually serving” (Rodger, 2005, p.
198). Baugh describes it as “one of those familiar instances in which 18 th
century constitutional theory was not matched by the political and administrative
facts” (Baugh, 1965, p. 464). The estimates said Baugh “were not designed as
instruments of control; their purpose was simply to predict needs so sufficient
funds might be granted; the main estimate for the navy, the Sea Service
estimate, can be understood in no other way” (Baugh, 1965, p. 464). The
annual number of men required to man the ships, including Royal Marines,
would have been difficult to estimate on the basis of the numbers of ships by
rate for it was very difficult to estimate the number of ships, by rates, which
were to be manned. For instance, as mentioned earlier, it would have been very
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difficult to estimate when ships would become available after undergoing a refit
or repair and, accordingly, when they would be re-commissioned and would
need to be re-armed, crewed and victualled.

There were other factors such as the probable success of the press, but
whatever the reason it is difficult to understand why the actual numbers could
not have been used instead. There were various returns available from which
the numbers on board a commissioned ship could be obtained, such as the
paperwork109 that was required to victual a Navy ship under Article II of the
1735 Purser’s Instructions. As for the ships that would need to be
commissioned, the numbers of men required would depend on the whether
there was peace or war and a very good understanding of what ships were in
Ordinary, and the estimates of the time taken to re-commission them.

This sort of planning would have required close communication between the
Dockyards and London with the consequence that the Navy Board had this data
and it was readily available. As an example, on 23 January 1735 the Commons
ordered that they should receive “an Account of the Number of Seamen
employed in the Service of the Royal Navy, from 31 st December, 1734, to the
31st December, 1735, upon a Medium of each Month, distinguishing what
numbers were borne, and what mustered in the Service. The said account from
the Commissioners of the Navy was laid before the Commons on the following
Thursday, 29 January 1736” (Minutes &c of the Second Session of the Eighth
Parliament of Great Britain) and it showed that, “Upon a Medium”, the number

109

Warrants were signed by the Chief-Officer on board a ship together with the Clerk of the
Cheque.
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of men borne was 28,819 men110. Why this order was made is not described but
the surprising thing is that it was only on the Monday of that week that the
Commons, in a Committee on Supply, had voted on a motion moved by Charles
Wager, the First Lord of the Admiralty, that 15,000 men be employed in the Sea
Service for 1736. The question being put on the motion, the same was agreed
to without opposition. There is no evidence to suggest that any of the Members
questioned why there was a very large disparity between this figure and the
numbers in the account prepared by the Navy Board.

Not everyone acquiesced tamely to the nominal numbers tabled in Parliament.
While there is the well documented throwing of the book of estimates at the
Treasury Bench by Edmund Burke in 1778, exclaiming that the Admiralty was
treating the House with contempt, there were other occasions when the
Commons was riven by debate on this subject. One of those occasions
occurred in February 1735 when a motion was made in the Commons for the
provision of 30,000 men for Sea Service for 1735 which some members
considered was excessive and should be reduced to 20,000. This was not
acceptable to the ministry, it being argued that the king should not
be obliged to disclose to this House all the Secrets of his
Government, all the negotiations he is now carrying out with foreign
Powers, and all the private Information he may have to received, in
relation to the Views and Designs of the several Powers now
engaged in War: Nor can it be expected that his Majesty should now
declare positively to us what he is resolved to do, in relation to his
engaging or not engaging in the present War (Speeches and
Debates of the First Session of the Eighth Parliament of George II, p.
22).

110

The number borne in the month of December 1735 was 28,582.
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A further argument in support of 30,000 was that in the previous year 20,000
had been approved initially by Parliament but during the year intelligence had
apparently been received in regard to the French and Spanish navies on the
basis of which the king had sought and received approval from Parliament to
increase the number of seamen from 20,000 to 27,000.

The opposition to the motion advised that while they did not consider the King
was obliged to disclose to the Commons all the secrets of his government, the
members could only formulate an opinion on the basis of the information they
had received directly from the king, in particular by way of the king’s speech to
Parliament, or such that was “laid before us in the most solemn Manner; and if
in any Case we ought to be cautious in this Respect, it ought surely to be in
Matters, which may any way relate to the loading the Subject with Taxes”
(Speeches and Debates in the House of Commons First Session of the Eighth
Parliament of George II, p. 28). As no account had been given to members as
to the position of Great Britain in regard to the war on the Continent, the
opposition concluded that they had to base their arguments completely upon
the king’s opening speech. For the reason it had not been given any indication
that at that time the Nation was in any danger the members of the Commons
were left with no alternative than to rely upon the public gazettes and the
newspapers for this information. As they could not discern any forthcoming
dangers they were “against loading (their) Constituents with maintaining that
additional number for the Year ensuing” (Speeches and Debates in the House
of Commons, First Session of the Eighth Parliament of George II, p. 30). After
further debate the motion that the number of seamen be reduced to 20,000
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failed to gain the numbers and it was defeated by 256 to 183 which indicates a
high level of concern within the Commons.

Nearly three weeks later a more serious attack on the Navy estimates and the
naval debt was mounted by William Wyndham. He brought to the notice of the
Commons the fact that at the end of the 17th century it was the practice to
submit the Navy estimates and accounts to a select committee for
consideration, along with those of the Army and Treasury. He was firmly of the
view that such a procedure should still be used and if it had he believed that the
increase to 30,000 seamen would not have been approved by a select
committee. If there had been a mechanism for the review of the naval accounts
any excess expenditure would have brought to the members’ attention as a
result of which the excess would have been provided for in the votes for the
ensuing year, not simply added to the existing debt.
(W)hen the Nation is thus freely run in Debt, the People being
ignorant of their Expence, cannot find Fault with any of those
extravagant Measures which occasioned that Expence; and when
Accounts are brought into this House in a Heap, and after the
Transactions to which they relate are all forgotten, it is then
impossible for Gentlemen to discover the Fallacies that may be
practised in the Manner of stating these Accounts (Speeches and
Debates in the House of Commons, First Session of the Eighth
Parliament, p. 75).
The consequence of such a method was that “(w)e have been made to believe,
that what we were spending was no more than the yearly Taxes would answer”
(Speeches and Debates in the House of Commons First Session of the Eighth
Parliament of George II, p. 77). The opposition then voiced their wish that they
be permitted “leave to move, That the ordinary Estimate of his Majesty’s Navy,
for the current Year, may be referred to the Consideration of a Select
Committee, and that they do examine the same, and report the Facts, with their
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Opinion thereupon, to the House” (Speeches and Debates in the House of
Commons First Session of the Eighth Parliament of George II, p. 77).

Following the Seven Year’s War and the American War of Independence the
government received general support in Parliament on the need to maintain a
two-power standard to counter the Bourbon powers and as a consequence the
naval estimates continued to have an easy passage through Parliament.
However, the need to repair the ships of the Navy as a consequence of their
heavy usage during these conflicts resulted in large amounts of money being
required for that purpose, but it was anticipated that following completion of this
work the naval estimates could be reduced to a level commensurate with a
peacetime establishment. The estimates for 1786 totalled £2,437,095 while the
five year’ projected total was £1,762,545, the reduction to be achieved through
a reduction in repairs (Webb, 1977, p. 199). The estimates were based primarily
upon the Observations on the Estimates of Charles Middleton who prepared his
observations in order firstly, to provide a perspective of the then existing state of
the Navy, secondly, to propose a plan for the building of new and replacement
ships, and thirdly to “offer some preparation for bringing our Naval Expenditure
into as narrow a compass as may consist with the power and security of the
Empire” (NMM: MID14/3).

5.3 Navy Debt
The repercussion of the system of estimating the Sea Service figures based on
the nominal numbers of men, which was exacerbated by no attempt being
made since the ‘days of the Commonwealth’ to review and adjust the rate
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regularly and so introduce some reality, was that the Sea Service funding for
the Navy was never adequate to cover actual expenditure. Together with any
over expenditure in the Ordinary and Extraordinary, the Navy was forced to fund
its over-expenditure by way of bills of exchange issued in lieu of cash.

These bills were negotiable but, as Charles Middleton noted, the credit rating
attaching to its paper forced the Navy “to make bargains at the ruinous discount
of 22%” (NRS, Vol. 38, vol. II, p. 185). The amount of paper outstanding rose to
incredible levels: £12,921,214 in December 1783, with the payment of debt of
this magnitude requiring special appropriations by Parliament: £1,000,000 in
1776, 1777, and 1778, £1,500,000 in 1780 and 1782, and £3,200,000 in 1781.
“No one appears to have suggested anything so revolutionary as that the Navy
should pay its creditors in ready money, much less to consider by what reform
that might be furnished” (Binney, 1958, p. 141). As noted above, following the
clearance of the Navy debt as at June 1783 the unfunded debt level of the Navy
once again increased rapidly. As well as maintaining the Sea Service rate at the
unrealistic £4 per man per lunar month, Binney pointed out another cause for
this unsatisfactory situation which was that “no application appears to have
been made to Parliament either for services known to be imminent though not
precisely estimable, nor for ‘Exceedings’ – that is to say, for expenditure
incurred upon authorised services over and above that estimated and provided
for” (1958, p. 143). If such a facility had been available there would have been a
reduced need for Navy Bill funding and its pernicious consequences.

This freedom to incur debts in excess of the estimates and the appropriated
supply applied as well to the Army which paid for its so-called extraordinaries by
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simply withholding army pay for up to a year, the resulting deficit being then
presented to Parliament as a fait accompli for retrospective sanction and
supply. It is remarkable that the deficit funding by the two services was tolerated
by Parliament. As noted earlier, there were some in Parliament who criticised
this situation but overall Parliament agreed tacitly with the existing system as
indicated by the comment of Lord North that he would consider any proposal to
improve the naval estimates but added that due to the notorious uncertainties of
the Sea Service it was necessary that there should be a discretionary power
lodged somewhere. North added that the existing system had subsisted for
many, many years which he considered was a ground in its favour (Reitan,
2007, p. 17). Accordingly, it is not surprising to learn that the estimates “were
passed unaltered in seven of the nineteen years between 1774 and 1792”
(Morriss, 2004, p. 94).

Baugh (1965, p. 463) has asked, “How are we to explain this policy of
underestimating”. He provides a number of possible explanations. Firstly “the
House of Commons wanted it this way as it had no machinery for controlling
public expenditure” (Baugh, 1965, p. 463) and it therefore attempted to
introduce a form of parliamentary control by limiting the funds it provided to the
Navy. The second and third possibilities he discusses are that the government
was attempting to keep the Commons “in the dark” (Baugh, 1965, p. 463) and,
because Parliament was considered to be the enemy of administration, there
was no point in providing any more information than was called for (Baugh,
1965, p. 465). His fourth possible explanation is that the estimates “were not
designed as an instrument of control; their purpose was simply to predict needs
so that sufficient funds might be granted” (Baugh, 1965, p. 465). However, this
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raises the question as to which year the prediction applied. His final explanation
is that it was politically expedient to do so. Baugh also makes reference to
comments by Binney (1958, pp. 142-143) that “they ran in the rut of precedent
and failed to appreciate the economies that would arise from keeping the navy
debt low” (Baugh, 1965, p. 466).

When discussing the naval debt, Wilkinson refers to the opinion of Robert
Nugent, who was later to become a Lord of the Treasury, “that the navy
estimates were deliberately kept short in order to achieve ‘a short lived
popularity’” (Wilkinson, 2004, p. 57). Wilkinson also refers to statements by
Henry Pelham and Lord North, both of whom were of the opinion that providing
the Navy with minimal funds was a practical issue, not a political one, otherwise
waste would been the consequence (Wilkinson, 2004, p. 58). Errors may have
occurred in the preparation of the estimates, or the king may have given Votes
of Credit in pursuance of some item of expenditure not included in the original
estimates, but to exhaust all possibilities it could be concluded that the poor
estimating was a case of “why bother”. There were too many unknowns in
estimating the Sea Service or the Ordinary with any kind of precision (for
example, who could predict storms and the level of damage arising), and,
anyway, it could be fixed later when a vote would be made to clear the debt into
which any excess would have been transferred. However, none of these
possible explanations are plausible, particularly when it would have been
noticed that the data such as the actual numbers of seamen borne and the
ships in ordinary were readily available, for the problem of poor estimating
continued for many decades. There is the strong possibility of a much more
serious reason which questions the morality of the Commons and the British
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establishment as a whole. Here the attack upon the estimates referred to above
by William Wyndham and his colleagues is picked up.
With respect to Ministers, indeed, and the Tools employed under
them … it is of great Advantage to have publick Accounts stand long
in Arrear; and this Advantage is greater in the Navy than in any other
Branch of publick Business, because Tradesman, and others who
serve the Publick, but especially Seamen, cannot lie long out of their
Money: If they cannot get their Money soon after it becomes due,
they must go to Usurers, ministerial Tools, and such like Extortioners,
to sell or pledge their publick Securities. This brings such Securities
to Discount, the longer they are of being paid, the greater Discount
they come to be at; so that at last they furnish a plentiful Harvest to
Ministers and their Favourites; for when the discount upon those
securities is raised to a sufficient Height, Ministers then give the
Watch-Word to their Agents and Favourites to go out and purchase;
and when they have got them all, or most of them into their Hands,
then the ministerial Bowels began to yearn for the Sufferings of the
publick Creditors, in having lain so long out of the Money; and great
Merit is assumed from their coming to a compassionate Resolution,
to have such and such a Class of publick Creditors paid off: This
House is always too good natured to refuse such a just Request; and
thus Extortioners get the full Value of those Securities, which they
purchase at a great Discount. This Sir, I shall not say is the Case at
present; but I must say I am apt to believe, if an Inquiry were made
into the Affair, it would be found that there is but a small Part of the
Debt, due upon the Navy, now in the Hands of the original Creditors
of the Publick; and even this, Sir, is an Inquiry not unworthy of the
Representatives of Great Britain in Parliament (Speeches and
Debates in the House of Commons First Session of the Eighth
Parliament of George II, p. 83).
These were very serious charges to be made against “Ministers ... and the
Tools employed under them” which, in all probability, could have been made
against other members of Parliament and any person outside Parliament who
were privy, through fair means or foul, to the date on which Parliament was to
vote funds to clear the Navy’s outstanding debt either in whole or in part. It is a
startling example of corruption at the highest levels. With the large amounts of
naval debt outstanding at any time and with discounts as high as 22% there
would have been very handsome profits to be made by holders of Navy paper
through Parliament deliberately under-estimating government expenditure. If
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this was the situation, then it was in nobody’s interest to amend the system or
change to DEB, or to allow select committees to be appointed in order to
examine the estimates before they were voted on, or to include any overexpenditure as part of the next year’s estimates instead of it being added to the
naval debt to be lost from sight. There would have been large amounts to be
made and accordingly it would have been a case of ‘what’s every man’s
business is nobody’s business’.

5.4 Treasurer of the Navy
Prior to the evolution of the Council of Marine Causes as a bureaucratic body,
the naval clerks did not have any general discretion over naval expenditure.
They were not allocated a budget for the upkeep of the Navy, instead being
paid sums by way of warrant direct from the Exchequer as required, with each
warrant being signed by the king and specifying the particular purpose for which
the money was required. The position of Clerk of the King’s Ships, for instance,
was one of little standing, with over-all control being in the hands of those at
higher levels in the government. It says much in regard to the standing of
William Gonson, the Keeper of the Storehouse, who in 1539 received from
Henry VIII “a payment of £500 “to be by him employed about his Highness’
affairs upon the sea”; which is to say that he was being trusted to manage a
small budget on his own responsibility” (Rodger, 2005, p. 223). By the time of
his death in 1544 nearly all naval payments were being made through Gonson’s
hands and he was being treated as the de facto Paymaster or Treasurer of the
Navy. Together with the development of the Council for Marine Causes, this
was a further example of the trend to centralisation of the Navy and naval
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finance, and by 1547 the Council was allowed considerable discretion over the
expenditure of large sums of money for the Navy. “Ten years later, in 1557, the
process was to reach its logical conclusion with the allocation to the navy of a
definite annual income for ‘ordinary’ purpose in peace-time, to pay for the
routine expenses of keeping the fleet in repair” (Davies, 1965. p. 274).

As noted earlier, the office of Treasurer was one of the offices that were
amalgamated to form the Council of Marine Causes. The office of “Treasurer of
our Marine Causes” was created by a patent “given and granted” by Henry VIII,
the first person appointed to the office being Robert Legge on 24 April 1546
(NRS, Vol. 131, p. 95). Legge, like his colleagues, was a person of standing and
ability being a merchant and shipmaster with over thirty years involvement in
the Iceland fishery and a leading London fish monger (Rodger, 2005, p. 226).
The manner in which his accounts were to be audited is of considerable interest
for there would be sufficient discharge if
he having the hands of two or three of our officers of our said marine
causes subscribed to his book and books of account or reckoning of
the same, testifying the payment and expending thereof, and the
shewing of these our letters patent and of the said book or -books of
account so subscribed as is aforesaid, and shall be sufficient
quittance (towards) all and every our auditors and other officers and
ministers in such behalf authorised and to be authorised to make
search and just allowance and discharge the same (NRS, Vol. 131,
p. 95).
Consequently, the approved policy in regard to the audit of naval expenditure
passing through the hands of the Treasurer of Marine Causes was that the
auditors could not disallow payments which had been approved by naval
officials. The policy was to remain unchanged for nearly three hundred years.
Whether this was a new policy introduced in 1546 and if so, what were the
bases for such a decision, cannot be determined. Davies also notes that it is
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impossible to determine, “How far this system may have already existed before
1546” (1965, p. 275). However, it is possible “that the procedure laid down in
Legge’s patent may have been introduced at the same time as the first “general
payments” to the Navy during William Gonson’s treasurership” (Davies, 1965, p.
275) that is, at the latest, in March 1539. With Legge’s appointment, all the
naval accounts were handled centrally through his office funded via general
warrants which allowed him to spend larger and larger sums in accordance with
his own judgement. On 8 January 1557 this was stopped when the financing of
the Navy was radically reformed through an order by the Privy Council. While
there is “no indication of the debate which prompted it” (NRS, Vol. 157, p. 302),
there is no doubt as to the importance of the decision for as a consequence the
order gave the Lord Treasurer responsibility for naval finance. From that date
until the 1590’s naval administration was firmly under the control of the
Treasury.

With an inherent weakness in the propriety of the audit process, this piecemeal
approach to funding would have aroused the reforming spirit of the Lord
Treasurer from 1550 to 1572, who was in the process of making changes to the
procedures within the Exchequer. The major reform instigated by Winchester
was the replacement of the piecemeal general warrants by an “Ordinary”
standing budget. The Privy Council Minute dated January 1557 states that,
ostensibly, the purpose of the order was to spare the Queen from the task of
“often signing of warrants for money to be defrayed about the necessary
charges of her Highness’s Navy, and being desirous to have some other order
taken for the easier conducting of this matter hereafter” (NRS, Vol.131, p. 70).
The pivotal point was that Winchester, with the advice of the Lord Admiral, took
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personal responsibility for “the sum of £14,000 by year to be advanced halfyearly to Benjamin Gonson, Treasurer of the Admiralty to be by him defrayed in
such sort as shall be prescribed by him the Lord Treasurer, with the advice of
the Lord Admiral” (NRS, Vol. 131, p. 70). The order then goes on to list those
“things” which Winchester would undertake to do “to get the navy into a state of
full repair and readiness, after which he believed £10,000 a year would suffice”
(Rodger, 2005, p. 228).

The initial annual advance of £14,000, to be made “by the issuing of an annual
privy seal warrant”, was not only to “finance the maintenance of the fleet, but it
also provided for the storing of a month’s supply of victual for 1,000 men, and
for the continuation of a large construction programme begun in the previous
year” (Adams, 1990, p. 98). On completion of this programme the warrant
dormant, now referred to as the “ordinary warrant”, was reduced by more than
originally envisaged falling to a low of £5,714 in February 1567 and it remained
at this level until 1590 (Adams, 1990, p. 98). As noted in an earlier chapter,
Benjamin Gonson and Edward Baeshe, who had been appointed to the office of
‘General Surveyor of the Victuals for the Seas’ (or ‘Controller General of the
Victuals’) in 1550, were required to account separately, presumably to
Winchester, at least once each year, or as required. The reduction in the
amount of the ordinary warrant was achieved by removing victualling from the
ordinary warrant which then was required to cover the costs of maintenance of
those ships that were not in commission, the ordinary wages of shipkeepers,
watermen, clerks, storekeepers and others at various shore establishments,
such as the Keeper of the Plug in the dry-dock at Deptford. Any expenditure in
excess of the ordinary had to be funded by ‘extraordinary warrants’ and this
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would cover sea charges, such as the expenditure of readying the ships for sea
and maintaining them at sea, and new construction.

The Navy’s account books, the Quarter Books, were maintained by the
Treasurer of the Navy and were divided into quarters with each quarter
subdivided into headings for each naval installation. The accounts for each
installation were divided into ‘Ordinary’ and ‘Extra-ordinary’. In the later years of
Henry VIII’s reign each page of the quarter books was signed by the
Comptroller and the Clerk of Ships, but in Elizabethan times the Surveyor of
Ships was also required to sign each page (Glasgow, 1970, p. 20). The
Treasurer’s annual declared accounts, which provide the central record of naval
expenditure, were summaries of these Quarter Books (his ’ledgier’) (Adams,
1990, p. 98).

On the death of Robert Legge in 1548, Benjamin Gonson, the son of William
Gonson was appointed the Treasurer of the Navy, although his patent of
appointment was not issued until July 1549 (Loades, 1992, p. 151). He was
succeeded by his son-in-law John Hawkins (or ‘Hawkyns’) whose patent of
appointment was issued in November 1577 and who was to become the
dominant figure in English naval administration (Rodger, 2005, p. 331).
Accordingly, mention of the two financial agreements he made with the Crown
in 1579 and 1585 is warranted. These agreements, known as the ‘Bargains’,
were designed to reduce the level of ordinary expenditure and by doing so
reduce the need for extraordinary warrants, but they were the source of
argument and cross accusations of corruption, a not unusual event in the those
years.
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The first Bargain consisted of two specific fixed-price contracts with the Crown,
the first contract of £1,200 per annum being with Hawkins himself covering the
maintenance of the fleet moorings, and the second for £1,000 per annum being
with shipwrights, Baker, Pett and Chapman (Rodger, 2005, p. 333)111, for the
regular maintenance of the ships hulls (the grounding and re-caulking). The
contract sums were to be paid from the Ordinary but free from accounting to the
Exchequer and, being set at levels that were less than the average annual
expenditure on these maintenance items, would bring economies to the Navy.
The work itself was subject to survey by the Council for Marine Causes.

The second Bargain, a maintenance contract, was for any savings from the
ordinary expenditure that Hawkins achieved being specifically allocated “every
year to do such reparations as shall be needful, either in making of a new ship,
repairing in dry dock, or any way otherwise that shall be needful, so that the full
number be kept as they are now at this present. If any ship be decayed, another
to be put new in her place, of like length and breadth, sufficiently builded” (NRS:
Vol.1, p. 335). This would seem to indicate that Hawkins was required to keep
the ships, boats and the infrastructure of the Navy in good order and it was
necessary that this requirement be fulfilled before any savings could be
determined. That is, he was not permitted to bolster the savings by cutting back
on the “ordinary”. This requirement was to have been surveyed by skilled
individuals who were also required to submit their recommendations as to the
work required to be carried out in the subsequent year. Both contracts were to
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last during pleasure and included the unusual provision that they were to be
free from accounting to the Exchequer. Overall, the aim of the contracts was to
achieve substantial economies in ordinary expenditure and in doing so reduce
the need for extraordinary warrants (Adams, 1990, p. 100). Unexpectedly, the
war with Spain intervened and as a consequence the bargain was never
accomplished. The contracts entered into were typical of “an age when officials
like (Hawkins) were not salaried civil servants so much as privileged contractors
with an ill-regulated business relationship with the Crown. They were expected
to make a profit for themselves while doing a good job for the queen, preferably
at less cost than their predecessors” (Rodger, 2005, p. 332).

At the time of Edward VI, the Treasurer of the Navy received money on a
piecemeal basis and from a variety of departments as well as the Exchequer. In
the declared accounts of Benjamin Gonson for the period 1548-51, it is shown
that he received money from various sources other than the Exchequer,
including the Mints, the Treasurer of the First Fruits and Tenths, the Scottish
wars treasurer, and the Court of Wards and Liveries. As well as these “ready
money receipts” there were the proceeds from the sale of “sundry prizes and
rowbarges”. Against the “summa totalis of all and singular receipts” (the
“charge” of £66,821/10/2), “the said accountant is allowed the clear and ready
money by him paid and defrayed” (including wages, imprests, and the “divers
and sundry charges incident and appertaining to the said marine causes”
(£61,250/14/3) plus the old debts that were outstanding at the date of the death
of Gonson’s predecessor, Robert Legge (£5,606/11/3 so arriving at a total
discharge of £66,857/5/6) resulted in Gonson being “in superplusage”
(£35/15/4) at the end of the period (NRS, Vol. 157, pp. 146-169). This amount
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was added to the charges allowed him in his next account. On the other hand, if
the charge had been greater than the discharge then Gonson would have been
in debt to the Crown for the difference. Gonson was required to enter into “one
great ledger or pay book “the particularities of all of the said charges” with every
page being “subscribed with the hands of three of the officers of the said marine
causes” (NRS: Vol.157, p. 149). The declared accounts were subject to audit,
the auditors signing them beneath the closing balance.

With the exception of this structural change, “the Navy Board continued
throughout Elizabeth’s reign in what was by then its established course (with)
the Treasurer of the Navy (presiding) at the Board’s collective meetings, as the
representative of the Lord Treasurer” (Rodger, 2005, p. 331). In addition to the
corporate business transacted at these meetings the four Principal Officers also
had departmental business to attend to. The Navy Treasurer was charged
firstly, with the preparation of the estimates of expenditure and obtaining the
requisite funds from the Lord Treasurer, and, secondly with the presentation of
the annual accounts of the Navy for audit in the Exchequer. As well as these
established duties there were also those duties that the Lord High Admiral of
the day was accustomed to promulgate by way of formal instructions and these
have been referred to above.

In 1671 a change was made in the status of the Navy Treasurer when James
issued a revised set of the instructions which had been issued in 1662. These
instructions clearly defined his status as that of a member of the Navy Board but
this effort to curtail his independence failed for he continued to work physically
apart from the Navy Board. By the late 18th century, the office of Navy Treasurer
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was political and changed with a change in ministry. The Third Report of the
Commission appointed to Examine, Take, and State the Public Accounts of the
Kingdom (“Commission of Accounts”) of March 1781 was concerned with the
great delay in the rendering of the accounts of the Treasurers of the Navy. At
that time the office of the Treasurer was divided into three branches, the
Paymasters, the Cashiers, and the Victualling. The Navy Treasurer was
personally accountable for all money he drew down from the Exchequer. Large
sums were constantly in his hands but the situation on his leaving office was
most unusual. At that time he retained possession of the balance and while in
possession payments continued to be paid from it until his accounts were finally
made up. When the Third Report was prepared there were five ex-Treasurers
one of whom had a balance dating back to 1689. This situation had come about
through the need for personal accountability.
The Accounts of the Treasurers of the Navy are made up and passed
as they come in course in order of Time; the Officers must finish One
Year before they begin upon another, and a subsequent Treasurer’s
Account is never finished till his Predecessor’s is finally closed (Third
Report of Commission of Accounts, 1781, p. 30)
It was explained that the delay in rendering the accounts had arisen because
there were numerous sub-accountants who held imprest balances in all parts of
the world and their clearance took time, and because only one Treasurer could
pay on one ship’s books. Payments to seamen of their wages were entered in a
ship’s books which formed the voucher for the Treasurer who made payment.
Until the books were closed the Treasurer’s accounts could not be audited for
want of these essential vouchers. With ships absent for lengthy periods it was
impossible for the relevant ship’s books to be closed unless the names of the
seamen not paid were removed from the original ship’s book and entered into a
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new book which as the Commissioners described was “a Work of great Labour
and Length of Time” (Binney, 1958, p. 144). The money that remained in the
hands of the ex-treasurers had been available for their own use and this
situation quickly engaged the negative attention of the Commissioners. Based
on the findings in the Third Report, the Commons in June 1782 resolved that
any such money held by the Paymaster General of His Majesty’s Land Forces,
and the Treasurer of the Navy could not be applied “to any purpose of
Advantage or Interest to themselves either directly or indirectly” (Tenth Report
of the Commissioners of Naval Enquiry (BPP, 1805(21), p. 129)).

In 1785, based on the Eighth Report of the Commission of Accounts which
concerned The Manner of passing the Accounts of the Treasurer of the Navy, in
the Office of the Auditors of the Imprest, Parliament introduced an “Act for better
regulating the Office of the Treasurer of his Majesty’s Navy” 1785 (25 Geo. III)
c. 31. In 1807, 1807, 1817, and 1821112 various changes were made by
Parliament in regard to this matter but in 1830 the Treasurer of the Navy Act,
1830 (11 Geo. IV & 1 Will. IV) c. 42 was passed, it being considered necessarily
“expedient to revise, amend, and reduce into One Act the Laws relating to the
Office of Treasurer of His Majesty’s Navy”. This consolidating Act concerned
matters of procedure that carefully stipulated the manner in which the Treasurer
was to operate his office.
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A further matter that was reported upon in the Eighth Report of the Commission
of Accounts was that the Treasurers accounts were to be signed by three
Commissioners of the Navy and, on the authority of these signatures the
Auditor of the Imprest approved the accounts without examining any vouchers.
The auditor did this in pursuance of a Writ of Privy Seal which the Treasurer
procured soon after appointment. The Tenth Report of Naval Enquiry also
succinctly described the position of the Treasurer of the Navy. The Treasurer
was appointed by patent but he did not perform in person any of the official
duties of his situation. He nominated and appointed the Paymaster to whom he
delegated the whole charge and conduct of the office by a power of attorney. In
November 1830, the office of Paymaster was abolished by the Tories under
Wellington which is surprising for by that time the office of Treasurer of the Navy
had become a sinecure. Although the Whig appointee to the position, Charles
Poulett Thomson, complained in Parliament that this necessitated the Treasurer
performing tasks that had been carried out by the Paymaster, it obviously did
create too many problems for him as he also held the position of Vice President
of the Board of Trade, a junior ministerial position.

On the abolition of the Navy and Victualling Boards in 1832 both the position of
the Treasurer of the Navy and the Navy Pay Office were retained but in 1835
the office of the Treasurer of the Navy was abolished by the Paymaster General
Act, 1835 (5 & 6 Will. IV). c. 35 along with that of the Paymaster-General of the
Forces, Treasurer of the Ordnance, and the Treasurer of the Royal Hospital at
Chelsea.
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5.5 Conclusion
To remain viable, efficient and effective the Navy required finance and in large
quantities and it is in this chapter that the administration of its finance has been
examined, with particular emphasis on the estimating of its expenditure. With
the Glorious Revolution came Parliament’s tentative initiation into the control of
expenditure but, with the exception of a few services of a civil character, control
was limited to the Army, Navy and Ordnance. Estimates were prepared and laid
before the Commons and upon these estimates the Commons vote an amount
for each service. For the Navy the voting of only a single amount for the whole
of the service was to remain unchanged until 1798. Another matter examined in
this chapter was the manner in which the Navy circumvented Parliament’s
parsimony, planned or otherwise, through debt but it was an expensive and
corrupting means of financing the Navy and its operations. Having voted the
funds to the Navy it was necessary to ascertain that the correct sums had been
issued by the Exchequer. This information came with the introduction in 1802 of
the Finance Accounts but as Welby said in his paper, these accounts did not
provide information as to how the funds had been actually expended. This said
Welby “was the great blot on (the British) financial system” (BPP 1902(387)
App. 13, p. 228). There is no argument with this opinion but to change the
financial system and report upon expenditure in such detail required that the
Navy’s accounting system be reformed by the adoption of DEB. The dynamics
of the required reform of the Navy’s accounting system are discussed in the
next two chapters,
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Chapter 6
The Dynamics of Reform of the Navy’s Central
Accounting System
Part 1: B&B’s System
6.1 Introduction113
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the DEB-based accounting system
which was recommended by B&B and approved by the Lords Commissioners of
the Treasury in July 1829. This system is numbered 5 on the following list that
was compiled by B&B of the systems available to the Navy Office and which are
shown in B&B’s Second Report dated 24 December 1829 (BPP 1831(50), p.
12). The systems, numbers 2, 3 and 4 are systems with which Deas Thomson
was involved and these are examined in Chapter 7.
1. The official system in use as at 1 January 1826 which was based
upon CAD;
2. the official system but with some improvements , including the
addition of an ‘abstract ledger’;
3. the system developed within the Navy Office under the direction
of Deas Thomson which was based upon DEB;
4. Deas Thomson’s amended system 3; and
5. the system recommended by B&B and approved by the Board of
Treasury which was based upon DEB.

The examination of B&B’s system commences with a review of the appointment
in 1828 of the Treasury Commission of Public Accounts. After many years in
which the existing systems of government accounting had been strongly
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261

criticised, the government was shamed into appointing a Select Committee of
Finance in 1828 to review the situation. Led by Parnell and consisting of
prominent members of the Commons the Committee recommended that the
public accounts should be based upon DEB and as a consequence the Lords
Commissioners of the Treasury appointed a Commission consisting of B&B and
Abbott to enquire into this important matter. Following their reviews of the
existing systems in various departments, including the Navy, the Commission,
wracked by dissension, issued one report prepared by B&B and a series of
reports prepared by Abbott. The Commissioners, however, were unanimous
that the CAD-based systems in use should be replaced by DEB-based systems
but disagreed on whether the new systems should use cash or accrual
accounting.

The system recommended by B&B was selected by Treasury in July 1829 but
the installation of the system in the selected departments was suspended in
December 1830 and finally abandoned with the selection in 1832 of Deas
Thomson’s system for adoption by the Admiralty.

6.2 The Treasury Commission of Public Accounts
In his letter of 7 July 1840 to Francis Baring, then Chancellor of the Exchequer,
Parnell advised that in February that year he had sent to Robert Gordon, the
Financial Secretary of the Treasury, a memorandum in regard to DEB in the
public sector with a request that he place it before Baring. Parnell stated that
the object of his original communication was to highlight the little progress that
had been made in introducing DEB within the public departments (TNA: T
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64/395). In both his letter of transmission and memorandum Parnell expressed
his obvious frustration with the lack of progress in the conversion to DEB as it
was twelve years since the 1828 Finance Committee had recommended the
system to Treasury. He sarcastically commented that unless steps were taken
for “vigorously forcing forward the work of establishing the Double Entry System
in every one of the Public Departments” a further twelve or even twenty-four
years will have passed (TNA:T 64/395). Parnell also reminded Baring that the
Committee had been composed of the highest financial authorities, Robert Peel,
William Huskisson, George Tierney, Alexander Baring and John Herries, all of
whom had agreed with the need for expediency in the replacement of the
existing accounting systems with ones based upon the principles of DEB (TNA:
T 64/395).

The appointment of the 1828 Finance Committee had been instigated by a
number of individuals of whom Herries was perhaps the most influential.
Following a banking crisis in 1825-1826, he had prepared a paper in 1827 in
which he described a recovery plan which included revisions to the hallowed
Sinking Fund, he being opposed to it in its then existing form, the retrenchment
of expenditure (for example, the abandonment of the settlements in west
Africa), and the appointment of a Common’s Finance Committee to assist the
government in overcoming the foreseen difficulties in convincing the public that
every possible saving in expenditure had been accomplished through the
retrenchments that had been made.
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To do the work most effectually and most satisfactorily, both for the
Government and the Public, a Committee of the House of Commons
would perhaps be the fittest instrument. If a Committee were
appointed to enquire into and report upon the whole of our public
expenditure ... they might, if well constituted and well managed, be
made the means of effecting some reformation and some savings,
which are not only desirable, but now almost indispensable; and they
would raise up a barrier against the unreasonable attacks and absurd
clamour which are now directed against every branch and degree of
expenditure, however legitimate and indispensable (Herries, 1880
Vol.1, pp. 143-144).
The appointment of the Finance Committee was announced on 7 May 1827 by
the Prime Minister, George Canning, as one of the measures for the 1828
session. Canning’s death, however, delayed the motion, which the succeeding
administration muddled. The administration which ultimately recommended the
Finance Committee to the Commons was headed by the Duke of Wellington
(Bonner-Smith, 1945, p. 156). Its composition was to have a serious effect
upon the cabinet of Lord Goderich (P.M. August 1827 - January 1828) (Herries,
Vol.1, 1880, p. 145) for in late 1827, following Herries appointment as
Chancellor of the Exchequer in September that year, there was considerable
debate over the appointment of the chairman of the forthcoming Finance
Committee. Lord Althorp, one of the leading non-coalition Whigs, had been
nominated by Goderich and William Huskisson but this was not acceptable to
Herries. His vehement opposition led to the dissolution of Goderich’s
government which was replaced by one formed by Wellington in which Herries
was appointed to the cabinet as Master of the Royal Mint (Jupp, 2004).

At the beginning of the 1828 session of Parliament, the Finance Committee
was appointed with Parnell in the chair while Herries was entrusted with the
management of its business on behalf of the government (Herries, Vol.2, 1880,
p. 91). The work of the Finance Committee, although very useful, was not
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completed. Only four reports were presented in the course of the 1828 Session:
the first report merely conveyed a six-line recommendation in regard to the
Sinking Fund (BPP 1828(110); the second examined the Ordnance Estimates
(BPP 1828(420)); the third dealt with the subjects of military and naval half-pay,
civil superannuation, and diplomatic pensions (BPP 1828(420)); and the fourth
examined revenue, expenditure and debt, and included an acclaimed
statement by Herries on the country’s finances (BPP 1828(519)). The
Committee’s second report which is of major interest to this study, sets out the
essential measures the Committee considered necessary to give full effect to
their proposals in the pursuit of the objects of reform and retrenchment. A major
object they considered was how to secure “a clear and uniform System of
Accounts in all of the Offices” (BPP 1828(420), p. 5). However, because the
members were not sufficiently acquainted with the various accounting systems
then in use across the departments, the Finance Committee was unable to
make any progress in this matter. Fortuitously, their difficulties were overcome
with the appointment by Treasury of the Commission of Public Accounts (BPP
1828(420), pp. 5-6).

The Parliamentary Session ended in July 1828 and it was unfortunate that the
Finance Committee was not reappointed when the Commons met next.
Although the proceedings of the 1828 Finance Committee had been circulated
amongst its members, they were not laid before the Commons and, apparently,
they no longer exist114. However, in the debates in the House in regard to the
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There is a possibility that the papers were destroyed in the fire of 1834 along with the House
of Commons (Bonner-Smith, 1945, p. 154).
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bill to amend the laws relating to the civil departments of the Navy as tabled by
Graham115, he made a number of references to the papers which resulted in a
member of the Commons (John Croker who was the First Secretary of the
Admiralty) describing the evidence given before the Finance Committee as a
“sealed book to him” (Hansard, Third Series Vol. 10, February 1832, Cols. 765832). During the debate the “gallant Admiral (George Cockburn) (had) seemed
to insinuate” that as Graham had not been a member of the Finance Committee
he had no right to refer to the testimony given before the Finance Committee.
In his address, Graham however, “maintained that he was fully justified in
alluding to it, for though that evidence was not printed, it was in a form which
made it cognizable to every Member of Parliament and in a place in which
every Gentleman who then heard him could resort at pleasure” (Hansard, Third
Series Vol. 10, February 1832, Cols. 765-832).

Further on in his correspondence with Baring, Parnell entreated him to “not let
the (1840) session close without taking some steps for speedily establishing the
Double Entry System” (TNA: T 64/395). Parnell said that he had had
conversations with many interested persons, including leading members of the
Ultra-reform Party (TNA: T 64/395), who had indicated their support for a
reformation of the public accounts. Parnell trusted that such support and the
information contained in the copy of the memorandum forwarded to Baring
would induce him “to take the subject into (his) consideration and do something
to place beyond all doubt the completion of what has been going on so very
slowly during the last twelve years” (TNA: T 64/395).

115

To be known as the Admiralty Act.
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The 1828 Finance Committee was not the first Finance Committee which had
proposed a reform in government accounting. In 1819, in its Fifth Report in
regard to the Audit Office, the then Finance Committee had referred to a
difference of opinion that had arisen within the Audit Commission as to “the
mode of conducting business and holding boards”. This and the “whole of the
information (the Finance Committee had) received respecting the conduct of the
business of this office demonstrates in their opinion the necessity of a most
exact and comprehensive revision and reform of the whole system” (BPP
1819(539) (121), p. 122). As a result the Finance Committee had contended
that as government and commercial accounting requirements were so similar,
with the exception perhaps of the magnitude of some of the transactions, there
were no grounds for government not to utilise the mode of accounting as
advocated by the men of commerce (BPP 1819(539) (121), p. 122)116.

As a consequence of the ‘suggestion’ made by the 1828 Finance Committee, a
“Treasury Minute, dated 18th April 1828; - respecting appointment of a
Commission to inquire into the different modes of keeping the Public Accounts”
(Appendix 6.2) was made advising that the Lords Commissioners of the
Treasury concurred “in this suggestion, and are pleased to direct a Warrant to
be prepared, appointing Mr. T. C. Brooksbank of this office, Mr. Samuel Beltz,
of the Commissariat Department, and Mr. Peter Harris (sic) Abbott, to examine,
and to report upon this matter” (Appendix 6.2). Abbott replaced John Bowring

116

Gomes et.al. agrees: “As in other European countries, the use of DEB for mercantile
purposes, especially within large commercial establishments, provided evidence for key
decision makers of the techniques potential relevance to public administration (2008, p. 1145).
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who had been nominated to be a commissioner but whose appointment had
been curtailed by the Tory Prime Minister, the Duke of Wellington, who objected
to Bowring’s radical opinions (Parker, 1993, p. 72). The warrant was issued by
the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury on 29 April 1828 (Appendix 6.3) and
appointed, authorised and required the Treasury’s Commission to inquire into
and report upon the several matters recited therein. It appeared to the Lords
that such an enquiry
may tend to afford satisfactory information, and to a probable
improvement in the mode of keeping the public accounts in the Great
Departments controlling the Public Expenditure if two Persons of
experience in the mode of keeping the public accounts, together with
an Individual well acquainted with the system of keeping and stating
Mercantile Accounts, were appointed jointly to inquire into and state
the manner in which the Public Accounts are kept in the several
Principal Departments connected with the receipt and expenditure of
the money granted by Parliament for the Public Service, and to
ascertain the nature and description of the Books kept in each office
respectively, and to state the purpose for which each Book is kept,
and the nature of the information it is calculated to afford (BPP
1829(290) App. 1) (Appendix 6.2).
The Commissioners were also required
to offer such suggestions as may, after such Inquiry, appear to them
as tending to a more uniform system of keeping these Accounts, as
well as calculated to afford more satisfactory and ready information in
regard to the nature and the amount of the expenditure under each
particular Head of Service. And further, to consider how far it may
appear to be practicable and advantageous to employ the mercantile
system of Double Entry in the keeping of the Public Accounts, in
preference to the official system now in use. These are to appoint,
authorize and require you ... to inquire into and report upon the
several matters hereinbefore recited (BPP 1829(290), App. 1),
(Appendix 6.2).
It will be noted that in accordance with the stated requirements the
Commissioners were required only to carry out an enquiry and to report upon
their findings. They were not required to recommend a particular system but if
they had been so required it would have been necessary to report upon all the
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options available, including the in-house system of Deas Thomson. However,
without making any recommendations that consideration, including testing,
should be given to the alternate systems that were available as well as the
various modes of accounting such as cash versus accrual, B&B, independently
of Abbott, recommended their own system which was to lead to questions in the
Commons at a later date following its selection.

Although the Warrant referred to ‘Public Accounts’, it did not define or describe
the meaning of the word ‘accounts’. In the absence of a definition or description
of the word, it would have been assumed, at least by government staff
members such as B&B, that the term covered only cash accounts in
accordance with the then existing measurement basis used in government.
Indeed, for much of their discussion in connection with the accounting for the
grants to the Navy, B&B said that they had “confined themselves chiefly to the
Cash Accounts of the department, conceiving that to be the intention of the
Lords Commissioners of the Treasury”. However, they pointed out that the
transactions and concerns of the Navy “may be considered as involving the
subject-matter for Four kinds of Account” (BPP 1829(290), p. 26).

The first of the “Four kinds of Accounts” to be described by B&B was the cash
account which covered the usual cash transactions expected in a cash
accounting environment. The second, third and fourth types of account were
connected with stores: the second was described as an account confined to the
quantity of stores received and used during the year, and on hand at year end;
the third account was described as a mixed account showing both the quantity
and value of stores received and used during the year, and on hand at year end
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(BPP 1829(290), p. 26). The fourth account was more complex than the first
three and was to be used for stores manufactured or worked up for various
purposes, for example the manufacture of sails, iron products such as anchors,
and ropes and cables in the yards. This account combined the cost of stores
used with the direct costs such as labour and fuel (BPP 1829(290), p. 26).

It is apparent from their Report that B&B were obviously unsure as to the Lord’s
Commissioners of the Treasury meaning of ‘accounts’ and during their review
requested from the Lords a more precise statement of the latter’s requirements.
It is surprising then that in the subsequent section on Store Accounts in the
Summary of their Report they made distinct proposals as to which stores
accounts should be maintained by the departments in the absence of such a
statement. Firstly, they said, there should be records of stores received, issued
and on hand, exclusive of cost and, secondly, there should be records “of priced
Accounts of such of the stores as are not re-issued in the original state in which
they were purchased, but manufactured under the superintendence of the
Department into other articles” (BPP 1829(290), p. 93).

In proposing the second and the fourth of the accounts referred to above, B&B
were, in effect, contradicting their earlier statements regarding the need for
further directions from the Lords before progressing further in the area. A further
contradiction occurred when the proposal to have the second kind of account
(the records of the stores by quantities only) was not included in their Summary
of Proposed Regulations (which were their recommendations). The ‘mixed
account’, although not discussed earlier in the report as a proposal, was alluded
to in the ‘regulations’ whereby an annual valuation was to be made of the stock
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of important articles remaining in the stores. The account for manufactured
articles was recommended but would have required a separate journal and
ledger and, based on B&B’s use of the word ‘incurred’ and the apportionment of
items such as labour and rent that had been accounted for in a separate ledger,
it would appear they were advocating the use of accrual accounting. If that was
the case they would have been advocating a relaxation of their demands for
uniformity and universality in the accounting systems used throughout the public
departments. It was a discrepancy that Abbott highlighted. (BPP 1829(325), p.
144).

In B&B’s opinion “(u)pon the precise mode of regulating these books, it would
now be premature to decide and the question must be left for future
consideration” (BPP 1829 (290), p. 94). While the ‘lapses’ displayed by B&B
may indicate they were under pressure, it may also indicate that they did not
possess the requisite knowledge and experience in the areas of stores
accounting and management, which places a question mark over the value of
their Report.

In his report Abbott said that he found “it impossible to report upon the Store
Branch, until we shall have visited one of the Dock Yards, or more, if the system
under which the yards be not the same in all” (BPP 1829(325), p. 14). However,
it was his understanding that the Commissioners had been expected to offer
suggestions as to a plan of recording both the quantities and value of stores.
Accounting for stores, including stores manufactured, would have been a matter
of considerable importance to those advocating retrenchment, such as Parnell.
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As well as the Summary of Proposed Regulations included in their 1829 Report,
B&B also prepared an Outline of Regulations for facilitating the introduction of
the proposed plan of account, a copy of which was provided to Melville as a
briefing paper. This paper is more of a user manual containing as it does a
great deal more detail of the operation of B&B’s system in each of the various
branches within the three Navy offices. It also lists the number of staff in the
accountants’ branches by position description following consolidation of various
branches. A copy of this outline was filed as paper ‘C’ in the Entry book of
correspondence between the Commissioners of the Navy and Messrs,
Brooksbank and Beltz (T 92/153B).

6.3 Dissension between the Commissioners
By the time the Commissioners submitted their reports to the Lords
Commissioners of the Treasury, the relationship between B&B and Abbott had
all but broken down. The tone of a minute made by B&B on 22 May 1829
indicates that acrimony had arisen within the Commission and it steadily
increased as the work of the Commissioners progressed. The minute indicates
B&B’s concern that the Commission would not be successful unless certain
administrative procedures were followed by its members, in particular that
investigations should be carried out on a joint basis, that members should meet
regularly and that the proceedings of all meetings should be minuted (BPP
1830(159), App. (A)). As an attachment to this minute, Brooksbank prepared a
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memorandum in which he noted that Abbott had objected to the minute 117 but
had declined to record his dissent.

The breakdown in the relationship was illustrated by the contents of a
memorandum prepared following a meeting of the Commissioners on 7 January
1829 when Abbott was accused by B&B of, amongst other things, carrying “on
his proceedings alone” (BPP 1830(159), App.(B), p. 16). However the delicate
relationship was to sour badly upon B&B becoming aware that, after the
discovery in 1828 of the perpetration of some ‘very criminal irregularities’ over a
number of years by the first clerk at the Greenwich Hospital, Abbott had been
requested by the Commissioners of the Hospital to undertake an examination of
the accounts of the Hospital, as a consequence of which he had in late
1828/early 1829 superintended the introduction of a new accruals based DEB
accounting system. Abbott’s failure to advise B&B of this was to cause them
considerable anger as was the fact that they had not been apprised of the new
system by the Hospital’s Commissioners and only ascertained that it had been
implemented on a visit to the Hospital (BPP 1829(290), p. 101).

It is unsurprising that Abbott’s actions should have caused B&B such
indignation and engendered a sense of betrayal for, as they pointed out in their
Report, the expenditure of the Greenwich Hospital was connected with that of
the Navy and accordingly made “the Accounts of Greenwich Hospital a part of
(their) Report” (BPP 1829(290), p. 32). B&B criticised Abbott’s Greenwich
Hospital system as “being less simple, less secure against fraud, and less
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Brooksbank did not note the reason behind Abbott’s objection.
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capable of affording ready information, than is consistent with the Business, the
Duties and the Trusts of a Public Department of Government“ (Emphasis in the
original) (BPP 1829(290), p. 32). In the Summary of their Report their criticism
of Abbott’s Greenwich system was even sharper describing it as being
“complex, inconsistent, confused and obscure, and, as a necessary
consequence of those qualities, calculated to conceal from the view of his
superiors the fraud or negligence of a dishonest or indolent Accountant” (BPP
1829(290), p. 102). Although Abbott’s system, “framed upon the exact countinghouse model, and, of course, kept upon the principle of double entry” (BPP
1829(290), p.101) had been introduced at the Hospital before the system
recommended by B&B had been approved by the Board of Treasury by their
Treasury Minute of 14 July 1829 (BPP 1829(290), p. 18), it was to be replaced
by B&B’s system in accordance with that Minute (BPP 1830(159), p. 19).

As a result of these events, there occurred an almost total breakdown in
communication between B&B and Abbott and despite there being some
common ground in their accounting systems, B&B and Abbott worked
independently on different accounting systems. However, there was a
conference between the three on 6 January 1829 when Abbott “called upon
(B&B) ... for the purpose of inquiring when we should meet to compare our
views respecting the accounts in the several Public offices, which were to form
the subject of our Report” (BPP 1830(159), App. (B), p. 16). From the contents
of the Memorandum of 7 January 1829, prepared by B&B following this
conference, they were most annoyed at Abbott coming forward at such a late
stage and suggesting to them that they should allow him to have input to the
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report they had completed but not transmitted to the Lords Commissioners of
the Treasury. In writing to Abbott they reminded him
that in opposition to our frequent remonstrances, made not only
verbally, but expressed in our recorded minute of 22nd July last,
which we showed you at the time, and which we felt it necessary to
make, either to induce you to concur in it, attend our meetings and
co-operate with us in a regular manner, or that we might not
ultimately be considered as agreeing with you in your views in
respect of a separate inquiry, (to which, from our previous experience
of its inconveniences we saw strong objections); you still dissented
from us on that point, and have continued ever since to carry on your
proceedings alone; that you have not only done so as to inquiry itself,
but that you have actually prejudiced the most important question
referred for our joint consideration, and committed yourself upon your
individual responsibility in your professional character as a public
accountant, without considering what you owed to us as joint
Commissioners, by introducing a particular system of account, not
sanctioned by us, (and which we trust we have submitted good
reason in our Report for rejecting, as particularly incompatible with
the business of a Public office) into the department of the Greenwich
Hospital.
You could be surprised at this very late period, when you come to
compare your views with ours, to learn ... that we have finished our
Report, without your assistance (BPP 1830(159), p. 17).
Abbott, however, was not prepared to be thwarted in his attempts to have input
to the report being prepared by B&B, for on 14 January 1829 he had a
discussion with John Herries whom Abbott knew had an interest in the work of
the Commission. Abbott reported that Herries had said that “it was highly
desirable that a unanimous Report should be made; that delay was of less
importance; that he would see Messrs. Brooksbank & Beltz, and endeavour to
remove any impediment to the discussion I had solicited” (BPP 1830(159), p. 9).
As a consequence of Herries’ intervention Abbott had three meetings with B&B
in an attempt to be able to contribute to their Report but, on being advised by
Abbott that he had not completed his enquiries respecting the Army accounts,
B&B then had their Report printed in the absence of input from Abbott and
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forwarded it to the Treasury on 9 February 1829. It consists of four parts, three
of which concerned the accounts of the Navy, the Army, and the Ordnance,
while the fourth provides a general commentary (BPP 1829(290)). The first part,
in regard to the Navy, also describes the accounting systems within the
Victualling Office, the Paymaster of Marines, Greenwich Hospital, and the
Paymaster of Widow Pensions.

In response to B&B’s report, Abbott quickly submitted five separate reports
dated 28 February 1829, one for each of the Navy and Navy Pay Offices, the
Transport Office, the Paymaster of Marines, the Victualling Office, and the
Ordnance Department. Abbott also submitted a Memorial (sometimes referred
to as the ‘Memorandum’) that he addressed to B&B in regard to B&B’s
proposed ‘Plan of Keeping the Public Accounts’, together with B&B’s
observations in reply (BPP 1829(325)). As noted earlier, Abbott did not produce
a report on the Army, Abbott having advised B&B on 2 February 1829, just
seven days before B&B transmitted their Report to Treasury, that he had not
completed his enquiries on the Army and would require a considerable time
longer before he could send in his views on the subject (BPP 1830(159), p. 10).

The discord between B&B and Abbott would have been exacerbated by the
deceptive and erroneous statements Abbott made in his afore-mentioned
Memorandum dated 28 February 1829 in which he submitted comments in
regard to B&B’s system. This is exemplified by Paragraph IV in which he strongly
criticised B&B’s system as being a variation of the Italian method in name only in
that the only similarity was it required the ledger to be in balance. Immediately
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following, Abbott then misquotes three sentences from B&B’s report and then
goes on to make the following statement.
It is precisely for neglecting the fixed rules of men of account, and of
principles invariably applicable; it is for attempting to perpetuate the
system adopted by public offices, of acting upon plans framed to their
peculiar transactions that the official plan of account recommended
by Messrs. Brooksbank and Beltz, appears to me so reprehensible
(BPP 1829(325), p. 145).
In reply B&B made the following remarks.
We regret to be compelled to charge our colleague in this place with
having perverted the quotation he professes to make from the
passage in our Report (page 88) to which he alludes.
Besides altering some of the words, and leaving out others, he omits
altogether the concluding part of the passage, which leads to a
different construction than the one he chooses to put upon it. (BPP
1829(325), p. 145).
Although the system advocated by B&B was selected by the Lords
Commissioners of the Treasury on 29 July 1829, Abbott in November of that
year prepared a letter addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury,
“to place on record a vindication of that part of his conduct upon which his
colleagues had described in their Report” (BPP 1830(159), p. 2). In his letter,
Abbott expressed his “severe disappointment” that the Board of Treasury had
given preference to “a system of account which after the maturest consideration
appeared to (him) ill-adapted to promote the valuable purpose for which the
commission was appointed” (BPP 1830(159), p. 2). He could not
suppose (that) your Lordships would add to my mortification by
refusing me this opportunity of clearing my conduct from the
aspersions of Messrs. Brooksbank and Beltz, by a candid
explanation of every circumstance connected with our unfortunate
misunderstanding (BPP 1830(159), p. 2).
Abbott said he wanted to provide the Lords with a better understanding of the
controversial matters outlined and to allay the ‘wilful’ misrepresentations made
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in regard to other matters. He was concerned that the Lords would arrive at an
incorrect impression of the value of his work whilst a member of the
Commission (BPP 1830(159), p. 2). Further in his letter, Abbott mentioned that
the Lords “must be aware that great objections are entertained in several of the
public offices to the plan proposed by Messrs. Brooksbank and Beltz” (BPP
1830(159), p. 13). Abbott said this led him to the main object of his letter which
was not merely to vindicate his conduct in regard to the system at the
Greenwich Hospital, or to describe the working relationship between his
‘colleagues’ and himself, or to expose “the singular injustice that (he)
considered (himself) to have been treated”, but to “firmly and energetically to
enter this my final protest against the system invented by Messrs. Brooksbank
and Beltz” (BPP 1830(135), p. 13). B&B in reply observed that they were not
aware of any objections having been made about their system, except from the
Navy Office, in which “the objections urged are against “journalizing” and
“ledger keeping” and would apply with still greater force to Mr Abbott’s system”
(BPP 1830(159), p. 13), and the small department of the Paymaster of Marines
which objected to making any alteration to its existing system. Abbott’s ‘conduct
in the affair of the Greenwich Hospital’ was described in detail in the body of
B&B’s report and in the conclusion they described “seeing that Mr Abbott was
prejudging and taking measures, as evinced by his proceedings at Greenwich
Hospital, apart from us, upon the most material question for our joint
consideration” (BPP 1829(290), p. 114). The fact that the original Commission
had been split by his arrogant behaviour does not seem to have been
recognised nor remembered by Abbott in his attempts to advance his position
with the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury.
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The apparent preparedness of someone in government to arrange for the letter
to be printed by order of the Commons on 18 March 1830 is of considerable
interest. It is difficult to believe the printing would have been at the behest of
Treasury as it already had made its decision on which system was to be used
across the public service. Unless, of course, the printing of the letter together
with B&B’s observations was carried out somehow in support of Treasury’s
decision. Despite his very public dispute with B&B, Abbott still had considerable
standing within government and as seen from the commissions he was later to
receive from various public sector departments (for example the Departments of
Woods and Forests, and Excise) in regard to accounting matters. One such
supporter was Parnell whose words in the Commons, referred to earlier, and in
his book On Financial Reform strongly confirm his keen advocacy of the
‘mercantile system’ that was recommended by Abbott (Parnell, 1831, p. 166).

The high esteem Parnell held for Abbott is clearly evident in his reference to
Abbott in his book.
Mr Abbott’s proposal to establish the Italian or mercantile system in
all public offices deserves to have great weight with Government and
Parliament. As a professional mercantile accountant, he holds the
highest rank; and he has acquired a full knowledge of official
accounts by diligently making use of powers vested in him for
ascertaining the nature, description, and purpose of the several
books used in each office. He has stated in a memorandum
submitted by him to the Treasury, of the 28th of February 1829, that
for every hour passed by his colleagues Messrs Brooksbank and
Beltz in the offices in the examining the books of accounts, he had
passed twenty; and this statement was not contradicted in the
observations of these gentlemen on this memorandum (Parnell,
1831, p. 166).
B&B had already commented about Abbott’s supposed industry in their
observations about Abbott’s letter to the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury
of 27 November 1829, which he had written in order to enter a final protest
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against the system of account ‘invented’ by B&B. They referred to how it had
“been suggested in one of the more extensive departments, in which he says
he spent so many hours, that the estimate would be more correctly made by
inverse proportion” (BPP 1830(159), p. 14). It is possible though that Parnell
was of the opinion that Abbott’s rare accounting credentials and his strict
adherence to the mercantile system was far more important than his errors,
omissions and misstatements.
To those persons who are practically acquainted with the mercantile
system of accounts, the reasoning on which Mr Abbott founds his
opinion of its being applicable to all official accounts cannot fail to be
completely satisfactory (Parnell, 1831, p. 166).
Parnell’s strong support of Abbott himself is also commented upon by Edwards
in his paper when he refers to the possibility that Parnell may have intended to
have Abbott appointed as “some kind of accounting Czar” (2011, p. 227). As
can be seen above, Abbott had voiced a similar opinion regarding the need for
an individual to be appointed who would be responsible for the superintendence
of the expansion in the implementation of DEB across the British Government.

B&B also had strong allies, including Briggs, then Assistant Secretary of the
Victualling Board, who was highly critical of Abbott’s report on the future
accounts of the Victualling Office. He prepared two undated papers which
appear to have been written sometime between the issue of Abbott’s report and
Briggs being appointed secretary to Graham, the First Lord of the Admiralty,
that is between February 1829 and November 1830.118
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On the abolition of the Navy and Victualling Boards in 1832, Briggs was promoted to the
position of Accountant General of the Navy, in place of Deas Thomson (ODNB, 2004).
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In his first paper, entitled Accounts of the Victualling Office - Prefatory Remarks,
Briggs described the purpose behind the preparation of the paper.
The only object of this paper is to (point out) the imperfect knowledge
which Mr Abbott has acquired of the existing system in the Victualling
Office, judging by the fairest rule possible, namely that of the
accuracy of the description he has given of it in his report.
Without wanting to comment upon the grammatical accuracy of Mr
Abbott’s language here and in many parts of his Report, it may be
admitted that Mr Abbott did spend more time in the Victualling Office
than the other Gentlemen and therefore it is more surprising that his
report should be so full of mis-statements (scarcely a paragraph
being correct) and that the Report of the other gentlemen should be
the reverse (TNA: ADM 106/3510).
In his second paper, entitled Remarks to the 4th Part of Mr Abbott’s Report,
Briggs described errors made by Abbott, the first of which appeared on the first
page of the latter’s fourth report in the report’s heading, IV.-.Victualling Branch
of the Navy Office (sic). Briggs pointed out that “(u)pon this it is only necessary
to remark that the Victualling Office119 has been separated from the Navy Office
for one hundred and forty two years!!” (Exclamation in the original) (TNA: ADM
106/3510).

Briggs noted in the first paragraph of his report how Abbott incorrectly stated
that “the receipts and payments by pursers and agent victuallers are brought to
account in the Cash office; he should have said in the Imprest office”’.
Displeased by Abbott’s errors, Briggs went on to question, “(h)ow therefore can
Mr Abbott have formed a correct notion of the business of an Office, the detail
of which he is so little master of” (TNA: ADM 106/3510). This was exemplified
by Abbott’s statement that “(i)n the Victualling Office neither Cash book nor

119

The Victualling Office was also referred to as the ‘Victualling Branch; Victualling Department’.
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Ledger are at present kept” (BPP 1829(325), p. 94). Briggs could not leave such
a statement unanswered.
The impression which could not fail to be produced upon the mind of
anyone perusing this statement would naturally be this: that the
Victualling (and indeed that all Departments of Government) had
really, from time immemorial, never been in the habit of keeping an
account of their Receipts and Payments an assertion so truly
preposterous as to carry its own contradiction along with it. The thing
is absolutely impossible. Can it for a moment be supposed that any
government, receiving, expending, and accounting for the accurate
expenditure (to a farthing) of millions of money could possibly bring
to account their receipts and payments without a book or books in
which the monies received and expended are accurately recorded!
(Exclamation in the original) (TNA: ADM 106/3510)
Briggs pointed out that Victualling did have a “cash book” but it was known as
the “Account Current with the Treasurer of the Navy”.
It is probable from the very superficial manner in which Mr Abbott
appears to (have) made himself acquainted with the existing system
in the Department that he had no recollection of such a book.
Mr Abbott may be right in his opinion that the system should be
altered but while that alteration is not within the power of the
Victualling Department it is an unjust calumny upon those belonging
to it to use such an expression as that ‘of the necessity for a Cash
Book they do not seem to be aware’ as if really they were totally
ignorant of the common principles of accounts (TNA: ADM
106/3510).
With glaring fundamental errors, omissions and ‘mis-statements’ such as these,
together with Briggs’ criticisms of his work, Abbott would have quickly lost any
support that he may have garnered at the Victualling Board. This was clearly
confirmed when on 28 November 1829, the Admiralty sent to the Treasury a
copy of a report dated 10 November 1829 prepared by the Committee of
Accounts of the Victualling Board. This was sent in reply to the request received
by the Admiralty from the Treasury dated 10 November 1829 that required the
several naval departments to report upon the steps they had taken in respect to
the conversion to B&B’s system. The final paragraph in the Committee’s report
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made reference to the shortcomings in Abbott’s report, examples of which have
been described above.
The committee conceive that they cannot entirely omit to notice the
report made by the third Commissioner on Public Accounts (Mr. P.H.
Abbott), as it appears to have been printed by order of the House of
Commons; but as it has not been officially referred to consideration
of the Board, the committee have only to remark, that in describing
the system of accounts now in existence in this department, Mr
Abbott has fallen into numerous errors and mis-statements which will
be obvious to the Board on the perusal of the fourth part (sic) of his
report from page 93 to page 104 (BPP 1831(50), p. 36).
A comment regarding Abbott was made by Briggs in the concluding paragraphs
of his second paper and follows his earlier comments as to Abbott’s inaccuracy
in determining the number of books he could abolish with his proposed system.
Briggs warned:
It is not meant to be inferred that even the labour of one book ought
not to be saved, if it can be done with propriety – but the mode of
giving the comparison by Mr Abbott serves to shew the unfair
impression which he is desirous of making to the prejudice of a
Public Department, for the purpose of gaining credit in favour of his
own system (TNA: ADM 106/3510).
Despite any damage to Abbott’s character and credibility that he suffered at the
Victualling Office, Treasury employed him to make up the accounts for one year
based upon the principles of DEB for the Department of Woods and Forests in
1833. In 1833, he was invited by the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the
Department of Excise, which was chaired by Parnell, to assist them in their
enquiries into the Excise Accounts, it being the Commissioner’s opinion that they
would be unable to acquire a complete knowledge of this system without the
assistance of a professional accountant ((BPP 1835(12) (13) (14) (15), p. 1). The
Commissioners considered that Abbott possessed the requisite credentials of
such a position as he “was one of the Commissioners appointed by Treasury in
1828 to inquire into the public accounts” ((BPP 1835(12) (13) (14) (15), p. 1).
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From his enquiries Abbott recommended the use of DEB in Excise in a report, a
copy of which was passed to the Board of Excise for their comments. A number
of the Board’s comments were somewhat critical of Abbott’s statements and
suggestions and these were passed on to him in order to provide him with an
opportunity to vindicate himself. (BPP 1835(12) (13) (14) (15), p .2). Attached to
the comments received from the Board were observations by the two General
Accountants of Excise (Cottrell and Cooper) who quoted verbatim some of the
comments made by B&B in their first report in 1829 regarding the system
introduced by Abbott at the Greenwich Hospital. The following is an example of
the comments selected from B&B’s report.
(The system) is strictly conformable to the Italian, or mercantile
method, and appears to have been hastily adopted with reference to
the usages of counting houses, or from such models that are
contained in the elementary treatises on book-keeping, without a due
consideration of all the circumstances to be provided for, or guarded
against, in applying the system safely and usefully to the several
purposes of a public department having a large pecuniary trust (BPP
1835(12) (13) (14) (15), p. 216; BPP 1829(290), p. 102).
In support of the quotes reported, Cottrell and Cooper referred to the general
observations regarding DEB which were extracted from the work of a Mr.
Marshall in his work A Digest of all the Accounts relating to the Population,
Productions, Revenues, &c, in which he contends that “to apply (DEB)
indiscriminately is ridiculous, inasmuch as when it is not absolutely necessary, it
embarrasses, rather than explicates” (BPP 1835(12) (13) (14) (15), p. 217).
Cottrell and Cooper summarised their observations by advising that from a
perusal of these extracts “from persons so well qualified to form a correct
judgment, renders the adoption of DEB a measure of ‘problematical utility’” and
recommended that DEB should be tested in various areas of Excise before a
final conclusion as to its adoption was made (BPP 1835(12) (13) (14) (15), p.
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217). In reply Abbott advised the Commission that during his enquiry he had
found both ‘great’ defects in the existing system and opposition to DEB which
creates serious difficulties in making effectual improvements. He queried
whether Messrs. Cottrell and Cooper, the ‘official gentlemen’ in the Excise
review, had any practical acquaintance with DEB, for “if they had it is
inconceivable that they should exhibit that extraordinary antipathy to it which
(official gentlemen) invariably manifest” (BPP 1835(12) (13) (14) (15), p. 218).
Abbott went on to remind the Commission that it was for them
to determine whether the general impressions of Messrs. Cottrell and
Cooper, backed by the more decided opinion of the Treasury
Officers, Messrs. Brooksbank and Beltz, and reinforced by the Mr.
Marshall’s authority, (who, in all probability never surveyed a
Government office in his life,) overbalances the evidence in favour of
double entry (BPP 1835(12) (13) (14) (15), p. 219).
Abbott considered that Cottrell and Cooper’s reference to B&B was due to them
feeling themselves incompetent to hazard an opinion or fairly grapple with the
subject of double entry” with the result that they deferred “with a kind of
reverential humility, to the decision of Messrs. Brooksbank and Beltz, as if they
were judges of greater calibre than the principal accountants of the Board of
Excise. But having, on a former occasion, engaged in a controversy with
Messrs. Brooksbank and Beltz on the question before us, I shall not now
resume it” (BPP 1835(12) (13) (14) (15), p. 219)

These words were followed by a general statement in support of the principle of
double entry which would have been welcome to the supporters of DEB.
No reform of the public accounts of this country will give permanent
satisfaction, or preclude the necessity of continual patchwork of the
numerous varieties of a bad system, unless a new modelling of them
all on the principle of double entry – boldly and uniformly, but at the
same time judiciously, carefully, and under the superintendence of a
single supervisor- is adopted (BPP 1835(12) (13) (14) (15), p. 219).
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In concluding his letter he advised the Commission that he had not been
surprised at the tone of the Board of Excise and their officers. He would have
been surprised if the tone had been otherwise. As he said, almost in passing,
Reformers meet with little approbation from those who are to be
reformed; yet great establishments will rarely reform themselves
(BPP 1835(12) (13) (14) (15), p. 223).
Both Treasury and Parnell must have been pleased with Abbott’s performance
for in consequence of the Commission strongly recommending DEB the
Treasury employed Mr Abbott in 1837 to prepare the accounts of Excise for
(probably) 1836 using DEB. (TNA: T 64/395). Their pleasure would have been
heightened when Abbott, appearing before the Select Committee on the
Accounts of Colonial Receipt and Expenditure in June 1837, advised that the
introduction of DEB in Excise would result in estimated savings of £300,000 per
annum through the elimination of superfluous internal controls that would no
longer be required because of the controls inherent in double entry (BPP
1837(516), p. 131). As for the introduction of DEB across government, Abbott
was of the opinion that savings would eventually save in the vicinity of
£2,000,000 per annum in the administration of public affairs (BPP 1837(516), p.
132).

Although it is easy to question the government’s continuing commitment to
Abbott120 as a DEB accounting system consultant in the light of what many
would consider to be his unseemly and disingenuous behaviour, it is necessary

120

As a postscript, as if to confirm any doubts about his character and integrity, Abbott
disappeared from the public accounts stage when he absconded to Brussels in 1841 with,
allegedly, £82,196 (BPP 1850(440), p. 27) in his possession which he had collected in his
capacity as official assignee under the English Bankruptcy Act 1831 (Edwards, 2011, p. 227).
He was never brought to justice.
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to remember that at that time there was a dearth of individuals who possessed
the knowledge, the experience and the preparedness to offer DEB consulting
services to the government. Furthermore, the lack of government staff members
trained and experienced in DEB was a matter of some concern to Treasury, so
much so that consideration was given to the employment of such persons from
outside government (BPP 1831(50), p. 18). The adoption of DEB would have
presented the government with considerable savings, perhaps not at the level
described by Abbott, which raises questions as to why the incrementalism in
British government, the muddling through, was permitted to continue to
challenge Parnell’s quest for a total change to DEB-based accounting in
government.

6.4 B&B’s Report on the Public Accounts
6.4.1 ‘Part I: On the Accounts connected with the Navy Grants’
B&B’s report121 of 9 February 1829 consists of a number of parts, the first On
the Accounts connected with the Navy Grants comprising sections on the Navy
Office, Treasurer of the Navy, Victualling Office, Paymaster of Marines,
Greenwich Hospital, and the Paymaster of Widows Pensions, of which only the
first three sections have been considered in this study (BPP 1829(290)).

In the first part of their report B&B referred to their examination in 1828 of the
existing accounts of the Navy Office stating that it appeared to them that “they

121

The title of the report is: ”Report Of The Commissioners Appointed To Inquire Into And To
State The Mode Of Keeping The Official Accounts In The Principal Departments Connected
With The Receipts And Expenditure For The Public Service &c.”(BPP 1829(290)).
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had been modelled more for the purpose of checking the accounts of the
Treasurer of the Navy, than for affording any explanatory detail of the Naval
Expenditure” (BPP 1829(290), p. 18). As a consequence, the expenditure of the
Navy was required to be recorded under only a very few heads of expense.
Details of the amounts paid by way of bills were entered into a number of
registers, such as the ’60-day Bill Register’, and as a consequence it was
necessary to dissect these registers in order to extract more detailed
information on expenditure, a very tedious task122. A flowchart of the existing
‘official’ system (system 1 in B&B’s list in the Introduction to this chapter) based
on a review of the existing accounting system that was carried out by Deas
Thomson in 1825 is shown below at Figure 6.1.

122

The existing or ‘official’ system reflected the attitude of most members of the Navy Board to
accounting as portrayed by the words of Martin and Boyle in their letter of 17 November 1829 to
the Admiralty (BPP 1831(50), p. 40) which is discussed later in the Chapter.
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FIGURE 6.1
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As well as these comments in regard to the existing system, the first part of
B&B’s report on the Navy Office and the Treasurer of the Navy is comprised of
a variety of Prefatory Remarks and is similar to a statement of user
requirements in that it describes the basic building blocks B&B employed in the
development of their system, for example the need for uniformity in accounting
across the public sector and the maintenance of the concept of personal
accountability of office holders. Their system would continue to use cash
accounting with the methods and procedures within the systems then in use
being revised following the changeover from CAD to a strictly stewardship form
of DEB. The outcome was to be a “regular uniform System of Account” (BPP
1829(290), p. 111) with a core system which would be common to all
departments but able to be modified to meet the needs of the individual
departments if required and if approved by Treasury.

The requirement for ‘uniformity’ across the public departments had been
recognised over many years. A previous Commission for Public Accounts123 in
their Twelfth Report in 1784 had observed that,
uniformity in the Course and Modes of transacting the Business of
the Public ought to be introduced and pursued, as far as practicable,
in similar Offices; It causes the Intercourse between Offices
connected to be carried on with greater Ease and Expedition, and
facilitates the Means of acquiring official Knowledge to those Persons
who pass through the different Departments of the state to the higher
Stations of Administration (Commission for Public Accounts (1784)
Twelfth Report, pp. 26-27).

123

This was the Commission Appointed to Examine, Take, and State the Public Accounts of the
th
Kingdom. The 12 Report was “Relative to the Manner of passing the Accounts of the Treasurer
of the Ordnance, in the Office of the Auditors of the Imprest”.
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An example of the existing barriers to the requirement for a ‘general uniformity
of system’ was the lack of commonality of year-end close-off dates across
departments. As pointed out by B&B, unless commonality existed across the
board in such matters it would create insurmountable barriers to comparing
departmental accounts, the estimation of departmental funding requirements
and appropriation of those funds, and the preparation of the national accounts
(BPP 1829(290), p. 7). B&B noted that, while the systems in the various
departments
must depend in great measure upon the nature whether simple or
complex, of its pecuniary transactions ... there were certain fixed
principles, without which no system could be deemed to be solid or
effectual; that these indispensable qualities, applicable to the
Accounts of every Department, were accuracy, simplicity and
perspicuity: in addition ... there should exist a general uniformity of
system, a facility of examination, and a ready means of affording
information on every transaction the Accounts involved (Emphasis in
original) (BPP 1829(290), p. 4).
These words are very similar to those of the Select Committee on Regulations
to Control Branches of Public Expenditure which, in 1810 in their Fifth Report,
Part II: (Audit of Public Accounts), noted that “there is a total want of that
simplicity and uniformity so essential to regularity and despatch, which ought to
characterise a great system of Public Accounts” (BPP 1810(371-1), p. 23). The
last point made by B&B in regard to the affording of information to all users was
a matter of considerable controversy and will be discussed below.

B&B referred to the Italian/mercantile system of DEB, attributing to it the highest
value as it “affords, unquestionably, valuable facilities for unravelling and
elucidating complex or intricate Accounts” (BPP 1829(290), p. 5). They were of
the opinion, however, that “it may not be advisable to employ it in its exact
mercantile form, but in a manner (as will hereafter be explained) more
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immediately suited to the business and duties of the Offices of Government”
(BPP 1829(290), p. 5). B&B were of the opinion that “in each department, two
principal Books were indispensable for the purpose of registering and recording
its pecuniary concerns; viz. A Cash Book and a Ledger: the first for entering the
Receipts and Disbursements as they occur; and the latter for distributing and
classing those Receipts and Disbursements under distinct and proper heads”
which should be the same as those specified in the annual estimates (BPP
1829(290), p. 5). A major point of difference between B&B’s and Abbott’s
recommendations was that B&B recommended that a journal be used for all
transactions with the exception of those transactions entered in the cash book.
This would have resulted in the majority of transactions not being posted via the
journal. A further difference was that B&B’s postings to the ledger were to
include a narration instead of the usual short entry of the mercantile system, the
narration being designed to enable reports to be prepared quickly and at any
time by a public office as to the manner in which financial responsibility has
been discharged (Edwards et al., 2002, pp. 650-651)

Following their Prefatory Remarks, B&B described various aspects of the
existing administration of the Navy Office and the Treasurer of the Navy (BPP
1829(290), pp. 8-26), including the general duties, structure and accounting
practices. In their outline of the general duties of the Navy Office, they
described the Navy Board’s committee structure followed by a description of its
various departments (also referred to as ‘branches’) and the duties performed in
each of them (BPP 1829(290), pp. 8-26). A description of the progress of the
public money through the Navy Office, from the grant being made by
Parliament, the receipt of money from the Exchequer and to the payment of the
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Navy’s creditors, included a description of the role of Treasurer of the Navy in
those procedures. Figure 6.2 below is an abbreviated table showing the Navy
Estimates for 1828 based on tables prepared by B&B and included in their
report (BPP 1829(290), pp. 12-13) in order to provide a clearer view of the
Navy’s expenditure which includes that for Victualling and Transport Services.

£179,648

Public Dept re Navy
Public Dept re Victuall
HM Yards at Home
Wages in Yards
Timber & Materials
Pilotage, Salvage, Fees
Foreign Yards
Victualling Yards
Medical Establishment
RN College, School Arc
Wages: Vessels in Ord
Victuals: ditto
Hired Packets
Ship Bldg: Bombay, Bermuda

TOTAL VOTED
Key to above empowering authorities
1
Act of Parliament
2
Order in Council
3
Patent of Appoint
4
Order of Admiralty
5
Patent
6
Orders of Sec State
Orders of Treasury
7

259,000
278,800
727,121
£5,995,965

Summary
Navy
Victualling
Transport
Total voted
Non-effective
Total voted

Navy
Victualling
Victualling
Transports

Repairs, Improve Yards
Repairs, Cremil Point
Army Provisions
For Transports

£189,321

1,393,215
163,917 Navy
Victualling

Navy
Navy
Navy
Navy
Navy
Navy
Navy

Superann Others Navy
Superann Others Vict

2,132,212

Navy
Victualling
Navy
Navy
Navy
Navy
Navy
Victualling
Victualling
Navy
Navy
Victualling
Navy
Navy

1,2,4
1,2,4
Extra Estimate
4,5
4,5
7
1,5,6,7

£876,500
130,215
1,500
10,000
105,000
10,000
260,000

£1,579,500

Navy
Victualling

Departments

Half-pay Flag Officers
Superann Off & Widow
Bounty to Chaplains
Compassionate List
Widows Charity
Widows Marine Off
Greenwich Hospital

150,683
490,000
851,566
50,000
51,617
63,859
60,176
6,426
105,815
51,438
34,450
36,534

£955,500
624,000

Amounts

Wages
Victuals

Heads

181,321
8,000
259,000
278,800

132,380
31,537

876,500
130,215
1,500
10,000
105,000
10,000
260,000

143,199
36,448
150,683
490,000
981,000
50,000
51,617
72,326
60,176
6,426
105,815
51,438
34,450
36,534

£955,000
624,000

Amounts

-8,467

-£129,434

Sale old
stores

£5,995,965
£4,582,706
1,134,459
278,800
£5,995,965
£4,438,833
1,557,132
£5,995,965

181,321
8,000
259,000
278,800

132,380
31,537

876,500
130,215
1,500
10,000
105,000
10,000
260,000

143,199
36,449
150,683
490,000
851,566
50,000
51,617
63,859
60,176
6,426
105,815
51,438
34,450
36,534

$955,500
624,000

Total to be
voted

(to nearest £)
(Source: BPP 1829(290), pp.12-13)

Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective

Non-effective
Non-effective

Non-effective
Non-effective
Non-effective
Non-effective
Non-effective
Non-effective
Non-effective

Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective

Effective
Effective

Effective/Noneffective

Navy Estimates 1828 (as presented to Parliament)

1,2,3
2,4
2,4
1,2,4
1,2,4
2
1,4

Empowering
authorities
Wages & Victuals
1
2
Ordinary Estimate
3
3
2,4
2,4
5
1,2,4,5
2,4
2,4
2,4
2,4
2,4
2,4
4
4,5
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B&B’s description of the “General manner in which the Navy Expenditure is
defrayed” (BPP 1829(290), p. 14) included a table showing the course of naval
expenditure and provided further information as to the role of the Treasurer and
his cashiers in the issue and expenditure of the grants; it forms the basis of
Figure 6.3 below.
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FIGURE 6.3
Course of the Naval Expenditure in 1828
Wages to Seamen and Marines.
Full and Half-pay to
Commissioned and Warrant
Officers.
Wages to the Artificers in the
Dock-yards.
Chaplain’s Bounty.

1.Cashier for
wages in
London, and
by Pay-clerks
at the Ports

Officers Bills (when they draw) for
Full and Half-pay.
Prepayments of Half-pay
Remittances by Revenue Officers.
Pursers Bills for Monthly Pay to
Seamen.
Foreign Remove and Sick Tickets.
Remittances by Seamen.
Allotments by Seamen.
Discharge Tickets.

2. Cashier for
Officers Bills,
Ticket, and
Allotments,
etc.

Salaries, Pensions,
Compassionate Fund.
For Stores supplied, and for Work
done by Contract.
Pilotage, Packet Service,
Subsistence for distressed
Seamen.
Blockade Service.

As
Payments
for Naval
Services
Treasurer
of Navy

Transport
Services

To Naval Storekeepers at home
and abroad.
Paymaster of Marines.
Greenwich Hospital.
Lieutenant Governor. Naval
College.
Raising Men for His Majesty’s
Fleet.
Officers at Semaphores.
Contingencies at the Admiralty,
Navy Office, and Navy Pay Office.
Solicitor to the Admiralty.

For Victualling Services supplied
by Contract.
Imprests to Agents abroad and
Pursers for purchase of Stores.
Clerk of the Check for salaries at
the Yards, and wages to Artificers
and Labourers

Exchequer

Bills
drawn
by the
Navy
Board

3.Cashier for
Navy and
Victualling
General
Services to
Pay bills

Imprests

Bills
drawn
by the
Victual.
Board
(Source: BPP (1829) (290), p. 15)
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B&B also made note of a problem in regard to the payment of Seamen’s Wages
that was the cause of “extraordinary embarrassment to which the Public Service
was liable” and from which “inconveniences of the most serious kind” emanated
(BPP 1829(290), p. 15). This problem arose from the accounts of a Treasurer of
the Navy not being finally passed until all the payments on the books opened
during his ‘treasurership’ were completed. The problem of outstanding balances
held by accountants within the public service had been a problem for many
years but it was particularly acute in the Navy.

The next matter discussed by B&B in their report was “The manner in which the
Accounts of the Naval Expenditure are kept” (BPP 1829(290), p. 18). Together
with a description of the then existing system based upon CAD, B&B used a
tabular view to provide a description of the trial124 in-house DEB-based
accounting system developed by Deas Thomson (BPP 1829(290), p. 19)125.
B&B also compared Deas Thomson’s system with the existing system using
Statements of Naval Expenditure prepared under each system for the 1827
financial year (BPP 1829(290), p. 20) (Appendix 6.5). Although the comparison
brought to light a number of differences, it was apparent that the cause for most
of these was differences in classification of the expenditure items, a problem
that could be overcome by improved training. While B&B obviously were not
unduly concerned, they did recommend that the old system should not be
prematurely abandoned. They considered however that “a good comprehensive

124

In Appendix 19 to B&B’s report George Smith, the Secretary of the Navy Board, formally
advised B&B that Deas Thomson’s system was “experimental, and not finally sanctioned” (BPP
1829(290), App.19, p. 175).
125
Appendix 6.4 provides an excerpt from pages 18-21 of B&B’s Report in which these items
are described.
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Cash Account” (BPP 1829(290), p. 21) was required but because “the postings
to the ledger would be so simple, being only cash payments ... a Journal would
not be found necessary, except for the purpose of the Accounts rendered from
time to time by the Imprest Accountants, and of including such other entries,
besides those contained in the Cash Account, as may be necessary for winding
up the general transactions of the year” (Emphasis in original) (BPP 1829(290),
p. 21). This was a major difference between the systems of B&B and those of
Abbott and Deas Thomson.

In their examination of “(t)he manner in which the Accounts of the Naval
Expenditure are rendered, examined and audited”’ (BPP 1829(290), p. 21), B&B
initially described the accounts that the Treasurer of the Navy was required to
complete. As well as a monthly report, he was required, at the close of the year
(under the provisions of the Act, 1821 (1 & 2 Geo IV). c. 74), to remit
to the Navy Office a general Statement of his Account for the year
and a Certificate, containing the Totals only of his Receipts,
Payments and Balance, attested by him as to its correctness, to
which Statement and Certificate of the Treasurer a further Certificate,
signed by three Members of the Navy Board was to be subjoined,
“That the Account for the year has been duly examined and
compared with the vouchers, and all other necessary documents in
support thereof, and that the whole of the Receipts and Payments
therein exhibited and set forth are correct” (BPP 1829(290), p. 22).
This statement was then forwarded to the Audit Office where the Treasurer’s
account was passed pro forma, and the Certificate of Audit given. This section
of B&B’s report also covered various other returns which were prepared in the
Navy Office by the various other accountants including such diverse persons as
Naval Storekeepers, the Solicitor to the Admiralty and the Navy, and the
Housekeeper at the Navy Office (BPP 1829(290), pp. 22-23).
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The final matter covered in the first section of Part I of B&B’s Report was the
“information which the books will furnish”, about which B&B made only a few
comments of a general nature (BPP 1829(290), p. 24), and the “several
accounts involved in the Naval Expenditure” (BPP 1829(290), p. 26). At the
conclusion of their examination of matters pertaining to the Navy Office and the
Treasurer of the Navy, B&B then examined the Victualling Office under the
same heads (BPP 1829(290), pp. 27-29). The Victualling Office maintained both
cash and stores accounts which were used to account for the value and
quantity of stores purchased for, and consumed by, the various branches of the
Navy, and for stores consumed by other departments of government, by
merchant ships in times of distress, and occasionally by those of foreign
governments (BPP 1829(290), p. 28).

On examining the Treasurer of the Navy’s Account with the Victualling Board
and the Statement of Expenditure of the Board for 1827, B&B found, as at the
Navy Office, that the Treasurer’s account was based on actual cash outgoings
versus the use of the figure for bills issued in payment during the year. The
latter figure covered bills that, whilst registered, were not payable until the
following year. Again, B&B were of the opinion that the institution of a proper
cash book would alleviate this problem (BPP 1829(290), pp. 28-29).

Parts II and III of B&B’s report were concerned with the Army and the
Ordnance. Part IV provided the ‘General Commentary and proposed System of
Account’ which, inter alia, concerned the Navy’s accounts, the main concern of
this study (BPP 1829(290), pp. 87-114).
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6.4.2 ‘Part IV: A General Commentary and Proposed System of
Account’
Having laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury the information
they had collected on the Navy, Army and Ordnance departments separately,
B&B then submitted in the ‘4th Part’ of their Report A General Commentary and
Proposed System of Account (BPP 1829(290) pp. 87-114). The ‘proposed
system of account’ was a generic system that could be used in all public
departments of expenditure. In other words, it was to be ‘the core system’
across all the departments. Their work, they said, had enabled them to suggest
a uniform system of account in the place of the ‘various, complicated and
expensive’ modes then in use by incorporating various alterations that appeared
to them to be necessary for the maximisation of convenience and economy.
They had been able to identify “some very intelligible rules” that could be used
across the public service in
the introduction of AN UNIFORM SYSTEM OF ACCOUNT that would
combine the several advantages of universality, simplicity and
regularity, accessible to the understandings of Accountants of
ordinary talents, and providing every desirable check for ensuring
accuracy and expedition in the details of management, and for the
due dispensation of the Public Money (Emphasis in original) (BPP
1829(290), pp. 87-88).
With regard to the existing systems, B&B considered that the defects of these
systems could be traced to the absence of “fixed rules clearly defined and
generally applicable, for recording the pecuniary transactions” (BPP 1829(290),
p. 88), a requirement peculiar to the public service. Individuals engaged in
professions and industry outside the public service had available to them
accounting systems that had evolved within their particular profession or
industrial enterprise over many years. For example, the accounting systems
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used in a counting house was very different from that used by a manufacturer
due to the dissimilarity of the accounting and reporting requirements of these
two types of business, and accordingly the suggestion that they should use a
common accounting system was inappropriate. It was, however, a different
situation in the public service where, in the past, uniformity should have been
possible and certainly would have been advantageous to all departments
because the user requirements were very similar and the stakeholders, the
populace, had common constitutional concerns. Rather than taking advantage
of these similarities, amendments to the various systems in accordance with the
exigencies of the departments had been implemented instead through the use
of add-ons to the base systems. From their experience, B&B had concluded
that as a consequence the accounting systems had become “complex,
burthensome and expensive” to operate. It was their opinion that it would have
been more efficient and more effective to have re-designed the systems when it
had become obvious that the existing systems were no longer able to meet the
demands placed upon them or provide the information as the user requirements
changed. Once again, the essential truth of the words of the Commissioners of
Public Accounts in regard to the “(d)ifficulties that must forever attend the
introducing of Novelty of Form into ancient Offices” as per their Fifth Report had
been confirmed. B&B pointed out that the above practices resulted in a
profusion of control books with a variety of titles (some of them altogether
irrelevant to their contents) to be accumulated in place of a regular cash book,
journal, and ledger which, if properly set-up and used in accordance with clearly
defined procedures, would have sufficed (BPP 1829(290), p. 88).
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The consequence, described by B&B as the “great defect” (BPP 1829(239), p.
88), was the unnecessary use of repetition in recording identical transactions
which was resulted in not only of a great waste of labour and expense, but also
much obscurity and complication in the financial statements of the departments.
“The means of removing those inconveniences are from this statement
sufficiently apparent” (BPP 1829(290), p. 88). B&B then pointed out that
(t)he first and most material want is a systematic arrangement of the
general accounts ... specially devised for the use of the Public
Offices. The principles upon which accounts ought to be regulated
are ... in all cases the same. Simplicity of arrangement, and the
exclusion of everything unnecessary, or calculated to produce
mystery and obscurity, are indispensable for the due regulation of
accounts of all description (BPP 1829(290), p. 88).
B&B classified the accounts in the Navy Office by type, either cash or stores.
The stores accounts were, as the name implies, those accounts used solely
within the stores system but there was no transfer of data from these accounts
to the cash system. B&B recommended that for the cash business of a public
department four principal books were required: a cash book, a bill book, a
journal, and a ledger, together with subsidiary books into which the minute
details were to be entered.
The books should be kept upon the principle of DOUBLE ENTRY, so
as to furnish at all times when required, either for the purposes of
information, or to prove the correctness of the accounts and
proceedings, a satisfactory BALANCE SHEET (Emphasis in original)
(BPP 1829(290), p. 89).
However, while they were of the opinion that double entry could be used in
accounting systems across public departments and merchants, they considered
that it was “far from desirable that the exact mode of making the entries
observed in the counting-house should be followed in a Public Office” (BPP
1829(290), p. 89). They had based their system on cash accounting and did not
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consider that the counting house use of accrual accounting should be used in
the public departments. Abbott’s system, however, used accrual accounting
which was the first of the major differences between the two sets of
recommendations. Even though B&B’s system would use the same
bookkeeping system as that used by merchants, they were of the opinion that it
was far from desirable that the overall system used in the public service should
be exactly equivalent. For example,
(u)nder the Italian or Mercantile plan the entries in the Cash and
Waste Books are transcribed and technically arranged in the Journal,
and thence posted into the Ledger, where nothing more is shown
(besides the dates, amounts and references to the Book where the
particulars are detailed) than the titles of the accounts which form the
counterbalancing or double entries; and the Account is still further
involved in obscurity by the frequent us of the word “Sundries”, as
inclusive of two or more such titles (BPP 1829(290), p. 89).
B&B described this as the “short entry”’ (BPP 1829(290), pp. 90 & 96).
They went on to recommend that a
Public Office, which is continually called upon for information upon a
variety of subjects, should possess the readiest possible means of
furnishing that information; and to this end, the Ledger should be
made to contain a condensed, but more circumstantial detail of the
proceedings than is usually afforded under the mercantile system
(BPP 1829(290), p. 89).
This recommendation for ‘explanatory ledger entries’ was explicit evidence of
B&B’s commitment to personal accountability (Edwards et al., 2002, p. 651) but
it was also a major difference between the system proposed by them and that
proposed by Abbott. Abbott recommended that the Italian/mercantile system be
followed exactly whereby all entries in the books of original entry, namely the
waste book and the cash book, should be entered in the journal before being
posted to the ledger on the basis of the ‘short entry’. B&B’s recommendation
that there be a narration in a ledger posting would have overcome one of the
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criticisms of DEB in that it is necessary to refer back to the journal to obtain
details behind a ledger posting.

It would seem that B&B and Abbott were both right and wrong. B&B were
correct when they concluded that they could dispense with the journal for the
cash transactions of a department. As the majority of transactions posted to the
ledger would be cash receipts or cash payments, the cash book, as a book of
original entry, could act in a similar manner to a journal by which the receipts
and payments would be summarised at the end of, say, each day and those
totals posted to the ledger so reducing the workloads of the bookkeepers, an
eminently sensible method common in the accounting systems of today. A
journal would be necessary only for the postings in regard to the transactions of
the sub-accountants outside London, together with any non-cash postings to
the ledger such as adjustments between accounts, or the sale of stores to other
departments. In their observations about one of the matters discussed by
Abbott in his Memorandum to his reports, B&B acknowledged that their “journal
differs from that of Mr Abbott merely from its not containing a transcript of the
cash book, and the entries being made under appropriate columns instead of in
the technical forms being described” (BPP 1829(325), p. 141) by Abbott.

The cash book, described by B&B as ‘this most essential book’, was to be made
up of a ‘debtor’ page and a ‘creditor’ page, the former for debit transactions and
the latter for credit transactions which were to be entered in chronological order.
At the end of each week, the cash book was to be balanced and reconciled to
the bank account. At the start of the following week the entries were to be
posted to the ledger. B&B advised that these tasks could be performed on a
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more regular basis if considered necessary. A specimen of the cash book was
included in the appendix to the Summary of Proposed Regulations (referred to
below), although a number of example entries were repeated, together with
specimens of the journal and the ledger. B&B’s system was based on
completed transactions with no prospective transactions included.
This is an essential element in the arrangement of the Accounts of a
Public Department. Great confusion has hitherto arisen in the
Financial Statements, from the practice of blending together
prospective with the actual payments, and which will be altogether
avoided by strictly limiting the final Balance Sheet to the Receipts
and Payments within the year (BPP 1829(290), p. 91).
This was a major difference between the thinking of B&B, and that of Deas
Thomson.

The penultimate section of the final part of B&B’s Report of 9 February 1829
consisted of the Summary of Proposed Regulations126 (BPP 1829(290), p. 111113) which provided a synopsis of the new system. In this section B&B
described the introduction of a “complete system of official Bookkeeping, and
the rapid rendering, incorporation and auditing of the entire Accounts of the
Departments” (BPP 1829(290), p. 112) as being the most important of the
contemplated improvements. The ‘official bookkeeping’ was to employ DEB and
would utilise a cash book, journal, and ledger. Those components which were
common to the departmental accounting systems would be reviewed by
Treasury each year and revised where necessary to maintain the ‘uniform
system of account’ across the departments. Cash accounting was to be used
and the transactions would be brought to account on a weekly basis. Home
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In Part IV the Proposed Regulations are also referred to as the “principal Regulations” the
“principal Suggestions”, “proposed arrangements”, and “contemplated improvements”.
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sub-accountants would be required to remit their accounts also on a weekly
basis while those off-shore would be required to remit their accounts each
month. It would be necessary for these accounts to be examined immediately
upon receipt and posted to the ledger via the journal as soon as possible
thereafter. A balance sheet was to be prepared and submitted to Treasury each
month. In order to ascertain the cost of articles manufactured in-house, a
separate journal and ledger would be maintained and a stocktake of high value
items would be performed at the end of each financial year (BPP 1829(290), pp.
111-113). Figure 6.4 is a rendition of B&B’s accounting system derived from a
number of sources.

Journals

Dr. Sub-agents
personal a/c's
Cr. Receipt a/c's

Receipts by subagents other
than their
imprests

Dr. Heads exp.
Cr. Sub-agents
personal a/c's

Payments by
sub-agents

(Sources: BPP 1831(50), pp. 24-36; BPP 1829 (290), p.91; BPP 1829(325), pp.151-2)

Ledgers (3):
Service Accounts; Personal
Accounts; Nominal Accounts

Dr. Bills Payable
Cr. Treasurer's
Cash a/c

Prepare
postings to
Ledger a/c's

Dr. Paymaster
Imprest a/c *
Cr. Bills Payable

Advice from
sub-agents re
bills drawn prior
to arrival of bills

Agents draw
bills for services
and goods

Navy and Victualling

Dr. Heads exp.
Cr. Bills payable

Creditors
holding Bills
awaiting
payment

Paymaster draws
bills, enters details
in the Order Book
and prepares
Journal

Advice of
services and
goods received

Dr. Heads exp.
Cr. Paymaster
Imprest a/c*

Copy of Cash Book
together with Vouchers

Copy of Order Book
together with Vouchers

* A "Paymaster Imprest a/c " has been
utilised in this flowchart to accom m odate
paym ents by 60-day bills although such an
account was not m entioned by Victualling in
their progress report of 10 November 1829
(BPP 1831(50)pp. 24-36). On page 35 they
referred to 60-day bills and recommended
that these bills should no longer be used. As
no finality was reached in this m atter the
"Paym aster Im prest a/c" has been used
above in order to prevent the "blending
together prospective and actual payments
"so strictly lim iting the final Balance Sheet to
the Receipts and Expenditure within the
year". This was recom m ended by B&B in
their report BPP 1829(290), p.91 and
described in BPP 1829(325), pp.151-2,
Observation XVIII.

Cash Book
prepared using
actual pay'ts.

Cash Book
maintained by
the Treasurer of
the Navy

Details of monies received

Treasurer of the Navy

B&B's System
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FIGURE 6.4
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6.5 Observations by various parties in regard to B&B’s
approved system
6.5.1 Abbott’s observations and B&B’s in reply
In his Report (BPP 1829(325) on the Navy and Navy Pay Offices127, Abbott
listed seven ‘general defects' in their ‘old’ accounting systems. The first defect,
which was also highlighted by B&B, was the lack of a “comprehensive cash
book”, the installation of which Abbott said would correct many of the existing
defects in the system. Its absence, he said, led to the second defect, the
numerous books kept by the Treasurer. The treatment of sums ordered to be
paid but not paid, as if they had actually been paid which led to a constant
disagreement between the cash in the hands of the Treasurer and the balance
per books of the Navy Office was a further defect, as was the necessity for
large sums of money to be held by the sub-accountants to the Treasurer, and
the numerous fictitious checks and counter checks on the funds nominally at
the Treasurer’s disposal, all of which resulted in complexity and repetition. A
clear separation of the duties of the Navy Office from those of the Navy Pay
Office, and the labour intensive requirement that cash order forms be prepared
and attached to original bills and other documents as warrants for their
payment, were two other defects in the existing system (BPP 1829(325), pp. 34). Abbott summarised his general opinion of the existing system when he said
that it was,

127

As noted earlier, the five reports were: I - Navy and Navy Pay Offices; II - Transport Office; III
– Paymaster of Marines; IV – Victualling Office; V – Ordnance Departments.
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altogether disjointed, made up of many elaborate branches, but
without a trunk to which unite them. From the branches are collected,
at the expense of much labour, materials compiled on sheets of
paper into a result, called an Abstract; but to judge of the correctness
of the result there are no criteria (BPP 1829(325), p. 4).
B&B’s use of the journal whereby cash transactions would not be entered in this
book prior to them being posted to the ledger accounts, that is the cash book
acting as a book of original entry, was a very contentious issue with Abbott and,
as a consequence, in his report on the Navy and the Navy Pay Office, he paid
particular attention to justifying the requirement for a comprehensive journal.
Where a journal is employed, the motives, at the instant of the
inscription of each transaction, are recorded. A Journal, in this light is
most essential in a Public Department, where the heads of office are
frequently removed and replaced by other individuals; but it has
intrinsic properties in a perfect system of account, that are
disregarded, only, where they are not intimately known (BPP
1829(325), p. 4).
A journal may be written up from abstracts or returns, whilst the
subsidiary books are in use by other persons (BPP 1829(325), p. 4).
A Journal enables the ledger-keeper to correct errors that may creep
in, or to make alterations that may be needful in the accounts,
without having recourse to erasures or obliterations (BPP 1829(325),
p. 4).
A journal is certainly required in such circumstances but if the ledger-keeper is
also the person who maintains the journal then the correction of errors would be
fraught with problems of internal control. The ledger-keeper should be able to
initiate amendments to accounts but they should be approved by some other
approved officer before being posted to the ledger. Abbott had further to say
about the journal.
A Journal is most useful at the annual balancing of the Ledger (BPP
1829(325), p. 5).
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On the Italian system, the ledger is not posted from the cash book,
but from journal, because the entries of the cash book undergo
arrangement and condensation in the journal previous to their final
entry in the ledger (BPP 1829 (325), p. 147).
Referring to the ledger, Abbott described it as being the “Index of the Journal
and Cash Book” and the journal as being “the narrative of the transactions
recorded in the supplementary books”. Further on, he said that where a
“(j)ournal is employed, the motives, at the instant of the inscription of each
transaction, are recorded” (BPP 1829(325), p. 4). However, Abbott was being
pedantic for if supporting documents existed then repeating this information in
the narrative would be a waste of resources as it would be if every entry in the
cash book was to be repeated in the journal as he proposed. In the latter case
the ‘motives’ would have been recorded at the time of the entry in the cash
book, not when the same information was entered in the journal. Abbott went on
to say that “a journal ... may be written up from abstracts or returns”, but so too
could the ledger.

It was noted earlier that Abbott had submitted, together with his five reports, a
Memorial (also referred as the ‘Memorandum’) On the Plan of Keeping the
Public Accounts, proposed by Messrs. Brooksbank and Beltz, in their Report to
the Right honourable the Lords of the Treasury (BPP 1829(325), pp. 143-155).
The Memorial deals with 23 observations made by Abbott together with the
observations of B&B in reply to each of them. There were two major matters in
the Memorial that Abbott was particularly disparaging about and it would have
been of no surprise that one of the matters concerned the failure of B&B’s
system to require cash transactions to be posted to the ledger through the
medium of the journal. “In the mercantile system the journal is the narrative of
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every transaction, and the ledger a brief summary of this narrative. In the
system of Messrs. Brooksbank and Beltz, the journal is, in fact, not a journal; it
is chiefly a transcript of accounts current rendered by sub-accountants” (BPP
1829(325), p. 146). In rebuttal, B&B observed, “our journal differs from that of
Mr Abbott merely from its not containing a transcript of the cashbook” (BPP
1831(50), p. 17) for the cashbook in their system was to act as a book of
original entry. In regard to B&B’s recommendation that the ledger postings
should contain sufficient description in order for the ledger to fulfil the reporting
requirements of the system, they were not advocating that this would apply to
the cash postings. It would have applied to other postings for which a journal
entry had been prepared, but it would have been better if they had
recommended that a journal voucher containing the supporting background
information instead of it forming part of the ledger posting itself, be prepared
and separately filed.

The other matter that Abbott was particularly disparaging about was the use by
B&B of cash accounting versus Abbott’s use of accrual accounting. His first
mention that this was the measurement basis he recommended was when he
said in his report that
(b)alancing books is not confined to an agreement of the cash; the
correctness of every other book is ascertained by a general balance
of the Ledger, and the correct balancing of books kept by double
entry must include, not only the money the money actually expended,
but also the liabilities of the establishment, and this I conceive to be a
very essential point (BPP 1829(325), p. 5).
The recommendation by Abbott of the use of accrual accounting would have
been expected by B&B as this was the type of system that he had installed at
Greenwich Hospital.

311

Abbott summarised his views of B&B’s system in his letter of 18 December
1829 to the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury. The “main object” of his
letter was to
firmly and energetically ... enter this final protest against the system
of account invented by Messrs. B&B ... though there may be various
modifications of mercantile double entry, such a system as that
recommended by (them) does not deserve the name. If they consider
it a mere modification of mercantile double entry, I cannot, I must not
be considered as concurring with those gentlemen in any such view.
It is a faint imitation, I had almost said counterfeit, of the mercantile
system, stripped of all its substantial advantages, and, therefore, it
can lead to no good result, if introduced into the public offices. In fact,
I venture to predict its thorough impracticability, unless it be most
extensively modified; and that if attempted in its original shape, it
must ultimately be abandoned (BPP 1830(159), p. 13).
Abbott objected to B&B’s system on other grounds, such as the abandonment
of the “compendious principle of the Italian method” (BPP 1829(325), p. 148)
which was concerned with the amount of supporting information that should be
shown in each ledger posting. As was discussed above, as a consequence of
their support of ‘personal accountability’, B&B had recommended that a
“detailed” or “explanatory” entry should be made to enable reports for outside
parties, notably the Parliament, to be quickly prepared “and to this end the
Ledger should be made to contain a condensed, but more circumstantial detail
of the proceedings than is usually afforded under the mercantile system” (BPP
1829(290), p. 89) in which the short-entry is normally used. Further on in the
Report, however, B&B allowed an exception whereby if the volume of weekly
transactions of a sub-accountant was to create excessively large detailed
postings to his personal ledger account, then under such circumstances
aggregates could be posted from the journal (BPP 1829(290), p. 120).
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In summary, of the matters criticised by Abbott, while some were of substance
and worthy of argument, there were others that appear almost frivolous in their
content and, together with his arrogance, his use of emotive language and
displays of paranoia, make his case appear weak and lacking in substance.

6.5.2 Parnell’s observations
Parnell was of the opinion that B&B had been given too narrow a brief by the
Lords Commissioners of the Treasury. Parnell recognised that B&B were
empowered to make “inquiries” and to make “such suggestions’’ that were
directed primarily to the introduction of a more uniform system of accounts for
expenditure within the public service. The Commission of B&B, and Abbott,
required that their suggestions would be developed after taking into
consideration the need for readily available accounting reports that provided
details of expenditure under each head, and the possibility of employing DEB.
From Parnell’s perspective this was too limited. He considered that
unless the constitution and organization of the great departments,
and the classification of the business of them, are, in the first
instance, revised and new modelled, according to some uniform and
simple principle, no attempt can succeed that may be made to
establish an uniform, accurate, and perspicuous system of public
accounts (Parnell, 1831, p. 162).
He went on to cite examples of variations that existed in the financial
administration across the public departments, such as in the practices followed
in the drawing down of funds from the Exchequer and in the controls over
unexpended balances in the hands of paymasters.

The basic difference between the systems of B&B and of Abbott was that the
former was built upon the retention of the requirement for personal
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accountability of office holders whereby it was necessary to be able to prove
that payments had validly occurred in accordance with the powers delegated by
Parliament. To accommodate this requirement it was essential that the features
of CAD accounting were retained within the new system of accounting
(Edwards et al., 2002, p. 651). Parnell believed that B&B would have
entertained the possibility of revising and new-modelling the systems in the
various offices but
evidently (they) have had to form a plan of accounts for a most
defective official system of transacting business; and having this
defective system constantly before them, they were to lead to
conceive a notion of an official system of accounts as
contradistinguished from the mercantile system. This is a
fundamental error that pervades all their views and all their plans
(Parnell, 1831, pp. 167-168).
Parnell believed that the reason why they did not propose a new-modelling of
offices as a necessary element of a proper system of accounts can be traced to
their commission (not requiring) them to do so; and no one could
expect that they would take it upon themselves to propose to abolish
sinecure treasurer-ships, and to recommend other great official
changes (Parnell, 1831, p. 168).
The fact that Parnell could speak about B&B’s commission not requiring them
to consider ‘new-modelling’ is ironic given that it was Parnell’s committee that
had recommended the commission in the first place.

6.6 Treasury Minute of 14 July 1829
The report from B&B and the reports from Abbott were duly considered by the
Board of Treasury together with the observations which B&B and Abbott had
respectively made upon the report of each other (BPP 1831(50), App. 1, p. 17).
On 14 July 1829 the Board of Treasury made a Treasury Minute in which they
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expressed their opinion that it would be expedient to introduce into each of the
departments listed the principal books as described by B&B in their Report (the
cash book, journal, and ledger), to commence as from the commencement of
the ensuing year (1 January 1830) (BPP 1831(50), App.1, pp. 17-18). The
‘departments’ listed included the Commissioners of the Navy, the Treasurer of
the Navy, and the Commissioners of Victualling.

In their Minute the Lords found it “satisfactory” to observe that there was
consensus in regard to the adoption of the “mercantile system” (i.e. DEB) within
the public departments. They concurred with B&B that its adoption did not mean
that adaption to the special needs of the departments could not be made. As
they pointed out, existing users of the system “keep their accounts in a peculiar
manner, adapted to their own particular business”, and even though the
business of government differs in many respects from that of merchants, they
saw no reason why the departments “should not have a peculiarity of system
suited to their particular nature and object” (BPP 1831(50), p. 17).

The books of account, kept and arranged upon the principle of DEB, were to be
introduced into the departments gradually and after much consideration, but
only if the departmental heads and executive officers had a thorough knowledge
of the new system. For the on-going management of the system, departments
would need to select individuals who displayed superior skills particularly in the
area of bookkeeping. If there were individuals who possessed superior skills in
areas other than bookkeeping, departments had sufficient time in which they
could be trained in this area. The speed with which the new accounting system
was expected to be introduced indicated significant underestimation by the
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Treasury of the complexity of the task ahead. As it was probable that
modifications would be required in some departments because of special or
unusual requirements, Treasury was to give consideration to these requests as
long as the general principles were adhered to and the requirement for
uniformity was not disrupted. B&B would be available either in person or in
writing to assist departments in the conversion which was planned for 1 January
1831 (BPP 1831(50), p. 17). In their Minute the Lords also ‘requested’ that the
listed departments, including the various departments of the Navy, should, after
due consideration, advise the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury of the
changes they perceive will be required with the conversion to the new system in
their department.

Although the conversion to B&B’s system had been minuted for the
commencement of the ‘ensuing year’, i.e. 1 January 1830, this was postponed
until the beginning of 1831. No Treasury minute has been found formalising this
postponement but there exist copies of correspondence from the Solicitor to the
Admiralty, Charles Jones in regard to any legislative impediment that would
cause a postponement to the conversion to B&B’s system. He wrote two letters
to Martin, the Comptroller, the first on 10 November 1829 advising that he saw
no legislative impediment to the conversion in the Navy Office as from the
commencement of 1830, but, only two days later, Jones advised Martin that
further consideration of the matter had resulted in him concluding that the
Treasurer of the Navy Act, 1808 (48 Geo. 3) c. 8 would need to be repealed
prior to the introduction of B&B’s system in the Navy Office. As well as this
legislative impediment, the possible training requirements, and the reports from
some of the departments that they would not be able to complete their
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conversions before 31 December 1829, made a conversion date of 1 January
1830 across the departments an impossibility. Under these circumstances
Treasury had no option but to postpone the conversion to 1 January 1831.

6.7 Deas Thomson’s observations and B&B’s answers in reply
Although B&B’s system had been accepted by the Lords of the Treasury in July
1829, Deas Thomson was requested by Melville in August 1829 to provide him
with a brief report on B&B’s system. This he did, also advising Melville that
because the Navy Office had been directed “to report officially on other points
than those connected with the new Books of Account” he would confine himself
to a few brief remarks on each principal Book of Account recommended by
B&B. B&B were later to review and provide answers to Deas Thomson’s
observations which are to be found in Part B of TNA: T 92/153B.

The absence of a cash book in both the existing system and Deas Thomson’s
trial system was a major criticism made by B&B in their report. They were
strongly of the opinion that the cash book should be a book of original entry
from which postings to the ledger should originate, certainly not from the various
bill registers (BPP 1829(290), p. 21). Deas Thomson agreed that at the time of
B&B’s visit to the Navy Office as part of their review a cash book had not been
in use. The reason was that it took two months for the Treasurer of the Navy to
forward vouchers for payments to the Navy Office for examination and this
“precluded the possibility of keeping a Cash Book available for any useful
purpose. The Account of Cash was, in consequence, shown only in the Ledger,
and was posted from the Treasurer’s monthly returns” (Appendix 6.6). However,
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in November 1828, the Treasurer implemented a procedural change 128 directing
that all the Treasurer’s vouchers should be sent to the Navy Office on a daily
basis as from 1 January 1829. As a result, a balance book was opened to be
maintained by the Treasurer showing on one side his total receipts for a day
and, on the other side, the amount of bills cashed that day. B&B were derisory
about this book as, in their opinion, it could not serve as the basis of the
subsequent postings to the ledger (Appendix 6.6). Deas Thomson described the
book as one that “is calculated to give every information respecting the
Treasurer’s accounts that can possibly be required, (and) is, at the same time,
so simple and requires so little labour to keep it up that no adequate substitute
will be found for it in (B&B’s) proposed new system”. Deas Thomson returned
B&B’s derisory remarks when he referred to their cash book as containing
“cumbersome detail the posting of which will be found impracticable” (TNA: T
92/153B). “But” as he said, supposing that difficulty was removed by dividing it
into four or five separate books, “there is no necessity whatever for repeating in
the Cash Book the details of every Bill previously recorded in full in the
Registers” (TNA: T 92/153B). In his letter of 10 August 1830, received by Deas
Thomson on 14 December that year, his son Edward described
(t)he Cash Book, as it has not very properly been called, of Messrs.
Brooksbank and Beltz is much too complicated a piece of Machinery
as I think has been very clearly shown by your able paper upon the
subject prepared for Lord Melville (Mitchell Library, Thomson Family
papers).
Deas Thomson further contended that the Registers (or Bill Books), could not
be dispensed with as they were the means by which the Treasurer’s Accounts
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This is an important point in understanding the relationship between the position of Treasurer
of the Navy and the Navy Office.
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were audited. In his opinion the end result of introducing B&B’s Cash Book was
a laborious repetition of information already available which would double the
number of entries in the subsidiary books without any offsetting advantages in
either the simplification or the audit of the accounts of the Navy Office (TNA: T
92/153B).

B&B refuted the suggestion that the cash book was “cumbersome” (Appendix
6.6) as entries to the cash book would consist of only the Receipts and
Payments made by the Paymaster’s cheques drawn upon the Bank of England,
while payments by the cashiers of salaries and pensions would be made on the
basis of quarterly lists which would result in a reduced workload for the clerks.
In regard to the transactions of the sub-accountants, while it was correct that in
the B&B system the details would be posted to the ledger accounts through the
journal and not the cash book, it was incorrect to believe that all details for each
transaction would be entered into the journal. Instead, B&B proposed that an
abstract would be made under the appropriate heads of service of these
transactions following their vouching and approval and it would be the
summarised totals of the heads of service for a period that would be posted to
the ledger. B&B contended that they had been wholly misunderstood if it was
conceived otherwise (TNA: T 92/153B).

The sources of these daily totals were the Registers of Bills, of which there were
ten, nine for Ready-money Bills and one for 60-day Bills. The “cash book”,
being a book showing only in summary form the daily totals of the receipts and
payments, showed no details of the individual cash transactions. B&B’s cash
book, a specimen of which is shown in the Appendix to the Summary of their
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report (BPP 1829(290), pp. 121-124) was to be in two parts, the first covering
receipts from debtors such as the Exchequer when funds were to be drawn
down as part of the annual vote or arising from the sale of old stores. The
second part of the cash book was to detail the payments made to creditors such
as the purchase of supplies. Entries were also to be made in this part of the
cash book for “bills payable” at the time of the liquidation of the bill, the drawer
having been previously debited with the amount in the journal and ledger upon
the receipt of the advice that the bill had been drawn.

The use by B&B of the cash book as the repository of transaction detail rather
than the registers/bill books in the trial system was a major difference in the
design of the two systems. B&B were of the opinion that with the Registers,
referred to as “subsidiary books”, then used in the departments, being no longer
required the use of their cash book would supersede a great number of books
then in use in both the Navy and the Navy Pay Office.

The second book that Deas Thomson made reference to in his correspondence
with Melville was the journal which was a major area of contention. He was
critical of the system proposed by B&B in which the journal would be replaced
by the cash book for the majority of the cash transactions. B&B noted that
the Book recommended by us is intended principally to facilitate the
incorporation of the accounts of the Sub-accountants after they have
passed examination and been allowed in the general accounts of the
department and not as a substitute for the mercantile journal ... It was
never meant to act as a check upon the whole of the Ledger entries,
the checks being simply afforded by the Cash Book and Ledger
itself”.
In Deas Thomson’s opinion, apart from the title, B&B’s journal had nothing in
common with a mercantile journal and accordingly was altogether nugatory as
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a control over the accuracy of the postings to the ledger. Consequently B&B’s
journal was altogether superfluous. Deas Thomson’s opinion was that
(t)he great advantages of a perfect journal being so manifest it
cannot but be considered a matter of regret that in modifying the
mercantile system of double entry to render it applicable to public
accounts, the Commissioners should have considered it advisable so
to alter the character of this book as to render it of little or no avail for
by destroying the universality of the Journal, they have divested the
system of one of its greatest merits (TNA: T 92/153B, Part B, p. 22).
B&B were strongly of the opinion that the employment of a journal to check the
accuracy of the ledger postings was a most complicated and unnecessary
arrangement that could not be satisfactory to any person conversant with the
subject. They considered that errors in the postings to the ledger would be
brought to light through the ‘judicious’ use of DEB combined with the
“expeditious rendering, examination and entry of the accounts” (Appendix 6.6).
Although double entry would certainly bring to light errors in the accuracy of the
debit and credit postings, they were being unrealistic in expecting that it would
bring to light errors in postings to incorrect ledger accounts. However, B&B
remained convinced that their journal was ‘nothing short of a perfect book’ and
they really could not perceive how they had destroyed the universality of the
Journal and so divested the system of one of its greatest merits (TNA: T
92/153B).

When discussing the ledger Deas Thomson described a major difference
between his system then in operation and that recommended by B&B which
arose from
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a different view taken of the nature of the payments; under the
present system all services paid by bills are debited in the Ledger
with the amount of such bills, and all services paid in cash are also
debited in the Ledger with the amount of such cash payments. The
Commissioners on the other hand, considering all bills issued as
prospective payments, propose that no entry of them should be
made in the Ledger until they are returned paid by the Treasurer. But
it is conceived that a Bill given to a claimant in payment of an article
delivered or for a service performed is in every respect an actual
payment, the claimant being satisfied and the service being at an
end; and it is most properly recorded under the date when the
settlement of the claim took place (Emphasis in the original) (TNA: T
92/153B, Part B, p. 24).
Obviously Deas Thomson’s system was not designed around the measurement
basis of cash accounting but about the modified cash accounting basis. “The
distinctive feature of accounts kept on a cash basis is that they record money
received and money paid, and only such transactions within the given period,
whether or not the receipts and payments are in respect of goods supplied or
services rendered during the period” (BPP 1950 (Cmd. 7969)). Modified cash
accounting, as mentioned in Chapter 2, differs from cash accounting in that, in a
government institution, it recognises receipts and disbursements committed in
the budget year and allows a specified period after year-end for payments of
these to be recorded and reported (IMF Manual on Fiscal Transparency, 2007
p. 129). There is no difficulty if the payments are made in the form of cash and
the situation does not change if the payments are paid in the form of bills of
exchange. Section 24 of the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act, 1866 (29 &
30 Vict.) c. 39, in part, states
An appropriation account of supply grants shall exhibit on the ...
discharge side thereof the sums which may have actually come in
course of payment within the same period (Emphasis added).
The term ‘in course of payment’ means not only that the liability shall have
matured, but the operation of the authorising payment shall have been
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completed before the end of the period. “Where a payment is made by cheque,
the “course of payment” is completed at the date of signature of the cheque. In
the case of a cash payment the receipt governs the date” (HMSO: A/CS GEN
18: A Guide; K 6-9). This means that any bills that are drawn and given to a
supplier of goods or services should be charged to the ledger at the date of
drawing; the bill not being paid for say 30 or 60 days after the claimant receives
it should not be the cause of the charge being delayed until that later date.
Accordingly, Deas Thomson’s disagreement with B&B’s proposal warrants
support.

Although there were some other differences between Deas Thomson and B&B
in regard to the bringing to account payments made by bills, this was the major
one. Another difference was in regard to the books of account and the date of
their closure. Under the ‘official’ system then in use the books were closed on
the balance date and any payments then outstanding were ignored. This was
contrary to B&B’s proposed procedure whereby the books were kept open until
all accounts had been received. Because of the Navy’s world-wide operation
this could result in delays of many months before the accounts from overseas
were received and brought to account. In B&B’s opinion, the existing procedure
of closing the books immediately at the close of the year was one “borrowed
from the practices of merchants, instituted for purposes peculiar to their own
affairs, but in the accounts of government it is calculated to lead to errors and
misapprehensions of the most serious kind (because) the receipts and
expenditure of unconnected periods would be mingled together” (TNA: T
92/153B, Part B, p. 27). This could result in accounts that would “be so far at
variance with the truth and with the statements of corresponding periods as to
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give rise to very inconvenient discussions” (TNA: T 92/153B, Part B, p. 28).
However, B&B stated that their motive was “to procure the truest statement that
can be attained of the transactions of the department, as well as with a view to
an eventual combination of all the expenditure of the department in one general
annual statement” (TNA: T 92/153B).

6.8 The Navy Board’s views of B&B’s system
In accordance with the Minute of the Lords of the Treasury of 14 July 1829, the
various departments that were ‘”desired” (BPP 1830(50), p. 18) to convert to
B&B’s system, were required to report to the Lords upon the steps they had
taken towards effecting the intended conversion. In regard to the steps taken
within the Navy, a letter dated 20 November 1829 was submitted by the
Admiralty129 advising the Treasury that, in their opinion,
under the existing laws it is not competent to the Navy and Victualling
Boards and Treasurer of the Navy to comply to the full, or to any
considerable extent, with the suggestions of Messrs. Brooksbank and
Beltz. Their Lordships therefore feel themselves precluded by that
obstacle from carrying into effect the desire of the Lords of the
Treasury ... except by an arrangement which would be inconvenient
and expensive, viz. Keeping two sets of books and accounts, one
under the old, and the other under the proposed new system
(Emphasis added) (BPP 1831(50), p. 39).
The Admiralty enclosed with its correspondence a copy of a letter dated 17
November 1829 it had received from Martin and Courtney Boyle, the
Superintendent of Transports, on behalf of the Navy Board which they had
prepared at the Admiralty’s direction and in which they set forth their
observations on the subject of the commencement of B&B’s system on 1
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The letter was from the Second Secretary to the Admiralty, John Barrow.
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January 1830. Based upon the details contained in a paper prepared by B&B
and provided to them through Melville, an Outline of Regulations for facilitating
the introduction of the proposed plan of account (TNA: T 92/153B, Paper ’C’;
BPP 1831(50), p. 43), Martin and Boyle had concluded that B&B had
not confined themselves to the business of suggesting the manner in
which the cash account should be kept, but (proceeded) to give the
outlines of a plan, which, while it disarranges entire branches of the
establishment of the office, introduces such novel and burdensome
operations as must prove inconvenient to the office, and a hindrance
to the dispatch of public business, without any apparent advantage
(BPP 1831(50), pp. 39-40).
The major point to note here is their reference to the ‘cash account’.

The opinions of the Navy Board and the Admiralty were summarised by B&B in
their Second Report to the Lords of the Treasury.
8. Navy Board: - Deprecate all interferences; would revert to their old
system in practice five years ago, with some contemplated
modifications, in preference to the mercantile system lately under trial
in the Navy Office, or to that approved by the Treasury (i.e. B&B’s
system).
9. Lords of the Admiralty: - Desire to be understood as not concurring
with the Navy Board, but recommend that the new system shall be
deferred for three or six months in the Navy and Victualling Offices,
to admit of the various alterations in the existing laws (BPP 1831(50),
p. 16).
To obtain a better understanding of Martin and Boyle’s opinion it is necessary to
refer to copies of correspondence between the Navy Board and B&B during the
period from 17 September 1829 to 9 November 1829 which are to be found in
the Entry book of correspondence between the Commissioners of the Navy and
Messrs. Brooksbank and Beltz (TNA: T 92/153B) in regard to matters in relation
to the conversion to B&B’s system by the Navy. In a letter dated 17 September
1829, B&B offered to provide “every assistance in their power” for the
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furtherance of the project and to afford to the officers involved “such
explanations as they may consider necessary for the attainment of a perfect
understanding

of

the

alterations

proposed”

(TNA:

T

92/153B).

B&B

recommended that the Navy Board put in place the same procedures adopted
by the Victualling Office whereby queries were to be forwarded in writing to B&B
and there would be occasional personal conferences of the parties. B&B
concluded their letter with a request addressed to the Navy Board for a
statement to be submitted to them describing those aspects of the plan for the
conversion to B&B’s system about which the Board required clarification. Martin
had apparently received similar orders from the Admiralty requiring the Navy
Board to endeavour to facilitate the conversion to B&B’s system and to that end
the Navy Board was to advise if they foresaw any difficulties in its execution.
Martin, in an undated memorandum which apparently was submitted to the
Navy Board, made the point that “(w)e are not called upon to offer new
schemes of account but to say how far we may think it possible and advisable
to give effect to those proposed” (TNA: ADM 106/2739). Martin went on to state
that it was “desirable that an account of every point proposed by (B&B) should
be briefly stated in a paper” which would enable the Navy Board to “be in a
condition to communicate with (B&B) as proposed in their letter of 17
September 1829” (TNA: ADM 106/2739). As a consequence Deas Thomson,
now the Accountant General following the abandonment of the committee
system in 1829, was
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called upon by the Board to report such observations as he might
think right to make on the recommendations of the Commissioners of
Account ... and in consequence of having been so called on, drew up
the report of the 21st (October 1829) to enable the Board to obey the
Admiralty orders, which directed us to report to their Lordships how
far it was possible or advisable to give effect to the recommendations
of the Commissioners (TNA: ADM 106/2739).
Copies of the “report of the 21st”, which was attached to Deas Thomson’s
memorandum, were distributed by the Navy Board to parties interested in his
observations. Such an action, Deas Thomson said, was contrary to normal
practice and it resulted in him remonstrating against it as
he could not believe it possible that the Board (would) adopt so
unusual ... a course as that of submitting the opinion of one of its
members (given to the Board at its own requisition for a specific
object) to be commented on by others and thus involve him in a
personal controversy in a matter of official regulation (TNA: ADM
106/2739).
It is obvious that this matter must have further damaged Martin’s relationship
with Deas Thomson which was already tenuous since they had clashed in
1825-6, so creating a very difficult working environment for Deas Thomson. This
episode goes some of the way in explaining the words used by Edward in his
letter to his father of 10 August 1830: “I regret to perceive the many grievous
disappointments and annoyances you have experienced in respect to the new
system of accounts” (Mitchell Library, Thomson Family papers).

Through his observations contained in ‘the report of the 21st’ Deas Thomson
provided an outline of both his system, which was then in operation, and B&B’s
system in case the Board should not be fully aware of the extent of the changes
proposed by B&B (Figure 7.6 provides a comparison of the two systems based
upon these outlines). Deas Thomson’s report was considered by the Navy
Board on 23 October 1830 which noted that it was of the opinion that the
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several points touched upon should be referred to B&B (TNA: ADM 106/2739).
As a consequence, the next letter filed, dated 29 October 1829, is from the
Secretary to the Navy Board, George Smith (Appendix 6.7), which closely
follows Deas Thomson’s report (TNA: ADM 106/2739). In their reply of 30
October B&B queried whether the Board was in possession of copies of the
memorandum that Deas Thomson had prepared in August for Melville and
B&B’s comments in reply. Martin’s prompt reply to B&B advising that the Navy
Board had not seen this correspondence undoubtedly would have caused
Martin considerable embarrassment and placed him in a difficult position so
further damaging his working relationship with Deas Thomson. B&B did not
reply to the queries raised by the Board until 2 November and in their reply B&B
included information that indicated the design of the new ledger pages had
been completed and as a result the Board, in its letter of acknowledgement of 6
November, advised they would be glad to receive copies of those pages
together with any other completed forms that may be available. This and other
advice in regard to the assignment book that was to be used could have been
viewed by B&B as positive indicators of the acceptance by the Navy Board of
B&B’s system.

In their letter to the Board of 9 November 1829 B&B advised that the new forms
were intended for the use of those departments which have advised Treasury of
their intention of adopting the new plan of account at the commencement of the
“ensuing” year and which in consequence have made the usual requisitions to
the Stationery office for the proper books (TNA: T 92/153B, pp. 78-79). These
words appear to indicate a lack of compulsion as to whether a department was
required to implement the new system.
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B&B’s view of the report of 17 November 1829 from Martin and Boyle on behalf
of the Navy Board was that it consisted of two parts, the first part setting out the
Board’s objections to the B&B system and the second the Board’s own
propositions in lieu of it. B&B were of the opinion that the objections arose
through the Board’s misconception both as to the B&B system itself and the
internal changes that will arise with its installation (BPP 1831(50), p. 10). Their
opinion is substantiated by Martin and Boyle’s apparent fixation on the ‘cash
account’ referred to above. B&B blamed the Navy Board for not providing B&B
with opportunities to provide the Board with system briefings which would have
provided clarification of both the system and the internal changes that would by
necessity accompany the systems conversion. The major objections expressed
by the Navy Board, B&B said, were “the burdensome routine of journalizing and
ledger-keeping” and the “ponderous machinery calculated to oppress the office
with its multiplied operations, and to add considerably to the expense of
conducting the service” (BPP 1831(50), p. 40). The first objection arose from
the Board’s belief that the need to obtain details of expenditure under the
various heads could be met by the use of a well-selected abstract as was used
in the Navy Office five years ago, albeit with slight modification and
improvement. The journal and ledger as recommended by B&B were not
necessary. The second objection arose from the Navy Board’s belief that B&B
had lost sight of the fact that the major responsibility of the “accountant branch”
was
the cautious inquiry into the nature of all purchases and transactions
which lead to expenditure of the public money, and the rigid
investigation of all accounts and vouchers delivered into office, either
before the passing of a bill on the Treasurer, or in proof of payment
made by a sub-accountant at home or abroad (Emphasis in original)
(BPP 1831(50), p. 40).
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This, Martin and Boyle said, was of “transcendant importance”. These were the
duties of major importance for accountants, not the recording and classifying of
financial transactions that had been paid. The latter is “mere matter of form,
requiring scarcely any other quality than a patient adherence to a prescribed
routine” (BPP 1831(50), App. 10, p. 40). They went on,
Nevertheless it is to accomplish these latter duties that the
Commissioners propose to introduce a ponderous machinery
calculated to oppress the office with its multiplied operations, and to
add considerably to the expense of conducting the service.
Our duty therefore leads us respectfully to deprecate such useless
innovations (BPP 1831(50), App. 10, p. 40).
Martin and Boyle then advised that the Accountant General (Deas Thomson),
while agreeing entirely with them in objecting to the measures proposed by
B&B, would rather continue with the development of the system he had
introduced than to revert to the previous system, albeit incorporating the
improved abstract which they recommended (BPP 1831(50), App. 10, p. 40).
They went on to observe that
although in some respects we differ from the Accountant-general as
to the merits of his plans, on the principle that vigilance before, and
not any combination of the book-keeping after payment, is the only
valuable object to Government, yet we would rather continue his
system at the known loss of services of two or three clerks, than
burden the branch with new duties involving unprofitable labour and
inevitable delay (Emphasis in original) (BPP 1831(50), App. 10, p.
40)
Martin and Boyle believed their remarks would assure the Lords of the
Admiralty that they had only one object in view and that was “to produce the
accounts, when required, in the form approved by the Treasury” (BPP 1831(50),
App. 10, p. 40). It appeared to Martin and Boyle that B&B’s system was
designed to fulfil the requirements of the mercantile world, not those of the Navy
and, accordingly, in order to meet the requirements of the Navy they requested
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that the Navy Board “be allowed to proceed in the simplest and least
burdensome, and consequently most expeditious mode towards the fulfilment of
(the requirements of Treasury)” (BPP 1831(50), App. 10, p. 40). In summary,
Martin and Boyle were requesting that the Navy should be allowed to keep their
accounts “as may be most convenient to the office, under the assurance ... that
the naval expenditure, accompanied by a balance-sheet, (would) be exhibited in
any manner the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty’s Treasury may from time
to time require” (BPP 1831(50), App. 10, pp. 40-41).

In their First Report B&B referred to the vouching procedures as the “system of
examination” (BPP 1829(290), p.84). With B&B’s commitment to the concept of
personal accountability, it would come as no surprise that they were in general
terms supportive of the Navy Board’s emphasis upon the accounting before the
actual expenditure. In their Second Report B&B said that they were “quite
ready to admit” (BPP 1831(50), p. 12) the importance of the Navy Board’s
stance. In preparing their First Report they had taken only a very general view
of this matter for they did not consider their commission required them to carry
out a detailed review of the system of examination (BPP 1829(290), p. 84).
Further information brought to their attention by the Navy Board, however,
enabled them now to offer their “humble support” to the suggestion by the Navy
Board that a full review of the system of examination was warranted (BPP
1831(50), p. 12)

The post-expenditure procedures for the accurate digesting and recording of the
expenditure was the bookkeeping system in regard to which B&B were of the
opinion that “the Navy Board appear by no means to attach the same value as
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the late Finance Committee and (the Lords of the Treasury)” (BPP 1831(50), p.
12). The opinion expressed in Martin and Boyle’s report “on a system of Bookkeeping, is that it is “a mere matter of form”” caused B&B to “respectfully”
express their
surprise at the opinion now given by the Navy Board, knowing that
their efforts have been employed during the last five years, without
success or satisfaction to themselves (with no less than five systems
of Account to select from), in devising what they now slightingly term
:a mere matter of form (BPP 1831(50), p. 12).
These systems are those listed in the Introduction to this chapter. B&B’s
surprise may have ensued in part from a perception that the Navy would be
supportive of their endeavours as both their new system and the system being
developed by Deas Thomson in the Navy Office were based upon DEB. In their
report they spoke about Deas Thomson in a very positive manner.
This gentleman appears to have devoted a considerable degree of
zeal and talent in endeavouring to establish a more systematic and
connected plan of Account; for which purpose he authorised all the
items of Expenditure, scattered in the Registers, to be entered in a
Journal in the mercantile form, and thence posted into a regular
Ledger (BPP 1829(290), p. 19).
As a result B&B may have seen the Navy as being an organisation that was not
afraid of committing to new concepts. What they found was a department that
exhibited not only all the traits that Parnell referred to in his memorandum to
Baring, including conservatism and an unbending reverence for tradition, but
well developed political traits as well.

The preparedness of the Navy Board to challenge Treasury as well as the
Admiralty, particularly at this time in politics, would have been a source of
surprise to many in government. The power of Treasury was increasing for
there existed in the Commons a point of view that Treasury should be playing a
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greater role in the management of public expenditure. This can be seen in two
of the reports prepared by the Select Committee on Finance of 1817. Firstly,
they referred to the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury “as the official and
responsible advisers of the Crown upon all matters which relate to the
superintendence and control over the public expenditure”. In a later report they
said “no department of large expenditure ought ever to be placed beyond the
controlling superintendence of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury” (BPP
(1817), p. 89). However, at the time the Navy Board voiced its opinion, the
power of Treasury was insufficient for it to order the Admiralty to take the Navy
Board to task and order it to implement a new accounting system based upon
that of B&B. In their Treasury Minute of 14 July 1829 the Lords directed that a
copy of the minute was to be transmitted to the Lords of the Admiralty who
were “desired to issue instructions in conformity with the directions contained in
this Minute” (Emphasis added) (BPP 1831(50), p. 18). These were not the
words of command but change was in the air perhaps as a result of the Navy
Board’s challenge.

In their Second Report to Treasury of December 1829, B&B considered that
they were back to where they had started from.
To leave the subject of Accounts in this state of uncertainty, in the
hands of the Navy Office, and of any other Department which might
with as much reason urge the same proposal, would we apprehend
be to return to the exact point from which we set out; and if all the
enquiry Your Lordships have instituted and deliberated upon were to
terminate in the abandonment of all interference on the part of the
Government, and a submission to the wishes of any one or more
Departments that may be inclined to entertain them, of being allowed
to keep their accounts in the manner they might prefer, the object
contemplated by Parliament and Your Lordships, of instituting a
general system applicable to all Public Offices, must of course be
defeated (BPP 1831(50), p. 13).

333

B&B said that they had been assailed “(by) opponents of the most opposite
character … on either side”. While they had been accused by Abbott of not
adhering sufficiently to the mercantile practice, they had been censured by the
Navy of adopting unnecessarily too much of that system (BPP 1831(50), p. 14).

As noted earlier in their letter of 20 November 1829 the Admiralty advised the
Lords of the Treasury that the existing laws precluded the Navy and Victualling
Boards from implementing B&B’s system except by an arrangement whereby
two sets of books would be maintained. They went on to state that “their
Lordships desire to be understood as by no means concurring with the Navy
Board in the view taken by them in the enclosed letter as to the best mode of
keeping the public accounts in their office”. As they intended “to introduce a bill
into Parliament for the purpose of consolidating and amending the several laws
which regulate the issue and expenditure of naval monies” (BPP 1831(50), p.
39), the Admiralty recommended that under all these circumstances the
implementation of the B&B accounting system in the Navy Office and the
Victualling Office should be deferred for three to six months, “and their
Lordships trust in the mean time a bill may be passed by the Legislature” (BPP
1831(50) App. 10 p. 40). B&B in their report to Treasury said that whilst they
were anxious to respect the opinions of the Navy Board, they felt it would be “a
dereliction of duty if (they) abstained from pointing out erroneous impressions
and views in any Department where they may appear to exist” (BPP 1831(50)
App. 10, p. 40).
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6.9 Treasury Minute of 17 December 1830 and the suspension
of B&B’s system
Reports from each of the departments concerning their progress on their
conversion to B&B’s system were reviewed by B&B on the basis of which they
prepared their Second Report to Treasury dated 24 December 1829. This report
was considered by the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury who prepared a
Treasury Minute on 9 February 1830 on the basis of which the postponement of
the conversion date from 1 January 1830 to 1 January 1831 was confirmed ipso
facto. Furthermore, they
entirely concur(red) with the Lords of the Admiralty, and in the
opinions expressed by Messrs. Brooksbank and Beltz, as to the
erroneous views and impressions entertained by the Navy Board
upon the subject of the proposed new system of account; and my
Lords being quite satisfied, not only from the consideration they had
given the subject previously to their Minute of the 14 th July, but from
the general tenor of the papers before them of the advantages to be
derived from the adoption of the proposed system, see no reason to
depart from the decision that they have already taken on this subject.
They therefore further direct that the books and plan of account be
introduced and acted upon in the Navy and Victualling departments,
as soon as possible, after the sanction of Parliament shall have been
obtained to such alterations as may be necessary in the existing laws
for that object (Emphasis added) (BPP 1831(50), p. 47).
While this minute of the Lords Commissioners regarding the adoption of the
new system reiterated their decisions of 14 July 1829 it is obvious, from the
tone of their words, that they were in a far different mood, expressing
themselves quite clearly and forcefully as to their requirements as to the system
conversion. Finally, the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury had issued words
of command.

The decision by Treasury to approve B&B’s system led to considerable
discussion in the Commons between pro-B&B and anti-B&B proponents. On 26
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March 1830 the Commons resolved itself into a Committee of Supply in regard
to the Navy estimates. Parnell, for instance, being a member of the latter camp,
was of the opinion that Treasury had “acted with too much haste”.
They should have let the merits of the two systems be tried before
they adopted one in preference to the other. They showed too great
haste in rejecting the system which included the journal ... the
Government should have tried the two systems before adopting
either. When the Finance Committee recommended that the public
accounts should be investigated by Commissioners, it was with a
view of procuring information, so that the best possible system might
be introduced. ... the system which included the journal was
preferable to the other, and thinking so, he must affirm, that the
Treasury had acted rashly in at once adopting the system which did
not include it (Hansard, Second Series Vol. 23, March 1830, Cols.
935-936).
Another member of the Commons, John Maberly, expressed his wish that
Abbott’s plan, which was similar to that adopted by the East India Company,
and by the French Government, had been preferred instead of “the fanciful
system of Messrs. Brooksbank and Belts” (sic.) (Hansard, Second Series Vol.
23, March 1830, Cols. 935-936).

In the Treasury Minute of 17 December 1830 there is mention of a report
received from B&B on the progress that had been made in the implementation
of their system in the Navy offices (BPP 1831(50), p. 48). The report referred to
was that of 15 December 1830, a copy of which is to be found in a document
entitled Report to the Treasury respecting the state of preparation in the Navy,
Victualling and Navy Pay Offices 15/12/1830 (TNA: T 92/154). Appended to the
report are copies of twenty items of correspondence which B&B considered
would “evince to their Lordships (of the Admiralty) the earnest desire felt by the
Commissioners of Victualling ... to come to a thorough understanding with the
Navy Board and their Treasury upon a work in which the duties of the three
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Departments are conjointly and intimately involved” (TNA: T 92/154, p. 11). The
general tenor of this statement would indicate that B&B were seeking the
support of the Admiralty in securing acceptance from the Navy Board in the
implementation of the B&B system. B&B reported that from their observations
at the three offices “there (was) no impediment or difficulty in the way of their
commencing upon the new System of Account from 1st January next” (TNA: T
92/154, p. 2). In referring to Deas Thomson’s system they considered that the
“defects in (his) plan were principally attributable to circumstances arising out of
peculiar official arrangements which had been long established and over which
he had no means of effectual control” (TNA: T 92/154), p. 2).

In his February 1840 memorandum to Baring, Parnell made reference to the
suspension of the B&B system; “I had applied to Lord Althorp to suspend it and
succeeded” (TNA: T 64/395). As a consequence, in the minute of 17 December
1830 referred to above, the Treasury directed “that the application of the new
system of accounts as recommended by Messrs. Brooksbank and Beltz, to any
public department in which it is not already introduced in practice, be
suspended till further orders” (TNA: T 64/395). Parnell could not have selected
a more powerful person than Lord Althorp, John Charles Spencer, who was the
leader of the Whigs in the Commons, who were then in power and, from 22
November that year, a Commissioner of the Treasury and Chancellor of the
Exchequer. As a result of this ‘suspension’, there were then only two systems
which could provide the “simple, uniform and accurate system of public
accounts” (Parnell, 1831, p. 106) required to replace, what Parnell described as,
“the complicated and multifarious methods of keeping accounts in all public
offices”. The two systems were those of Deas Thomson and Abbott.
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Further in his memorandum to Baring, Parnell had referred to the “great
obstacle” to the implementation of the system and that was “the rooted hostility
of all the Departments to the System of Double Entry which arises from the
natural effect of long habits and from the total ignorance that prevails amongst
the officers and clerks now employed on accounts, of even the elements of
Double Entry” (TNA: T 64/395). He was also cognisant of the observations
made in 1781 by the Commission for Public Accounts in their Fifth Report in
regard to the “(d)ifficulties that must forever attend the introducing of Novelty of
Form into ancient Offices” (Fifth Report, p. 19).

Edwards et al. (2003, p. 55) cite the reason given by Bartle in his thesis for the
suspension.
(I)t had soon been discovered that there were considerable
opposition to new methods in some public departments, such as the
Navy Board, with its enormous retinue of sinecurists and few
changes had, in practice, been introduced.
This supports the comments made by Parnell but it is doubtful that this would
have provided sufficient reason for Althorp to suspend the system that had been
approved by Treasury, and for Parnell to seek the suspension of the B&B
system when his avowed wish, the adoption of double entry throughout the
public sector, was so close to being realised. It is apparent there had to be
another reason(s).

In his book Parnell was very critical of the fact that B&B had not recommended
the use of the ‘pure’ Italian/mercantile system as Abbott had done. The ‘pure’
system required the entries in the waste and cash books to be transcribed into a
journal before they were posted to the ledger. The problem to Parnell was that
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the latter’s system was not truly ‘Italian/ mercantile’ in that they did not require
the entries in the cash and waste books to be transcribed into a journal before
they were posted to the ledger. In B&B’s opinion “the ledger should be made to
contain a condensed, but more circumstantial detail of the proceedings than is
usually afforded under the mercantile system “(BPP 1829(290), p. 89). This was
B&B’s ’explanatory ledger entry’ designed to provide a public office with the
“readiest possible means of furnishing information” when called upon (BPP
1829(290), p.89). This conflicted with the Italian/mercantile method in which
(t)he entries in the Cash and Waste books are transcribed and
technically arranged in the Journal, and thence posted into the
Ledger, where nothing more is shown (besides the dates, amounts
and references to the Book where the particulars are detailed) than
the titles of the accounts which form the counterbalancing or double
entries; and the Account is still further involved in obscurity by the
frequent use of the word “sundries”, as inclusive of two or more such
titles (BPP 1829(290), p. 89).
As discussed earlier, this method was described by B&B as the ‘short entry’.
There was also B&B’s variation from the strict mercantile system that it was not
necessary for ledger postings from the cash book to be made via the journal.
This was anathema to Parnell.
(A) ledger so formed from the cash book, without a journal, would
bear no substantial similitude to a merchant ledger, because the
whole principle of utility and security belonging to the mercantile
system, consists in the manner in which the journal is kept; so
that Messrs. Brooksbank and Beltz propose a plan which
sacrifices the security of the pure Italian system to the minor
object of saving the trouble of referring to a regularly kept journal
in making out accounts for Parliament (Parnell, 1831, p. 168)

6.11 Conclusion
In this chapter a close examination has been made of the development of the
system recommended by B&B and approved by Treasury in July 1829.
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Emanating from the 1828 recommendation made by the Committee of Finance,
it should have been the output of a corroborative effort of the three members of
the Treasury Commission but for the dissension between the members. The
systems recommended by B&B and Abbott were DEB- based but while that of
B&B used cash accounting and was oriented towards personal accountability
Abbott’s system used accrual accounting and financial accountability as
advocated by the men in commerce.

The main critics of B&B’s system were the Navy, and Parnell and Abbott
combined. The Navy did not want to see any change let alone the remodelling
of the basic system as recommended by Abbott, but were prepared to accept
the system developed in-house by Deas Thomson. Parnell and Abbott strongly
supported a remodelling that would have introduced full mercantile accounting
which was based upon accrual accounting and using the double entry
technique of bookkeeping. They saw B&B’s system as being nothing more than
the existing system dressed up through the use of DEB. Abbott was also very
critical of B&B’s willingness to trivialise the journal by making the cash book a
major book of original entry which, Abbott said, went against the basic tenets of
DEB as espoused by Pacioli. B&B’s system, the use of which was suspended
in 1830 as a consequence of Parnell’s recommendation to Althorp, was to be
abandoned in 1832 with the adoption of the DEB-based accounting system that
had been developed in the Navy Office by Deas Thomson. It is this system and
its development that will be discussed in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 7
THE DYNAMICS OF REFORM OF THE NAVY’S
CENTRAL ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
PART 2: DEAS THOMSON’S SYSTEM
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Chapter 7:
The Dynamics of Reform of the Navy’s Central
Accounting System
Part 2: Deas Thomson’s System
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter the development of a DEB-based accounting system within the
Navy Office under the direction of Deas Thomson will be examined. The
adoption of this system, in a modified form, by the Navy was a momentous
event in accounting history for it was, as confirmed by Anderson “the first
instance in which the commercial system of double entry was applied to the
accounts of a great public department in this country” (BPP 1873(70), p. 87).

As discussed in the Introduction to Chapter 6, B&B in their Second Report on
progress in the implementation of their system in the various public departments
had listed five accounting systems that were available to the Navy Board. B&B’s
system which was the fifth on their list was discussed in that chapter. The
second, third and fourth, the ‘Deas Thomson systems,’ were those developed
under the direction of Deas Thomson (BPP 1831(50), p. 12) in his role of
Chairman of the Committee of Accounts/ Accountant General of the Navy
Board. The second system was the original CAD-based system which was
modified by collecting details of accounting expenditure in a “General Abstract
Register” but it was abandoned after a short trial of 5 to 6 months. The third of
the listed systems was the second of the ‘Deas Thomson systems’ and was
DEB-based. The fourth of the listed system, the third of the ‘Deas Thomson
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systems’, was the DEB-based system further modified and was the system
officially adopted by the Navy in 1832.

From the limited information that has survived, the ‘project team’ consisted of
only two individuals in the Navy Office, Deas Thomson, Commissioner and the
Chairman of the Committee of Accounts of the Navy Board, and Anderson, a
Clerk in the Bills and Accounts section of the Navy Office. There is no indication
that the team was officially appointed by the Board, but there is a Board minute
dated 12 May 1826 which consists of a memorandum from the Committee of
Accounts advising the Board that “the Committee has the satisfaction of
submitting to the Board a Statement shewing the result of the New System”
(TNA ADM 106/2719) (A copy of this minute forms part of Figure 7.3 to be
found later in this chapter).

7.2. John Deas Thomson
John Deas Thomson’s father, ‘John senior’`, had married Katherine Deas, the
only daughter of a Leith merchant, and as a consequence of the marriage he
had changed the family name to ‘Deas Thomson’. The marriage turned out to
be of benefit to the family for it secured a distant relationship with Charles
Middleton who was to hold the positions of Comptroller of the Navy Board from
August 1778 to March 1790, a Commissioner of the Admiralty from May 1794
to November 1795 and, in 1805, following his advancement to the peerage as
Lord Barham, the First Lord of The Admiralty. The family’s connection with
Middleton, which was strengthened through John senior’s second marriage, his
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new wife being a niece of Middleton’s, was particularly beneficial to John’s son,
also named John Deas Thomson, who is the major character in this study.

The family’s connection with the Navy originated with the appointment of John
senior to the position of Naval Officer/Storekeeper (Grigg Family papers) with
the establishment of a naval depot at Leith in Scotland in 1781 which followed
an indecisive action between a British squadron under Vice-Admiral Hyde
Parker and a Dutch Fleet off the Dogger Bank in the North Sea. Deas Thomson
had acted as clerk and assistant to his father but, subsequent to the peace
which was signed between Britain and the United States of America at the
Peace of Paris in 1783 and the closure of the naval office (Grigg Family
papers), Deas Thomson moved to South Carolina in the United States in order
to recover some legacies that had been bequeathed to him by relatives of his
family (Foster, 1978, p. 2). Another reference describes Deas Thomson’s
purpose in travelling to Charleston, North Carolina as “a vain effort to clear up
financial confusion arising from the American Revolution and the demise of
several relatives” (Moore, 1970, p. 189). However, soon after his arrival, Deas
Thomson entered into business with the purchase of a share in a small riverschooner later becoming a rice planter. He evidently prospered (Foster 1978
p.2) for he invested heavily in cattle, land and slaves (Moore, 1970, p. 189). He
became a US citizen (Moore, 1970, p. 189), and married the daughter of an
influential and respected local planter (Foster, 1978, p. 2). In 1787 he advised
his father that he intended to remain permanently in America but, in
accordance with his parent’s wishes, he returned to Edinburgh in 1791
accompanied by his American wife (Foster, 1978, p. 2).
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The Navy Office at Leith had been re-established in the mid-1780 and John
senior had been re-appointed to the position of Naval Officer/Storekeeper.
Deas Thomson on his return from the United States resumed working with his
father, acting on occasions as the Civil Agent for Transports in that vicinity as
and when required by the Navy. He also commenced business as a merchant
in Leith and initially he seems to have been successful (Foster, 1978, p. 2). The
work performed at the Navy Office must have been of considerable variety, for
example in 1797 it was responsible for the conversion of ten merchant ships to
gun brigs130 which required rearming, equipping and fitting out. This was
carried out without the involvement of any Navy infrastructure. Another example
was the arrival of a Russian squadron in 1797 during its passage from
Archangel to join Admiral Adam Duncan’s fleet off the Texel in the Netherlands.
It was Duncan’s ships which later annihilated the Dutch at Camperdown 131 that
year. A number of the Russian ships had required refitting, including a 74 gun
line of battle ship and a frigate which had been dismasted en-route. The work
was carried out without any outside assistance in the open roadstead of the
estuary of the River Forth, the Firth of Forth. In 1798 John senior was injured in
the execution of his duties which resulted in him relinquishing his position and
Deas Thomson being appointed Naval Officer in his place.

On a change in government in 1804 Deas Thomson was called to London by
Middleton and recommended to the first Viscount Melville as being a proper

130

Small square-rigged, flush-decked, general purpose vessels of about 200 tonnes, armed with
up to 14* 4 pounder guns.
131
Camperdown was then a coastal village about 16 km. northwest of Alkmaar, just north of
Amsterdam.
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person to collate papers in Middleton’s possession. Subsequently, Deas
Thomson was appointed Secretary to the Committee of Naval Revision in 1805
which was chaired by Middleton. In May 1805, Middleton was appointed First
Lord of the Admiralty following the resignation of Viscount Melville and
advanced to the peerage as Lord Barham. In July 1805, Deas Thomson was
appointed a Principal Officer and Commissioner of the Navy which was
succeeded in 1829 by the position of Accountant General of the Navy, an office
he held until 9 June 1832 when he was forced to retire by the government in
the guise of Graham (Collinge, 1978, p. 143). His wife having returned to the
United States because of a mental condition, Deas Thomson was joined in
London following his appointment by his two surviving sons, John and Edward.

In 1819, during which the United States experienced its first financial crisis, ,
one of Deas Thomson’s sons, Edward, at the age of 19, was fortunate to
secure employment as a clerk with a London counting-house, Inglis Forbes and
Co., through the intervention of one of his father’s cousins who was a partner in
the firm. In regard to the type of work performed by a counting house in the
early 19th century, reference is made to a memorandum prepared in 1766 by
the partner of a merchant firm, Herries and Company of Jeffreys Square,
London (National Library of Scotland: Fettercairn Papers (Acc. 4796, Box 201,
B’dle.11)) which was a substantial London firm that provided amongst other
services a bill of exchange service. The memorandum is a procedures manual
which sets out various staff “instructions” including those covering the
maintenance of the firm’s books of account for an accounting system based
upon the Italian/mercantile mode. The books of account used were a
wastebook in which was entered “all the circumstances of every transaction”,
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“narrating in the Journal style”; a journal which contained “nothing more than a
corrected Copy of the Wastebook ... reverting to double Entrys” and a ledger
which was “posted from the Journal & Cash Book”. The ledger was “prick’d off”,
that is, reconciled with the journal and cash book on a weekly basis. Also
maintained was a “Check Ledger”, an internal control device that was a
variation to the Italian mode, to which was posted each day the financial
transactions directly from the wastebook, the account balances being
compared with the financial ledger and the cash book at the end of each
quarter.

Inglis Forbes & Co, where Edward worked, was also a substantial Londonbased counting house and presumably as a result of competitive pressures
would have provided services and had accounting systems in place similar to
those in Herries and Company. During his seven years with Inglis, Forbes and
Co., Edward would have gained an invaluable working knowledge of DEB
which was widely used in commerce at that time. As it transpired, Edward’s
knowledge of DEB was invaluable for both Edward (he was to become the first
Colonial Secretary of the colony of New South Wales) and his father, as
Edward had, in about 1821-22 (Foster, 1978, p. 19), suggested “to his father a
simple and efficient double entry system of accounts, for use in the naval office”
(Foster, 1978, p. 19). Foster’s reference is to an unsigned and undated note in
Edward’s hand-writing (as confirmed by a comparison with that in a letter he
wrote to his father in May 1827 both of which forms part of the Grigg Family
papers).
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The most simple and efficient system of accounts, which can be
suggested for the Navy seems to be that of double entry, without
however going into those minute details which merchants find it
necessary to adopt.
The sums noted by Parliament may be considered under one general
head of “Naval Supplies” for which the Exchequer should be debited.
The Treasurer may be looked upon in the light of the Banker of the
Establishment and debited for all sums received from the Exchequer
which would consequently have credit for all sums drawn for
particular services and these therefore debited under the particular
head or heads of these services. The Treasurer should also have
credit for the sums issued in advance or imprest to the various
officers who would be debited for the same and credited, and the
service for which the advance was made debited, as the necessary
vouchers & accounts being rendered. It is obvious that all these
accounts must balance, except the heads of service the aggregate
amount of which however would, if correct, be found to correspond
with the amount issued by the Exchequer, thus forming a complete
cheque in every stage for every sum paid.
No doubt many difficulties will arise in the details of the system, of
which the foregoing is merely an outline, but they may be easily
overcome; in some instances it may be necessary as is very much
the practice in some merchants to raise fictitious heads (Grigg Family
papers).
With his training and experience in a counting house over the seven year
period, there would be no doubt that Edward would have had the requisite
knowledge and skills to have been able to have tutored his father in the
Italian/mercantile mode of accounting (Price, 1987, p. 134). It is of considerable
interest, however, that in later correspondence with his father, Edward
continually referred to the fact that the system arose from his father’s proposals
and from the enquiries which his father had been mainly instrumental in
instituting (Mitchell Library, Thomson family papers). With his experience in
South Carolina and as a merchant in Leith, it would be expected that Deas
Thomson would have possessed a practical understanding of mercantile
bookkeeping prior to Edward’s suggestion to him of its possible use in the Navy
Office. This contention is reinforced by an examination of a number of cash
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books that Deas Thomson had maintained while living in South Carolina
(Mitchell Library, Thomson Family Papers) and the contents of a draft memorial
he prepared addressed to the Duke of Wellington on behalf of his son John in
which he referred to the “system of account” used in Navy at the time of his
succession to the Chairmanship of the Committee of Accounts of the Navy
Board as one which made
it impracticable to render any distinct or intelligent statement of the
real receipt and expenditure of the Navy in any shape to be
comprehended by members of the government. That your
memoralist immediately set about introducing a system of account,
with which his early habits in life rendered him familiar (Grigg Family
papers).
Deas Thomson’s experience is also referred to in the Minutes of Evidence in the
Report from the Select Committee on Income and Property Tax (BPP
1862(467). At paragraph 9, Richard Bromley, the then Accountant General of
the Navy132, referred to the
system that had partly been introduced by Sir John Thomson, who
had been the Accountant General of the Navy under the Navy Board,
and who had previously been connected with commerce, and who,
therefore was conversant with the commercial system of double
entry. He, under the Navy Board, to a great extent commenced, with
Mr Anderson as an assistant, to prepare books upon the principle of
double entry (BPP 1862(467), p.2).
On his appointment to the Navy Board in 1805, Deas Thomson was made “a
Member of the Committee of Stores (when he introduced an improved method
of manufacturing business by which a very good saving has accrued)” (Grigg
Family papers). This was followed by membership of the Committee of
Transport (Grigg Family papers) and finally the Committee of Accounts in

132

Bromley had been appointed Accountant General in February 1854, replacing Briggs.
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February 1822 (TNA: ADM 106/2714). In March 1825 he succeeded Edward
Bouverie as Chairman of the Committee of Accounts on Bouverie’s death
(TNA: ADM 7/821) and in December that year tabled at the Navy Board a 21page Memorandum of that Branch of the Civil Service of the Navy, which
relates to the Receipt, Expenditure and Mode of Accounting for the money
annually voted by Parliament for Naval Services. The memorandum sets out
his findings from a review he had undertaken of the Navy Office’s accounting
system133. Deas Thomson had considered it was “his duty to enter, somewhat
minutely, into a general examination of the system by which the business in the
Department of Accounts had been conducted, and to suggest such
improvements as appear to him necessary, towards rendering it more
complete, and better adapted to the ends in view” (ADM 106/2714) (Appendix
6.1).

Together with his knowledge of DEB, Deas Thomson undoubtedly possessed
the appropriate background and personal qualities required to instigate the
project for the changeover to the Italian/mercantile mode of accounting in the
Naval Office and to lead the team responsible for it. His accounting experience,
his work experience in the Navy, his sense of duty, his ability and willingness to
lead, and his dogged determination and readiness to continue with the
development in the face of adversity were exactly the qualities that were
required by the public service, let alone the Navy, at that time. He was an
individual who understood people and recognised talent, an example being his

133

It was this review that initiated the changes that culminated in Deas Thomson’s DEB-based
accounting system being officially sanctioned for use in the Navy Office.
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selection of

Anderson to work with him on the project, together with his

readiness to challenge persons of influence and power such as the Comptroller
of the Navy Board, Byam Martin. He understood individual responsibility long
before the term was used by both John Barrow and James Graham years later
(Barrow, 1847, p.409). Furthermore, he was both ready and able to argue
theoretically and practically with accountants from Treasury on diverse aspects
of the Italian/mercantile mode and its implementation within the Navy Office.
Deas Thomson was the “key individual” (Jones, 2008, pp. 356-357), of the
project for without him the project would have been delayed for many years
with serious repercussions in the diffusion of DEB across the British
Government. , At the commencement of this most important project he would
have been “well aware of the difficulties that must for ever attend the
introducing novelty of form into antient offices” (5th Report of the Commission
of Accounts 1780 quoted in Deas Thomson’s Memorandum of December 1825,
Appendix 6.1). However, he would probably not have been prepared for the
trials and tribulations and the depth of ill-feeling he had to confront before his
system was accepted by Graham in 1832. In a letter to his father dated 10
August 1832, Edward made reference to “the many grievous disappointments
and annoyances you have experienced in respect to the new system of
account … so much toil, trouble and responsibility” (Mitchell Library, Thomson
Family papers).

The difficulties Deas Thomson had to contend with in his attempts to have his
trial system accepted by the Navy Office were obviously well known within the
public service. B&B, for example, in their observations in regard to comments
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that Deas Thomson had made in a letter dated 11 August 1829 to Melville,
were aware how
(a)t the commencement of our investigation Mr Deas Thomson had
for near two years been contending with Sir Byam Martin, the
Comptroller and with other members of the Navy Board for the
propriety of permanently establishing (his) system of accounts (TNA:
T 92/153B).
The work of Deas Thomson and his team from late 1825 until Martin’s removal
in November 1831 was managed by a parochial and conservative Navy Board
led by an obstructionist narrow-minded, and politically motivated Comptroller
(see also Bartle in Chapter 5).

The conservatism of the Navy Board is also exemplified by another important
change introduced by Graham following the abolition of the Navy and Victualling
Boards in 1832 when he reversed the policy of the Navy Board which had
persisted for years in the production of ships which failed to meet the
requirements of the Admiralty. The decision-making regarding the specific
requirements in the building of a new ship or class of ships was in the hands of
the Navy Board which was able to “exert a powerful influence on design matters
and at times completely dominated decision-making on the size and
characteristics of warships built, sometimes to the frustration of the Admiralty’s
good intentions” (Gardiner (a), 1992, p. 117). This “powerful influence” was of a
conservative nature which particularly constrained the “growth in size of British
ships and it is significant that it was not until the abolition of the Board in 1832
that Royal Navy warships were built larger than those of rival powers” (Gardiner
(a), 1992, p. 117). Briggs, who replaced Deas Thomson as the Accountant
General in 1832 following the abolition of the Navy Board, was of the opinion
that the Navy Board
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had persisted for years, in direct opposition to the strongly expressed
consensus of naval opinion, in spending hundreds of thousands
annually upon vessels inadequate in size and armament to compete
successfully with the new classes of vessels in course of construction
in the naval dockyards of France and the United States (Parker,1907,
p. 152)
Anderson had some very definite thoughts regarding the Navy Board’s
conservatism when it came to the trial accounting system. In evidence before a
Select Committee in 1845, he noted how work on the system commenced late
in 1825 but it did not lose its trial designation until 1832, the delay being
“occasioned by the reluctance which the Navy Board felt to the introduction of
the system as an innovation, and probably showing matters much more in detail
than was thought advisable at the period” (BPP 1845(520), p. 104). It was ironic
that on 14 February 1832, George Cockburn, an ex-commissioner of the
Admiralty Board, expressed his opinion in Parliament that the Navy Board,
which he might call the Board of Detail, being composed of men who
had risen principally from the various departments in the service, was
generally opposed to any sweeping change, come from whatever
quarter it might; and it had, he believed, by that part of its
constitution, prevented a great deal of mischief. It prevented other
people going too fast; and was, on the whole, he thought, very
beneficial. It was a most valuable drag-chain on those who were in
too much haste; at the same time, he had never known the Navy
Board make any opposition to orders when they were given
(Hansard, Third Series Vol. 10, February 1832, Col.349-76).
Yet this was the same Cockburn who gave the Royal Navy impetus towards
steam power in the 1840’s when he was the First Naval Lord of the Admiralty.

Parnell made no reference, either in Parliament or in his book, to Deas
Thomson’s Navy Office in-house trial system. The latter omission was noted by
Edward who, in a letter to his father of 10 August 1830, wrote
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In reading Sir Henry Parnell’s book on Finance it struck me forcibly
that, in animadverting upon the defective system formerly pursued in
the N.O, he ought in fairness to have mentioned the improved
method under trial (Mitchell Library, Thomson family papers).
Deas Thomson’s involvement in the in-house development of a replacement
accounting system based upon the principles of double entry was referred to by
Anderson in a memorandum he prepared on the System of Account and Audit
in Operation in the Department of the Accountant General of the Navy which is
appended to the Report of the Committee Appointed by the Admiralty to inquire
into the Audit, &c. of Naval Accounts (BPP 1873(70), p. 86) and discussed
below. Anderson, a staunch ally of Deas Thomson’s played a major role in the
development of the trial system.

7.3 William George Anderson
Anderson entered the Navy Office on probation as a clerk third class in the
Office of Bills and Accounts on the 2 March 1825. Twelve months later, on 17
March 1826 and on the nomination of the then Comptroller, Byam Martin, he
completed his “probationary year of servitude” and was “entered as a clerk of
the third class on the establishment of the Office” (TNA: ADM 106/2715). As he
advised the Committee Appointed by the Admiralty to inquire into the Audit &c.
of Naval Accounts (BPP 1873(70), p. 73) Anderson spent more than 6 years
(1826 to1832) employed on Deas Thomson’s new system eventually becoming
Deas Thomson’s private secretary (Collinge, 1978, p. 82). On the abolition of
the Navy Board, Anderson was transferred to the Admiralty having been
selected to install the new system in all departments of the Admiralty where he
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reported to Briggs, the new Accountant General (BPP 1845(520)).134 During his
time at the Admiralty he continued to be employed on the establishment of the
new system as well as being responsible for the Navy accounts and estimates
until his transfer in 1838 to the Office of the Paymaster General as its
Accountant under the Paymastership of Henry Parnell. A new accounting
system based upon that in the Admiralty had been established there by Parnell
18 months before Anderson’s transfer. In 1854 he joined Treasury as Principal
Clerk of Finance and remained at Treasury until his retirement in 1867 as
Assistant Comptroller and Auditor General.

Never had there been a more opportune time for a person with Anderson’s
abilities to enter the employment of the Navy Office for he was to become
renowned for his DEB accounting skills earning considerable respect over the
years both inside and outside the public service. As an example, in a paper
Budgets and Accounts of England and France which he presented to the
Statistical Society in May 1866, a Major-General Balfour stated:
I desire to offer my tribute of respect to Mr Anderson, the able,
zealous, and devoted officer of the Treasury, who with the late Mr
Arbuthnot, long contended, though with partial success, for those
improvements in public accounting so much needed, and so well
known to them as being possible (Balfour, 1866, p. 324).
Anderson’s intellect together with the wide knowledge and skills that he
acquired resulted in him appearing at numerous public hearings as an expert
witness in regard to public sector accounting. Balfour (1866, p. 326) made
mention of the continued calls upon Anderson’s skills.

134

This contradicts a date of entry of 1832 given by J.M.Collinge in Office-Holders in Modern
Britain VII: Navy Board Officials 1660-1832.
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Mr Anderson of the Treasury, with an amount of practical knowledge
rarely acquired by any one officer, has given such frequent evidence
relative to the great defects in our national accounts that it is difficult
to restrict the extracts from his testimony showing how serious such
defects are.
In June 1845, Anderson was called before the Select Committee on Accounts of
Colonial Receipt and Expenditure which had been ordered by Parliament “to
examine into the Accounts of Colonial Receipt and Expenditure laid on the
Table of this House and to Report as to the mode in which it is desirable to
frame the same for the future, in order to introduce uniformity, regularity,
correctness, and completeness “(BPP 1845(520), p. 2). He was asked a series
of questions by the Committee in regard to the mercantile system of DEB and
its use elsewhere in the public service. As to the Navy’s accounting system that
had been replaced in 1832, Anderson described it as one by which “it was
impossible to render accurately a general account of the naval receipts and
expenditure. There were no books in existence from which the information could
be collected”. When questioned about the mercantile system in the Navy, he
observed that its development
commenced in the year 1826; but it was not fully established and
recognised as the only system upon which the books were kept in
that department till Sir James Graham was First Lord of the Admiralty
in 1832. The delay was occasioned by the reluctance which the Navy
Board felt to the introduction of the system as an innovation, and
probably showing matters much more in detail than was thought
advisable at the period. … (I)t was originally introduced by Sir John
(Deas) Thomson, who was a member of the Board; but he had a
majority against him, and he was obliged to give way till the Admiralty
issued a positive order (BPP 1845(520), p. 105).
In 1872, Anderson (now ‘Sir William’ and Assistant Comptroller and Auditor
General) was requested by the Committee Appointed by the Admiralty to
Inquire into the Audit, &c. of Naval Accounts to submit a memorandum On the
Subject of the System of Account in operation in the Department of the
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Accountant General of the Navy, the main object of which was to explain the
official proceedings which took place prior to the introduction of the Bill for the
abolition of the Navy and Victualling Offices in 1832. In the memorandum,
Anderson described the appointment135 of a “numerous Committee” from which
a sub-committee was selected, to which was referred “the clauses of the Civil
Departments Consolidation Bill that pertained to payments, account, and audit
for consideration” (BPP 1873(70), p. 86).

With such a brief the sub-committee was required to deal with two matters that
had arisen from the abolition of the Navy and Victualling Boards, first, the form
of the Navy Estimates and, second, the selection of the accounting system to
be used. The sub-committee was chaired by Graham, in his position as First
Lord of the Admiralty, and included Briggs, the new Accountant General of the
Navy, Charles Jones, the Solicitor of the Admiralty, and attended by others as
required, such as the Chairman of the Audit Board. Anderson, while not a
member, was required by Graham to attend all meetings because of his
intimate knowledge and experience with the accounting systems used in the
various departments. The sub-committee found that
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Anderson did not mention the date of the appointment, but it must have been in late
1831/early 1832, as Graham’s bill was read a first time on 14 February 1832 (Hansard, Third
Series Vol. 10, February 1832, Cols. 349-376).
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(t)here was no system, properly so called, existing in the Victualling
and Transport Departments, but an improved system of accounts,
according to strict mercantile practice, had been a few years under
trial in the Navy Office, under the direction of the Chairman of the
Committee of Accounts (Sir John Deas Thomson), but the Navy
Board, of which he was a member, being opposed to the introduction
of the mercantile system, under a mistaken idea that public accounts
were of so different a character that the system was not applicable to
them, the new books of account had never been officially recognised
by them (BPP 1873(70), p. 86).
It is to be noted that Anderson’s earlier comments which he had made in regard
to the ‘reluctance’ of the Navy Board to implement the internal system
developed by Deas Thomson, which are repeated in Chapter 2 of this study,
had now changed to refer to the ‘opposition’ of the Navy Board.

In his book, Life and Letters of Sir James Graham, Charles Parker quotes from
a letter from Welby dated 1905 to an unknown addressee. Welby, who had
been Permanent Secretary of Treasury for nine years, described the close
working relationship between Anderson and Graham as follows:
Sir William Anderson, when quite a young man outside the service,
had been picked up by Graham to aid him in devising the new
scheme of accounts in the Admiralty. How Sir James came across
him I do not know, but it was a singularly happy choice; and
Anderson was transferred afterwards to institute accounts and reform
financial procedures in other departments. In fact he is the author of
our present system of account throughout the service (Parker, 1907,
Appendix To Chapter VII, p. 166).
Welby was incorrect in that, firstly, Anderson had been employed in the public
service since 1825, and, secondly, Graham was not the architect of the new
system.
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7.4 Influential supporters
At a time when advancement was very dependent upon patronage, Deas
Thomson had connections with many of the leading men in government.
Perhaps most importantly he could trace through his mother a connection with
the illustrious family of Dundas, at a time when the politics and patronage of
Scotland were effectively dominated by Henry Dundas (1742-1811), the first
Viscount Melville, and afterwards by his son, Robert (1771-1851), the second
Viscount (Foster, 1978, p. 5). Robert Saunders Dundas, the second Viscount
who had taken the name of his wife, Anne Saunders, was appointed First Lord
of the Admiralty in 1812136 in the government led by Liverpool. Deas Thomson
was boastful about his connection with the Dundas family, an example being
his referral to Melville in the draft memorial addressed to the Duke of Wellington
mentioned above, “That your memoralist immediately set about introducing a
system of account with which his early habits rendered him familiar, of the
efficacy and value of which he can with confidence appeal to his respected
friend Lord Melville” (Grigg Family papers). Deas Thomson’s position in
Edinburgh society and in naval circles enabled him to become acquainted with
other notables including Lord Nelson and Lady Hamilton and Walter Scott.
These connections rather than his financial situation determined his standing
as a member of the upper middle classes (Foster, 1978, p. 5).

Following Deas Thomson’s advancement to the chairmanship of the Committee
of Accounts it is apparent that he took it upon himself to maintain a close

136 Robert Saunders Dundas, the second Viscount Melville, served as First Lord of the
Admiralty from 1812-27, and 1828-30.
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working relationship with Melville. On at least three apparently unofficial
occasions he provided Melville with written material on various aspects of the
financial administration of the Navy Office. The first occurrence was in late
1825 early 1826 when he sent a copy of the above-mentioned memorandum
he had prepared for the Navy Board in December 1825 in regard to the
business carried out under the direction of the Committee of Accounts (NMM:
ADM BP/47B). This he had referred to in a letter to Melville of July 1826, which
was the second occasion.
In December last (1825) with the view of directing the attention of my
colleagues to the state of the business transacted in the Committee
of Accounts I drew up a detailed statement of various duties of that
department.
I did myself the honor of sending your Lordship a copy thereof soon
after (NMM: ADM. BP/47B).
Deas Thomson went on to advise that
(s)ince the improvements therein suggested have been put in
operation, it affords me sincere pleasure to say they have been found
to answer in every respect and the new System of Accounts which
has brought more and more to assimilate with that in universal use in
the Mercantile world, will afford at all times a distinct and I trust
accurate view of the receipt, expenditure and mode of accounting for
all the money voted by Parliament for naval purposes or derived from
other sources (Emphasis in original) (NMM: ADM BP/47B).
The third occurrence was in August 1829 when at Melville’s behest Deas
Thomson provided him with a brief report on the system of account
recommended by B&B, to which Deas Thomson appended “a few brief remarks
on each of the principal books of account recommended by (B&B)” (TNA: T
92/153B) (Appendix 6.6).

Although Robert junior was made redundant in the May 1829 reforms of the
Navy and Victualling Offices, he returned to the Navy Office as Deputy
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Comptroller on the retirement of Henry Legge in October 1830. In a letter to
Henry Goulburn in September 1830 Melville described the role Robert played in
the reformation of the Navy’s accounting system.
Without my son’s support, neither Mr Thomson, nor Messrs
Brooksbank and Beltz, nor any other person would have had the
slightest chance of introducing a more effective system of accounts
in the Navy Office, and without which there can be no adequate
control in the superior authorities nor security for the public money;
but with Robert as Deputy Comptroller, the civil business of the
Board would be conducted efficiently and smoothly (NAS:
GD51/2/720/5).
Although no records examined mention any direct involvement in the project by
Robert Dundas, he was a member of the Committee of Accounts along with
Deas Thomson. In this role, he would have been well aware of the project and
its progress, probably to a greater extent than the other commissioners. This is
exemplified by his signature, along with that of Deas Thomson, appearing on
two memoranda that were submitted to the Navy Board, the first of 2 March
1826 advising of changes to the heads of expenditure (TNA: ADM 106/3512),
and the second of 13 February 1828 which accompanied the financial
statements as at 31 December 1827 prepared using Deas Thomson’s new but
unofficial accounting system (TNA: T 92/155). Although by reason of Melville’s
correspondence it is possible that he and his son Robert may have played a
supporting role in the development of Deas Thomson’s in-house accounting
system, it is possible to be cynical regarding the degree of support provided
due to Deas Thomson apparently having to confront the continuing antagonism
of Martin’s Navy Board during the development when, for most of that time,
Melville was First Lord of the Admiralty. Furthermore, the quality and quantity of
the support provided by Melville is doubtful when consideration is given to the
comments of an individual who had wide experience in the administration of the
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Navy, namely John Henry Briggs, who, in his book Naval Administrations, 1827
to 1892, wrote, “Lord Melville’s retrograde proclivities were only too well known,
and therefore nothing in the shape of reforms or improvements could
reasonably be expected during his tenure of office; expectation was not
disappointed”. Briggs (1897, p. 9) went on: “The administration of Lord Melville
was the era of donkey-frigates, overmasted sloops and coffin gun-brigs, and
was rendered memorable, in naval annals, by the substitution of carronades for
long guns, whereby the numerical strength of a man-of-war was increased at
the expense of her fighting efficiency except at close quarters”.

Deas Thomson also used his relationship with George Clerk who, like Melville,
had been appointed a Lord of the Admiralty under the Liverpool administration.
Clerk held that post until May 1827 when he was appointed to the office of Clerk
of the Ordnance. He returned to the Admiralty in February 1828 as a member of
Clarence’s Council being reappointed a Lord of the Admiralty on the Duke’s
resignation. He remained at the Admiralty until August 1830. In early 1827 Deas
Thomson sent Clerk copies of a statement of receipts and expenditure and a
balance sheet, probably as at the end of 1826 and undoubtedly prepared using
the in-house system, another example of Deas Thomson’s preparedness to
deal directly with individuals outside the Naval Office. With his experience in the
Navy, Clerk’s reply to Deas Thomson, which indicates an understanding of the
existing official system of accounting in the Navy, was most positive and very
supportive.
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In my opinion your system conveys a distinct and accurate idea of
the amount of the various branches of our naval expenditure, and
exhibits it, in our view, in a very perspicuous manner, which was
formerly impracticable under the system of collections (as they were
termed) of the sixty day and ready money bills according to the
system heretofore pursued.
I am sure that your system will be found of great service in
simplifying the naval accounts, and will prove of much benefit to the
preparation of the estimates. I can assure you that I feel very
anxious, both on account of the trouble you have had in digesting
and arranging this system, and also of the advantage which the
public will derive from its adoption, that it should be permanently
established and acted upon (Grigg Family papers).
Clerk also made similar positive comments about Deas Thomson’s system in
the Commons when he k advised that “(t)he present Accountant-general had
introduced, in lieu of the old system, a very improved system of accounts, upon
the basis of double entry” (Hansard, Second Series Vol. 23, March 1830, Cols.
935-936). In February 1831, he made reference to the system during the debate
in the Commons in regard to the Navy’s estimates:
A change, however, had lately taken place in the books. That change
was made by Mr Deas Thomson, the Accountant-general of the Navy
who had proposed new books of accounts, of which he had no doubt
the balance-sheet now produced by the right hon. Baronet (Graham),
was the result. That mode of keeping the accounts was tried for the
first time in 1826, as an experiment. There was a great doubt
whether that experiment would succeed, but after various trials,
improvements had been gradually introduced, till now, he believed,
the system had nearly arrived at perfection (Hansard, Third Series
Vol. 2, February 1831, Cols. 947-993).

7.5 The development of Deas Thomson’s in-house accounting
system in the Navy Office
The development of the in-house accounting system in the Navy Office
commenced on 1 January 1826 (TNA ADM 106/2719) under Deas Thomson’s
direction. B&B became aware of the development of the new system when they
commenced their review of the accounting system in the Navy Office in 1828.
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As outlined above, in December 1825, Deas Thomson, as Chairman of the
Committee of Accounts of the Navy Office, recognising that changes had
occurred in the various duties of the different offices within the Navy Office
since the advent of the committee structure in the Navy Board, had undertaken
a review of the accounting in the Department of Accounts in the Navy Office.

As a result of his review, Deas Thomson submitted a 21 page Memorandum on
that Branch of the Civil Service of the Navy, which relates to the Receipt,
Expenditure and Mode of Accounting for the money annually voted by
Parliament for Naval Services (TNA:ADM 106/2714), which has been
reproduced as Appendix 6.1. In this memorandum, dated 20 December 1825,
Deas Thomson initially described the estimating process for the naval services,
which had been described in the Sixth Report of the Select Committee on
Income and Expenditure of the United Kingdom 1816-18 in regard to the Navy
(BPP 1817(410)). This was followed by an outline of the appropriation process
then in place, after which he referred to the changes that had occurred in
regard to the management of the Navy Board with the establishment of the
committee structure. A brief description was provided of the operation of the
accounting offices, confirming the need for simplification of the accounting
processes which had been described by various commissions and committees
over the years. Deas Thomson was aware of the problems associated with
change which had been described by the Commissioners Appointed To
Examine, Take and State the Public Accounts in their Fifth Report of 1781.
Deas Thomson also referred to the Commission’s Eighth Report in which they
referred not only to the need for simplification but to uniformity and perspicuity
as well (TNA: ADM 106/2714). In the Memorandum Deas Thomson made a
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number of criticisms, a major one being in relation to the method of
abstracting137 and summarising expenditure which, in his opinion, resulted in
(t)he great desideratum appears to be, so to abstract and arrange
the payments made for the different kinds of store, and the
multifarious items comprehended in carrying on so extended a
service as that of the Navy, as neither to create perplexity by
unnecessary details, nor to omit that degree of perspicuity and
distinctiveness so necessary in all matters of this kind (TNA: ADM
106/2714) (Appendix 6.1, p. 7).
He pointed out that an attempt had been made earlier to abstract expenditure
“under certain printed heads, on different sheets of paper (but) the slightest
inspection of this system shews at once its ‘inutility’ and, in many instances, the
falsity of the deductions drawn from it” (Appendix 6.1, p. 7). When the Navy
Office was inspected three years later by B&B, they reported that the ‘Abstract’
consisted of “a large sheet of chequered paper, in the squares of which the
whole amount of the expenditure of six millions is to be digested; and which
Abstract is intended to supply the place of a regular Ledger” (BPP 1831(50), p.
12). In a memorandum to Melville of August 1829 (TNA: T 92/153B, p. 15)
Deas Thomson referred to the employment of a ‘General Abstract Register’ to
collect details of all expenditure of the Navy, and a ledger for the management
of personal accounts (TNA: T 92/153B, p. 15). However, as he advised Melville,
the maintenance of this register proved to be labour-intensive making it
necessary to condense the data. The concept was abandoned after a short trial
of “5 or 6 months” (TNA: T 92/153B, p. 15) in 1826.

137

To abstract expenditure is to collect and summarise accounting data under the various
heads. CAD without the inherent flexibility and accuracy of DEB is difficult and time consuming
to use for this purpose.
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Deas Thomson’s other major criticism was an organisational one which, in his
opinion, necessitated a reorganisation of responsibilities and duties within the
Navy Office in order to improve efficiency in the clerical and reporting functions,
and so ultimately simplify the preparation of the Navy’s accounts. It was
obvious that some alteration in the mode of transacting certain parts
of the business of the Cash Department of the Navy Office is
necessary. Indeed, to render the arrangements complete, it will be
absolutely expedient to draw a distinct line between the two offices,
called the “Bill and Treasurer’s Accounts Office”, and the “Office for
Examining Foreign and Home Accounts” (TNA: ADM 106/2714)
(Appendix 6.1, p. 7).
Such changes would also necessitate amendments to the existing heads of
expenditure and to this end Deas Thomson drafted a “Prospectus: Heads of
Expenditure for the Ledger” (TNA: ADM 106/2714). From various items of
correspondence138 between Deas Thomson and Martin, it is apparent that Deas
Thomson’s advocacy of both the organisational change and the amendment
and publication of an amended schedule of heads of expenditure in the
absence of the Navy Board’s formal approval caused acrimony between himself
and Martin which was to exist for many years to the disadvantage of both Deas
Thomson and the Navy. The problems are examples of the obstructionism Deas
Thomson had to confront from the time he commenced work on the new
system.

138

There is a plethora of documents and associated correspondence in regard to a
reorganisation of the Navy Office as had been espoused by Deas Thomson in his December
1825 memorandum (Appendix 6.1). Deas Thomson made his recommendation in a Minute of
the Committee of Accounts (Minute number 2333) dated 20 December 1825 (TNA: ADM
106/2714) and after many weeks of haggling between he and Martin, the Navy Board in
February 1826 “thought” that Deas Thomson’s “plan may be tried for twelve months” (TNA:
ADM 106/2714).
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With regard to the amended schedule, Martin’s management style can be
ascertained from the various papers on file. The first item, dated 2 March 1826,
which is reproduced in part as Figure 7.1 below, is a memorandum from the
Committee of Accounts to the Committee of Correspondence with which was
enclosed a lithographically produced copy of a schedule of heads of
expenditure to be used in the ‘abstract ledger’ in the trial system, work on which
commenced on 1 January 1826 (Only the headings of the schedule are shown
below.) (TNA: ADM 106/3512). It consisted of three columns: the heads of
expenditure; where voted in the estimates; and observations. The schedule was
designed to be of assistance to Board members and the accounting staff by
providing a link between the actual expenditure and the Parliamentary votes. As
multiple copies were required, Deas Thomson had had the schedule
reproduced using the quicker and cheaper method of lithography139.

FIGURE 7.1

C. A. 2nd. March 1826
The enclosed is submitted as a specimen of the improved mode in which it is
intended the Heads of the annual expenditure shall in future be kept in the Office,
upon reference to which it will at once be seen what has been expended on any of
the Services enumerated therein.
John Deas Thomson

139

Henry Legge

Lithography uses a plate on which only the image to be printed takes up ink.
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Navy Office
The Heads of the Annual Expenditure of His Majesty’s Navy, as inserted in
the Abstract Ledger, commenced the 1st of January 1826 alphabetically
arranged.

Heads of Expenditure

Where Voted in the

Observations

Estimates

(Source: TNA: ADM 106/3512)

On the final page Deas Thomson had appended the following note:
It may be found necessary, after this System has been fairly tried, to
subdivide some of these Heads, and to consolidate others. Therefore
this Prospectus, of what is intended by the Plan now proposed, can
only be considered experimental, at the outset (TNA: ADM
106/3512).
Martin objected strongly to the preparation, production and distribution of this
lithographed document, as can be seen from Figure 7.2 which lists the
questions /points that were put to Deas Thomson together with his replies (TNA:
ADM 106/3512).
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FIGURE 7.2

I shall be much obliged to Mr Thomson to inform me upon the following
points.
Questions/ points put to Deas
Thomson by Martin
1. By whose authority has
enclosed paper been printed?

Replies by Deas Thomson

the

By that of the Committee of Accounts - It is lithographic
not printed

2. Whether the arrangements of the
heads as they stand has been
submitted to the Board, and if so, the
date?

It has not been submitted to the board being considered
a matter of an arrangement in the offices under the
Committee of Accounts. This arrangement is specially
alluded to in a paper drawn up by Mr Deas Thomson for
the information of his colleagues and which was laid on
the Board Room table for the information of the Board
but never formally read, as it was objected to by the
Comptroller when the Minute of the Committee of Accts.
th
Of 20 December was under consideration in February.

I asked on the occasion in question if
the report was to the same purpose as
the papers I have previously seen and
being advised in the affirmative I said I
did not think it necessary, as far as I
was concerned, to hear it again.

No reply was made.

3. To what purpose is it intended to
apply the paper in question?

For the purpose of pointing out the heads of expenditure
in the system of accounts now under trial.

I can understand that proper office
books in the forms proposed may be
required in bringing out the heads of
expenditure as suggested; but why the
small lithographic copies; for what
purpose are they intended for (writing
unclear).

If this question applies to the lithographic statement of
the heads of expenditure of which copies were sent as
soon as prepared to the Comptroller and to the
Committee of Correspondence. The reasons for
adopting this mode of explaining the views of the
Committee are obvious viz. That not only every member
of the Board might have an opportunity of examining the
principle on which the new system of accounts was
formed, but that every one of the Clerks in the offices
under the Committee might see plainly and distinctly the
head of expenditure to which every payment whether
made by Bill or otherwise was applicable.

(Note: the above is not a repeat of a
previous point made by Martin. They
are to be found on separate pages.)

I shall be glad to see the minute of the
Committee for the lithographic copies
of the forms – it may tend to answer
any enquiries

Verbal orders only were given for the lithographic forms
alluded to.

Signed: Martin

Signed : Deas Thomson

6 March 1826

(Source: TNA: ADM 106/3512)
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The attitude displayed above by Martin is in direct contrast to the attitude he
had displayed when he had been called to answer inquiries made by the
Finance Committee in 1817 about the constitution and practice of the Navy
Board. In answer to the question “Do (the separate committees of the Navy
Board) make reports to the General Board?” Martin replied
Not on all occasions; if they have any doubt or any difficulty, they
always refer to the Board; but in the ordinary discharge of duties
belonging to those departments, they have power to execute them
themselves (BPP 1817(410), p. 205).
It is obvious from the manner in which Deas Thomson took it upon himself to
handle this matter that this would have been understood by him as being in the
ordinary discharge of his duties and did not need to be referred to the Navy
Board.

The next item of correspondence in connection with the “lithographed schedule”
is a four page memorandum of censure from Martin dated 9 March 1826
addressed to the Navy Board concerning Deas Thomson’s lithographed
document (referred to by him as “the lithographic statement”) which displays the
poor working relationship that existed between the two men. Martin wrote that
he wished “to express his opinion as to the objectionable mode by which this
measure has been matured and promulgated as an official regulation by an
individual Commissioner of this Board” (TNA: ADM 106/3512). Martin then
reminded the Commissioners of the Navy Board of his position by referring to
the Fourth Report of the Commissioners for Revising and Digesting the Civil
Affairs of His Majesty’s Navy (TNA: ADM 106/3512).
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According to the King’s Order in Council of 8 June 1796 the
Comptroller is at the head of each Committee; all divisions of duty in
the different Committees are directed to be made by the Comptroller,
with the assistance of the Chairman of the Committee; and in any
cases of importance recourse is to be had to the advice and authority
of the Comptroller or Board, as the nature of the case may require!!
(Exclamation marks in original) (TNA: ADM 106/3512)
Martin’s very public criticism of Deas Thomson not only created an acrimonious
working environment which did not dissipate, as will be seen later, he had also
belittled his own position which can be clearly seen in the wording of the Board
minute.
The Board considered the Comptroller’s statement in respect to the
measures adopted by the Committee of Accounts for altering the
plan of keeping the accounts of the naval expenditure and
promulgating the same. The Board also read Mr Deas Thomson’s
observations in answer to the said statement. The Board are of the
opinion that the grounds of complaint, as set out in the Comptroller’s
statement are just and reasonable, but being also of opinion, that the
evils complained of have arisen unintentionally on the part of Mr.
Deas Thomson, and giving him full credit for his zeal in the public
service (TNA: ADM 106/3512).
Further on in his memorandum, Martin stated that he was not questioning “the
propriety of bringing into a more distinct point of view the expenditure of the
Naval Department”. In the concluding paragraph he declared that in his opinion
Deas Thomson’s plan
may be adopted experimentally with a view to an improved method of
collecting the Accounts; but I object (as wholly unnecessary for that
purpose) to the two columns, one referring to the Navy Estimates,
the other appropriated to Observations and therefore recommended
their being omitted. The Lithographic papers which have been printed
are not required for any public purpose and had better be put aside
(TNA: ADM 106/3512).
Martin’s complaint was that he felt he had a right “to insist that no such change
shall take place without reference to the Board or myself and that we shall not
again find new arrangements issuing from the Lithographic Press unknown to
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any person at the Board” (TNA: ADM 106/3512). In their Fourth Report dated 9
July 1806, the Commission for Revising and Digesting the Civil Affairs of His
Majesty’s Navy had agreed that in cases of importance or complication the then
“present practice should be continued of having recourse to the advice and
authority of the Comptroller, or of bringing them before the Board for their final
decision, as the nature of the case may require” (BPP 1809(120), p. 8).

The next item of correspondence which demonstrates the opposition that Deas
Thomson and his new accounting system faced was a five page memorandum
to the Navy Board from him dated 10 March 1826 in which he expressed his
disappointment at the way he had been treated, using emotive words such as
“unquestionably extremely painful in defending himself from a charge that he
had assumed powers in his own person which were delegated to another” and
“to be compelled to enter into so minute a detail as the present”. Deas Thomson
also made mention of the innuendo that he had acted without authority
responding that
he (Deas Thomson) finds it has been the invariable practice of the
chief clerk in the Bill Office to change, alter and amend the heads,
under which the collection of ready money and sixty day bill have
been made, and to have these printed as well as the titles of all the
bodies in his departments without any other authority than his own,
and that this is no more than is done every day by any chief clerk in
the office without even considering it necessary to consult the
committee under which they act on the subject at all (TNA: ADM
106/3512).
He then referred to the rules and regulations of the Fourth Report under which
the Navy Office was supposed to work.
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It must be apparent to every member of the Board that this report in
question has become a dead letter and that some of the daily
practices of the office are not only in direct opposition to the very
letter and spirit of this report but in defiance of regulations to which
the particular attention of the Board has been called (TNA: ADM
106/3512).
Deas Thomson’s memorandum was followed by a minute from the Navy Board
which directed that the two columns of the “lithographed schedule”, the first of
which contained the particular vote for each head of expenditure listed, and the
second which could be used by accounting staff to note any observations they
wished to make, “be suppressed, as recommended by the Comptroller”, and
advised that in its opinion “the papers should not have been communicated to
any member of the Board of Admiralty before it had received the sanction of the
Board or Comptroller” (TNA: ADM 106/3512). Thus Deas Thomson received his
colleagues’ exoneration, approbation and mild rebuke. This incident highlights
the negative environment in which Deas Thomson had to labour during the
development of the trial system and supports the words of Anderson in his
memorandum to the Admiralty Committee to inquire into Audit of Naval
Accounts that the Navy Board “opposed the introduction of the mercantile
system” (BPP 1873(70), pp. 86-87).

Although from Anderson’s papers it would seem the new system had from the
start been designed around DEB, in his memorandum to the Navy Board of 20
December 1825 Deas Thomson noted that
(a)ny attempt to establish a regular set of mercantile books on the
plan of double entry would so completely overturn the whole of the
present system as to render most of the existing Regulations
nugatory, and in fact would require clerks formed to habits of quite a
different nature. Nor does this appear at all necessary (TNA: ADM
106/2714).
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The project team initially believed that in order to account for all the sums voted
by Parliament for every branch of the Navy Board it was only necessary to
abstract the various bill books and registers and post the resultant figures to the
ledger (TNA: ADM 106/2714). To do this, Deas Thomson advised, in his August
1829 report on the B&B system he had prepared at the behest of Lord Melville,
that a “General Abstract Register”140 (was) to collect accounting data and, with
this register and a series of subsidiary books in place, the use of DEB was
considered to be unnecessary (TNA: T 92/153B).

This remodelled CAD system using a “system of abstracts”’ was the second of
the “five systems of account to select from” which B&B referred to (listed in the
Introduction to Chapter 6). That this prototype initially met Deas Thomson’s
requirements is confirmed by a minute of the Committee of Accounts dated 12
May 1826 (Figure 7.3) which, together with a copy of these accounts, is shown
in Figures 7.3 (a), (b), (c) below. It will be noted in the second report, the Heads
of Expenditure, that the term ‘Abstract Ledger’ has been used instead of
‘Abstract Register’. As can be seen from an examination of the schedule of
expenditure, there was only very limited information available, for example the
item ‘Stores’ totalling £170,887 would have covered a multitude of different
items such as wood, tar, hemp, slops. The lack of information could have been
ameliorated by introducing further items or by maintaining subsidiary records
but the expansion of the list of heads of expenditure (amending the chart of

140

B&B described the Abstract Register as being used for the dissection of the 60 day Bill
Register. It was “a large and broad sheet of paper, divided into partitions and squares, in which
the sums are collected from the Registers according to the items of Expenditure required” (BPP
1829(290), pp. 18-19).
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accounts) in a CAD environment would have created extra work for the clerks
attempting to “prevent omissions and to ensure the accuracy of the results”
(TNA: T 92/153B) (Appendix 6.6). A matter that should be highlighted is that it
would appear from a brief review of the Balance Sheet that because it shows
both debit and credit balances it had been derived from a ledger based upon
DEB. This certainly was not the situation.

375

FIGURE 7.3 (a)

Minute of the Committee of Accounts 12th May 1826

The Committee has now the satisfaction of submitting to the Board a Statement
shewing the results of the New System of accounting for the receipt and
expenditure of Naval Money the quarter ending 31st of March last
It is not intended to bring these Accounts to a Balance every quarter, but only at
the end of each year.
The present Quarterly Statement has been prepared solely for the purpose of
exhibiting in a clear point of view, the result of the System introduced by the
Committee on the 1st January last, and to which particular allusion was made in
the Statement prepared by the Chairman of the Committee of Accounts and
annexed to the Committee's Report to the board of the 20th December last.
12 May 1826.
Notation
12 May 1826: Read to the Board

(Source: TNA: ADM 106/2719)
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FIGURE 7.3(b)
Balance Sheet of the Heads of the Expenditure of His
Majesty’s Navy for the Quarter ending the 31st of March 1826
exclusive of the Transport & Victualling Services
Dr
(to the nearest penny)
Cr
£
To amount paid by
sixty day Bills drawn
on the Treasurer in
1825
but
not
becoming due until
1826

209,639

s

d

3

£

16

3

9 By amount received
from the Exchequer
st
between the 1 of
st
Jan and 31
of
March 1826

1,230,016

13

1

By amount received
under the head of
Voluntary
Charge
st
between the 1 of
st
Jan and 31
of
March 1826

46,300

14

10

1,437,359
4
(Source: TNA: ADM106/2719)

2

1,216,854

4

6

Abating
therefrom
the amount of Sixty
Day Bills registered
in
the
Quarter
st
ending
the
31
March 1826 but not
becoming due until
April and May 1826

-178,791

2

8

Shows the amount
payable
by
the
Treasurer between
st
st
the 1 of Jan to 31
March 1826, to be

-2
9
11
________ ____ ____

15

6

189,659
8
1,437,359
4
(Note: this is an abridged version.)

8
2

To balance in the
hands
of
the
st
Treasurer on the 31
March 1826 under
the head of Navy

d

161,041

To amount paid by
Ready Money and
Sixty
Day
Bills,
drawn
on
the
Treasurer between
st
st
the 1 Jan and 31
March 1826; & for
wages
etc
paid
during the same
period;
as
per
Abstract
of
the
Expend. of the Navy
under specific heads
for
the
Quarter
st
ending 31
March
1826 enclosed

Abating
a
sum
deducted from a
Transport Bill No. 14
in 1826 that was
included in a former
Bill

s

By balance in the
hands
of
the
st
Treasurer on the 31
December 1825

1,247,699
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FIGURE 7.3(c)
The Heads of Expenditure of His Majesty’s Navy, as inserted
in the Abstract Ledger, commenced the 1st January 1826
alphabetically arranged, for the Quarter ending the 31st of
March 1826 exclusive of the Transport & Victualling Services
(to the nearest penny)
Heads of Expenditure

£

Advances for other Departments of Government
N.B. This Head includes stores furnished to the Ordnance and
Victualling Departments, and the Repairs etc. To Revenue Cruizers
Bounty to Chaplains
Breakwater
Coast Blockade
College – Royal Naval and School of Naval Architecture
Compassionate Fund
Contingencies of the Admiralty, Navy Office and Navy Pay Offices
Courts Martial - Expences of
Deserters – Apprehension of
Distressed Seamen – Subsistence of
Freight of Specie
Greenwich Hospital
Half Pay
Head Money
Hire of Vessels
Incidental Expenses at Home and Abroad
Law Charges
Longitude Board and Royal Observatory
Marine Clothing, Accoutrements, and Necessaries
Miscellaneous Allowances
Ordinaries at Home, Wages to Officers etc.
Packet Service
Passage Money
Pensions on the Ordinary Estimate of the Navy
Pilotage
Raising Men
Rents, Taxes paid for Property occupied for Naval purposes
Revenue Cruisers
Salaries
Salvage of Stores
Services Promiscuous
Signal Stations and Semaphores
Slop clothing and Bedding
Special Services
Stores
Wages to Seamen Afloat, Artificers and Labourers
Works New at Yards at Home and Abroad
st

Amount of Imprest Bill drawn on the Treasurer between the 1 of
st
January and the 31 March 1826 and imprested to different Public
Accountants, as shown in the Accountants Ledger, but the specific
Heads of Expenditure under which they are to be abstracted, cannot be
given until the respective Accounts have been received and examined.

s

d

-

-

-

1,268
3,021
1,426
569
6,228

6
6
10
11
1

118
39
1528
52
50,000
207,767
3,475
186
380
1,025
1,133
3,042
1,108
24,382
8,947
141
59,189
1,090
7
455
106
30,621
44
1,420
263
13,480
5,161
170,887
329,968
58,31
1,003,102

7
14
14
16
13
17
10
16
15
12
2
7
1
2
8
5
7
7
3
8
12
15
3
16
19
3
19
5
14
17
8

213,751

16

4

1,216,854

4

6

7
5
7
11
1
5
9
4
6
5
11
6
11
9
2

st

Expenditure of the Navy for the Quarter ending the 31 March 1826
exclusive of the Transport and Victualling Services
(Note: this is an abridged version.)

(Source: TNA: DM106/2719)
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Although the “system of abstracts” based upon the original CAD-based system
had been successful, Deas Thomson advised Melville that “it was found that a
repetition of the details contained in the subsidiary books not only rendered the
posting to the Abstract (Ledger) extremely laborious but at the same time
swelled out some of the accounts to such an extent as to make it absolutely
necessary to condense the entries” (TNA: T 92/153B). As a consequence it
was decided to abandon this system after “5 or 6 months” (TNA: T 92/153B)
and move to a DEB-based system. Nevertheless, the trial had not been in vain
for, as Deas Thomson observed,
It ... proved that in recording the cash transactions of numerous
accountants, it was necessary to adopt certain fixed principles to
prevent omissions and to ensure the accuracy of the results. The
principles were known to form the basis of the Mercantile System of
Double Entry, but the novelty of that system in a public office (this
being the first department in which it has been introduced) the want
of instruments acquainted with its principles and the partiality that
existed for the old forms rendered its introduction almost an
insuperable difficulty. It was nonetheless adopted in its mercantile
form without prejudging the deviations which it might be necessary
to make from it, to adapt it entirely to the wants of the office (TNA: T
92/153B) (Appendix 6.6).
Deas Thomson had pointed out the major difficulties he was to confront in
introducing his DEB-based system, the system’s novelty, the dislike for change,
and the lack of qualified staff, all of which rendered the introduction of his
system “almost an insuperable difficulty” (TNA: T 92/153B) (Appendix 6.6).
Following the preparation of the accounts for 1827 based on DEB (Figures 7.4
(a), (b), (c)) it is apparent from a comparison of them with those that were
prepared as at the end of first quarter of 1826 (Figures 7.3 (b) and (c)) that a
considerable amount of work must have been carried out by Deas Thomson’s
team. They provided a great deal more financial information and, overall, the
accounts are very much more sophisticated. A major change was the addition
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of a new Statement of Receipts and Expenditure which provided details of cash
movements instead of them being shown in the Balance Sheet which now
provided only details of amounts owing and amounts owed. Details of the gross
expenditure figure in the Statement of Receipts and Payments was provided in
a supporting statement of Heads of Expenditure. The Committee prepared a
memorandum on 13 February 1828 to which they annexed a Statement of
Receipts and Expenditure of the Navy, Victualling and Transport Services for
the year ended 31 December 1827, together with a Balance Sheet as at that
date. The members of the Committee were obviously proud of their efforts,
which can be seen from the memorandum.
It is with increased confidence that the Committee submit to the
Board the propriety of naming an early day for a final determination
in regard to the New System of Accounts, the results of a second
years trial being now before the Board, which the Committee
conceives proves their endeavours to place the accounts of the
Navy upon a more simple, regular and comprehensive footing to
have been attended with perfect success and affords ample
grounds for the sanction of the Board to its permanent adoption
(TNA: T 92/155 and ADM 106/3512) (Appendix 7.1).
The Committee went on to advise the Navy Board of some of the positive
attributes of the new system, in particular its flexibility and its ability to complete
accounting tasks more promptly. They advised that they considered the system
could be simplified and improved, and that
the method of keeping the accounts, so far from being attended
with additional expence (as has often been urged as an objection to
it) now that the numerous difficulties that have attended its
introduction have been completely surmounted, can be carried on
with considerably less labour, whilst as has been fully shewn, all
requisite information can be more easily and more correctly
afforded than under the system formerly in use (TNA: T 92/155 and
ADM 106/3512) (Appendix 7.1).
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FIGURE 7.4(a)

Minute of the Committee of Accounts 13th February 1828
The Committee now lay before the Board a Statement of the Receipt and Expenditure of the
Navy including the Victualling and Transport Services for the year 1827, together with a Balance
st
Sheet shewing the sums remaining due to or by this Department on 31 December last, with the
unappropriated balance available to the payments of 1828.
It is with increased confidence that the Committee submit to the Board the proprietary of
naming an early day for a final determination in regard to the New System of Accounts,
the result of the second years trial being now before the Board which the Committee
conceive proves their endeavours to place the Accounts of the Navy upon a more simple
regular and comprehensive footing to have been attended with perfect success and
affords simple grounds for the sanction of the Board to its permanent adoption.
st

By this System the Committee were enabled, as early as the 1 of January to lay before the
Board a detailed statement of the 60 day Bills issued during the preceding year, arranged under
all the various heads of expenditure, from which, with the documents now presented, any
information relative to the accounts of the Navy can be furnished to other departments of
government, or to members of the Board, with the greatest accuracy and dispatch.
If any one circumstance can prove the superiority of the new system it is that which has lately
occurred in making a Return to the Treasury Order communicated by Mr Barrow’s letter of the
th
14 of January viz for an account shewing the actual payments for Navy Services within each of
the years 1823, 1824, 1825, 1826 and 1827 under the heads into which the Navy Parliamentary
Estimates are divided, the compilation of which, for the years 1823 1824 and 1825 has, under
the Old System, occupied the Bills and Treasurer's Accounts Office and the Office for Foreign
and Home Accounts for nearly four weeks; whereas had it not been necessary to wait for the
th
Statement from the Victualling Board for 1827, which only came to hand on the 8 instant the
Accounts for 1826 and 1827 could have been made up from the new books, by either of the of
the two gentlemen employed in keeping them, in as many days.
The Committee do not think it necessary to trouble the Board with any further details, and have
only to add that the books for 1828 should the system receive the sanction of the Board may be
still further simplified and improved, and that the method of keeping the accounts, so far from
being attended with additional expence (as has often been urged as an objection to it) now that
the numerous difficulties that have attended its introduction have been completely surmounted,
can be carried on with considerably less labour whilst as has been fully shewn, all requisite
information can be more easily and more correctly afforded then under the system formerly in
use.
That the board may be able to investigate the subject completely, the books arising out of the
new system accompany this report.
Initialled by: John Deas Thomson and Robert Dundas.

Notations:
19 February 1828: Read to the Board.
22 February 1828: The Board will take this subject into consideration on Tuesday next the 26
instant.
7 March 1828: The Board does not think it expedient to take this subject into consideration at
this time as it is understood the Committee of Finance has got it before them.
(Emphasis added) (Source: TNA: T 92/155)
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FIGURE 7.4(b)
Statement of Receipts and Expenditure
of the Navy in the Year 1827
together with the Balances at the beginning and close of the Year – prepared according
to the New System of Accounts
Dr
(to the nearest penny)
Cr
Receipt
To Balance remaining
st
on the 31 Dec 1826
applicable to the
payments of 1827
To Amount voted for
the Services of 1827

£

s

d

602,214

9

6

6,125,850

-

7

To Extra Receipts
under the following
Heads:
Fees on Public
Instruments
Proceeds of the sale
of old stores

10,189

66,243

1

11

9

10

Proceeds of the sale
of old ships

6,239

9

8

Proceeds of the sale
of old slops

1,746

10

11

Receipts
miscellaneous
Rents of Naval
Premises
Rent of Dockyard
Traps
Sunn Hemp Balances
recovered,

982

3,870

1,937

8,224

11

18

18

9

6,827,499
2
(Note: this is an abridged version.)

9

11

3

7

10

Expenditure

£

s

d

By Gross amount
expended for the Navy
as per detailed
account rendered

4,959,504

15

1

66
238
6,385

4
6
19

2
4
11

17,748

10

5

70,473

6

7

51

18

1

Abate for Repayts.
under the following
Heads:
* Damage done to HM
ships
*Effects of seamen
* Marine necessaries.
*Repairs done & Stores
supplied to private
ships etc.
* Stores supplied to &
works performed for
other Depts.
* Widows Charity –
abatements for
* For unclaimed Bills,
cancelled
Net Expenditure of the
Navy in 1827

160

4

6

4,864,380

5

1

By Gross Expenditure of
Victualling Service

1,156,176

11

5

60,684

1

3

347,843

3

10

1,365

15

3

Total Net Expenditure
1827

6,306,351

16

10

By Balance 31 Dec
1827 applicable to 1828

521,148

6

0

Abate for Repayts. of
Victualling Service
By Gross Expenditure of
Transport Service
Abate for Repayts. of
Transport Service

6,827,499
2
10
(Source: TNA: T 92/155)
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FIGURE 7.4(c)
Heads of Expenditure
of the Navy in the Year 1827
(to the nearest penny)
Heads

£

By wages to seamen afloat
By Admiralty Office; Salaries and Contingencies
By Navy Pay Office;
do
By Navy Office;
do
By H.M. Yards, at home;
do and wages
By Cost of Timber and all other materials etc (incl. Bombay)
By Cost of Pilotage, salvage, head money etc
By H.M. Yards abroad, salaries, wages & contingencies
By Royal Naval College; School for Naval Architecture
By Ordinaries, Wages to Officers, Shipkeepers and men
By Packet Service, including purchase of packets
By Half pay to Flag Officers
By Pensions to Officers in the military-line of the Service
By Bounty to Chaplains
By Compassionate Fund
By Widows Charity
By Pensions to widows of Marine Officers
By Greenwich Hospital, in part of the Grant of £260,000.0.0
By Pensions to Officers in the Civil-line of the Service
By Repairs and Improvements in the Yards
Money impressed to accountants, principally abroad; of the
expenditure of which no accounts have yet been received
Gross amount expended for the Navy
(Note: this is an abridged version.)

s

d

1,146,912
61,612
32,530
72,955
695,204
890,595
100,695
70,420
6,659
107,576
40,341
873,823
130,072
1,414
9,658
106,500
9,529
235,000
128,665
234,535

1
13
13
8
15
6
6
5
4
1
12
17
13
7
5
19
10

11
6
8
4
4
5
1
2
10
3
11
5
6
10
1

4,801

12

10

4,959,504
15
1
(Source: TNA: T 92/155)

383

FIGURE 7.4(d)
Balance Sheet of the Navy
for the Year 1827
(as delivered to the Navy Board by Mr Thomson)
(to the nearest penny)
Dr

Heads of Accounts

£

s

d

543,943
176,970
4,954
282
125
446
3,011
6,538
1,939
4,662
12,184
89
291
145
404

8
11
10
1
4
2
17
8
9
6
5
9
8
1

9
4
9
3
4
8
11
9
9
8
10
8
4
7

391

19

11

2,609

12

-

324
6
231
13
17
16
14

5
19
17
19
8
19
5

8
10
7
2
11
1
8

Cr

£

s

d

74
13
1,317

3
15
12

11
11
8

256,248

2

9

15,896

4

8

521,148

6

10

794,698

6

9

st

HM Exchequer as at 31
December 1827
Treasurer of the Navy
Paymaster of Marines
Greenwich Hospital
Widows Charity
Paymaster of the Navy
Clerk of the Check at Deptford
Clerk of the Check at Woolwich
Clerk of the Check at Chatham
Clerk of the Check at Sheerness
Clerk of the Check at Portsmouth
Naval Officer at Deal
Naval Officer at Harwich
Naval Officer at Leith
Naval Officer at Haulbowline
Naval Officer at Antigua at 30 Jun
1827
Naval Officer at Bermuda at 30 Jun
1827
Naval Officer at Bombay at 31 Dec
1826
Capt. Gouch Raising men in Town
Capt. Pryce Raising men at
Liverpool
Lieut. Knevitt Holden Hill
Semaphore
Lieut. Wilddey
Lieut. Spiller Admiralty Semaphore
Lieut. Smith Portsmouth
Semaphore
Mrs Frodsham, Housekeeper Navy
Off
Joshua Thorne, Converter of
Timber
Commissariat Department
Bills Payable, for bills not falling
due till after 1st January 1828
East India Company, for bills drawn
by our agents in India
Navy Supplies, for balance
remaining on the 31st December
1827, available to the payments of
1828 (see Appendix 7.2, 1 of 2)
.

794,698
(Note: this is an abridged version.)

6

9

(Source: TNA: T 92/155)
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Having changed over to a system based on DEB (the third of B&B’s “five
systems”), the new system was trialled for one year after which it was
concluded that it would not be advisable to institute any major change until the
clerks in the Navy Office had gained further experience using the system and
until after any requests for change received from the users had been thoroughly
considered. Since the date of B&B’s review in 1828 some improvements were
made consisting principally of an improved journal and a more secure process
of posting to the ledger (the fourth of B&B’s “five” systems). After the trials of the
“the mercantile system”, Deas Thomson believed that
(a)though grounded on self-evident principles, it was nevertheless
defective in certain particulars and that the relation established
between the Journal and Ledger rendered it possible for the
Bookkeeper to make cross-entries in the Journal, and then to
transcribe them in the Ledger and thus conceal neglect and even
fraud (TNA: ADM 106/2714).
To overcome this problem Deas Thomson had the journal and ledger prepared
by different individuals.

Following his review of both the existing original system and Deas Thomson’s
system, Abbott prepared a series of ‘charts’ of the accounting procedures within
the Navy Office (BPP 1829(290), p.40). An example of one of his ‘charts’, Chart
of the New System Under Trial at The Navy Office, circa 1828, has been
prepared and is shown below (Figure 7.5). Abbott’s chart is a very lucid
technical document which supports his high standing as a professional
accountant within accounting and government circles.
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CHART OF THE NEW SYSTEM UNDER TRIAL AT THE NAVY OFFICE

FIGURE 7.5

(extracted from the Report of P. H. Abbott to the Lords of the Treasury)
Office for Bills &Treasurer’s Accounts

Note: Stores and work
are paid for by Sixty-day
Bills; other services by
what are called Ready
Money Bills

1. Examines and adjusts
all claims for stores
delivered, or work
executed by contract.
2. Examines and checks
the Treasurer’s account
3. Prepare Bills on
Treasury, to be signed by
three Commissioners, and
enters them in the
respective Register below.

A weekly Account of Money required to
pay 60 day Bills falling due, and an
Estimate of the probable demand for
Ready Money is, after being submitted
to the Committee, forwarded to the
Treasurer, with directions to solicit the
sum from the Treasury.

Registers of Bills (10)
Registers of Service (7)
1. Salaries
2.Pensions
3.Compassionate Fund
4. Pilotage
5. Packet Service
6.Subsistence of
Distressed Seamen
7. Blockade Service

At the end of every month
the Total of Bills issued
for each of these heads of
service, together with the
Total Expenditure of the
Transport and Victualling
Board are entered in the
Journal.

Registers of Bills combing the nature of Bill Book and Cash
Book (3)

Office for Home &
Foreign Accounts
Examine Accounts of:
 Clerks of the
Check of Dock
Yards, Home
and Abroad.
 Officers of
Establishments
Home and
Abroad
 Parties
imprested with
money.
 H.M.’s Consuls
 Paymaster of
Marines
These various
Accountants have
printed instructions as
to the nature of the
vouchers, and are
required to transmit
quarterly accounts.
Those who are not
periodical accountants
transmit their accounts
and vouchers with the
letter of advice of bills
drawn.
Quarterly accounts are
rendered in Dr and Cr

Office for Seamen’s’
Wages
Checks and examines
the payments in
 London and at
the Outports
 For Half-pay
 Wages in
general
Weekly Accounts are
rendered by
 Paymaster of
Navy
 Cashiers for
Wages
 Cashiers for
Officers Bills
Pay Clerks at ports of
payments made and
balances in hand.
By the comparison of
the above reports, and
the probable wants of
this branch, are
grounded demands first
submitted to the
Committee, who
authorises the
Treasurer to solicit a
Treasury Order.
The whole are entered
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Imprest Register
Bills at sight, to be
afterwards accounted
for.
From hence posted
into:

Imprest Ledger
In which each Bill is
placed to Dr. of the
Accountant, or person
drawing, who is
afterwards credited
by the amount of
disbursements,
shown by the books
of the Home and
Foreign Accounts.
But the Accountant
may have received
monies for Old
Stores, which do not
make their
appearance in this
Ledger.

Promiscuous
Register Bills at sight
for all Miscellaneous
Services; its contents
are entered in an
Abstract Book, and
from thence in the
Journal.

60 Days Register
All Bills for Stores
delivered; these are
daily posted into an

Abstract Register
Under the heads of
service for which
they are drawn as
for Timber, Stores
etc. At the end of
the month the
Register is totalled,
and entered, under
the title of “Stores
received under
contract”, in the
Journal.

between the accounting
party and the
Government, marking
against the
disbursements the No
of Voucher supporting
each charge; the subaccountant debiting
himself for all monies
by imprest bills or
voluntary charge.
These accounts, when
received, are entered in
abstract in one of a set
of books allotted to the
accountant from whom
they are received.
Separate accounts are
kept therein for each
distinct head of receipt
and expenditure, and a
column for the date of
each item, the no. of
each voucher, and any
observations on
informality or otherwise;
and lastly a column for
the decision of the
Committee of Accounts
thereon.
On a folio at the end of
each book an account
current, with printed
items for the different
heads of expenditure is
opened; and also for
each head of receipt;

under the head of
Wages, in the Journal.
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the total of these
corresponds with the
balance of the original
account.
An entry is made to the
debit of each head of
expenditure, to the
credit of the accountant
in the Journal.

Note: - As soon as possible after the end
of the year the Books are closed, and a
Balance-sheet together with a Statement
of Total Receipts and Expenditure under
each head of service, is laid before the
Committee of Accounts, who present it to
the Board for their information.

JOURNAL

LEDGER

FIGURE 7.5

(Source: BPP 1829(325), p.40)
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On 7 March 1828 the Navy Board, after consideration of the material provided
by the Committee of Accounts, resolved that it “does not think expedient to take
this subject into consideration at this time as it is understood the Committee of
Finance has got it before them” (TNA: ADM 106/2714).There is nothing on
record that indicates that the Navy Board took any formal action to bring to the
attention of the Finance Committee the progress that had been achieved in the
development of the Navy Board’s in-house accounting system. It took another
four years for Deas Thomson’s system to be sanctioned for use in the Navy.

7.6 The December 1830 review of progress in the installation of
B&B’s system
It was noted in Chapter 6 that B&B, in December 1830, received a request from
the Admiralty, via the Treasury, “that they might be instructed to ascertain at the
Navy and Victualling, and at the Navy Pay office, what progress has been made
in preparing for the introduction of (B&B’s) new system of accounts to
commence on 1st January next” (TNA: T 92/54). From their inquiries and
inspections, B&B were able to inform the Treasury in a report dated 15
December 1830 that there was “no impediment or difficulty in the way of the
commencement of the new System of Account from the 1st January next” (TNA:
T 92/54).

B&B then made reference to the various “defects” they had considered existed
in Deas Thomson’s system and which they had “adverted to in (their) Report of
9th February 1829”’, that is their First Report to the Lords of the Treasury. These
were “alterations”, (TNA: T 92/54) that is changes, which he would need to
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make to his system in order to make it equivalent to B&B’s approved system. If
not made, the Navy Board would not meet the requirements of Treasury as
outlined in its minutes of July 1829 and December 1830. B&B were of the
opinion that the defects in Deas Thomson’s system “arose out of peculiar official
arrangements which had long established and over which he had no means of
effectual control” (TNA: T 92/54). The first “defect” was the absence of a good
cash account of actual receipts and payments promptly made up and delivered
by the Treasurer of the Navy which would lead to the entry in the books of the
orders for payment instead of actual payments. The second “defect” was the
blending of payments made by the Sub Accountants from appropriations in
different financial years, and the third “defect” was “some technicalities incident
to the Mercantile Journal and Ledger which (they) considered by the
establishment of a good and comprehensive Cash Account, be simplified and
improved for the particular Transactions of the general routine of business in the
Departments of Government” (TNA: T 92/153B). Although B&B’s report was
read to Treasury on 17 December, the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury on
the same day directed that the application of the new system to any public
department in which it is not already introduced in practice, be suspended till
further orders (BPP 1831(50), p. 48) as a result of Parnell’s intercession (TNA:
T 64/395).

7.7 Deas Thomson’s system
As discussed in Chapter 6, Deas Thomson at Martin’s direction prepared for
the Navy Board a 14 page memorandum dated 21 October 1829 that offered
“such observations on the recommendations of the Commissioners for Stating
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Public Accounts (B&B) respecting the Cash Transactions of this Department
(the Navy Board) as should occur to him” (TNA: ADM 106/2739). He then
prepared outlines of the system “now in use” (the trial system) and “that
proposed to be substituted for it” (B&B’s system). Figure 7.6 below provides a
comparison of the two systems based upon the outlines Deas Thomson
prepared for the Navy Board. It is obvious from the tone of his report that Deas
Thomson saw this as an opportunity to have his accounting system
reconsidered given the hostility of the Navy Board towards the system
advocated by B&B. It was obvious from the Treasury Minute of February 1830
that the Treasury and the Admiralty were intent on replacing the existing CAD
accounting system and that the Navy Board’s wishes counted for little. Deas
Thomson’s system was an acceptable alternative to the Navy Board if a new
system could not be avoided.
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FIGURE 7.6

Comparison of Deas Thomson’s system with that of B&B

Deas Thomson’s System

B&B’s System

Cash book:
The cash book is a daily record of the
receipts and payments of the Treasurer of the
Navy, as far as the same are rendered daily.

Cash book:
The cash book is to cover all receipts and
payments of the Treasurer BUT in the detail
previously described by B&B. It is to be a
literal copy of the Treasurer’s cash book. NO
cash transactions of the sub-accountants at
home and abroad are to be posted via the
cash book.
Cash transactions of Sub-Accts. at home and
abroad are to be rendered and passed weekly;
on their receipt they are to be entered in the
journal and ledger.

Journal and Ledger:
In the Journal and Ledger are included all the
cash transactions of the Navy. All bills
issued by the Navy Board are debited to the
heads of expenditure or, in the case of
imprests (i.e. advances) to the individuals to
whom issued. The credit is to bills payable.
The Imprest and Promiscuous Bills are
journalised and posted daily, all other
monthly. The Treasurer’s voluntary receipts
(e.g. sales of old stores) and his payments
under the several heads of wages, bills
payable etc. are entered and posted monthly.
Cash transactions of sub-accountants at
home and abroad are debited to the heads of
expenditure and credited to the imprest
accounts monthly.

Journal:
The journal is to embrace the details of all the
cash transactions of sub-accountants both
home and abroad, and such other entries that
cannot be passed through the cash book.

Period end:
Quarterly
Quarterly statements are prepared and for all
the cash transactions including those of
accountants both home and abroad.
Annually
The books are closed as soon as possible
after the end of the year, and the balance
determined and transferred to the books for
the succeeding year.

Period end: The books are not to be closed
until the receipt of every account from abroad
for the period to which they relate. Monthly
accounts are to be prepared for the Admiralty
and Treasury.

Ledger:
The ledger will be posted from the cash book
and the journal. For all bills issued, the heads
of expenditure are not to be debited until the
actual payment is made.

(Source: TNA: AD106/2739)
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Payments are made by bills or cash. The bills were recorded in nine different
registers: Stores, Victualling, Marine, Miscellaneous, Non-Effective, Full-Pay,
Pilotage, Distressed Seamen, and Imprest141. The first eight registers were
confined to final payments while the Imprest Register was used for sums on
imprest and not finally accounted for. The journal entries for the first five
registers were abstracted daily into an ‘Abstract of Bills’ under the various
heads. The next three registers having been opened for one specific service
did not require abstraction. At the end of a month the eight registers were
totalled by debiting the various ledger accounts and crediting the account ‘bills
payable’. The use of abstract books was described by Cory as being “one of
the best modifications that has ever been made in the Italian method of
accounts” (Cory, 1840, p. 112). The abstract books acted as subsidiary ledgers
which were necessary to relieve the journal and the ledger of the large volumes
being handled by the clerks142. The journal and the ledger were kept apart and
both of them were posted from the original documents and abstract-books
independent of each other. They remained separated until they were presented
to the examiners from the Audit Office, who compared the entries and, if they
found them to be correct, inserted the reference folios and pages in each.
Every omission or inaccuracy was therefore immediately detected. This
expedient was also an effectual security against posting to wrong accounts, a
type- of error which balancing will not detect (Cory, 1840, pp. 116-117). Deas
Thomson in his report to Lord Melville voiced his opinion that,

141

These are payments made on account to designated and approved individuals in advance of
expenditure. They are similar to CAD.
142
Cory mentions that the number of bills that were being issued was 22,000 annually (1840,
p109).
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a Bill given to a Claimant in payment of an article delivered or for a
service performed is in every respect an actual payment, the
Claimant being satisfied and the service being at an end; and it is
most properly recorded under the date when the settlement of the
claim took place (TNA: T 92/153B).
B&B, however, “considered all Bills issued as prospective payments” and
therefore “no entry should be made in the Ledger until they are returned paid
by the Treasury” (TNA: T 92/153B)143. Reverting to the language of CAD, it is
therefore apparent that B&B were not prepared to recognise there had been a
discharge until the physical payment had been made. It is a further example of
B&B’s “close concern with the underlying personal accountability of officeholders in a hierarchical system where the objective was to demonstrate that
payments had validly taken place within delegated powers” (Edwards et al.,
2002, p.650). It was an example of their predisposition “towards retention of the
essential features and attributes of CAD accounting within the planned new
system of accounting” (Edwards et al., 2002, p. 651).

As the bills were paid, as advised by the Treasurer, the bills payable account
would have been debited and the Paymaster General or cash account credited.
The same treatment applied to the imprest bills prepared for the imprest
accountants both at home and abroad, debit entries being made to a
receivables account in the general ledger in the name of the party to whom the
imprest advance had been made. The credit entry was to the same ‘bills

143

In his memorandum of 21 October 1829, Deas Thomson advised that the objections of B&B
to his system could be reduced to 1. the blending of prospective with actual payments; 2. mixing
the transactions of accountants for one year with those of the succeeding year; and 3. the use
of the short ledger entry vs. the narrative long form recommended by B&B which was
synonymous with B&B’s support for personal accountability (TNA ADM 106/2739).
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payable’ account to which the monthly total for the first eight registers was
credited.

Cash payments include all payments made by the Paymaster General on lists,
and on general or permanent orders, through his paymasters in town or his pay
clerks at the ports, such as wages on ships’ books, allotments, salaries, and
non-effective charges such as pensions and half-pays. At the close of a month,
the various heads of service were debited and the Paymaster General credited.
The one departure from the above and that was the quarterly salaries of the
establishments in town and at the ports, the difference from bills arising from
the payments being ‘net’ of deductions such as superannuation.

On receipt of an account from an imprest accountant, together with supporting
vouchers, a review of the cash transactions were made and, if approved, they
were abstracted under the various heads of service, journalised and posted to
the ledger, quarterly.

In Deas Thomson’s system the books were closed as soon as possible after
year-end and the closing balances transferred to the following year’s books
(TNA: T 92/153B). The measurement basis used was “modified cash”, although
he makes no mention of a specified period after year-end within which they
would have had to have been paid or be cancelled. It was not “cash
accounting”, nor was it “accrual accounting” even though a balance of unpaid
bills at year-end was carried forward to the next financial year. In his
memorandum to the Navy Board, Deas Thomson took the opportunity of
making the following comments to the Board.
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Such is the simple outline of the system now in operation, and which
the Accountant General conceives he may be allowed to say is in
every respect calculated to meet the needs of the service, with every
regard to economy and despatch, whilst the results produced by it,
have met with the entire approbation of the Lords Commissioners of
the Admiralty, as signified by Mr Barrow’s letter of 19 th March last
(TNA: ADM 106/2739).
At the conclusion of his memorandum Deas Thomson advised the Navy Board
that the new system that was “simple and efficacious”, “which had stood the
test of experience and (was) working to the perfect satisfaction of all parties
and to the conviction of those who originally most avers to its introduction”
(TNA: ADM 106/2739). His final words to his colleagues was that
Having performed his duty in submitting the foregoing remarks to the
Board, the Accountant General leaves to their wisdom the adoption
of such measures as, under the circumstances of the case, they may
judge most expedient for the public service (TNA: ADM 106/2739).
It is unfortunate that Barrow’s letter seems not to have survived. However, by
1831 it is obvious that from comments made by Deas Thomson’s son Edward
in a letter to his father of July 1831 that Deas Thomson’s efforts were finally
being recognised.
I am happy to learn, that your exertions in establishing the new
system of accounts has at length attracted attention in those quarters
where its merits are likely to be appreciated. There is an excellence
about the system, which I have felt confident all along, could not fail
in time to annul all opposition to its permanent introduction, and I
should not be surprised to find it’s early and most strenuous
opponents compelled to acknowledge its superiority. This once
effected, the example will be followed by other departments of
Government, and you will have the proud satisfaction of having
introduced a system, which showing at a glance, the expenditure for
any service, will enable the public to judge whether the benefit is
worth the expence – and thus the most important saving to the
Country will be effected (Mitchell Library, Thomson family papers).
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7.8 Selection of Deas Thomson’s system following the abolition
of the Navy and Victualling Boards
Following Graham’s appointment as First Lord of the Admiralty on the election
of the Whigs in November 1830, he appointed a committee in 1831 to discuss
the clauses of the then forthcoming Civil Departments Consolidation Bill (later to
be known as the Admiralty Act). The clauses relating to accounting and audit
were referred to a sub-committee and it was from their work that the annual
Naval Appropriation Account emanated. The other important matter the subcommittee considered was the selection of the accounting system to be used by
the Admiralty following the abolition of the Navy and Victualling Boards. There
were three different accounting systems that were available: the system in use
in the Victualling Office, the old Navy Office system, and Deas Thomson’s new
system which was under trial in the Navy Office (BPP 1873(70), p.86). The
following are excerpts from a memorandum prepared by Anderson in 1873.
The Sub-Committee inquired carefully into this subject, as Sir James
Graham was strongly of the opinion that an efficient system of
accounts was the keystone of his financial reforms in the Naval
Department: they extended, moreover, the range of their inquiries,
and they found that the commercial system of accounts had been for
a considerable period in successful operation in France, where it
embraced the whole of the national accounts. The most conclusive
evidence, however, of the value of the double entry was its universal
adoption by the intelligent mercantile world, as that which was best
adapted to record and methodise the complicated and multifarious
operations of trade, for which it had been used in all commercial
countries, almost from the first dawn of commerce.
As this was the first instance in which the commercial system of
double entry was applied to the accounts of a great public
department in this country, Sir James Graham considered it prudent,
in a practical question of this kind, to consult Mr. Poulett Thomson,
whose knowledge of commercial and financial accounts gave great
weight to his opinion; and strengthened by Mr Thomson’s
recommendations, the Sub-Committee decided upon the adoption of
that system for the general accounts of the consolidated Naval
Department (BPP 1873(70), p. 86-7)
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This meant that, finally, Deas Thomson’s trial system had been formally
sanctioned.

This was later recognised on 13 March 1844 in a Return to an Order of the
Honourable House of Commons, which required each of the public departments
to prepare a Statement of Changes which have been introduced into the Public
Departments in the System of Book-keeping since the Report on the
Exchequer, made by the Commissioners of Public Accounts in 1832. In
response, John Thomas Briggs, then the Accountant General of the Navy,
prepared a Statement of Changes that the Admiralty had introduced in its
system of bookkeeping since 1832 in which he confirmed that the accounting
system was based upon the Italian system of DEB “in its most improved form”.
This system, though partially in force at the late Navy Office … in
(1832), was extended so as to embrace the whole of the naval
departments when the Navy and Victualling Boards were abolished,
and principal officers appointed in lieu, under the Act (2 Will.4) c. 40
(1st June 1832) (BPP 1844(364), p. 2)144.
“By most improved form” Briggs was referring to the various modifications that
had been made to the original DEB-based system, including the replacement of
quarterly with monthly entries and postings of the sub-accountants expenditure
on home and foreign stations into the journal and ledger, the use of subsidiary
ledgers to reduce the volume of entries to the journal and postings to the
general ledger and to facilitate reference to the transaction details and original
documents, all of which rendered a more cohesive and efficient accounting
system. This is the fourth system in B&B’s list of systems available to the Navy.

144

In 1845 Briggs advised the Select Committee on Colonial Accounts that “the completion, the
full introduction of (the new system)” was in 1832 (BPP 1845(520), p. 31).
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In consequence of these modifications and auxiliaries to the system,
the Naval Department has been enabled to lay before Parliament,
annually, a correct balance sheet of its receipts and expenditure,
without which it is doubtful whether the same could have been
rendered within the time prescribed by Act (2 Will. 4) c. 40 (BPP
1844(364), p. 2).
In accordance with s.30 of the Admiralty Act the Admiralty was to prepare each
year, on or before the thirtieth of November, “an Account, to be signed and
attested by the Accountant General of the Navy, of the Naval Receipt and
Expenditure for the Year ending on the Thirty-first day of March preceding,
distinguishing the Expenditure under the several Heads of Naval Service, as
expressed in the Appropriation & or Acts of that Year” (2 Will 4), cap. 40”. The
account was to be audited by the Commissioners for Auditing the Public
Accounts following which a certified audited copy of the account was to be laid
before the Commons on or before the thirty-first day of January following if
Parliament was sitting or, if not, within one week after Parliament assembled.
This was the annual “balance sheet”’ that

Welby referred to in his

memorandum to the Select Committee on Public Monies; it was to be called the
“Navy Appropriation Account”. Here was the way by which the ‘great blot’ on
the British financial system, as described by Welby, was to be remedied, for the
Commons was at last provided with the means of knowing how its grants had
been expended.
The precedent thus created was applied in later years to other great
divisions of public expenditure, and has formed the model on which
the Appropriation Accounts are now rendered. It is the first instance,
as far as I am aware, in which a minister grasped the importance, I
might say the necessity, of laying before the House of Commons a
return of actual expenditure (BPP 1902(387), p. 229).
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Unfortunately, as Welby pointed out, as the Act did not require the Commons to
pass judgement on the account, it practically passed year by year without the
notice which it really deserved (BPP 1902(387), p. 229).

The major change to Deas Thomson’s accepted system which was
subsequently introduced arose from the books not being closed at year-end 31
March, but would be left open for a further seven months to 31 October at
which time an Appropriation Account (a statement of receipt and expenditure
or, as was referred to by many, including John Barrow, as “a balance sheet of
receipt and expenditure” (BPP 1837(78), p. 1)) would be made up. The extra
seven months would allow the outstanding bills to mature and be paid. It would
appear that any bills that remained unpaid as at 31 October were to be
cancelled and the votes to which they had been charged would be credited.
Any of the outstanding bills presented after that date would need to be treated
as a new bill (Cory, 1840, p. 104). As a result there would be zero balances in
the bills payable accounts and, hence, the measurement basis of the system
became ‘cash’. A further change made was that the lack of narrations in the
ledger accounts was found to be inconvenient which vindicates, in part, the
recommendation made by B&B on the subject (Cory, 1840, p. 118). In addition,
there were two sets of closing entries: the first was carried out on 31 March
when the books were closed preparatory to new ones being opened on 1 April;
the second closing entry was made on 31 October when the accounts of the
expenditure of the financial year ended 31 March were wound up (Cory, 1840,
p. 118). The first closing entry was performed by striking a balance on every
account in the ledger, and closing them by posting the balances, in total, to a
‘balance account’. The new accounts were opened on 1 April by reversal of
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these entries. To accommodate this system, the ledger contained two columns
under each head of service, one for the past financial year ended the previous
31 March to which was posted any arrears paid for that year in the seven
months to 31 October.

7.9 Final words in regard to the work of Deas Thomson
The debates in regard to the estimates of the Navy for 1832 would have been
of considerable interest to Deas Thomson. He would have been both elated
and disappointed as to the manner in which he personally had been treated by
three members of the Commons. George Clerk referred in Parliament to the
departure of a number of commissioners on the abolition of the Navy Board.
This included Deas Thomson, who, Clerk advised, was replaced by the
individual who had been Graham’s private secretary, namely John Thomas
Briggs, his appointment as Accountant General being made by Graham. Prior
to being appointed to the position of Graham’s private secretary, Briggs had
been the Assistant-Secretary to the Cash Committee of the Victualling Board.
The right hon. Baronet opposite has placed his own private
Secretary, who had been Assistant-secretary to the Cash Committee,
in that office, over the heads of all the old servants of the public.
Now, for an administration which professed to discard patronage, this
was indeed most extraordinary behaviour. He did not mean to find
fault with the individual who had been appointed to that office-he
believed that he was fully competent to discharge all the duties of itbut he was quite certain, that if the right hon. Baronet had retained
his seat on the Opposition Benches, and the late Administration had
made such an office, and such an appointment, the right hon.
Gentleman would have called it a scandalous job (Hansard, Third
Series Vol. 2, February 1831, Cols. 947-993).
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Graham in an insensitive and even insulting manner replied to Clerk’s
accusations in an attempt to reassure the Commons that he had only acted in
the best interests of the Navy. He confirmed that
(i)t did so happen, that, by the constitution of the (Navy) Board, the
deputy chairman was chairman of accounts, and, without meaning
the slightest disrespect to naval gentlemen, he must say, that if the
gallant members of that profession were less fit for any one service
than for another, that service was presiding over public accounts.
The Chairman (of the Committee of Accounts) was old, was entitled
to superannuation and to his pay, and it was thought that it would be
desirable that he should retire (Hansard, Third Series Vol. 2,
February 1831, Cols. 947-993).
Leaving aside Graham’s error in describing Deas Thomson, although not by
name, as the Chairman of the Committee of Accounts when he was the
Accountant General, his reply was in effect a disparagement of the work of
Deas Thomson. There were, however, some positive words for Deas Thomson
from Parnell.
The country was much obliged to the person who had reduced the
Navy Accounts to a system of Double Entry; and it would be most
useful if it was adopted generally throughout the accounts of the
country. Hitherto they have been going upon a system of entire
deception, for when they thought they were voting for one thing, it
turned out that they had been voting for another (Hansard, Third
Series Vol. 2, February 1831, Cols. 947-993).
Surprisingly Parnell made no mention of this in his book which was published
initially in 1830. In his 1840 book Cory strongly argued that the accounting
system that had been introduced into the Admiralty should be introduced into
all other departments, suitably modified where necessary, in order to overcome
the extant major deficiencies in the machinery of government, namely the need
for centralisation through the restoration of Treasury and the need for uniformity
in departmental constitutions, organisations, and methods. He highlighted the
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fact that the Admiralty’s double entry based system possessed seven essential
qualities.
1. It met the requirements for accuracy and promptness;
2. It was adapted to the votes of Parliament which enabled the
estimates to be prepared with ease;
3. It accurately regulated the supplies to the expenditure;
4. It could be expanded to meet the needs of any exigency;
5. It guarded against negligence and misapplication;
6. The books could be closed at any time and the financial
reports quickly and accurately prepared; and
7. With the exception of the journal and the ledger, the system’s
books were based upon mechanical regularity (Cory, 1840, p.
169).
The system of accounts at the Admiralty, Cory said (1840, p. 98), was by its
very nature the most complicated of any of the public services but it had been
remodelled by the exertion of

Graham and it is a “result of the greatest

perseverance and the most ingenious contrivances that the Admiralty accounts
have attained their present approximation to perfection” (Cory, 1840, p. 101).
“Such is the excellent system of accounts, which has been put in force and is
conducted at the Admiralty, under the superintendence of its Accountantgeneral, Mr Briggs” (Cory, 1840, p. 123). Unfortunately, he made no reference
to the efforts of Deas Thomson. Although it was only seven years between
Cory’s book and when the system became operational, Deas Thomson’s name
and his efforts were well on the way to being consigned to oblivion. A pension
and a knighthood in a minor order did not assuage his treatment at the hands
of an ungrateful Graham. On learning of his father’s treatment, Edward wrote to
Deas Thomson as follows.
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I received your letters of March (1832) communicating to me the
proposed changes in the Civil departments of the Navy, and
conveying copies of your correspondence with Sir James Graham in
respect to your retirement from office. It would be difficult to convey
to you an idea of the feeling of indignation and surprise with which I
received this intelligence – the infamous job of attempting to get rid of
you, and to provide for Mr Briggs, seems almost too bad for any man
to attempt, and I sincerely hope that it may recoil back upon the
author of it in the way he richly merits. The universal and public
testimony which seems to have been paid to your abilities and
exertions as a public officer is highly gratifying, and will tend to show
those in power that the public interests cannot be sacrificed to their
private jobs without creating a feeling of indignation on the part of the
community (Mitchell Library, Thomson Family papers).

7.10 The changeover to DEB elsewhere in British government
departments
The changeover to DEB elsewhere in the British Government was to be a slow
protracted process, ‘limping leisurely along’ using the words of Welby (BPP
1902(387), p. 229). It was an example of British ‘incrementalism’, of ‘muddling
through’ with no firm objective in sight. Following the suspension of B&B’s
system, it was decided in mid-1831 to create a commission consisting of
Parnell and John Bowring to examine the use of DEB by the French
government. It was unfortunate that Parnell soon after was appointed Secretary
at War which resulted in Bowring journeying to Paris alone. He prepared three
reports which highlighted the success achieved by the French in their
changeover to DEB. In his Third Report, he described the use of DEB in the
French War Department as “not only the best, but the only perfect instrument
for the gathering up of all participants in a form which shall provide for their
greatest clearness, conciseness, correctness and completeness” (BPP 183132(586), p. 4). It would be expected that such glowing words should have
assisted in overcoming the inertia in British government departments but the
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situation is best described by the words of Anderson in a paper he and Parnell
prepared which was attached to a Treasury Minute 27 November 1840. In
many quarters, he said, there was a strong opinion that the chief obstacle to
the introduction of the double entry system lay in the want of proper persons in
each department for keeping the books. Furthermore, a dearth of practical
experience with the system was exacerbated by anecdotal evidence that
attempts to implement the system elsewhere had met with failure (BPP
1844(364), p. 39). He continued,
I am quite prepared to admit that strong prejudices against the
system do exist, but I should attach by far too much importance to
them were I to apprehend that they could oppose any formidable
obstacle to the introduction of the double entry system in any
department, if the Treasury were to make a serious attempt to
establish it, and adopt the proper measures for that purpose (BPP
1844(364), p. 39).
Attitudes such as these noted by Baring meant that by February 1840, DEB
had been implemented in only two departments, the Admiralty, and his
Paymaster General’s Department (TNA: T 64/395). There was then a major
coup for the DEB protagonists with the implementation of the system in the War
Office which occurred in April 1841 in accordance with the Treasury Minute of
27 November 1840, so enabling the department, in its Return145 to the Order of
the House of Commons in 1844, to report that the system had been introduced
(BPP 1844(364), p. 1). It is worthwhile noting that the Board of Treasury
selected Anderson “of the Paymaster–general’s department to assist, under his
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Twenty-seven returns were prepared by departments in accordance with an Order from the
House of 13 March 1844, including the Admiralty, Excise, Treasury, War Office, and Woods.
Together, the returns formed A Statement of the Changes which have been introduced into the
Public Departments in the System of Book-Keeping since the Report on the Exchequer, made
by the Commissioners of Public Accounts in 1832; and Copies of any Treasury Minutes on the
same Subject since that Period (BPP 1844(364), p. 1).
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orders, in the application of the double entry system to the War-office accounts”
(Emphasis added) (BPP 1844(364), p. 34). This was an astute move by
Treasury because of Anderson’s skills and the great experience he had
accrued in the Navy Office and Admiralty, and at the office of the Paymaster
General146.

DEB had also been used in the Woods department when Abbott was contracted
by Treasury to prepare the accounts for the twelve months following the
consolidation of the Woods and Works departments in 1832. Parnell stated that
Woods did not adopt DEB but this is countered in the department’s Return
which states that “(t)he system was adopted upon (Abbott’s) recommendation,
and has ever since been acted upon” (BPP 1844(364), p. 29). Also referred to
earlier by Parnell was Abbott having been retained by Treasury in 1837 to make
up the Excise department’s accounts based upon DEB following Treasury’s
receipt of a report prepared by the Commissioners of Excise Inquiry which
outlined defects in the accounts of Excise and recommended that DEB should
be used. As a consequence Excise was directed by Treasury Minute to make
the changeover as from January 1841 (BPP 1844(364), p. 11).

The return from Treasury advised that “(n)o change had taken place in the
system of book-keeping ... the accounts in this department having been kept by
double entry for many years prior to (the Report on the Exchequer in 1831)”
(BPP 1844(364), p. 1). This statement was signed by ‘T. C. Brooksbank’ and on
the surface there would appear to be no reason to doubt its veracity.

146

In place of Abbott, a better candidate for the position of ‘accounting Czar’ (Edwards, 2011
p.272) would have been Anderson.
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Nevertheless, it is perplexing on three grounds; no confirming evidence has
been discovered; the apparent validity of the statement by Binney referred to
earlier in Chapter 2 of this study that DEB was introduced to Treasury in 1688
evaporates when Binney’s contention that DEB was used in the domestic
accounts of the revenue departments is refuted; and finally reference is made to
the minutes of evidence taken before the Select Committee on Public Accounts
BPP 1856(375) (375-1). In his answer put to him by Graham, Anderson at
Question 1801 (p. 206) replied that
When I went to Treasury two years ago, at the commencement of the
war, I found certain accounts established which were founded upon
the Exchequer accounts; there were no cash-book, journal, or ledger;
none of the books which are ordinarily used in the double entry
system; I found that I had to be responsible for the management of
the public balances without any of those aids which are essential to
enable me to carry on the business safely and economically ... I
immediately set to work to establish a regular system, such as exists
in the great departments ... (but) those books I am bound to found
upon Exchequer credits; I am obliged to carry out that system upon a
false principle, because the Acts of Parliament requires that our
expenditure shall be founded on credits, and not upon actual
payments, so that the books are perfect, but the results are not.
In reply to Question 1802, “The whole principle of double entry
cannot be introduced on account of the necessity of an adherence as
a basis of account to the Exchequer form?” Anderson replied,
“Precisely”.
In reply to Question 1803, “Are those the books that were kept by Mr
Brooksbank?” Anderson replied, “Yes they are the same books.”
In reply to Question 1804, “Are they the old books of the Revenue
Department of which Mr Brooksbank was the head?” Anderson
replied, “Yes.”
In reply to Question 1805, “He was selected, was he not, as an
accountant to look into the system of bookkeeping, and to report
upon it?” Anderson replied “Yes” (BPP 1856(375) (375-1).
Under these circumstances it is difficult to understand how Brooksbank could
advise that while DEB was in use he did so knowing that it was in a totally
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difficult context from that of the other ‘great departments’. This suggests that
further research into Treasury’s accounting systems is warranted in order to
clarify the situation.

7.11 Conclusion
In this chapter the three accounting systems with which Deas Thomson was
involved have been discussed. They were, firstly, the existing ‘official’ system
modified through the introduction of an ‘abstract register’, secondly, the initial
system based upon DEB, and, thirdly, the modified DEB-based system which
was to be installed as the central accounting system in the ‘new’ Admiralty,
following the abolition of the civil Navy and Victualling Offices in 1832. This was
the first occasion on which DEB was introduced in a British Government
department. Based upon the words of many individuals voiced in parliamentary
committees and in the Commons, this system was recognised as a major
advance in British Government accounting, even though the efforts and
success of Deas Thomson and his team in the development of this system was
not recognised by people such as Parnell and Graham. Of similar concern is
that the accolades from various parties following the adoption of DEB by the
Admiralty were attributed to the wrong persons and as a consequence Deas
Thomson’s name and the role he played in advancing government accounting
in Britain have remained unknown, until now.
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Chapter 8
Summary and Conclusion
Although the adoption of DEB throughout the British government was to take
many years to complete, it introduced numerous important improvements to
British Government accounting. This is exemplified by the words of the Select
Committee on Public Monies in August 1857 which, based upon the evidence
provided by competent witnesses, had found that wherever it had been applied
in the public departments it had materially aided in the introduction of order and
regularity in their financial transactions, facilitated the audit of the accounts, and
had promoted correct appropriation. In the Navy DEB had stood the test of
great expansion during the Crimean war, had improved the punctuality with
which the annual accounts of receipts and expenditure were presented to
Parliament, and facilitated the audit of the naval expenditure (BPP 1857
Session 2 (279), p. 5). The evidence the Committee referred to included a
memorandum on financial control prepared by the then Chancellor of the
Exchequer, George Lewis, in which he stated that the cause of all the defects in
the control of government finance had been an imperfect system of accounts
(Appendix

7.1).

As

a

consequence

the

Select

Committee

earnestly

recommended to the Commons that DEB should be extended to all
departments in which it had not been adopted and that Treasury should be held
responsible for the maintenance of the uniformity of the departmental systems.
(BPP 1857 Session 2 (279), p. 5).

The crucial milestone in the introduction of DEB in British Government was the
adoption of the DEB-based accounting system which had been developed in
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the Navy under the leadership of a Commissioner and later Accountant General
of the Navy Board, John Deas Thomson. Although the DEB system had been
initiated in 1826 in the Navy Office by Deas Thomson, it was not finally
established and recognised as the official accounting system in the Navy until
1832. The delay, William Anderson said, arose from both the abhorrence of the
Navy Board to innovation and the perception that the new system would bring to
light matters in more detail than Board members thought advisable (BPP
1845(520), p.104), notwithstanding that the new system had been developed
within the Navy Office by a member of the Board.

Outside the Navy, Deas Thomson’s efforts did not receive the recognition they
deserved as illustrated by Cory’s omission of any reference to either Deas
Thomson’s system or to Deas Thomson himself although he did name the
person he believed was the architect of the change, namely Graham. Even
more puzzling, although Parnell indirectly referred to Deas Thomson in
Parliament he was guilty of the same omissions in his 1831 book On Financial
Reform, despite acknowledging the work of Treasury’s Commission of Public
Accounts in the development of DEB-based systems.

The DEB innovations introduced in the Navy Office by Deas Thomson reflected
primarily his belief in the operational advantages of DEB, even if it was more its
form which attracted him and the accounting efficiencies which it allowed. The
reforms were not those of a senior civil servant intent on protecting the interests
of a privileged class with which he was closely identified but that of an individual
knowledgeable in and convinced of the practice and benefits of DEB in
strengthening the

constitutional protections expected

of

public sector
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accounting. This has been shown to be confirmed by his son, Edward, who
frequently referred to the way in which his father’s accounting system was about
greater accuracy and improved parliamentary surveillance of the Executive.

Identification of Deas Thomson as the instigator of DEB in British government, a
person whose life, beliefs and appreciation of the benefits of DEB had been
moulded by the ideologies of both the landed aristocracy and the merchant
class, questions the significance given by Edwards et al. (2002) to ideological
conflict in their assessment of the introduction of DEB. This study has confirmed
that there was indeed an element of ideological conflict which was present in
both the personal and professional conflict between B&B and Abbott and the
rejection by the Navy Board of any move to DEB, irrespective of its form and
despite the success of Deas Thomson’s innovative accounting system.
However, the evidence provided in this study suggests that the ruinous
relationship between B&B and Abbott which prevented them working
cooperatively and which determined the nature of the accounting system
accepted by Treasury, rather than being exclusively or even primarily a matter
of class based ideological differences was a complex amalgam of class
interests and personal antipathy arising from professional intolerance,
arrogance, ambition and opportunism. Edwards (2001, p.680) allows for this
feature when he observes that there “may have been a clash of personalities”.

There was a contest between two men on one side, B&B who were acculturated
with the values, practices and expectations of the British civil service which
were closely aligned with the interests of the landed aristocracy, and an
individual, Abbott, who had never held office in a government department and
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who had acquired a very considerable reputation as possibly the most
prominent representative of the rising profession of accounting. For Abbott,
appointment to the Commission of Public Accounts, in place of Bowring who
had been rejected by Wellington for his radical views, confirmed the importance
with which he expected his views to be received. Abbott was accused of abuse
of process and contravening the accepted protocols of the civil service, in
particular seeking to get senior members of the government and other
prominent individuals to intervene on his behalf to promote his views with the
Lords of the Treasury. These criticisms were less about ideological differences,
although these would have framed Abbott’s beliefs and attitudes, and more
about Abbott’s professional ambitions and lack of respect for and understanding
of the career civil servants B&B and the peculiar needs of the public accounts.

For Abbott, B&B were unyielding products of their public careers; intolerant of
change, ignorant of all the benefits of DEB and guardians of existing
arrangements and class interests. They did allow for moderate enhancements
to existing practices so long as they did not threaten the fundamental values of
personal accountability and stewardship of public funds upon which they were
based. B&B’s insistence that DEB would need to be adjusted to the operational
and constitutional practicalities of government was for Abbott, who obstinately
refused to consider any modifications to the merchant’s accrual-based DEB, an
obvious manifestation at a time of great social transformation of the
determination of those who held power and whose interests continued to
determine the priorities of government to resist any changes which may
threaten their position and the substantial and enduring social, political and
economic advantages that this provided. Despite this perception, Abbott’s
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successes elsewhere in reforming the accounts of public bodies, combined with
Abbott’s overwhelming professional confidence, even arrogance, seemed to
allow him to believe that with the support of like-minded influential individuals,
such as Herries, he would be able to set aside constitutional and administrative
practices with the system of accounting that he proposed.

B&B, as career public servants, were well aware that introducing the new
accounting practices associated with the form of DEB adopted was of itself
going to be a major challenge to very conservative departments such as the
Navy, without even considering the effect of any attempt at redirecting the focus
of government accounting from stewardship and personal accountability which
most especially emanated from the constitutional imperative of government
accounting. In appointing Abbott the Lords of the Treasury had communicated
an openness to change, especially given that his criticisms of government
spending were well known (Edwards et al., 2002, p.644), but at the same time
their reaction to his proposed accounting system indicated that they expected
that any change would be incremental and that Abbott would be able to
appreciate this by working closely with B&B rather than promoting in an
arrogant manner a sudden and dramatic transformation of the intention of
government accounting with a radically new form of accounting. However, for
Abbott the abusive tirades that he directed at B&B after his recommendations
were rejected indicated that the introduction of his form of DEB had become
identified with him personally and the ambition he had to gain greater
involvement for private accountants in government through the introduction of
DEB, the domain of the private accountant, irrespective of any practical or
constitutional considerations.

414

Unfortunately the failure to acknowledge the efforts of Deas Thomson and the
unjustifiable transfer to and the acceptance by others of the credit due to him as
the architect of DEB in British Government continues today. It is perpetuated in
the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography in which the entry for John Thomas
Briggs informs the reader that he was appointed to the position of Accountant
General of the Navy holding office for twenty-two years, “during which term
many and important improvements were made in the system of accounts,
notably double entry bookkeeping ... Briggs made a major sustained
contribution to the modernisation of naval administration“ (ODNB, 2004). In
Briggs’ defence, during his appearance before the Select Committee on
Colonial Accounts he advised the members that on his appointment as
Accountant General of the Admiralty in 1832 he had found that DEB had been
introduced by ‘Mr Thomson’ “three or four years before (he) went there” (BPP
1837(516), p.73). Deas Thomson’s forced retirement in 1832 by Graham, which
had occurred contemporaneously with the abolition of the Navy and Victualling
Boards and the assignment of their responsibilities to the Admiralty, enabled
Briggs, who had been Graham’s private secretary, to assume the role of
Accountant General of the Royal Navy.

While the project to convert the Navy’s system from CAD to DEB had been
completed successfully by the time Briggs assumed office, further work was
required to convert the Victualling sub-system to DEB and to integrate it with the
rest of the Admiralty. This work was performed by Admiralty staff including
Briggs and Anderson. Briggs was a convert to DEB, being highly
complementary about not only its simplicity and its inherent accuracy but also
the way in which its use as an accounting tool “enables you to combine a great
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variety of things together in an easy manner, which is impossible to do by any
other system” (BPP 1845(520), p. 31). Briggs was negative in only one aspect
of DEB and that was in regard to the “methodising and arranging extensive and
complicated details, such as occur under any revision of the naval accounts”
(BPP 1845(520), p. 101). It would appear that he was talking about system
amendments arising from the need to revise the heads of expenditure, the chart
of accounts, and/or additions to or deletions from the list of required reports. In
an organisation the size and complexity of the Navy such difficulties would be
expected and as Briggs said “would occur under any revision of them, whether
the accounts were kept by double entry or any other method” (BPP 1845(520),
p.101). He also referred to, what he termed, “simpler accounts” in which case
he considered that the “greater machinery” of DEB, “the necessity of having a
journal and ledger in addition to a mere cash-book”, was not warranted (BPP
1845(520), p. 36).

The extension of DEB to the victualling operations of the Admiralty post-1832
warrants further research. Prior to the suspension of the B&B system in
December 1830, the Victualling Office had been very supportive of the
conversion of its existing CAD system to B&B’s new system. This is clearly
evident from the report from the Cash Committee of the Victualling Board of 10
November 1829 which is included in the Appendix to B&B’s Second Report
(BPP 1831(50), p. 24). The Committee had been applauded by B&B for their
efforts in their Report to the Treasury respecting the state of preparation in the
Navy, Victualling, and Navy Pay Offices of 15 December 1830 which arose from
a request from the Admiralty for B&B “to ascertain...what progress had been
made in the preparations for the introduction in those Departments of the new
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System of Account ordered to be adopted by the Minutes of the Board of
Treasury of the 14th July 1829 and 9th February 1830“ (TNA: T 92/54, p. 1). The
twenty appendices to this report contain correspondence to and from the
Victualling Office which B&B considered would ”evince to the Lordships the
earnest desire of the Commissioners of Victualling” for the success of the
conversion (TNA: T 92/54, p. 11).

With the experience gained in their incomplete conversion to B&B’s system it is
possible that the conversion of the Victualling system post-1832 to the Deas
Thomson system would have been a relatively simple task. More than likely,
what would have taxed the skills of Briggs and Anderson would have been the
integration of the accounting sub-systems of the Navy and Victualling Offices
and the development of a new coordinated accounting system able to meet,
firstly, the combined reporting and management requirements of the two now
abolished offices, secondly, any new reporting and management requirements
arising since the amalgamation of these offices, and thirdly whether it would
meet the Navy’s requirements under war-time conditions. This final requirement
would naturally have been a matter of concern as can be seen in the above
statement by the Select Committee on Public Monies that DEB had successfully
withstood “the test of great expansion during the late war” (BPP 1857 Session 2
(279), p. 5). The management of the integration of the various systems at the
Admiralty is a matter that warrants further research.

Another matter warranting research is the accounting for stores which was an
area in which B&B obviously had limited knowledge and certainly limited
experience which was clearly seen from their handling of the subject in their
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1829 report. Indeed, Abbott was highly critical of their approach. From at least
the point of view of the large sums of money expended, the accounting for
stores calls for considerable future research. With the term ‘stores’ covering not
only items which are received and issued in the original state in which they were
purchased, but items used in the manufacture of other articles that are issued
and consumed by the service, will also mean that researchers into naval
accounting for stores will have to enter the realm of cost accounting in the Navy.
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APPENDIX 1.1

An excerpt from the
Fifth Report from the Select Committee on Finance (1819) Audit
Office
BPP 1819(539) (121), p. 122
An Account relating to the disbursement of Public Money differs in no other
respects, than occasionally in its magnitude, from an account between
individuals: the mode of keeping it ought to be the same; the same sort of
vouchers are required for the sums expended; similar modes of investigating
the truth must be resorted to, wherever differences or difficulties occur: Nor can
it be reasonably be imagined, that in the multiplied and complicated
transactions between the mercantile and commercial men in this country, any
mode of examining and passing accounts, which is better or more secure than
that which is established by universal usage, can have escaped their industry
and acuteness.
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APPENDIX, NO. 13.
_____________
AN EXCERPT FROM THE MEMORANDUM HANDED IN BY
LORD WELBY
(See Question 2505.)
_____________
THE CONTROL OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS OVER THE
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE.
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APPENDIX 2.1

APPENDIX, No. 13.
_____________
An Excerpt From The Memorandum handed in by Lord Welby (See
Question 2505.)
_____________
THE CONTROL OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS OVER THE PUBLIC
EXPENDITURE.
Parliament under the Tudors and the Stuarts exercised no control over the
ordinary expenditure of the Crown, but from early times it sought occasionally
to appropriate extraordinary grants to the service for which they were required.
Under Charles II, it appointed on one occasion Commissioners of Accounts to
ascertain how money granted for a particular emergency had been expended,
and on that occasion, even before the Revolution, it grasped the meaning of a
real control inasmuch as it was not satisfied with directing beforehand that its
grant should be appropriated to a specific object, but it sought to ascertain
through its Commissioners that the money had been actually expended on that
object. The established revenue of the Crown, however, whether derived from
taxes or from other sources, and, indeed, in most cases extraordinary subsidies
were left at the absolute disposal of the Sovereign.
The Revolution introduced great changes into our financial system. A fixed
annual sum was granted to the King for his life to defray the expenditure of
himself and his household, and also the charges of the Civil Government, and
hence this grant was known as the Civil List. The King through his Ministers
had absolute control over this grant, but he had no power of supplementing or
increasing it. Hence, if the Royal expenditure was excessive, or if the charges
of the Civil Government increased with the increase of wealth and population,
the Civil List fell into arrear, and at various times in the 18th and in the early part
of the 19th century Parliament was asked for special grants to clear off the debt
which had thus arisen. In the reigns of George III and George IV various
charges of the Civil Government were taken off the Civil List, and made either a
permanent charge on the Consolidated Fund or provided by annual Vote. Thus
the present Civil List and expenses of Civil Government charged on the
Consolidated Fund (as distinct from the charges of the Civil Government voted
in Supply) are the remnant of the old fabric of the Civil List created at the
Revolution. The expenditure on these services does not come under the annual
review of Parliament. It is granted once and for all. The Civil List is payable
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during the life of the Sovereign, and the charges on the Consolidated Fund are
payable under the limitations of the Acts which grant them until Parliament
repeals or modifies the Acts.
The great financial change made at the Revolution related to the charge of the
Navy and Army. The Revolution introduced annual sessions of Parliament, the
French war led to annual Votes in Supply for Navy, Army, and Ordnance
services, and these Votes were formally sanctioned by Lord Somers’
Appropriation clauses. It should be added, for the sake of accuracy, that even
in the time of William III, a few Votes were taken annually for services of a civil
character. These gradually increased in number, but they were comparatively
insignificant in amount until the latter part of the reign of George III. It will be
seen, then, that the control of Parliament over public expenditure began with
the Revolution, but that that control extended only to expenditure on the Army,
Navy, and Ordnance. The reality of the control was proved by the reduction of
the Army enforced after the Peace of Ryswick by the House of Commons
against the wishes of the King. The control, however, was limited in its
character. Estimates for the military services were laid before the House of
Commons, and upon these estimates the House of Commons voted an amount
for each service. There was only one vote for the whole of the Navy service
until 1798. In Anne’s reign the Army grant was divided into two or three Votes,
but in both services there grew up a practice of expending large sums without
the previous sanction of Parliament on “extraordinaries” and a vote for these
extraordinaries was submitted for the sanction of the House of Commons in a
subsequent Session. The control exercised through the Votes in supply was
therefore imperfect, and left a great latitude to the executive Government, of
which the Government did not fail to avail itself.
But this control, imperfect as it was, ceased with the act of voting. No means
were taken by which the House of Commons could ascertain whether the
money was actually expended on the service for which it was voted. No
accounts were presented on system to the House of Commons until the
introduction in 1802 of the publication which we know as the “Finance
Accounts”. Until 1802, therefore, Parliament had no information of any kind as
to the expenditure of the money which it had voted, unless a return for a special
object was asked and granted. It is true that under the pressure of the wars of
William and Anne, Commissioners were from time to time appointed to examine
the accounts, but these Commissions were too often of a party character; their
reports were not, therefore, trustworthy and were used for party purposes.
During the long peace no demand arose for such inquiries, and though more
thorough examination into accounts was instituted by Commissions appointed
after the American and during the French War, and though these Commissions
brought to light irregularities and pointed out defects in financial organisation,
they had no continuity, and had none of the elements of an audit.
There was, indeed, an audit conducted by officers of the Exchequer under
regulations framed for the times of the Tudors and Stuart's. It was left unaltered
at the Revolution and for nearly a century afterwards. It limped leisurely along,
so much so, that in 1782 great accounts 20 and 30 years old were still open,
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and there were accounts not yet settled which went back to the reign of William
III. But this limping audit was not an audit for Parliament. The accounts when
audited were not submitted to Parliament; they were declared before and
passed by the Treasury, the authority of the Treasury in passing them was
unquestioned.
It is important also to note that the returns presented to Parliament, such as the
Finance Accounts, were not based upon the results of this audit. The public
revenue is paid into the Exchequer, and money required for the public services
is issued from the Exchequer, but issues from the Exchequer did not represent
actual expenditure. They are imprests to the different Departments and
Departments defray the actual expenditure of the State out of those imprests.
The statements of expenditure in the budget, in the Finance Accounts, and in
almost all other accounts laid before Parliament up to the present day, do not
give the actual expenditure but the issues from the Exchequer. The
Appropriation Accounts alone give the audited expenditure. It will be seen,
then, that from the Revolution until 1802 the House of Commons received no
information as to the public expenditure except that which the Chancellor of the
Exchequer might think fit to give them in his Budget speech, and that was
usually of very meagre character. It may be added that from 1802 until 1866
(the date of the Exchequer and Audit Act) the House learned only the
issues from the Exchequer. Thus it knew the sums which had been
imprested to the Departments from the Exchequer; it did not know how
the Departments had actually expended those imprests.
Here was the great blot of our financial system. Defects in the Estimates
and in the method of voting them were gradually removed, but the chief defect
of all, that the House of Commons did not know how its grants had been
expended, remained unremedied until the Exchequer and Audit Act came into
force. It is a singular that two of our greatest Chancellors of the Exchequer, Mr
Pitt and Sir Robert Peel, did not seize the point. It is the more singular as
regards Mr Pitt, because he reformed the system of audit , he swept away the
old audit by officers of the Exchequer, and transferred to a new authority, the
Board of Audit, which he endowed with considerable powers. The audit applied
by the new Board was effective as far as it went, and prompt as compared with
that of the Exchequer Officers, but he made no provision for laying the results
of the audit before the House of Commons. The Treasury passed the audited
accounts, it owed no responsibility to Parliament in respect of them, and
remained, as under the previous system, master of the situation. A clause
added to his audit Act would have gone far to render the audit of Parliament
effective but he did not add it. Possibly he was not anxious to give the House of
Commons that which the House had not asked, for it is difficult to conceive that
so able a financier, when reforming the system of audit, did not see that the
control of Parliament over expenditure must be gravely defective so long as
Parliament was not aware of the results of that audit. The defect left
unremedied by Mr Pitt remained unremedied for another 80 years. The House
of Commons entertained no doubt as to the efficiency of the Appropriation Act,
and believed that the Executive Government needed no control in order to
ensure the due observance of that Appropriation. Yet the attention of
Parliament was again drawn to the subject in 1834 when the old Exchequer
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was abolished and the custody of public money was entrusted to a newly
created officer, independent of the Executive Government, the Comptroller of
the Exchequer. It was his duty to allow no issue from the Exchequer except in
accordance with Act of Parliament; but no attempt was made to bring the actual
expenditure under control. The fact is that Chancellors of the Exchequer,
their advisers, and Parliament itself was still under the illusion that
parliamentary control over expenditure could be effectively secured by
safeguards on the issue of money from the Exchequer without following
the expenditures further.
The great defect in parliamentary control above described remained
unremedied, I said, until 1866. That is the case, but sometime earlier an
important but isolated measure adopted in one Department of the State laid a
foundation for the reform of 1866. In 1831 that most able administrator, Sir
James Graham, became First Lord of the Admiralty. He found the civil
branches of that department organised as they had been organised at the time
of Elizabeth. He left them organised on the principle that has worked, and
worked well, to the present day. Sir James Graham's speech in moving the
Navy estimates of 1831 is of historical interest. In the course of it he said that
he and Mr Hume in 1829 and 1830, when calling attention to the Navy
Estimates, had too much neglected the details of the Estimates in their anxiety
to effect a tangible reduction of the general sums of the Votes. Had they not
been so much occupied in pointing out savings, they would have effected much
benefit in investigating how far the actual expenditure under each head
squared with each Estimate. The only remedy which he saw then was to lay
before the House annually a balance sheet, in which would be specifically
placed under each head the actual expenditure of the Navy and Victualling
Boards. Parliament in consequence, and at his insistence, passed an Act
requiring the Admiralty annually to present such an account to the House of
Commons. This account, called the Navy Appropriation Account, has been
annually presented up to the present time. It is based on the audited account of
naval expenditure, and it shows the actual expenditure, as ascertained by the
auditor, under each head of service. The precedent thus created was applied in
later years to other great divisions of the public expenditure, and has formed
the model on which the Appropriation Accounts of public expenditure are now
rendered. It is the first instance, as far as I am aware, in which a minister
grasped the importance, I might say the necessity, of laying before the House
of Commons a return of actual expenditure; but it was an isolated instance,
applying to only one branch of expenditure, and there being no provision in the
Act which forced the House of Commons to pass judgement on the Account, it
practically passed year by year without the notice which it is really deserved. 147
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Memorandum from Welby The Control of the House of Commons over the Public
Expenditure Appendix 13 to the Report from the Select Committee on National Expenditure
1902 (387), pp. 228-229.
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The traditional functions of the Navy Board as described by Sir
William Monson in the 17th century
Corporate

To carry out the instructions of the Lord High Admiral, and to cause all ordinary
businesses to be done according to the ancient and allowed practice and
allowed practice of the Office, viz
to make contracts on their own initiative for the supply of materials to the Navy;
to accumulate the necessary stores;
to superintend the supply of victuals;
to pay (in person if possible) the ships in commission and the workmen at the
Royal Dockyards;
to supervise rates of pay;
to represent the financial needs of the Navy in the proper quarter; and
to recommend suitable persons for filling such vacancies as might occur in
those inferior offices which are held under the Lord High Admiral’s warrant.
Departmental

1. Treasurer

to prepare estimates of the charges of the Navy, and to obtain the funds
necessary to meet them from the Lord Treasurer of England; and
to present the annual accounts the Navy for audit in the Exchequer
2. Comptroller
to serve as a check upon the Treasurer (the method of bookkeeping in the Navy
was so unsatisfactory that this check appears to have been illusory);
to audit the Storekeeper’s accounts; and
to supervise the payments made to the victuallers.
3. Surveyor
to make an annual survey of all ships in harbour, stores, storehouses, wharves,
and dockyards, and to examine vessels on their return from sea;
to survey the provisions supplied by victuallers;
to survey the quality of stores purchased; and
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to audit the accounts of the boatswains and carpenters on the return of their
ships from sea.
4. Clerk of the Acts
to act as Secretary to the Board
(Sources: Tanner, 1897A, pp.26-27; NRS, Vol. 18, vol. 3, pp. 403-404
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Deas Thomson’s ‘Memorandum’
20 December 1825
Various changes having taken place in the duties of the different offices under
the Navy Board, and in the number of clerks appropriated to each of those
under the Committee of Accounts, since the establishment of the office was
framed by the Fourth Report of the Board of Revision in 1806 (BPP 1809(120)),
particularly the reductions of clerks and the consolidation of certain offices in
January, 1822; the Chairman of the Committee of Accounts, on his first
appointment as a member thereof (in February 1822) and since his nomination
to his present situation has conceived it be his duty to enter, somewhat
minutely, into a general examination of the system by which the business in the
Department of Accounts has been conducted, and to suggest such
improvements as appear to him necessary, towards rendering it more complete,
and better adapted to the ends in view. He therefore submits, as the result of
his inquiries, the following.

Memorandum
on that Branch of the Civil Service of the Navy, which relates to the Receipt,
Expenditure, and Mode of Accounting for the Money annually voted by
Parliament for Naval Service
Previously to the meeting of Parliament, estimates for
the Naval, Victualling, Ordnance, and Transport
Departments are framed by the Navy Board under the
direction of the Admiralty showing what sum will be
required for the ensuing year, under the specific Heads
hereinafter mentioned: the number of seamen to be
employed; the number of ships in commission; and
other matters of importance; being first settled by the
Executive Government, and communicated to the
Navy Board through the Admiralty for their guidance in
framing the same.
The Select Committee of the House of Commons, in
the Sixth Report on Finance (1817) thus described the
four Heads of Service.
First the Vote of Seamen commonly called the “Wear
and Tear Estimate", being the expenses of the wages
and victuals of the men voted for the service of the
year, and the wear and tear and ordnance of the ships
in which they serve, or in short, the military branch of
the service.
Secondly the “Ordinary Estimate” being the expense of
the Offices and Dockyards, the care of the ships in
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Ordinary, the wages and victuals of the men employed
in taking care of the ships in Ordinary. Also the half
pay and the various classes of superannuation and
pensions comprising what may be called the “Civil
Service of the Navy ".
Thirdly the “Extraordinary Estimate” which includes the
expense of building and repairing His Majesty's Ships,
and of all new works in the dockyards or naval
establishments at home.
Fourthly the expenses of the Transport Department,
which, though not altogether nor strictly speaking a
Naval Service having been hitherto included in the
Naval Estimates, and being now placed specifically
under the Navy Board, must be considered as
belonging to this Department.

When the various items are voted, they form one
general sum at the credit of the Naval Service in the
Exchequer. The sum voted for the Victualling is
appropriated exclusively to that Branch of the Service,
and is drawn from the Exchequer by the Treasurer,
under the authority of the Commissioners of the Navy
and Victualling*; and that part of the Wear and Tear
Estimate, or, as it is called the report above quoted
“The Military Branch of the Service”, which is destined
for the Sea Ordnance, is appropriated to the Ordnance
exclusively, and never comes into the hands of the
Treasurer of the Navy at all.

The remaining sum is appropriated to the Pay of the
Fleet and Ordinary – to the payment of Half Pay and
Pensions – to the allowance to Out Pensioners of
Greenwich Hospital – to the payment of the artificers in
the dockyards and the purchase of stores and
materials – to the building and equipment of ships of
war – to the keeping up of the various Naval
Establishments at home and abroad – and to the

*The Victualling Board
only authorize the
Treasurer to draw
money
from
the
Exchequer to pay their
Ready Money Bills.
They send
to the
Navy Board monthly,
an account of Sixty
Days Bills falling due
in the ensuing month;
and the Navy Board
include that amount in
the money demanded
to pay Sixty Days Bills
for both Departments
in the ensuing month.
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Transport Service, now conducted by the Navy Board; Memo February 1826
in fact, to all other Naval Services whatever.
Since this was written,
an alteration has taken
The money is drawn from the Exchequer, from time to place in the form of
time, as occasion requires, by the Treasurer of the the Estimate No. 1,
Navy, under the authority of the Navy Board; and in which was called the
conformity with the provisions of the Act (48 Geo 3) c. Wear
and
Tear
8 is appropriated under the two distinct heads of Estimate, is no longer
Wages, and General Services.
so
denominated,
because that item
Thus all payments of every description, with the which contained a
exception of those for the Victualling and Medical specific sum for Wear
Establishments, and the Sea Ordnance, are made by and Tear or Materials
the Navy Board, who make out bills for the salaries of for the ships in Sea
the Admiralty and the Treasurer’s Departments, the Service,
calculated
Admiralty having no powers to draw money from the according
to
the
Treasury nor the Treasurer to appropriate any money number of men voted,
in his hands, but such as is warranted by the Sign is left out, and an
Manual of the King, or by the signatures of three equal amount added
Commissioners of the Navy.
to that article in the
Ordinary
Estimate,
The Navy Board is therefore the great general which provides for the
accountant branch of almost every department of the charge for timber and
Naval Service; and is responsible for all payments materials. And again,
which it authorizes. The Treasurer, who alone passes that
item
which
an account with the Audit Board, having his account, provided for the Sea
(which includes the Victualling and as well as the Service, according to
Naval and Transport Services) certified annually by the the number of men
Navy Board.
voted, being no longer
included in the Navy
From this it is evident that the Treasurer may be said Estimates,
but
to represent the banker of the two naval departments transferred
to
the
(the Navy and Victualling Boards); all payments made Ordnance.
The
by him for General Services being by bill, whilst all remaining two items,
those for Wages at home, including the Pay of the viz the Charge for
Fleet, the Ordinary, Half Pay, Wages of the artificers in Wages
and
the
the Dockyards, etcetera, are recorded in sets of books, Charge for Victuals,
previously prepared under the direction of the Navy alone continued in the
Board, in one set of which the Treasurer's clerks set off estimate, now called
the various items paid to the parties or their legal the
Estimate
for
agents, whilst, in another set, clerks from the Ticket Wages and Victuals.
and Seamen’s Wages Offices, check, and enter the
amount paid:- all Payments to the Fleet, to the
Ordinary, and for Half Pay, being made in the
presence of a Commissioner of the Navy, agreeably to
(an) Act of Parliament.
From this detail it will be seen of what importance it is
that the Accountant Branches of the Navy Office
should be not only properly regulated, and
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systematically organised, but minutely superintended
in the execution of their various duties.
Formally the Bill Office, the Seamen’s Wages Office,
and the Office for Comptrolling the Treasurer’s
Accounts, were separate and distinct branches; the
two first being expressly called the Comptroller’s
Offices; the latter (under one of the civil members of
the Board) the Comptroller of the Treasurer’s Accounts
Office.
None of the active duties of these offices were, or
could be executed by the members to whom they were
assigned, and the Chief Clerks had the sole control of
everything.
The inefficiency of this system was pointed out in the
reports of the Commissioners of Inquiry into Fees et
cetera in 1788, who proposed that the Navy Board
should be divided into three committees, of three
members each, (the Comptroller presiding over the
whole) and that each committee should have certain
distinct branches or offices put under their control. This
was partially carried into effect in 1796, and more
systematically by the Fourth Report of the Board of
Revision in 1806. By this arrangement, the Office for
Bills and Accounts (after being divided into two
separate branches hereafter mentioned) – the
Treasurer’s Accounts Office – the Seamen’s Wages
Office – and that of Receiver of Fees and Paymaster
of Contingencies, fell to be conducted under the sole
control of the Committee of Accounts.
In 1821/2, when the government determined to reduce
the number of clerks by all practical means, even by
the consolidation of offices, the Office for Comptrolling
the Treasurer's accounts was incorporated with the Bill
Office, and styled the “Office for Bills and Treasurer's
Accounts"; the duties relating to consuls and other
foreign services, previously carried on in the Bills
Office, having been transferred to the "Office for
Foreign and Home Accounts".
The Allotment Office was abolished altogether as a
separate branch, and that portion of it which related to
officers’ Quarterly Bills, was incorporated with the
Seamen’s Wages Office, but left under the control of
the Committee of Correspondence; which Committee
has also the direction of the other branch (the Ticket
Office) the duty of which is to regulate the Pay of the
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Fleet; at the same time that the original duty of the
Seamen’s Wages Office, viz, the keeping of a check
upon the Treasurer (so far as relates to wages) is
under the management of the Committee of Accounts.
How far it is expedient that the different duties
appropriated to the same office should be so
intermixed as to require its being under the control of
two distinct committees, it is not intended now to
inquire; but it is evident from the above statement, that
the Seamen’s Wages Office is a branch of which the
Committee of Accounts have not the exclusive control
or responsibility.
The other three offices, the Office for Bills and
Treasurers Accounts – the Office for Examining the
Foreign and Home Accounts – and the Receivership of
Fees and Paymaster of Contingencies, are under the
exclusive control and direction of the Committee of
Accounts; and it is to the business transacted in them,
which it is the first object of this paper to call particular
attention.
Every payment for General Services, viz., for stores
delivered or works performed under contract, all
Promiscuous Services, such as salvage, maintenance
of distressed seamen, etc, all money impressed to
parties who have to render an account of its
expenditure are paid by bills on the Treasurer, made
out in the Bill Office, and signed by three
Commissioners; as well as all bills for Salaries,
Pensions, Pilotage, the Packet Service, the
Compassionate Fund, etc., the whole being registered
in separate books thus: –
1st. All stores delivered into the Dockyards, or works
performed by contract, and now paid for by bills at
sixty days without interest, and are registered in one
book called the "Sixty Days Bill Book". These services
were originally paid for by bills payable at an indefinite
period, with the discount of the day added, which
sometimes amounted to fifteen or twenty percent. The
system was changed in 1797 to bills at ninety days,
with interest at three pence halfpenny per hundred
pounds per deim added, which was afterwards
reduced to three pence; and ultimately, viz, in 1817,
the present system of issuing bills at sixty days without
interest, was adopted.
2ndly. All Promiscuous Services, such as, claims of
every description – bills of exchange – salvage of
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ships and stores – etc. etc., are paid by ready money
bills, and are registered in a separate book bearing the
name of "Promiscuous Services".
3rdly. All sums impressed to parties who have to
render an account of their expenditure, are registered
in a separate book called the "Imprest Bill Book".
4thly. Salaries, including those of the Admiralty and
Treasurer's Office, the Navy Office, etc., are paid by
bills which are registered in a book styled the “Salary
Book".
5thly. Pensions are likewise paid by bills, and amount
to upwards of two thousand in number every quarter.
They are registered in the "Pension Bill Book".
6thly. Demands for Pilotage are also paid by bill, and
registered in the "Pilotage Bill Book".
7thly. The Packet Service, now transferred to the Navy
Office, is paid by bills, quarterly, which are registered
in a separate book.
8thly. All payments on account of the Compassionate
Fund are made by bill, and registered in a separate
book.
The bills entered in the five last register books, being
for distinct and separate services, when added up and
brought forward at the end of every quarter, shew the
amount paid in Town under each distinct Head, very
accurately.
This is not the case with the bills entered in the first
three register books, viz. the "Sixty Days Bills" – the
"Bills for Promiscuous Services" – and the “Imprest
Bills”. Those require to be abstracted under the distinct
Heads to which they properly belong. For instance, all
stores delivered upon contract or by special
agreement, as well as all bills for New Works carrying
on for the improvement of the Dockyards, being paid
for by Sixty Day bills, each payment ought to be
carried to the respective Head of service to which it
properly belongs, in order to shew the amount so
expended. All Promiscuous Services are paid for by
Ready Money bills, and the title of the book points out
the necessity of their being abstracted separately, in
order to shew to what Head of Service each payment
belongs.
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The "Imprest Bill Register Book" contains the
particulars of all bills issued to public accountants, or
to persons who have received money on the public
account, and who have to render satisfactory accounts
for the same.
The abstracting these last payments under different
Heads can only be effected after the parties have
rendered their accounts; when it becomes necessary
to bring the various payments to the respective Heads
of expenditure to which they belong.
All the reports made by the different Commissioners of
Accounts, and by Committees of the House of
Commons, which had been appointed to examine into
the public accounts of the Kingdom, point out the great
necessity of simplifying them as much as possible. In
the Fifth Report of the Commissioners appointed to
examine, take, and state the Public Accounts of the
Kingdom, in 1780, (See Molleson’s Edition, page 72),
they say – “We are well aware of the difficulties that
must for ever attend the introducing novelty of form
into antient offices, framed by the wisdom of our
ancestors, and established by the experience of ages:
they are considered as incapable of improvement; the
officers educated in, and accustomed to the forms in
use, are insensible of their defects; or, if they feel
them, have no leisure – often, no ability- seldom any
inclination – to correct them; alarmed at the idea of
innovation, they resist the proposal of a regulation,
because it is a change, though from a perplexed and
intricate to a more simple and intelligible system”: and
in a subsequent report they add “Simplicity, uniformity,
and perspicuity, are qualities of excellence in every
account, both public and private; and accounts of
public money, as they concern all, should be intelligible
to all”.
** The Select Committee of Finance of 1819, in their
Fifth Report, after communicating on the “impropriety
(sic) of translating the public accounts into a barbarous
jargon” which is “not always intelligible even to the
officers of the Departments within which this language
is exclusively manufactured,” observed that “an
account relating to the expenditure of public money,
differs in no other respect, but occasionally in its
magnitude, from an account between individuals. The
mode of keeping it ought to be the same. The same
sort of vouchers are required for the sums expended –

**The word used by
the Committee was
‘practice’
not
‘impropriety’.
An examination of the
Fifth Report (BPP
1819(539) (121), p.2)
reveals the paragraph
containing the words
in
the
report
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similar modes of investigating the truth must be
resorted to, whenever difficulties or differences occur;
nor can it be reasonably imagined that in the multiplied
and complicated transactions between mercantile and
commercial men in this country, any mode of
examining and passing accounts, which is better or
more secure than that which is established by
universal usage can have escaped their industry and
acuteness”.
Any attempt to establish a regular a set of mercantile
books on the plan of double entry, would so completely
overturn the whole of the present system, as to render
most of the existing regulations nugatory, and in fact
would require clerks formed to habits of quite a
different nature.
Nor does this appear at all necessary; for if the bills
entered in the "Sixty Days Bill Book", and
"Promiscuous Service Book” are properly abstracted,
and posted regularly into a ledger under their
respective Heads of expenditure; and if the accounts
rendered by accountants to whom money is
impressed, be in like manner properly abstracted and
posted into the Ledgers, these, with the amount, at the
end of each quarter, of the Salary, Pension, Pilotage,
Compassionate Fund, and Packet Service Register
Books, together with the payments made under the
different Heads of Wages, Yards, and Half Pay, also
posted into the Ledger, will shew the amount paid
under every Head of Expenditure whatever, in the
most satisfactory manner, and account for all the sums
voted by Parliament for every Branch of that portion of
the Naval Service under the direction of the Navy
Board.
The great desideratum appears to be, so to abstract
and arrange the payments made for the different kinds
of Store, and the multifarious items comprehended in
carrying on so extended a service as that of the Navy,
as neither to create perplexity by unnecessary details,
nor to omit that degree of perspicuity and
distinctiveness so necessary in all matters of this kind.
The annexed Prospectus shews the different heads of
expenditure proposed to be adopted and those
branches of the Estimate and subsequent Votes from
which the Supply is drawn.
The only attempt hitherto made to attain any such

concerned with “a
barbarous
jargon”
came after the words
commencing
“an
account relating to ...”
Deas
Thomson’s
wording would be
appropriate if the word
“after” in his paragraph
“The
Select
Committee of Finance,
of 1819, in their Fifth
Report after. ... ” was
altered to “before”.
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object has been by abstracting under certain printed
heads, on different sheets of paper, the amount of all
Ready Money and Sixty Day Bills; and which has been
called “The Monthly and Yearly Collection of Bills in
Course, and Ready Money Bills”. The slightest
inspection of this system shews at once its inutility
and, in many instances, the falsity of the deductions
drawn from it. These “collections” have never
embraced any detail of the expenditure of the sums
impressed to public accountants at home and abroad.
They have not shown how the payments made by the
Clerks of the Cheque of the Dockyards, and the naval
officers at home and abroad are applied. In these
accounts many items appear which ought to come
under Heads of Expenditure named in the “collection”
such as the payment of the artificers etc. employed
abroad, duties on Stores imported, Pilotage, Pensions,
etc.
From what has been said, it is obvious that some
alteration to the mode of transacting certain parts of
the business of the Cash Department of the Navy
Office is necessary. Indeed, to render the
arrangements complete, it will be absolutely expedient
to draw a distinct line between the two offices, called
the "Bill and Treasurers Accounts Office” and the
"Office for Examining Foreign and Home Accounts".
The Bill and Treasurers Accounts Office carries with it
the exact denomination of business, to which it ought
to be exclusively devoted. The branch which was
separated from it in 1807, and then called the Office
for Foreign Accounts, was originally intended to bring
up a long outstanding list of arrears of foreign
accounts, which had accumulated to an alarming
degree in the course of the War, and for the
examination of which no adequate provision had
previously been made, and to which was oddly enough
added (in order to make it the more consistently put
under the charge of a clerk of high official rank) the
accounts of the Clerks of the Cheque and of the naval
officers at home whilst a variety of accounts, of a
precisely similar nature, and requiring the same
system of examination, were allowed to remain with
the Bill Office, to which the whole had originally
belonged.
The number of clerks appropriated to both offices in
1807, when the separation took place, and in 1822,
when the new arrangement of duties was made, and
the Treasurer’s Accounts Office incorporated with the
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Bill Office is shown in the margin***.

***
Bills &
Foreign
In order to simplify the business of both Offices, as Accounts
Accounts
well as render the system more effective, it is only
necessary to apply the well-known principle of
1807
subdivision of labour, and keep the clerks employed in
each office strictly to their respective duties.
1 chief
1 chief
14 other
6 other
The "Bill and Treasurers Accounts Office" ought to 15
7
have nothing to do with the examination of the
accounts of parties to whom money has been
1822
impressed. It should be strictly confined to keeping an
efficient check upon the Treasurer, by furnishing him, 1 chief
1chief
daily, with a list of all Ready Money Bills passed, and 15 other
8 other
monthly, with a list of all Sixty Days falling due in the 16
9
ensuing month; and seeing that he has the necessary
authority for drawing from the Exchequer, to meet
those payments; as well as examining the Treasurer’s
payments, and the vouchers from which the
Treasurers Annual Account for the Commissioners of
Audit is made up; together with making out bills for all
stores delivered or services performed – for claims of
every description – for Salaries, Pensions, Pilotage,
Packet Service, Compassionate Fund, etc..
At present, exclusive of these duties, the accounts of
the Paymaster of Marines – of the Solicitor of the
Admiralty and Navy – and the Contingencies of the
Admiralty and Navy Pay Office, (which three last are
previously audited by the respective Departments
themselves, and therefore only required to be recast,
and compared with the vouchers) together with sundry
petty Contingent Accounts of no moment, are still
allowed to remain with the Department of Bills and
Treasurers Accounts.
The examination which these accounts undergo,
being, as before stated, exactly similar to what takes
place with regard to the accounts examined in the
Office for Foreign and Home Accounts, it would be a
manifest improvement in the arrangement of business
between these two offices, if the line were in future to
be distinctly drawn between them; and the duties of
the Bill and Treasurers Accounts Office strictly
confined to what the title of the office implies; and if the
accounts of all parties to whom money has been
impressed or advanced in any manner or way
whatever, were all examined, checked and abstracted
(in the mode before alluded to) in one and the same
office, which might then with strict propriety be styled
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the Office for Foreign and Home Accounts only.
To accomplish this arrangement, it is only necessary to
transfer two of the clerks now employed in the Bill
Office in the examination of the accounts in question,
to the Office for Foreign and Home Accounts; and then
the number of clerks in each would be as stated in the
margin****, and the system of business complete in ****
every respect, and free from apprehensions of arrears,
Bill and Treasurer’s
whether in time of war, or in the event of an armament,
Accounts Office
however sudden, as the entry of a few extra or 1 Chief – 1st Sec. 1st
temporary clerks to assist the established clerks Class
already trained and accustomed to the business of the 4 Clerks of 2nd Class
office, would be equal to any emergency whatever.
9 Clerks of 3rd Class
14 in all
What is now recommended is nothing more than what
was successfully practised in the three separate Office for Foreign and
departments of Transports, Sick and Hurt, and
Home Accounts
Prisoners of War, under the late Transport Board, and 1 Chief – 2nd Sec. 2nd
is now in use in that which was transferred to the Navy Class
Office in 1817.
2 Clerks of 2nd Class
8 Clerks of 3rd Class
J. D. Thomson
11 in all

(Source: TNA: ADM 106/2714)
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Copy of Treasury Minute, dated 18th April 1828; respecting
appointment of a Commission to inquire into the different
modes of keeping the Public Accounts
_______________________________________

The Chancellor of the Exchequer states to the Board, that it has been
suggested by the Finance Committee, that it might tend to afford satisfactory
information, and to a probable improvement in the mode of keeping the Public
Accounts in the great departments controlling and conducting the Public
Expenditure, if two persons of experience in the mode of keeping the Public
Accounts, together with an individual or individuals well acquainted with the
keeping and stating mercantile accounts, were appointed jointly to inquire into,
and to state the manner in which the Public Accounts are kept in the several
principal Departments connected with the Receipt and Expenditure of the
money granted by Parliament for the Public Service; and to ascertain the nature
and description of the books kept in each office respectively, and to state the
purpose for which each book is kept, and the nature of the information it is
calculated to afford; and if they were also required to offer such suggestions as
may, after such inquiry, appear to them as tending to a more uniform system of
keeping those Accounts, as well as calculated to afford more satisfactory and
ready information in regard to the nature and the Amount of the Expenditure
under each particular Head of Service. It is suggested also, that the persons
who may be appointed to make this inspection, and inquiry, should be
particularly instructed to consider how far it may appear to be practicable and
advantageous to employ the mercantile system of Double Entry in the keeping
of the Public Accounts, in preference to the official system now in use.
My Lords concur in this suggestion, and are pleased to direct a Warrant to be
prepared, appointing Mr T.C. Brooksbank of this office, Mr Samuel Beltz, of the
Commissariat Department, and Mr Peter Harris (sic) Abbott, to examine, and to
report upon this matter.
_______________________________________
Whitehall, Treasury Chambers,
4th June 1828.

GEO. R. DAWSON

(Source: BPP 1828(420), App. 53)
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Thos. C. Brooksbank, Esq. et al. appointed to inquire into the
mode of keeping
Public Accounts
After our hearty Commendations. Whereas it appears to us that it may tend to
afford satisfactory information, and to a probable improvement in the mode of
keeping the public accounts in the Great Departments controlling and
conducting the Public Expenditure, if two Persons of experience in the mode of
keeping the public accounts, together with an Individual well acquainted with the
system of keeping and stating Mercantile Accounts, were appointed jointly to
inquire into and to state the manner in which the Public Accounts are kept in the
several Principal Departments connected with the receipt and expenditure of
the money granted by Parliament for the Public Service, and to state the
purpose for which each Book is kept, and the nature of the information it is
calculated to afford; and if such Persons were also required to offer such
suggestions as may, after such Inquiry, appear to them as tending to a more
uniform system of keeping those Accounts, as well as calculated to afford more
satisfactory and ready information in regard to the nature and the amount of the
expenditure under each particular Head of Service. And further, to consider how
far it may appear to be practicable and advantageous to employ the mercantile
system of Double Entry in the keeping of the Public Accounts, in preference to
the official system now in use: These are to appoint, authorise and require you,
Thomas Constantine Brooksbank, Samuel Beltz and Peter Harriss Abbott, to
inquire into and report upon the several matters herein before recited.
For which this shall be your Warrant. Whitehall, Treasury Chambers, the
29th day of April 1828.
WELLINGTON
HENRY GOULBURN
ELIOT
To Thomas Constantine Brooksbank, Samuel Beltz, and Peter Harriss Abbott,
Esquires
(Source: BPP 1829(290) App.1)
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Excerpt from B&B’s Report of 9 February 1829 (BPP 1829(290), pp. 18-21)
Upon our examination of the Accounts of the Navy Office, it appeared to us
that they had been modelled more for the purpose of checking the
Accounts of the Treasurer of the Navy, than for affording any explanatory
detail of the Naval Expenditure.
st

1 According to
the Old System

For the first object, very few heads of Account were necessary, and Your
Lordships will find, upon reference to the Ten Years Account for the Naval
Expenditure, which we desired to be prepared from the Books i9n the
office, as already made up, that before the year 1826 the whole of the
Expenditure of the navy was recorded under very few heads of service;
each head in the Account being the total amount of the Bills entered in the
several Registers during the year.
This is at present partially done in a Register called an Abstract Register:
and in regard to Imprests, the Accounts, when rendered by the subaccountants, are entered in a Ledger for that particular service, called the
Imprest Ledger. Thus the Expenditure is scattered and distributed in
different books, and the process of preparing any detailed Account from
them has been done by means of a large and broad sheet of paper,
divided into partitions and squares, in which the sums are collected from
the Registers according to the items of Expenditure required. This is a
substitute for a regular Ledger, and the great defect of the old system of
Account was the want of good general Cash Book, and a proper Ledger.
To remedy the acknowledged defects of the old system, a new one was
introduced in 1826, under the direction of Mr Deas Thomson, a Member of
the Board, and also of the Committee of Accounts.

nd

2 According to
the New System

This gentleman appears to have devoted a considerable degree of zeal
and talent in endeavouring to establish a more systematic and connected
plan of Account; for which purpose he authorised all the items of
expenditure, scattered in the Registers, to be entered in a Journal in the
mercantile form, and thence posted into a regular Ledger. Mr Thomson’s
system will perhaps be better understood by the following Tabular view we
formed of it.
The Payments made by the Navy Board, by Orders on the Treasurer when
for Stores, or for Workmanship, are Sixty-day Bills; and when for other
heads of service, by Ready-money Bills. These Bills are all recorded in the
Navy Office in the following Registers, against each of which we have
inserted the Number of Entries or separate Payments ordered by the Navy
Board in the year 1827. (NOT shown in the following table.)
Registers
Ready Money Bills:
1. Salaries
2. Pensions
3. Compassionate Fund
4. Pilotage
5. Packet Service
6. Subsistence of.
Distressed Seamen
7. Blockade Service

Journal

Ledger

Total of the orders
for Payment
entered during
each month in
these several
Registers is carried
once a month to the
Journal

From the Journal the
posting is made under
proper heads of
Service into the
Ledger; in which is
also posted the
Grants of Parliament
and Treasurer’s
Receipts
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8. Promiscuous Register

9.Imprest Register

Entered daily in
Journal

Posted under proper
heads

Entered daily in
Journal

Posted when the
Imprest is made, to
the debit of the
Accountant, and when
the Accounts are
rendered the
payments are posted
to his credit, and also
to their respective
heads of Service.

60 Day Bill Register
The Bills are entered
promiscuously in this
Register, but another
Register is prepared
from this, called AN
ABSTRACT REGISTER
in which the Bills are
distributed under proper
heads of Service, such
as Timber, etc. and
totalled at the each
month.

Entered monthly
from the Abstract
Register.

From a monthly
statement prepared in
the Wages Department
of the payment of
Wages, Yards,
Ordinaries, Half-pay and
Chaplains Bounty.

An entry is made in
the Journal
monthly.

Posted under proper
heads.

Posted to the Ledger.

The Payments of Bills issued for Transport Service, and by the Victualling
Board, are recorded according to the Returns delivered from those
Departments.
We thought it right, with a view of seeing the Accounts which both systems
could at present produce, to call for a Statement of the Naval Expenditure
in the year 1827, under the general heads of the Estimate, but subdivided,
for the purpose of affording information, as far as the Books of Account
would furnish it.
In return to that requisition we received the two Accounts, which Your
Lordships will find in the Appendix.

See Appendix
6.5 below.

But upon comparing these Accounts, we found only four articles in them
corresponded in amount. We applied for explanation on the subject, which
Your Lordships will also find in the Appendix. However defective the old
system was acknowledged to be, as it had been found to answer some
particular and immediate purposes, the Navy Board determined, and we
think wisely, not to abandon it until they were satisfied that it could be at
once substituted by a better.
The two systems are therefore at present in operation. We consider that
the essential basis still wanting is a good comprehensive CASH
ACCOUNT, and that it should be from such an account, and not from the
scattered Bill Registers, that the Ledger should be formed.
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APPENDIX 6.5
A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE ACCOUNTS OF THE
EXPENDITURE OF THE NAVY SERVICE, IN THE YEAR 1827
ACCORDING TO THE STATEMENTS RECEIVED FROM THE
BOOKS OF THE OLD AND THE NEW SYSTEM OF ACCOUNT, IN
THE NAVY OFFICE
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APPENDIX 6.5
A Comparative View of the Accounts of the Expenditure
of the Navy Service, in the Year 1827
according to the Statements received from the Books
of the Old and the New System of Account, in the Navy Office
(to the nearest pound)

Expenditure in 1827
Wages to seamen and marines
Victuals to above & Officers in
Ordinary & Victualling Office &
Victualling Yards & Medical
Establishment & Army Provisions
Public Departments:
Admiralty Office
Navy Pay Office
Navy Office
His Majesty’s Yards at Home &
Wages in above yards
For timber and repairs (incl.
Bombay)
Pilotage
Foreign Yards
Royal Naval College
Wages etc. to Officers in Ordinary
Hired packets
Half-pay to Flag Officers, etc.
Pensions (military)
Bounty to Chaplains
Compassionate List
Widows of Marine Officers
Greenwich Hospital
Repairs and improvements in Yards
Transports
Pensions (civil)
Imprests Unaccounted For:
For Widows Pensions
Solicitor to Admiralty and Navy
Offices
Differences between Imprests and
expenditure of foreign yards
Differences between amount of Bills
registered in 1827 and amount of
Bills payable in 1827
Repayments by other departments
Amount of Imprests for which
accounts have not been received
Totals

Old System £
1,073,663

New System £
1,146,912

Difference £
73,249

1,048,896

1,095,492

46,596

2

53,572
32,646
73,265

61,612
32,530
72,955

8,040
-116
-310

3

692,940
1,137,664
73,971
59,681
8,851
107,719
38,671
873,713
129,438
1,414
9,759
9,529
235,000
337,705
326,104
155,320

695,205
890,595
100,695
70,420
6,659
107,577
40,342
873,824
130,073
1,414
9,658
9,529
235,000
234,535
346,478
128,666

2,265
-250,096
26,724
10,739
-2,192
-142
1,671
111
635
-101
-103,170
20,374
-26,654

4
4
1
4
4

106,500
15,071

106,500
-

-15,071

6

49,769

-

-49,769

6

30,994

-

-30,994

6

-

- 95,125

-95,125

6

6,681,855

Diff #
1

5

2
2
6

4,801
4,801
6,306,349
375,506
(Source: BPP 1829(290), p. 167)

# Explanation of the differences greater than £1,000
1. Different classifications of expenses.
2. Incorrect classification of expenditure and minor variations in sources of data.
3. Omission in the old system of a payment.
4. Different accounting treatment.
5. Incorrect accounting in the old system.
6. No explanation given.
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APPENDIX 6.6
Letter from Commissioner Deas Thomson of the Navy Office
to Lord Melville 11 August 1829
Deas Thomson’s Observations
Agreeably with the wishes expressed by
your Lordship yesterday, to have a brief
report on the system of account
recommended by the commissioners for
stating public accounts, and which is
directed to be carried into effect on 1
January next, I beg to submit the
following
observations
for
your
Lordships early consideration. As we
are under directions to report officially
and other points of those connected
with the new books of account, I shall
confine myself to a few brief remarks on
each of the principal books of account
recommended by the commissioners.
1st. Cash Book
At the time of the visit of the
commissioners at the Navy office, in the
early part of their enquiry, no regular
cash book had been introduced to show
in one point of view the various
subdivisions
of
the
Treasurers
balances.
The distant period at which the
treasurers account was delivered in for
examination, precluded the possibility of
keeping a cash book available for any
useful purpose. The account of cash
was in consequence, shown only in the
ledger, and was posted from the
treasurers monthly returns. This plan
was necessarily continued until the
close of the last year, up to which
period the treasurers accounts were
always two months in arrears. The
treasurers minute of November last
reckoning all his vouchers for payments
under the heads of general services to
be sent to this office for examination
daily, at once cleared the way for the
introduction of the cash book.

B&B’s Answers
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On 1 January following a book with
appropriate columns for the different
balances which the Treasurer is
required to keep was consequently
opened showing on one side the whole
of his receipts daily and on the other the
amount of bills cashed each day in 19.
The book in question, while it is
calculated to give every information
respecting the Treasurer’s accounts
that can possibly be required, is, at the
same time, so simple and require so
little labour to keep it up to no adequate
substitute will be found for it in the
proposed new system.

There is no objection to keeping a
book in the Navy office such as is
here described for stating the daily
balances in the hands of the
Treasurer. But it is not such a book
as is wanted (and which cannot be
dispensed with in the establishment
of a perfect system of account) to
serve as the basis of the subsequent
entries in the ledger. Any plan of
bookkeeping that does not admit of a
regular cash account must be
radically defective, and open the door
to errors of all kinds as well is require
constant resort to numerous books
which can and ought to be abolished.

One great objection to the cash book
recommended by the Commissioners is
that from its cumbersome detail the
posting of it will be found impracticable.
But supposing that difficulty to be
removed by dividing it into four or five
different books, there is no necessity
whatever for repeating in the cash book
the details of every bill previously
recorded in full in the register.

There would not be any cumbersome
detail in the cash book with proposed
institute the payments will not require
any further revision in that we have
pointed out for separating the
payments made by checks on the
bank from those making cash in the
Treasurer’s office. There will be no
difficulty whatever in transferring the
entries to the ledger, a task which,
with ordinary diligence, might be
easily performed by a single clerk in
one or two days each week; and the
arrangement save all the Journal
entries to which a subsequent
observation refers.

As a book for official reference it will be
found to answer no purpose whatever,
the register is now in use, being most of
them confined to particular services,
with the view of facilitating a reference
to former payments, and they combined
in themselves a classification which
could not be adhered to in the cash
book proposed. The registers all bill
books contain all the information which
the commissioners proposed to repeat
in their cash book, and could not under
any circumstances can't be dispensed
with, being the records by means of
which the treasurers accounts are

As a book of references the cash
book would be exceedingly useful, in
as much as it would comprise a
connected in a well digested detail of
the actual receipts and payments of
the Treasurer. The entries would
contain a complete system of
classification much more perfect than
any that has yet been adopted, and
be so prepared as to facilitate
subsequent postings under the
respective heads of service in the
ledger. The thirteen Registry or Bill
Books are required under Mr
Thomson's
arrangement
for
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examining the Treasurer’s accounts,
but they would not be required for
Moreover, this detailed cash book, that purpose under the provisions we
containing a laborious repetition of have made, and they can and might
information already record in the office, be dispensed with.
in a more perfect shape, is not
calculated to seek to see a single book A perfect cash account could
now in use. The increase of labour in supersede a great number of books
thus doubling the number of entries in now in use both in the Navy and
the subsidiary books will be very great, Navy pay officers. The accounts kept
without its being productive of any in the separate official branches
advantages in simplifying or checking charged with the adjustment of the
the accounts of the Department.
claims of the public creditors must be
retained under any plan, but the
books used in the subsequent stages
of the business – those relating to the
actual payments, the audit of the
Treasurer's
accounts,
and
for
combining the whole in the general
accounts of the affairs of the
Department – can only be restricted
with them their due limits under such
a plan as we have proposed. That we
propose to increase the labour can
only be said in consequence of a
complete misapprehension of the
whole tenor of our Report.
________________________________ ______________________________
audited.

2nd. Journal
As some important improvements on
the mercantile system of account had
been adopted since its introduction into
this Office, and more particularly with
reference to the Journal, it may not be
necessary to trace them through the
progress of the trial of the system in this
Office.
The late committee of accounts in
undertaking to remodel the accounts of
the Navy at first conceived a plan
although not by Double Entry, in some
respects similar to the one now
proposed by the Commissioners; it
consisted in collecting the whole of the
Navy expenditure into a General
Abstract Register and all personal acts
into a ledger. After a short trial it was

We must be allowed to observe that
there is no similarity whatever
between our plan and that which
allusion is here made.
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found that a repetition of the details
contained in the subsidiary books not
only rendered the posting of the
abstract extremely laborious at the
same time swelled out some of the
accounts to such an extent as to make
it absolutely necessary to condense the
entries. This system of abstract
however necessary may have been at
the outset, as paving the way to the
introduction of a better plan of account
was prudently abandoned after a short
trial of 5 or 6 months. It never the less
proved that in recording the cash
transactions and numerous accounts, it
was necessary to adopt certain fixed
principles to prevent omissions and to
ensure the accuracy of the results. The
principles were known to form the basis
of the Mercantile System of double
entry, but the novelty of that system in a
public office (this being the first
Department in which it has been
introduced) to want of instruments
acquainted with its principles and the
partiality that existed for the old forms
rendered its introduction almost an
insuperable difficulty.
It was none the less adopted nearly in
its mercantile form without prejudging
deviations which it might be necessary
to make from it, to adapt it entirely to
the wants of the office.
After the first years trial, it was not
considered advisable to make any
sudden changes in the system, but to
effect such alterations as appeared
more immediately necessary leaving
the system open to subsequent
improvements which it was conceived
might be more effectually acted upon,
after they had been truly considered in
the clerks had become more conversant
with and reconciled to the principles of
the system, and the nature of the
contemplated changes. It must tell At the time of our first visit to the
whether the distinctively stated that at Navy Office, the short ledger is entry
the time of the examination of the books of the counting house (see report
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of the commissioners, although the
entries were not so full in the villages,
as they have been since, yet the short
mercantile entry had been abandoned.

page 96) was the only one in use.
Some brief explanations were
subsequently added, but they formed
nothing like such a perfect ledger
account as we could safely
The improvements that have since been recommend to be kept in a public
made in the system consist principally office.
in an improved Journal, and a more
secure process of posting the ledger. In At the commencement of our
the progress of the trial of the investigation Mr Thomson had fallen
mercantile system, it was ascertained, mere two years been contending with
that all the ground on self-evident Sir Byam Martin, the Comptroller and
principles, it was nevertheless defective with other members of the Navy
in certain particulars and that the Board for the proprietary of
regulation established between the permanently establishing a system of
Journal and ledger rendered it possible accounts which he here admits to be
for the bookkeeper to make cross open to strong objections and, above
entries in the journal, and then to all close, to be calculated to facilitate
transcribe them in the ledger and thus the perpetration of floral Lords on the
conceal neglect and even fraud.
part of the individual is employed in
conducting it. It would, indeed if it had
It was also ascertained that an error been persisted in, been productive of
committed in the Journal must of nothing but embarrassment and
necessity be carried to the ledger and mischief and we content that the plan
that even in posting the ledger from the he has since substituted for it must
Journal sums might be omitted or lead to the same result.
posted to wrong accounts and either
errors committed which a balance could Every departure from a rigid
not expose.
simplicity in the arrangement of
extensive accounts must inevitably
To remedy these defects a Journal in be a source of error and add to the
an improved principle has been unavoidable
expenses
of
introduced instead of forming the basis management. The plan of employing
of the results of the ledger as in the a Journal for the purposes of
generally prevailing system the Journal checking the entries in the ledger is
is used to verify these results: both the the most complicated as well is
Journal and ledger are written up from unnecessary arrangement and can
original documents and By different be satisfactory to no one who is the
clerks as the entries are compared and least conversant with the subject.
certified at the close of the business of The only true mode of checking the
each day by a third person.
entries on the principle books is by
combining judiciously, the double
This course, wild obviates the message entry system with the expeditious
that the much useless detail and rendering, examination and entry of
repetition in the journal, at the same the accounts of the several agents
time secures and accuracy in the employed, taking for the basis the
results the ledger which was not to be actual receipts and expenditure of the
found in the established mercantile Department. It is not possible that an
plan, and moreover, by making the error can arise under the plan we
Journal and ledger independent of each have recommended, unlike unless
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other, dispatch is essentially promoted,
as both books may be proceeding at the
same
time;
but
the
greatest
recommendation in favour of these
amendments is the security which they
present against fraud.
The commissioners have in one part of
their report had perverted to the
possibility of a dishonest agent
concealing fraudulent transactions by
means of the mercantile short entry.
The same object may be used as easily
accomplished by means of the
explanatory entry; but under the new
and improved system in operation in
this office no across entry whatever can
be made in the ledger without the
knowledge of the clerk who keeps the
Journal, for the Journal being a perfect
check on the details this was on the
Journal results of the ledger, affords the
most perfect security both against error
and fraud. The amounts of the accounts
of receipts and expense and of the
personal accounts, are kept in distinct
columns in the Journal and the total is
being added and carried forward the
general balance of the accounts in the
ledger is ascertained at one glance thus
obviating the laborious process hitherto
unavoidably observed by picking out the
debits and credits of the whole ledger.

through the neglect or misconduct of
the superintending offices against
which no system whatever can of
itself adequately provide.
Mr Thomson's arrangement is directly
opposed to the retrenchment of the
numerous
useless
books
and
accounts in the Navy and Navy pay
office and consequently to the desire
of the government and the country to
conduct the public business in the
most economical way possible.
Everyone who has at all understood
the tendency of our suggestions must
see that they've lead to the eventual
abolition of everything that is
complicated or unnecessary in the
conduct of the departmental accounts
and to the substitution, in their place,
of a simple and effectual system,
which provides in every possible way
for all the objects to which the
accounts are meant to be subservient
as well is for the security of the
public.
We
would
not
expect
that
suggestions founded upon such
views would meet with no opposition.
The existing arrangements were
admitted on all sides to be full of
defects and inconveniences, and in
the course of our enquiries we
discussed that partial improvements
had
already
been
frequently
attempted and found to be in
effectual, and that we could not
faithfully fulfil the task entrusted to us
with our grim recommending an
alteration of the whole system. We
accordingly
recommended
that
instead of making a variety of
detached documents relating to
payments made and to be made on
the basis of the plan of account in the
great departments as heretofore
been done and is still done under the
new plan of Mr Thomson is that the
basis should in future be a simple
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cash account of the actual receipts
and payments and we were aware
that such a change from a
complicated
to
play
in
this,
straightforward system (which could
not but be in consistent with the
established habits and prejudices of
some of the public servants) would at
the outset be regarded with
apprehension, and that it could not, in
fact, be brought about by through the
direct
interposition
of
the
government.
We have performed our part, and our
humble and how and our humble
endeavours have been honoured
with the approbation of the Treasury.
We are prepared to proceed in
compliance with the directions
contained in their Lordships minute of
14 July, but it must not be concealed
that the cordial co-operation of the
heads of the departments is
indispensably necessary to ensure
success to our undertaking, which we
never supposed would not call from a
certain degree of attention and
exertion,
and
probably
the
relinquishment of some very natural
prejudices, on the part of those
officers.
The labours and anxiety attending the
general balance of the accounts is also
totally avoided, as the books by the
simple process exert too, are balanced
from day to day throughout the year,
and the balance sheet of the accounts
which, under all existing systems of
double
entry,
is
a
document
unsupported by any other proof of its
accuracy than the ledger itself, is under
the system now established in this
office, corroborated by the balance of
the Journal which prevents any error on
alteration in the balance of the Ledger
accounts.

The Journal entries are under this
plan collected from a variety of
detached documents – a defect
which adheres to most of the plans
adopted in the departments and is
itself a source of error and
unnecessary labour and they do not
after all record the actual receipts
and payments. The device can afford
no check except upon the ledger
entries, which could be checked with
at least equal effect by the use of the
regular cash book. The arrangement
is a palpable departure from that
perfect simplicity which ought to be
rigidly adhered to in recording the
pecuniary transactions of a public
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Department while it is blamed at the
expense of much preparatory labour
left altogether out of view in the
account of it here given.
Greater detail has gone into and may
print probably be considered necessary
to establish the utility of a Journal
embracing all the elements of the
Ledger accounts, but it was essential to
carry conviction on that point previously
to noticing that it defects of the
substitute
recommended
by
the
Commissioners.
The book recommended by them
retains little more of the ordinary
mercantile Journal, than the title, and
being partial in its operation, is
altogether an nugatory as a check, as
the ledger might with greater proprietary
be posted from the accounts and
documents themselves them from the
transcripts in the proposed Journal.

The book recommended by us is
intended principally to facilitate the
incorporation of the accounts of the
Sub- accountants, after they have
passed examination and been
allowed in the general accounts of
the department and not as a
substitute for the mercantile Journal,
which is kept for objects with which a
public has nothing to do. It was never
meant to act as a check upon the
whole of the ledger entries, the
cheques being an Liberal afforded by
the cash book and ledger itself.

Thus it is considered that under such a
system as that proposed by the
commissioners this book will be found
altogether superfluous as it will afford
no security for the accuracy of the
results of the ledger and cannot in any We have before stated that we
sense be considered as simplify or consider the actual receipts and
checking the ledger entries.
payments as recorded in the cash
book to be the only true basis of a
The great advantages of a perfect perfect system of account. Mr
Journal been so manifest it cannot be Thomson adopts a totally different
considered a matter of regret that in basis viz. the orders upon the
modifying the mercantile system of Treasury as recorded in a variety of
double entry to render it applicable to registers. The mercantile journals is
public accounts, the commissioners necessary to his plan, but it is not so
should have considered advisable so to ours which proposes to accomplish
the altar the character of this book as to every desirable object without
render it of little or no avail for by conforming to that part of the practice
destroying the universality of the of merchants, where end to obtain a
Journal, they have divested the system ‘profit and loss’ account of their
of one of its greatest merits.
several
adventures
they
are
compelled to have recourse to
numerous journal entries.
We do not understand with what

459

justice our Journal can be said to be
superfluous. The accounts of the
subaccountants
must
be
incorporated
with
the
general
accounts, and there must be a book
for arranging under the proper heads
of service such portions of the
disbursements as have undergone a
regular examination and been
approved, as well as to facilitate the
accurate and systematic distribution
in the pages of the ledger. For the
objects required to be obtained in a
public office, our Journal we must be
permitted to contend is nothing short
of a perfect book and we really
cannot perceive in what respect we
have “by destroying its universality
divested the system of one of its
greatest merits”.
________________________________ ______________________________
3rd. Ledger
One great difference between the
system now in operation in that
recommended by the commissioners
consist in a different view taken of the
nature of the payments;
under the present system all services
paid by bills are debited in the ledger
with the amount of such bills, and all
services paid in cash also debited in the
ledger with the amount of such cash
payments. The commissioners on the
other hand, considering all bills issued
as prospective payments proposed that
no entry of them should be made in the
ledger and tool they are returned paid
by the Treasury. But it is conceive that a
bill given to a claimant in payment of an
article delivered or for a service
performed is in every respect and actual
payment, the claimant being satisfied
and the service being at an end; and it
is more properly recorded under the
state of the settlement of the claim took
place; if however the recommendation
of the commissioners is adopted, no

The real difference between us is
this, that Mr Thomson enters in the
Journal from the bill registers at
certain periods (not at the time in the
bills drawn) the amount of the orders
upon the Treasurer at the debit of the
particular service services, where as
we propose to do the same services
from the cash book after the actual
payments. He must be understood
that our plan is consistent in this
respect with the one heretofore
pursued, that it is conformable with
the practice of most of the other
departments, and that the alteration
is calculated to confuse the general
statements of the public accounts. At
the same time it is not all necessary
for the purpose of obtaining an
immediate statement whenever it
may be required of the amount of the
outstanding bills upon the Treasurer
as well is the particular services for
which they were granted and there is
an evident advantage in being
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record of the adjustment of any claim
will appear in the ledger until the
settlement of a subsequent transaction
between the Treasurer and the holder
of the bill; and in cases when bills
remained unclaimed, the services for
which they were issued will never be
debited at all. Another material objected
to such a plan will be that an account in
the ledger will show the amount of
these outstanding bills; and as the
board is liable to be called upon at any
time for the payment of the, the
information is too much importance to
be dispensed with in the principle books
of account; neither will the balance
sheet show the amount of these
outstanding
bills
and
will
not
consequently be a faithful statement of
the accounts of the Department.

enabled to distinguish in a general
statement of the departmental
transactions, the amounts actually
paid for the stores from the unpaid
obligations of the board.

Another material difference exists
between the two systems with reference
to the period of closing the books under
the present system the mercantile
practice is followed in this office. The
books of the Department a closed as
soon as possible after the expiration of
the year without waiting for the receipt
of accounts from abroad which must in
the bully be in arrears. The accounts
are consequently balanced at the close
of the year without reference to any
claims that may be outstanding for that
year; and these balances constitute the
first entry in the books for the
subsequent year. The commissioners
on the contrary, contests of the books
for the year should not be closed until
every account for that year had been
received, also, that the accounts of the
subsequent years should be opened
although those for the preceding year
have not been closed.

In the naval departments their
receipts and payments of the
Treasurer included by far the most
important of the whole transactions
and they will be brought to account
finally on the last day of each year.
The accounts of the home agents
being to be rendered weekly may be
brought to account within a week or
two of that day, and the accounts of
the sub accountants serving abroad
being to be audit monthly and being
referable only to a very few distinct
heads of the estimate I also for the
most part be included in the general
account of the year within a
reasonable period, while the delay
and finally closing the Journal and
ledger four, will in no respect impede
the progress of the accounts of the
current year or prevent the easy
preparation of a correct balance
sheet.

The only argument that has been
brought forward in support of such a
recommendation that information as to
the expenditure within the year may
possibly be required for the purpose of

We take leave to refer to a separate
paper in which we have dwelt more
particularly in the propriety of this part
of our arrangement to which we beg
to add that we consider the regular of

It must also be understood that Mr
Thomson obtains a object of no real
importance and in itself inconvenient
at the expense of that simplicity
arranged arrangement which should
characterise the money records of
the public Department and by
perpetuating a most cumbrous
machinery of books and accounts in
the Navy and Navy Pay Office which
must
always
embarrass
the
government in its attempt to reduce
expenditure to the lowest possible
limits.
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making a comparison with the estimates
for the same year. In opposition to that
argument will it will only be necessary to
state that the comparison cannot be
made, until a period when it will lead to
no practical good.
Much inconvenience to also result from
such practice, for as no final account of
receipts and expenditure for any year
can be made out, until the receipt every
account belonging to that year, every
statement of the expenditure prepared
previously closing to the books of the
year, must necessarily be liable to after
correction, and vary in amount
according to the period when such
statement is called for, and in time of
war, the closing of the books would be
delayed to an indefinite period.

keeping together (as far as may be
conveniently practicable) in one
general
account
the
various
disbursements of a particular year, to
be of the utmost importance with a
view to the attainment of a correct
statement of the public transactions,
and that the reasoning in the
observations to which we are now
rented flying is wholly insufficient for
disproving its necessity.
The plan of finally closing the books
on a public Department immediately
at the close of the year is borrowed
from the practices of merchants,
instituted for purposes peculiar to
their own affairs, but in the accounts
of government it is calculated to lead
to errors and misapprehensions of
the most serious kind. We need only
to refer to the annexed analysis of Mr
Thomson's two statements of naval
expenditure to 30 June 1829 to shew
that under such a plan the receipts
and expenditure of unconnected
periods and thereby mingle together,
and it is evident that under the
superintendence of an officer less
distinguished for vigilance and
accuracy than that Gentleman, the
periodical statements submitted to
government and to Parliament might,
from the neglect of enforcing the
early rendering of the agent’s
accounts
or
delays
in
the
examination when received, be so far
at variance with the truth and with the
statements of corresponding periods
as to give rise to very inconvenient
discussions.
Our only motive for recommending a
different course was not that the
expenditure for one year might be
compared with that of another, but to
procure the truest statement that can
be attained of the transactions of the
department as well as with a view to
an eventual combination of all the
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expenditure of the departments in
one general annual statement.
We have elsewhere stated that, in
establishing the rule, we will not
unaware that exceptions must be
made to it in cases where the
accounts cannot be obtained within a
reasonable
time,
or
where
questionable charges must stand
over for future explanation. But how
arrangement
will
render
the
explanation which must accompany
the periodical statements short and of
easy comprehension.
________________________________
Finally it may not be unnecessary to
add that, if such an account as the one
in question should be required, it can be
prepared from the books now in use,
with the greatest facility and accuracy
without having recourse to the
dangerous expedient recommended by
the commissioners.

______________________________
It is not possible that such a
satisfactory account as we propose
to give can be prepared, either with
facility or accuracy from the books
now in use. There is not the slightest
danger connected with the expedient
alluded to which is not ours but has
always been, in practice resorted to
was more or less accuracy: we only
prescribed it as a rule for the purpose
of ensuring uniformity in the making
up in rendering of the whole of the
departmental accounts.

Moreover the transactions of our agents
abroad and now recorded under proper
dates, whereas the commissioners
proposed that they should be recorded
in the books of the office under dates
when it is impossible that this office can
have any knowledge of them.

This is a mistake. The transactions of
the agents abroad will be recorded in
the Journal with reference to the
date's in which they occurred.

Again, a material difference exists
between the two systems in respect to
the entry in the ledger of the cash
transactions of the sub accountants;
under the present system, the receipts
and payments of our agents are posted
in the ledger quarterly and they could
not be posted more frequently without
entailing much additional labour it on
the office, and exposing the books to
unavoidable arrears.

The accounts of the agents at home
may be rendered weekly and the
accounts of the agents abroad may
be rendered monthly; and they may
be examined, entered and posted
immediately after the receipt without
any greater exertion on the part of
the individuals employed than what
the public has a right to expect at
their hands.
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The labour required as we are
persuaded, been greatly overstated
and we had calculated on the natural
the effects of the apprehensions that
might prevail on this point. Our plan
diminishes the expenses of the office,
while it really exacts only very
ordinary and reasonable exertion
from the officers and clerks.
Although it may not be proper to enter
these accounts and ledger more
frequently than at present it may not
withstanding be found advisable to
require more frequent transmission of
the
accounts
of
receipts
and
disbursements of the sub accountants
than at present. Your Lordships may
however, probably consider that in the
numerous cases where the quarterly
expenditure of an accountant does not
amount to more than 20 or 30 it would
be too much to require a weekly
statement of his disbursements.

It is most essential that the accounts
should be entered in the ledger more
frequently, and if it is extended that
there should be any improvement in
the system of accounting for the
public expenditure, this point must be
attended to as one of primary
importance.

The system now in operation contains
as much detail as can safely be given
for in extensive accounts too much
minutiae invariably creates confusion
and must necessarily give rise to great
changes in the system in a time of war.

We are not advocates for too much
minutiae or unnecessary detail. We
do not propose the line should be
written that is not indispensably
required for stating the transactions
with
sufficient
clearness
and
accuracy and we contend that our
plan would not be required to be
altered in the slightest degree in the
event of the recurrence of a war.

________________________________
In conclusion it is respectfully submitted
to your Lordships earnest consideration
whether, in the uncertainty that now
prevails as to the practicability of the
system of the commissioners as yet
untried, it would be consistent with the
public security to discontinue that now
in operation in the Navy office which

______________________________
We know of no uncertainty prevailing
as to the practicability of our system.
It is practicability must be evident to
everyone who will candidly review
our report; but we have always
admitted that for its successful
introduction of the cordial and
energetic support of the principal

It should not be left to the discretion
of the agents to render their his
account more or less frequently
according to the amount of these
transactions: he should be compelled
to render them within the required
period even if no transaction has
taken place in order that that fact
may be brought under the notice of
the Board.
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has so fully developed its own utility.

J.D. Thomson
11 August 1829

P.S.
Your Lordship will readily perceive that
if an annual Statement of Receipt and
Expenditure cannot be made up (under
the new system protected by the
commissioners) until the receipt of
every account from abroad belonging to
that year, the same reasons will prevent
the completion of the quarterly
statements, now so readily furnished by
the system in operation here.

departmental offices is indispensably
required. Two rejected on the ground
of its having been yet untried would
be to introduce an entirely new
principle in the conduct of the public
business which would oppose them
in super bull barrier to all
improvement.
This observation has been made, we
apprehend,
without
due
consideration. Our plan would supply
a statement of this description with
more expedition and great accuracy.
See further remarks on the subject in
the accompanying papers, as well as
a rough sketch of the periodical
statement which might be furnished,
if necessary, every week and be
prepared in a few hours.

(Source: TNA: T 92/153B, pp.9-32)
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APPENDIX 6.7
NAVY OFFICE 29 OCTOBER 1829
LETTER TO THE COMMISSIONERS FOR EXAMINING AND
STATING THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTS REGARDING THEIR
SYSTEM.
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APPENDIX 6.7
Navy Office 29 October 1829
To the Commissioners for examining and stating the public accounts.
Gentlemen,
I am commanded by the Commissioners of the Navy to acquaint you that on
considering the Report you have made in regard to conducting the Accountant
part of the duties of this Department, it appears to them that your proposal goes
to record cash transactions of the establishment in three principal books, viz:
Cash Book, Journal, and Ledger.
Your Cash Book is intended to embrace all the receipts and payments of the
Treasurer, in detail and is intended to be a literal copy of the Cash Book kept by
the Treasurer.
Your Journal is intended to embrace the details of all cash transaction of Subaccountants at home and abroad, and is to comprehend such other entries as
cannot be passed through the Cash Book.
Your Ledger is to be posted from the Cash Book and Journal, the details both to
be transcribed as far as may be practical.
As you state that the heads of service are not to be charged with any bill until it
is actually paid, the Commissioners of the Navy infer that it is your proposal to
discontinue the Bill Registers which are now kept in this office and from which
the entries are made. This is the first point on which the Board request to be
favoured with your sentiments.
2nd. The account of Bills Payable, it appears, is not to be credited as at present
on the acceptance of the bill but on the advice of it. Such a course the Board
apprehend could not be uniformly acted upon, as bills often come in before the
advice of their being drawn is received.
3rd. The cash transactions of Sub-accountants at home are proposed to be
passed weekly and on their receipt they are to be entered in the Journal and
Ledger. But in regard to foreign accounts, the books are not to be closed until
the receipt of every account from abroad for the period to which they relate.
4th. The proposed books unless there be a gross mistake in the ruling and
printing appear to shew an irreconcilable discrepancy. On the Dr. side of the
ledger, a column appears headed "To whom paid" and on the Cr. side, on the
other hand headed "From whom received". Upon the principle of double entry
(of which you appear to have a very high opinion) what is shown as a debit of
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one account, must also appear at the credit of another. Consequently it is
obvious that those columns are totally inapplicable to personal accounts in as
much as accountants are debited with money received, and credited with
money paid. Whereas on the contrary the heads of service are debited with
money paid and credited for money received. It is impossible therefore that the
same form can be suited to both.
5th. The column headed, "For what service" although it may apply to service
accounts, is certainly not applicable to personal accounts, as it is impossible to
ascertain when the money is issued to accountants, for what service it may be
expended .
6th. With regard to the cash book, which is to embrace all payments for "Wages"
as well as "General services" in detail the posting will, if not altogether
impracticable, be found so very laborious that it will be impossible for the clerk
by whom it is to be kept, to spare it for the ledger keeper to make his entries
from.
7th. he cash book of the present system embraces all the bills paid in each day,
in one entry to the credit of bills payable, the heads of service having been
debited there with in the ledger on the issuing of the bills, and as you propose
that the heads of service should not be debited with the amount of a bill until its
liquidation, inasmuch as all bills are looked upon by you as prospective
payments, it appears necessary to point out that in your reply to the protest
made by the third person in your commission, you distinctly state that bills of
exchange receivable and payable, do not properly come under the description
of prospective payments, inasmuch as value must have been received for them
before they were drawn. It is precisely for the reasons stated by you in reply
above quoted that under the present system all bills issued for value received,
are charged at once to the heads of service.
8th. Your recommendation to charge the bills under the dates when returned
paid, instead of the date when issued, it appears irreconcilable with your further
recommendation to debit parties upon receipt of their letters of advice.
9th. With respect to the Journal, strong doubts exist unless it be universal and
can be made to operate as a check on the ledger, whether it may not with great
propriety be dispensed with altogether, as the labour writing up the Journal from
weekly statements of the receipts and disbursements of the accountants at
home, and monthly statements from abroad, will, as well as the cash book,
greatly impede the progress of the ledger, as neither cash book, nor Journal,
embracing such masses of detail entries, can ever be spared for the use of the
ledger keeper as before observed.
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10th. The board cannot be with our apprehension that difficulties must attend the
attempt to carry into effect the proposed system, as far as relates to the cash
book and journal, but stronger doubts operate the difficulties will be more
sensibly felt with regard to the ledger, in which the entries in the cash book and
journal will be combined, and that instead of exhibiting a clear and concise
statement of the accounts, the ledger will, if the posting be found even
impracticable, be rendered truly complex, not to say, obscure, by overwhelming
masses of detail.
11th. It will not be necessary at present to pursue these remarks on the books
themselves any further, there are other arrangements connected with them
which appear to call for observation.
The weekly returns from all home accounts are calculated to occasion a
considerable increase of business in bringing their receipts and payments to
account at such short intervals, not only to this office where they are to be
stated and passed weekly, but also to the accounts themselves, as they will
require nearly as much time in the investigation and statement thereof. The
same inconveniences it is apprehended will be felt in respect of the proposed
monthly accounts from abroad. These accounts were formally rendered
monthly, but it did not infrequently happen that two, three, and even four months
accounts came to hand the same time, and this practice was abandoned from
its obvious inconvenience.
12th. The closing of the books appears also to be unnecessarily deferred, if
you're object be to afford means of preparing an account of the expenditure for
or belonging to, a particular year, such an account can easily be prepared
without keeping the books open. It might with equal propriety be advanced that
every sub accountant should delay the closing of his until every expense of the
yard, all the service on which he is employed for such period as the accounts
embraces has included therein, foreign such a course is adopted, the actual
expenditure for the year could not be obtained.
13th. The propriety of an open balance is very questionable, and in need not be
further dwelt upon them to serve than to observe that to wait till the accounts of
all the subaccounts in distance stations to the close of the year had been
received and examined, could create so much unnecessary delay is to rent in
an account of no value whatever for any practical purpose.
14th. When money is obtained from the commissary at the storekeepers abroad,
it is the practice to post some so obtained, against the accountant on the receipt
of the letter of advice; but to extend this principle to all bills drawn on the board
of consuls, captains, pursers and others would not only double the number of
personal accounts in a ledger, would lead to endless confusion, as many parties
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draw bills of which they never advise the board, and bills are also frequently
presented for acceptance before the letters of advice are received; and it is
presumed therefore that the best and safest way will be to charge the bills after
they have been presented.
15th. It is observed that the objections which you were which against the present
system are reduced to the three following points viz.
1st Blending prospective payments with actual payments;
2nd. Mixing of the transactions of the accountants for one year, with those
of the year succeeding; and
3rd Bills involved in the obscurity incident for the short ledger entry.
To the first objection, it has been remarked, in answer, that unless such a
course be pursued, the liabilities of the establishment must be excluded from
the books. The ledger of a public office, it is conceived should shew not only the
amount of bills which have been paid, but also the amount of those coming in
course of payment; and be observed this course is not only in strict conformity
with the principle universally sanctioned by mercantile experience, but is also
recommended by yourselves, where you propose to make entries of bills
payable upon the receipt of letters of advice.
The second objection has already been noticed.
To the third objection it is observed that the short entry ledger complained of,
was abandoned before you inspected the books, and in the books of the
present year, the details are even more fully given.
16th. the proposition for paying pensions and other periodical allowances, upon
lists instead of bills as at present has long been before the board and is waiting
only the authority of an act of Parliament to be carried into effect.
17th. To the proposition for consolidating the Treasurer’s balances, which
subject was particularly noticed in a paper from the Accountant General of the
Department had submitted to you, and in the Board's letter of the 8th August
1828, it is not concede necessary to make any further allusion.
The foregoing are the observations which it is judged right to submit for your
consideration, and the Board beg to be favoured with your remarks and opinion
thereon.
G. Smith
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APPENDIX 7.1

Excerpt from the
Memorandum on Financial Control put in by the Chancellor of
the Exchequer
to the Select Committee on Public Monies
BPP 1857 Session 2 (279) Appendix 1
In the interval which elapsed between the completion of the Report of the
Commissioners of Public Accounts on the Exchequer in 1831 and the passing
of the Act (4 Will. 4) c. 15, in 1834 by which the old Exchequer was abolished,
and the new department was placed on its present footing, the Government of
Lord Grey had to deal practically with the question of the misappropriation of the
annual grants of Parliament. It was discovered that in the naval department, for
a series of years prior to 1831, systematic misappropriation of the separate
grants made for naval services had from year to year taken place. It is not
necessary here to particularise these irregularities, as they were fully discussed
in the House of Commons at the time; it will be sufficient to state the moneys
voted for specific objects had been systematically applied to other purposes not
sanctioned by Parliament. The question which Lord Grey's Government had to
determine was, what security could be offered to the House of Commons
against recurrence of similar evils: – was the remedy sought in the constitutional
control of the Exchequer? The money supplied for the misappropriations
complained of had been issued by the Exchequer itself, and so far from that
department having the means of preventing them, it was ignorant of the
existence of any irregularity. The Report on the Exchequer was then before the
Government, and the measures for giving effect to the recommendations which
it contained were under consideration. Yet the Government does not appear to
have considered that the check of that department upon misappropriation could
be of the least avail in repressing the irregularities for which a remedy was
required; and the Government was right. To provide a remedy it was necessary
to investigate the causes. These were: – loose estimates, which did not truly
represent the financial requirements of the naval service;- an incomplete
system of accounts, which did not and could not exhibit the naval expenditure
under the heads of the separate grants of Parliament;- a tardy examination of
accounts, which would have delayed the preparation audited returns of
expenditure to a period when they would have been of no practical value; – but,
above all the absence of any returns to the House of Commons upon which
reliance could be placed, showing how far the intention of Parliament had be
complied with in the application of the naval grants.
It was evident that at the root of these defects lay an imperfect system of
accounts. Without correct accounts of past expenditure it was impossible
to prepared correct estimates of future expenditure. In the absence of
correct accounts of current expenditure it was impossible to regulate
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properly the application of the annual grants. Without a complete system
of accounts the arrears of unaudited expenditure could not be kept in
view, and balanced accounts of the naval expenditure compared with the
separate grants could not be prepared for the information of Parliament.
The Commissioners of Accounts, in their Report148 on the Exchequer in
1831, had recommended ”the introduction of the commercial system of
bookkeeping by double entry in its purest and most simple form in all
public departments”, considering its application ”as forming the
necessary groundwork of any really important improvement;” and after
recommending the appointment of the commission annually to examine the
accounts they added, “At the same time that we propose this new security for
the faithful appropriation of the public money, we beg to repeat that the best
security will be obtained in such a system of public accounts as is founded on
the principles we have suggested”. The system recommended was therefore
applied to the whole of the various, complex, and extensive accounts of the
navy; and the results of the naval receipt and expenditure were condensed in a
concise and intelligible balance sheet, the annual estimates were revised, and
all arrears of accounts cleared off. But it was necessary to go one step further to
give permanency to these improvements, and to provide a security for the
presentation to Parliament annually of accounts which should faithfully
represent how far the directions of Parliament had been complied with in the
application of the grants. The Government therefore submitted for the sanction
of Parliament, that the naval accounts should be placed under the supervision
of the Commissioners of Audit, that they should be audited by the
Commissioners as to the appropriation of the grants, and that an annual
account should be laid before the House of Commons, with the certificate of the
audit board as to its accuracy. These provisions were embodied in the Act (2
Will.4) c. 40. The first naval account laid before the House of Commons
pursuance to this Act was for the year 1832 – 33.
In 1846 these regulations were extended to the accounts of the War Office,
Commissariat, and Ordnance, the estimates of these departments having been
previously revised. The Act (9 & 10 Vict.) c. 92, providing for the preparation,
audit, and the presentation to Parliament of annual accounts of the receipt and
expenditure of all the naval and military departments, was passed in that year.
This Act is the authority under which the naval and military accounts are now
prepared.
(Emphasis added) (Source: BPP 1857 Session 2 (279) App.1, pp.31-32)

148

BPP 1831(313)
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A TABULAR VIEW OF THE VARIOUS BOOKS IN WHICH THE NAVAL RECEIPTS AND PAYMENTS ARE RECORDED
_________________________________________________________________________________________________
RECEIPTS
1. Votes of
Parliament

Consisting of 19 Votes, the aggregate amount of which is carried to the Journal and Ledger
from the printed Votes of the House of Common, by debiting the “Exchequer” and crediting
the general account of “Navy Supplies”.

Annual

2. Appropriations
in Aid of the
Votes

Consisting of Old Stores and Extra Receipts brought to account in the preceding year, and
credited on the Estimates of the current year; theses are debited to the “Appropriation in Aid
Account” from the printed estimates of the year and are credited in like manner as the Votes,
to the general account “Navy Supplies”.
________________________

Annual

The Receipts for Old Stores, &c., during the currency of the year, which are not available for
the service of the year, are retained for appropriations on the Estimates of the ensuing year;
they are debited, from the various personal accounts in which they occur, against the parties
receiving such sums, and are credited under detailed heads of receipt. At the close of the year,
they are written off from these detailed heads to the “Appropriation in Aid Account”. When
abated on the Estimates, they are transferred to the account of “Navy Supplies”, as explained
above; thus closing the “Appropriation in Aid Account”.

Monthly

Annual

Dr. Exchequer
Cr. Navy Supplies

Dr. Appropriation Account
Cr. Navy Supplies

Dr. Accountants
Cr. Heads of Receipt
Dr. Heads of Receipt
Cr. Appropriation Account

(Source: BPP 1845(520), p.791)

___________________________________________________________
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A TABULAR VIEW OF THE VARIOUS BOOKS IN WHICH THE NAVAL RECEIPTS AND PAYMENTS ARE RECORDED
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
PAYMENTS
1. Bill
Payments







Store Register (Naval Stores of all kinds)
Victualling ditto (Provisions and Victualling Stores)
Marine ditto (Shore Pay, Clothing, Barrack Stores, &c.)
Miscellaneous ditto (Various Effective Services)
Non-effective ditto (Arrears of Half-pay, Pensions &c.
prior to 1 October 1836)

 Full Pay Register (Officers and Seamen’s Pay)
 Pilotage ditto (Pilotage of His Majesty’s Ships)
 Distressed Seamen ditto (Subsistence and Passage)

Abstracted daily under very detailed heads of
service, and the results, under condensed heads,
carried monthly to the Journal and Ledger
Abstract of Bills
Carried to the Abstract monthly in totals, under
the three heads they represent, and included in
the same entry of the Journal and Ledger as the
above

 Imprest Register, viz.
Paymasters of Marines, Naval, Victualling, and Medical
Storekeepers, Agents &c; Paymasters of Contingencies,
Commission Agents, and other Imprest Accountants,
whose Accounts Current are opened in the principal
Ledger.
Lieutenants in charge of Semaphores, Recruiting
Officers, Royal Marines, Officers, Royal Navy, raising
Men, Consuls &c.
Captains, Pursers, and other Officers afloat

2. Cash
Payments

Payments by Her Majesty’s Paymaster-general in Town

Monthly
Dr. Heads of service &
Imprest Accountants
Cr. Bills payable

Carried in detail direct to the principal books,
and included in the same monthly entry as the
above.

Posted in detail, at the close of every month, to
the accounts of the parties to whom chargeable,
and included in monthly entry, as above

Auxiliary Ledger
No. 1

Ditto

Auxiliary Ledger
No. 2

Consisting of bills paid, payments for Wages on
Ship’s Books, Allotments, Salaries on List, Halfpay and Pensions, also Transfers to the Ports;
these are entered in the Journal and Ledger
monthly, from a “Town Account Abstract Book”,
made up from the Paymaster –general’s Weekly
Return

Monthly
Dr. Bills payable, Heads of
service &c.
Cr. Paymaster-general or
Cash
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3. Payments
by Imprest
Accountants

Payments from Her Majesty’s Paymaster-general at the
Ports

Consisting of bills paid, payments for Wages to
Seamen , Dock-yard Hoys, Artificers, Police,
Teams, Allotments, Salaries and on Lists,, NonEffective Services, and various other Charges;
these are entered in the Journal and Ledger
monthly, from a “Port Account Abstract Book”,
made up from the Monthly ort Returns

First Class: Paymasters of Marines, Agents, Storekeepers,
and other Accountants whose Accounts are in principal
ledger

Consisting of sums chargeable under almost
every head of the estimates; these accounts are
quarterly; they are posted into the Abstract from
day to day, as they are allowed and passed, and
the monthly totals carried to the Journal and
Ledger.

Second Class: Lieutenants in charge of Semaphores,
Recruiting Officers, Officers raising men, Consuls, and
Officers Afloat whose accounts are opened in the
Auxilliary Ledgers

Consisting of Charges for Distressed Seamen,
Pilotage, Semaphores, Recruiting, raising men
for the Fleet, Stores, Provisions &c.; these
accounts are for various periods, and are posted
into the Abstract precisely on the same principle
as those comprised in the First Class.

Monthly
Dr. Bills payable, Heads of
service &c.
Cr. Paymaster-general or
Cash

Abstract of
Accounts, No. 1
Monthly
Dr. Heads of service
Cr. Imprest Accountants
Abstract of
Accounts, No. 2

APPENDIX 7.2(b)
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